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The central banking system has been a worldwide-adopted banking system since 
the 20th century, which influences political and economic structures profoundly in 
different countries to this day. Chinese Mainland is the second biggest economic entity, 
whose economic growth in the last 30 years gets the attention of the world. One hot topic 
is the function of China’s central banking system. But the works for studying the 
establishment of China’s central bank and the monetary thought debate behind the event 
still require further analysis. This thesis explains the establishment of China’s central 
banking system by following the monetary thought debate among Chinese economists, 
politicians, and foreign financial specialists. They provided advice for monetary policy 
from 1927 to 1949.  
This research has the following three main objectives:  
Revise the monetary thought debate from 1927 to 1949 among Chinese 
economists, politicians, and Western financial specialists on how to improve the Chinese 
monetary system and how to build an effective central-banking system during wartime.  
Demonstrate how the establishment of central banking was supported by the 
monetary theories provided in the monetary thought debate.  
Identify which parts of the above monetary thoughts caused the growing and 
enormous price inflation during wartime; discuss whether other thoughts in the debate or 
related financial thoughts were adopted as monetary policies and if they could have 
avoided the economic collapse and Communist occupation in 1949.  
This research uses the two following methodologies:  
Economic history: this thesis uses the methods of economic history (a 
combination of orthodox economic theory, the Austrian school’s view on central banking 
and price inflation, and quantitative methods, paying particular attention to institutional 
factors and the long run) to view the establishment of China’s central bank and the 
monetary debate behind it.  
Extensive use of primary sources located in archives: this thesis uses archives 
to demonstrate the above topics.  
The thesis is structured in three parts. The first part is about China’s general 
economic and political situation (from the 19th century to 1927) (Chapter 1). The second 
part demonstrates the monetary thought debates and silver standard currency reform from 
1927 to 1937 (Chapter 2 to Chapter 4). The third part focuses on central banking and 
wartime (1937-1949) (Chapter 5 to Chapter 6). The contents of each chapter of the thesis 
can be briefly summarized as follows: 
Chapter 1: This chapter reviews China’s general economic and political 
situation from the 19th century to 1927. First, we discuss the comprehensive history of 
China from the Qing Empire—the last Chinese dynasty—to the 1911 Republican Xinhai 
Revolution. The reform of the late Qing Dynasty had contributed mainly to China’s 
progress, especially the modernization of the Chinese economy and opening the Chinese 
market to the entire world. Still, stagnant political reform disappointed the social elite and 
caused the Xinhai Revolution. Since then, China was either in wartime or in Communist 
despotism, except the Nanjing Golden Decade (1927-1937). We argue that if the Qing 
Dynasty successfully implemented all necessary reforms, including banking reform, 
faster before people became angry, China could have been a developed, prosperous, and 
liberal society without authoritarian rule. Furthermore, we also introduce the Austrian 
15 
school’s economic study of free banking institutions in the late 1890s in the Chinese 
southeastern coastal city of Fuzhou. Along with other studies, they revealed that China 
had a long-time history of free banking institutions before the 1920s, which is different 
from the later central banking patterns in China. This chapter also points out that unlike 
the Chinese Communist Party’s official negative opinions on the epoch of the Beiyang 
Government, independent researchers have found some positive elements that happened 
during the Beiyang era. Although some regional wars happened among the warlords, due 
to a pro-laissez-faire economic policy, the domestic economy was still growing, 
especially the industries that were not related to the war. Because of World War I, the 
energy of Western countries was placed on the European battlefield. Hence, there was no 
Western power to intervene in China’s domestic political and economic affairs, which on 
one side, avoided the wars that had happened in the late Qing Dynasty due to poor Sino-
foreign relations. In addition, we also argue that the improving economic situation and 
monetary ideas laid the foundation of the monetary policy debate and led to the 
establishment of China’s first modern central bank since the late 1920s, especially during 
the Nanjing Golden Decade (1927-1937). 
Chapter 2: This chapter is an original synthesis that reviews the biography, 
monetary theories, and reports for China’s central banking institutions of Edwin 
Kemmerer. Most importantly, this chapter also includes our original review of 
Kemmerer’s 1929 reports for the construction of China’s first modern central banking 
experiment. These crucial reports sought to build an effective Chinese central banking 
system based on Edwin Kemmerer’s main theories, such as a central banking system with 
a 100% gold reserve. Kemmerer was an economics professor at Princeton University and 
the world-famous “Money Doctor” who helped build central banks in various countries in 
Latin America, Europe, and Asia.  
One originality of the research in this chapter is that we visited the original 
archives of Kemmerer’s research on China’s economic issues kept by the Hoover 
Institution at Stanford University. To start, we demonstrate the biography of “Money 
Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer and his monetary and gold theories. We not only review his 
general theory on central banking and gold reserves but also provide some commentary 
from a few Austrian economists on Kemmerer’s theory, as they both emphasize the 
function of a gold standard in banking systems. Secondly, we present Kemmerer’s reports 
from 1929 and our commentary on whether his project for China was well planned and 
practicable. We provide a detailed description of Kemmerer’s reports and present the 
critical reports on China’s banking system. Finally, we illustrate our commentary on the 
reports. In addition, the general political and economic background in China from 1927 to 
1937, which were related to Kemmerer’s reports, is presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 3: This chapter reviews Arthur N. Young’s banking thoughts on 
China’s central banking reform from 1927 to 1937. As a member of Kemmerer’s Western 
monetary specialists’ group for China, who also influenced the decision-making of the 
Chinese National Government and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to adopt Western-
style central banking institutions, Young’s reports on his banking thoughts will be mainly 
checked in this chapter.  
One originality of the research in this chapter is that we visited the original 
archive of Young’s research on China’s economic issues kept by the Hoover Institution at 
Stanford University. This chapter also reviews Arthur Young’s biography. As a senior 
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student graduating with a Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University, Young worked 
with “Money Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer and came to China as an essential member of the 
1929 Kemmerer Commission for China to analyze and study China’s currency and 
economic issues, making policy recommendations to the Chinese National Government. 
Kemmerer was his “teacher and colleague” who influenced Young’s economic thoughts. 
Also, we find that Young not only came to China as an international economist proficient 
in Spanish but also visited Latin American countries and Spain to conduct research on the 
economic affairs of these countries. Furthermore, he also visited some European and 
Asian countries such as Poland and Vietnam to help them carry out economic and 
monetary policies. In the later sections, we review Young’s general comments on the 
modernization of Nationalist China and his central banking thoughts from 1927 to 1937. 
Chapter 4: This chapter studies how China established its first modern central 
banking system from 1927 to 1937, filling a gap in the previous international research on 
the entire process of establishing China’s first modern central bank. In Chapter 1, we 
discussed that China had more than two thousand years of free banking, and silver tael 
was used as the main currency standard since the 15th century. However, the three central 
banking reforms that happened in the 1920s and 1930s fundamentally changed the status 
of China’s banking system. China, a country of using traditional and diverse metal 
standards, eventually established its first modern central bank in 1928. In 1933, the 
country abolished the traditional silver tael standard, setting its Silver Dollar standard, 
which was designed by the Sino and Western financial specialists of the National 
Government based one a decade discussion.  
Initially, due to the 1929 gold standard plan proposed by the U.S. financial 
specialist E. W. Kemmerer, the Silver Dollar standard would become a transition between 
the old silver tael standard and the future gold standard. However, due to the fragile 
internal financial condition and the 1934 US Silver Purchase Act, it became impossible 
for China to have sufficient silver to establish its Silver Dollar Standard, not mention the 
gold standard given that China was not a country that produced this scarce metal. Instead, 
from 1934 to 1935, after three rounds of Sino-Western negotiations, China was going to 
implement a fiat money system, Fabi, whose currency value was based on its exchange 
rates of the U.S. dollar and the British pound. The reform was taken in November 1935, 
which ended China’s two-thousand-year history of using metals as currency standards. 
The relatively stable political and economic conditions, along with the global trend of 
establishing a central banking system to strengthen the state power and the national 
financial system, made the birth of China’s first modern central banking system 
inevitable. Based on first-hand references, the monographs of the authoritative scholars, 
and the empirical data, this chapter focuses on the study of the history of the 
establishment of China’s first modern central banking institutions, providing an original, 
in-depth synthesis and analysis of China’s first modern central banking establishment 
process. 
Chapter 5: This chapter analyzes the conditions of China’s first modern central 
banking institutions during the Second Sino-Japanese War. China established its first 
modern central banking in 1928, along with its 1933 silver-standard reform and its 1935 
fiat-currency reform. Due to the 1935 banking reform plan, the Chinese National 
Government would establish a modern central reserve banking system that was planned 
to control the currency issuance fully. However, the outbreak of the Second Sino-
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Japanese War in 1937 delayed the ongoing central banking reform. Based on quantitative 
analysis and original synthesis of archives and previous research, this chapter studies 
China’s central banking institutions during the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945.  
To understand the wartime banking structure in China, it is crucial to review the 
relevant historical backgrounds. This is due to the complicity of the wartime China as the 
country was separated into Free China, Japanese-occupied China (along with Manchukuo) 
and Communist-occupied area. At the beginning of the analysis, this chapter provides the 
political and economic background during the Second Sino-Japanese War, along with an 
analysis of the disappearing local, private, and spontaneously free-banking systems. 
Secondly, this chapter deals with the background of the wartime banking policy. In the 
later sections, we discuss the process of the wartime expansionary monetary policy and 
price inflation and provide an in-depth discussion of the possible causes of the wartime 
price inflation, along with its consequences. 
Chapter 6: This chapter analyzes the conditions and the collapse of China’s first 
modern central banking institutions during the Chinese Civil War. Although China 
established its first modern central bank in 1928, along with its 1933 silver-standard 
reform and its 1935 fiat currency reform, due to the outbreak of the Second Sino-
Japanese War, the banking reform deployed. Because China passed its first 
democratically created Constitution in 1946, becoming the world’s largest democratic 
country at the time, post-WWII China was originally expected to establish a stable 
banking system. However, during the following Chinese Civil War period, not only did 
the central banking experiment fail by massive price inflation and chaotic economic order, 
but the government of the Republic of China was also defeated militarily by the Chinese 
Communist Party.  
This chapter provides a quantitative, qualitative, and synthetic analysis of the 
collapse of China’s first modern central banking system and its price hyperinflation 
during the Chinese Civil War. Based on the above political background, this chapter 
provides a brief description of the Chinese economy during not only the Chinese Civil 
War, but also an in-depth analysis of the process and the reasons why two currency 
systems, the Fabi and the Gold Yuan Notes, collapsed successively during the Civil War. 
This chapter also synthesizes the economic, political, and social consequences of the 
wartime expansionary monetary policy and its price hyperinflation. The massive issuance 
of currency and its subsequent price hyperinflation in response to military expenditures 
later became the most prominent feature of China’s economy during the Civil War. We 
point out that President Chiang Kai-shek and the government of the Republic of China 
must bear the ultimate responsibility for the collapse of the monetary system and price 
hyperinflation as they ignored all the suggestions of the Chinese and foreign economists. 
They opposed the payment of military spending through excessive monetary expansion 
policy.  
An original evaluation of the economic and monetary policy debates during the 
Civil War is provided in this chapter. Furthermore, we also point out that the Marshall 
Plan for China, which arrived lately in 1948, was useless to stabilize the Chinese 
economy and its monetary system. The chapter concludes by pointing out that the 
Chinese Civil War and the collapse of China’s first central banking system have had a 
profound impact on the contemporary cross-strait relationship among the Communist 
Chinese Mainland and the Republic of China on Taiwan since 1949.  
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Conclusion: Finally, in the concluding chapter, we provide some conclusions 





El sistema de banca central ha sido el sistema bancario adoptado en todo el 
mundo desde el siglo XX, influyendo profundamente en las estructuras políticas y 
económicas de muchos países hasta nuestros días. China continental es la segunda 
potencia económica más grande a nivel internacional, cuyo crecimiento económico en los 
últimos 30 años ha llamado la atención en todo el mundo. Un tema candente relacionado 
con China es la función de su sistema de banca central. Sin embargo, los trabajos para 
estudiar la creación del banco central de China y el debate sobre el pensamiento 
monetario detrás de la aparición de dicha institución, aún requieren un análisis más 
detallado. Esta tesis explica el establecimiento del sistema de banca central de China 
siguiendo el debate del pensamiento monetario entre economistas y políticos chinos y 
especialistas financieros extranjeros, que brindaron asesoramiento para la política 
monetaria de 1927 a 1949. 
Esta investigación tiene tres objetivos principales: 
Revisar el debate sobre el pensamiento monetario de 1927 a 1949 entre los 
economistas y políticos chinos y especialistas financieros occidentales sobre cómo 
mejorar el sistema monetario chino y cómo construir un sistema bancario central efectivo 
durante la guerra. 
Demostrar cómo el establecimiento de la banca central se fundamentó en las 
teorías monetarias propuestas en el debate del pensamiento monetario. 
Identificar qué partes de ese pensamiento monetario causaron la creciente y 
enorme inflación durante la guerra y discutir si otros planteamientos del debate o posturas 
financieras relacionadas, de haber sido adoptados como políticas monetarias, podrían 
haber evitado el colapso económico y la ocupación comunista en 1949. 
Esta investigación utiliza dos metodologías: 
Historia económica: esta tesis utiliza los métodos de la historia económica (una 
combinación de teoría económica ortodoxa, la visión de la escuela austriaca sobre la 
banca central y la inflación de precios, y métodos cuantitativos, prestando especial 
atención a los factores institucionales y a largo plazo) para ver el establecimiento del 
banco central de China y el debate monetario que hubo detrás de él. 
Uso extenso de fuentes primarias ubicadas en archivos: esta tesis utiliza 
archivos para demostrar los puntos anteriores. 
La tesis está estructurada en tres partes. La primera parte es sobre la situación 
general económica y politica de China (desde el siglo XIX hasta 1927) (Capítulo 1). La 
segunda parte demuestra los debates de pensamiento monetario y la reforma del patrón 
plata de 1927 a 1937 (Capítulo 2 al Capítulo 4). La tercera parte se centra en la banca 
central y la guerra (1937-1949) (Capítulo 5 al Capítulo 6). El contenido de cada capítulo 
de la tesis se puede resumir brevemente de la siguiente manera: 
Capítulo 1: Este capítulo revisa la situación económica y política general de 
China desde el siglo XIX hasta 1927. Primero, discutimos la historia extensa de China 
desde el Imperio Qing, la última dinastía china, hasta la Revolución Republicana Xinhai 
de 1911. La reforma en los últimos momentos de la dinastía Qing había contribuido 
principalmente al progreso de China, en concreto, con la modernización de la economía 
china y la apertura del mercado chino al mundo entero. Aun así, la estancada reforma 
política decepcionó a la élite social y causó la Revolución Xinhai. Desde entonces, China 
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estuvo en tiempos de guerra o en despotismo comunista, excepto en la Década de Oro de 
Nanjing (1927-1937). Argumentamos que, si la dinastía Qing hubiera implementado con 
éxito todas las reformas necesarias, incluida la reforma bancaria, antes de que la gente se 
enojara, China podría haber sido una sociedad desarrollada, próspera y liberal sin un 
Gobierno autoritario. Además, también presentamos el estudio económico de la escuela 
austriaca sobre las instituciones de banca libre a finales de la década de 1890 en la ciudad 
costera de Fuzhou, en el sureste de China. Junto con otros estudios, revelaron que China 
tenía una larga historia de instituciones de banca libre antes de la década de 1920, que es 
diferente de los patrones posteriores de banca central en China. Este capítulo también 
señala que, a diferencia de las negativas opiniones oficiales del Partido Comunista Chino 
sobre la época del Gobierno de Beiyang, investigadores independientes han encontrado 
algunos elementos positivos que ocurrieron durante la era de Beiyang. Aunque tuvieron 
lugar algunas guerras regionales entre los jefes militares, debido a una política económica 
pro-laissez-faire, la economía nacional todavía estaba creciendo, especialmente las 
industrias que no estaban relacionadas con la guerra. Debido a la Primera Guerra Mundial, 
la energía de los países occidentales se focalizó en el campo de batalla europeo. Por lo 
tanto, no había poder occidental para intervenir en los asuntos políticos y económicos 
internos de China, lo que evitó las guerras que habían sucedido a finales de la dinastía 
Qing debido a las malas relaciones chino-extranjeras. Además, sostenemos que la mejora 
de la situación económica por un lado y las ideas monetarias por otro, sentaron las bases 
del debate de política monetaria y condujeron al establecimiento del primer banco central 
moderno de China desde finales de la década de 1920, especialmente durante la Década 
de Oro de Nanjing (1927-1937). 
Capítulo 2: Este capítulo es una síntesis original que revisa la biografía, las 
teorías monetarias y los informes de instituciones de la banca central china de Edwin 
Kemmerer. Lo más importante de este capítulo es que también incluye nuestra revisión 
original de los informes de Kemmerer de 1929 para la construcción del primer 
experimento moderno de banca central de China. Estos cruciales informes buscaban 
construir un sistema efectivo de banca central china basado en las principales teorías de 
Edwin Kemmerer, como un sistema de banca central con una reserva de oro del 100%. 
Kemmerer fue profesor de economía en la Universidad de Princeton y el famoso “Money 
Doctor” que ayudó a construir bancos centrales en varios países de América Latina, 
Europa y Asia. 
Una originalidad de nuestra investigación en este capítulo es que visitamos los 
archivos originales de la investigación de Kemmerer sobre los problemas económicos de 
China guardados por la Institución Hoover en la Universidad de Stanford. Para comenzar, 
mostramos la biografía de “Money Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer y sus teorías monetarias y 
sobre el oro. No solo revisamos su teoría general sobre la banca central y las reservas de 
oro, sino que también proporcionamos algunos comentarios de algunos economistas 
austriacos sobre la teoría de Kemmerer, ya que todos ellos enfatizan la función de un 
patrón oro en los sistemas bancarios. En segundo lugar, presentamos los informes de 
Kemmerer de 1929 y nuestro comentario sobre si su proyecto para China estaba bien 
planificado y era factible. Proporcionamos también una descripción detallada de los 
informes de Kemmerer y presentamos informes críticos sobre el sistema bancario de 
China. Finalmente, ilustramos nuestro comentario sobre los informes. Además, en este 
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capítulo se presentan los antecedentes políticos y económicos generales de China desde 
1927 hasta 1937, que estaban relacionados con los informes de Kemmerer. 
Capítulo 3: Este capítulo revisa la opinión de Arthur N. Young sobre la reforma 
de la banca central de China de 1927 a 1937. Como miembro del grupo de especialistas 
monetarios occidentales de Kemmerer para China, también influyó en la toma de 
decisiones del Gobierno Nacional Chino y del Generalísimo Chiang Kai-shek para 
adoptar las instituciones de banca central de estilo occidental, los informes de Young 
sobre su pensamiento bancario serán revisados principalmente en este capítulo. 
Este capítulo también repasa la biografía de Arthur Young. Como estudiante 
senior graduado con un PhD. en economía por la Universidad de Princeton, Young 
trabajó con el “Money Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer y llegó a China como miembro esencial 
de la Comisión Kemmerer de 1929 para China para analizar y estudiar los problemas 
económicos y monetarios de China, haciendo recomendaciones de política al Gobierno 
Nacional Chino. Kemmerer fue su “maestro y colega” que influyó en los pensamientos 
económicos de Young. Además, descubrimos que Young no solo vino a China como 
economista internacional con un buen dominio del español, sino que también visitó países 
latinoamericanos y España para realizar investigaciones sobre los asuntos económicos de 
estos países. Además, también visitó algunos países europeos y asiáticos como Polonia y 
Vietnam para ayudarlos a llevar a cabo políticas económicas y monetarias. En las últimas 
posteriores, revisamos los comentarios generales de Young sobre la modernización de la 
China nacionalista y su pensamiento sobre la banca central de 1927 a 1937. 
Capítulo 4: Este capítulo estudia cómo China estableció su primer sistema 
moderno de banca central de 1927 a 1937, llenando un vacío en la investigación 
internacional previa sobre todo el proceso de creación del primer banco central moderno 
de China. En el Capítulo 1, discutimos que China había tenido más de dos mil años de 
banca libre, y como el tael de plata se usó como el principal patrón de divisas desde el 
siglo XV. Sin embargo, las tres reformas de la banca central que ocurrieron en las 
décadas de 1920 y 1930 cambiaron fundamentalmente el estado del sistema bancario de 
China. China, un país que utilizaba diferentes patrones metálicos tradicionales, 
finalmente estableció su primer banco central moderno en 1928. En 1933, el país abolió 
el patrón tradicional de tael de plata, estableciendo su estándar de dólar de plata, que fue 
diseñado por especialistas financieros de China y Occidente del Gobierno nacional, 
basándose en una discusión de una década sobre asuntos monetarios. 
Inicialmente, debido al plan estándar de oro de 1929 propuesto por E. W. 
Kemmerer, especialista financiero de EE. UU., el estándar del dólar de plata pasaría a ser 
una transición entre el antiguo patrón plata y el futuro patrón oro. Sin embargo, debido a 
la frágil situación financiera interna y la Ley de Compra de Plata de los Estados Unidos 
de 1934, fue imposible para China tener suficiente plata para establecer su Estándar del 
Dólar de Plata, sin hacer referencia al patrón oro puesto que China no era un país que 
produjera este escaso metal. En cambio, de 1934 a 1935, después de tres rondas de 
negociaciones sino-occidentales, China iba a implementar un sistema de dinero fiduciario, 
Fabi, cuyo valor monetario se basaba en sus tipos de cambio con el dólar estadounidense 
y la libra esterlina. La reforma fue adoptada en noviembre de 1935, lo que puso fin a los 
dos mil años de historia de China con el uso de metales como estándares monetarios. Las 
condiciones políticas y económicas relativamente estables, junto con la tendencia global 
de establecer un sistema de banca central para fortalecer el poder estatal y el sistema 
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financiero nacional, hicieron inevitable el nacimiento del primer sistema moderno de 
banca central de China. Basado en referencias de primera mano, las monografías de 
estudiosos autorizados y en datos empíricos, este capítulo se centra en el estudio de la 
historia del establecimiento de las primeras instituciones modernas de banca central de 
China, proporcionando una síntesis y análisis originales y en profundidad del primer 
proceso moderno de establecimiento de la banca central china. 
Capítulo 5: Este capítulo analiza las condiciones de las primeras instituciones 
modernas de banca central de China durante la Segunda Guerra Sino-Japonesa. China 
estableció su primera banca central moderna en 1928, junto con su reforma del patrón 
plata de 1933 y la reforma de la moneda fiduciaria de 1935. Debido al plan de reforma 
bancaria de 1935, el Gobierno nacional chino establecería un moderno sistema central de 
reservas bancarias que estaba pensado para controlar completamente la emisión de 
divisas. Sin embargo, el estallido de la Segunda Guerra Sino-Japonesa en 1937, retrasó la 
reforma de la banca central que estaba en curso. Basado en un análisis cuantitativo y en la 
síntesis original de archivos e investigaciones previas, este capítulo estudia las 
instituciones del sistema de banca central de China durante la Segunda Guerra Sino-
Japonesa (1937-1945). 
Para comprender la organización bancaria de China en tiempos de guerra, es 
crucial revisar algunos antecedentes históricos relevantes. Esto se debe a la complejidad 
de China en tiempos de guerra, ya que el país se separó en la China Libre, la China 
ocupada por los japoneses (junto con Manchukuo) y el área ocupada por los comunistas. 
Al comienzo del análisis, este capítulo proporciona los antecedentes políticos y 
económicos durante la Segunda Guerra Sino-Japonesa, junto con un análisis de la 
desaparición de los sistemas de banca libre locales, privados y espontáneos. En segundo 
lugar, este capítulo trata sobre los antecedentes de la política bancaria en tiempos de 
guerra. En las secciones posteriores, discutimos los procesos de la política monetaria 
expansiva en tiempos de guerra y la inflación de precios, y brindamos una discusión en 
profundidad de las posibles causas de la inflación de precios durante la guerra, junto con 
sus consecuencias. 
Capítulo 6: Este capítulo analiza las condiciones y el colapso de las primeras 
instituciones modernas de banca central de China durante la Guerra Civil China. Aunque 
China estableció su primer banco central moderno en 1928, junto con su reforma del 
patrón plata de 1933 y su reforma de la moneda fiduciaria de 1935, como consecuencia 
del estallido de la Segunda Guerra Sino-Japonesa, la reforma bancaria se implementó. 
Debido a que China aprobó su primera Constitución democráticamente creada en 1946, 
convirtiéndose en el país democrático más grande del mundo en ese momento, 
originalmente se esperaba que la China posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial 
estableciera un sistema bancario estable. Sin embargo, durante el siguiente período de la 
Guerra Civil China, el experimento de la banca central no solo fracasó por la inflación 
masiva de precios y el caótico orden económico, sino que el Gobierno de la República de 
China también fue derrotado militarmente por el Partido Comunista Chino. 
Este capítulo proporciona un análisis cuantitativo, cualitativo y sintético del 
colapso del primer sistema moderno de banca central de China y su hiperinflación de 
precios durante la Guerra Civil China. Basado en el contexto político anterior, este 
capítulo proporciona una breve descripción de la economía china durante la Guerra Civil 
China, pero también un análisis en profundidad del proceso y las razones por las cuales 
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dos sistemas monetarios, el Fabi y el Gold Yuan Notes, colapsaron sucesivamente 
durante la Guerra Civil. Este capítulo también sintetiza las consecuencias económicas, 
políticas y sociales de la política monetaria expansiva durante la guerra y su 
hiperinflación de precios. La emisión masiva de divisas y la posterior hiperinflación de 
precios en respuesta a los gastos militares, más tarde se convirtió en la característica más 
destacada de la economía de China durante la Guerra Civil. Señalamos que el presidente 
Chiang Kai-shek y el Gobierno de la República de China debían asumir la 
responsabilidad final del colapso del sistema monetario y la hiperinflación de precios, ya 
que ignoraron todas las sugerencias de los economistas chinos y extranjeros. Se opusieron 
al pago del gasto militar, a través de una política de expansión monetaria excesiva. 
En este capítulo se proporciona una evaluación original de los debates de 
política económica y monetaria durante la Guerra Civil. Además, también señalamos que 
el Plan Marshall para China, que llegó en 1948, fue inútil para estabilizar la economía 
china y su sistema monetario. El capítulo concluye señalando que la Guerra Civil China y 
el colapso del primer sistema de banca central de China han tenido un profundo impacto 
en la relación contemporánea del Estrecho entre la China continental comunista y la 
República de China en Taiwán desde 1949. 
Conclusión: Finalmente, en el capítulo final, proporcionamos algunas 
conclusiones y sugerimos extensiones para futuras investigaciones. 
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Introduction 
This introductory chapter presents the general characteristics of the doctoral 
thesis. It begins by exposing the research background that led to the choice of the topic to 
investigate. Then it explains the objectives pursued and the methodology with which the 
thesis has been carried out. Finally, it argues the structure with which the content has 
been organized according to the research questions that the thesis faces. 
Research Background 
The central banking system has been a worldwide-adopted banking system since 
the 20th century, which influences political and economic structures profoundly in 
different countries to this day. Chinese Mainland is the second biggest economic entity, 
whose economic growth in the last 30 years gets the attention of the world. One hot topic 
is the function of China’s central banking system. But the works for studying the 
establishment of China’s central bank and the monetary thought debate behind the event 
still require further analysis. This thesis explains the establishment of China’s central 
banking system by following the monetary thought debate among Chinese economists, 
politicians, and foreign financial specialists. They provided advice for monetary policy 
from 1927 to 1949.  
The Review of Chinese Monetary and Banking History. The reason that gives 
us the incentive to research this topic is because of our review on Chinese financial and 
banking history (K. Chang, 1958; Chou, 1963/1969; Tamagna, 1942; Rawski, 1989; 
Hong, 2008; J. X. Zhang, 2001). Before the establishment of the Chinese National 
Government in 1927, both the private sector and the government shared legal rights to do 
mintage. Meanwhile, China had less governmental regulation in monetary issues (J. Zhu, 
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2012). Silver, as a rare metal, was recognized as the primary currency standard in China 
(J. Zhu, 2012; Rawski, 1993; Friedman, 1992) long throughout Chinese history.  
However, as the institutions in China rapidly changed during the late 1800s and 
the early 1900s, everything related to the Chinese banking system gradually changed 
according to the following reasons; (D. Ma, 2016; Shiroyama, 2008; Hong, 2008; K. 
Chang, 1958): 1) the popularity of central banking systems in the early 20th century all 
around the world; 2) the price fluctuations caused by the global economic situation and 
the unstable political and economic situation in China (Rawski, 1989); 3) the necessity of  
National Government for building a central banking system to consolidate its political 
power (Ji, 2003); and 4) wars among the National Government, the Japanese, and the 
Communists in Chinese territory (Boyle, 1972; Chassin, 1966).  
Due to these reasons, the following things happened during the transformation 
from the free banking system to central banking: 1) the issuance of money was gradually 
monopolized by central banking before 1935 (D. Ma, 2016); 2) the establishment of 
China’s first central bank in 1928; 3) the emergence of the central banking silver standard 
in 1933 (J. Dai, 2005); 4) the appearance of fiat money Fabi (⌅ᒓ) in 1935 (Du, 2014), 
which was the first central banking paper currency system; and 5) the short and hurried 
appearance of Gold Yuan in 1948 (䠁ൃࡨ), which was the National Government’s last 
currency system in Mainland China (J. Zhu, 2012). Meanwhile, as the National 
Government was using the issuance of paper currency fighting in the war, the disaster of 
expansionary monetary policy and price inflation was happening from 1937 to 1949 (K. 
Chang, 1958), which almost destroyed the enormous Chinese economy, especially 
causing the establishment of Chinese Communist rule in 1949. Behind the establishment 
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of China’s central bank, the big and enthusiastic monetary thought debate (1927-1937) 
was discussed amongst both Chinese and Western specialists, which was about how to 
solve China’s political and economic crisis by building an excellent central banking 
system (J. Du, 2014; J. Zhu 2012; Hong, 2008; Shiroyama, 2008; J. Dai, 2005; J. X. 
Zhang, 2001).  
The Review of Edwin W. Kemmerer and Arthur N. Young’s Theories on 
the Chinese Central Banking System. During the big debate, some Western monetary 
specialists like Edwin W. Kemmerer and Arthur N. Young provided direct policy advice 
on China’s banking system (A. Young, 1936, 1963, 1965, 1971). Especially E. W. 
Kemmerer, who also participated in the establishment of central banking in many Latin 
American countries, played a significant role in solving the Chinese question (Kemmerer, 
1944/2011; Kemmerer Commission 1929a, 1929b). As the politicians in National 
Government directly got advice from both Chinese and Western monetary specialists, 
illustrating the relationship between policymaking and the monetary thought debate is 
very important to see the general picture in that epoch. The thesis systematically 
researches the new Chinese-born central banking system by following the monetary 
debate and making a connection between Chinese and global central-banking movements.  
The Review of President Chiang Kai-shek’s Position on Banking 
Institutions, Along with the Banking Proposals of the Republic of China’s Founding 
Father Sun Yat-sen. As the leader of the National Government, Chiang Kai-shek’s 
understanding of the currency system played a decisive role in the final decision of the 
National Government (J. Zhang, 2001, p. 1158; ACPBC, 1991, pp. 181-182). Though 
Chiang did not have sufficient economic knowledge, he firmly believed that the issuance 
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of banknotes through the central banking system and the abolition of metal currencies 
such as gold and silver were the trends in social evolution. He also legitimized his 
proposal by claiming that the monetary revolution he was managing was also advocated 
by Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China.  
However, Chiang’s claim was not precisely what Sun Yat-sen proposed. Though 
Sun did not offer any systematic theory of establishing the modern central banking 
institution, he still argued that it was necessary to issue banknotes to solve the financial 
shortage of the National Government, but that the banknote reserves do not necessarily 
have to be 100%. While on the contrary, our research finds that Chiang never showed any 
keen interest in supporting a 100% reserve banking system. From the analysis of the 
Chapters 5 and Chapter 6, we see that Chiang Kai-shek’s vague currency concept had 
buried an indefinite bomb for his next series of erroneous currency decisions. 
The Review of Monetary Theories of Economists and Politicians Soong Tse-
ven and Kung Hsiang-hsi. As the most important economic policy advisors and 
politicians of Chiang, Soong Tse-ven and Kung Hsiang-hsi also played essential roles in 
the formulation of the National Government’s monetary policy (J. Wu, 1992; Kuo & Lin, 
2006, J. Zhang, 2001, pp. 1104-1106). However, as an economist who once studied at 
Harvard University and Columbia University in the United States, Soong, who had the 
economic theory and international vision, obviously did not agree with Chiang Kai-
shek’s thinking in currency policy. On the issue of monetary policy, T. V. Soong, like 
Chiang Kai-shek, advocated that China needed a unified national monetary system and 
the introduction of a Western modern central banking system. As for how to establish the 
institution of the central bank, Soong did not have a clear answer initially, but gradually 
28 
evolved his monetary thought according to the development of the economic and political 
situation and the suggestions of other economists. The most significant difference 
between Soong Tse-ven and Chiang Kai-shek’s monetary policy is that Soong opposed 
the expansionary monetary policy and price inflation, advocating limiting currency 
issuance to curb price inflation. It is worth mentioning that Soong’s 100% reserve 
proposal and the 100% gold-standard reserve plan proposed by Edwin K. Kemmerer in 
1929 complemented each other. Soong also supported Kemmerer’s plan at that time. In 
fiscal policy, he also advocated austerity for budgetary policy, opposing the government’s 
use of large amounts of expenditure for military spending. Because the government’s 
final decision-maker was Chiang Kai-shek, although Soong theoretically fought price 
inflation policy, he was unable to act upon his convictions. Instead, he was forced to help 
the Chinese government sort out as much as possible the fiscal and monetary policies 
with the development of the economic situation and Chiang Kai-shek’s policy thinking. 
Generally speaking, Soong Tse-ven was a Milton Friedman-like monetarist and a laissez-
faire financial scholar and politician. From the understanding of the gold standard and 
100% reserve, perhaps Soong may be the most libertarian among the financial 
policymakers of the National Government.  
Like Chiang Kai-shek and Soong Tse-ven, Kung also considered that the fiat 
money reform of the National Government inherited Sun Yat-sen’s monetary thinking (S. 
Wang, 2006; J. X. Zhang, 2001, p. 1160; Zhuo, 1986, p. 435). After 1933, Kung became 
Chiang’s most crucial financial assistant instead of Soong. Unlike Soong, although 
Kung’s point of view acquiesced in his understanding of supporting a 100% silver reserve, 
he also endorsed a fiat money policy with fractional reserves, which is contradictory. 
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Kung did not have a clear monetary theory and indulged Chiang Kai-shek’s policy on 
currency abuse in practice. Therefore, Kung Hsiang-hsi was utterly different from Soong 
Tse-ven’s tight fiscal and monetary policies practically, though he himself theoretically 
was against expansionary monetary policy and price inflation.  
The Review of Monetary Theories of Other Chinese Economists and Their 
Laissez-faire Proposals. Before and during the currency reform around 1935, other 
economists also put forward their opinions and suggestions on China’s currency banking 
system and currency standard, though their voices did not directly affect China’s currency 
reform as the monetary ideas and policies of Chiang Kai-shek, Soong Tse-ven, and Kung 
Hsiang-hsi. The opinions and suggestions of these economists on monetary policy were 
mainly divided into three groups. The first group of scholars supported various forms of 
the silver standard, the second group of scholars supports multiple forms of physical 
articles standard, and the third group of scholars were radicals in supporting the policy of 
non-exchangeable banknotes (J. X. Zhang, 2001; Ye, B. Li & Zhong, 2003). It is 
regrettable that in the literature we have found so far, no scholars of the Golden Decade 
(1927-1937) were supporting the idea of returning to the traditional free banking silver 
standard or were influenced by the Austrian school supporting the modern school’s 
position on the free banking system.  
It is worth mentioning that, among the above scholars, Yao Qingsan 
systematically introduced the monetary theories of Western scholars from the ones who 
supported gold standard (i.e., G. Cassel, J. Kitchin, G. F. Warren, and F. A. Pearson), the 
ones who supported to stabilize price levels (i.e., I. Fisher, A. Salter, P. Einzig, H. 
Strakosch, and D. H. Robertson), and the Keynesian monetary theories (Yao, 1935a, 
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1935b, 1935c, 1938). Especially, Yao Qingsan was probably the first Chinese economist 
during the Mainland period of the Republic of China who systematically introduced the 
Austrian School of Economics’ monetary theories into China. In Trends in Modern 
Currency Thoughts and World Currency Systems, Yao introduced F. V. Weisser, J. G. K. 
Wicksell, F. A. Hayek, and L. von Mises’ business cycle theories.  
During the Civil War, economic scientists and intellectuals provided sufficient 
and diverse opinions on how to construct China’s economic and monetary system. 
Among them, Soong Tse-ven and Arthur N. Young were the representatives of the 
economists who were in the level of policymaking that can directly influence the 
decision-making of President Chiang Kai-shek; they were in favor of relatively free trade, 
and free exchange policy that they believed was positive for the Chinese economy, and 
they were firmly against the expansionary monetary policy along with its consequence of 
price (hyper)inflation (RCLHNCC, 1985). They suggested the postwar ROC government 
should adopt a more self-disciplined monetary policy, arguing that this policy would be 
good for post-war economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. They strongly opposed 
uncontrolled military spending and advocated stabilizing the economic and financial 
order through fiscal austerity and other methods. From the previous chapters of the thesis, 
we have already known that Soong Tse-ven and Arthur N. Young had a consistent view 
of supporting fiscal and monetary tightening policies, even after the late 1920s. They did 
not contradict themselves.  
Apart from them, economist Yang Peixin was in favor of a more laissez-faire 
and a more profound perspective, who not only supported the above policy views that 
Soong Tse-ven and Arthur N. Young held, but even proposed the complete abolition of 
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state-owned enterprises and any other kind of government.  He did this by demonstrating 
the danger of government economic intervention and regulation through his down-to-
earth empirical observation of the real situation of the Chinese economy and the 
economic life of the Chinese people with sound and systematic argumentation. 
Furthermore, Yang Peixin also perceived that a sound economic policy alone 
was not enough for China’s post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction (P. Yang, 1946, 
1948). For him, constitutional democracy was also essential to establish a healthy and 
positive postwar economy. Therefore, his perspective was not just from the limited 
version of policymaking, but also considers the more profound question of building an 
excellent institution in a macro and long-term perspective.  
We also reviewed the theories of other scholars, such as Wu Chi-yuen, who 
advocated a market economy with a certain degree of government economic intervention 
on China’s economy and monetary system (i.e., just prices and a certain degree of 
governmental industrial and international trade regulations) (C. Y. Wu, 1946a, 1946b; S. 
Fang 1945/1947). None of them agree that the government can deal with the Civil War’s 
military expenditures using indiscriminate monetary expansion. They were also very 
critical of the danger of price inflation and its harm caused by an extremely expansionary 
monetary policy.  
Unfortunately, none of the above views were adopted by President Chiang Kai-
shek, who was the final political decision-maker and who had little knowledge of 
economic theories. Therefore, it was no wonder why George Marshall, who had come to 
China from 1946 to 1947 to regulate the conflicts between the Chinese government and 
the Communist Party and ultimately failed later, became pessimistic about the future of 
32 
the Republic of China during the ongoing Chinse Civil War. Although these scholars did 
not propose a free banking theory similar to the Austrian School of economics, if their 
proposals against inflation were adopted, they might have been enough to stop the 
collapse of the Republic of China’s financial system before 1949. 
The Review of the Austrian School Economists’ Views on Edwin Kemmerer 
and His Theory of Gold Standard. We also find that the Austrian school economists, 
who are in a strong position of supporting the gold standard, free banking, and criticizing 
price inflation, also studied Edwin Kemmerer’s monetary theories and provided their 
perspectives on central banking and its price inflation. Selgin (1992) demonstrated 
Foochow’s free banking system, which provided more evidence on the Chinese banking 
system before 1927. Edwin Kemmerer (1944/2011; Kemmerer Commission, 1929a, 
1929b; J. Zhu, 2012) brought the central banking theories from the United States, directly 
submitting a monetary reform report to top politicians and economists in National 
Government and influenced the conception of central banking in their minds.  
Selgin also criticized the theory of gold-standard central banking-system 
proposal by Kemmerer and his companions, both theoretically and historically (Selgin, 
1988, 2015a, 2015b). He suggested a free-banking system without the regulation of 
deposit reserve. Fundamentally, Selgin claimed that the proposal of establishing a gold-
standard central-banking system was theoretically wrong. For Selgin, it is the private-law 
which made the gold standard possible and credible, not the governmental law (Selgin, 
2015b, p. 261). The commitments attached by sovereign immunity do not and cannot 
execute private sanctions if the banks break their promises, which will make the 
commitments to maintain a gold parity impossible and not credible. Moreover, central 
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banks can use their monopolized power to devalue currency without punishment. They 
can even benefit by doing this manipulation and can also make the currency holder of 
central banks afraid of the devaluation of currency. A gold standard based on the central 
banking system would be finally tempted by speculative attacks (Selgin, 2015b, p. 261).  
For the gold and monetary theories of Edwin Kemmerer, Selgin claimed that 
historically, there was no relationship between the pre-WWI gold standard and 
manipulation from the central banking system (Selgin, 2015a, p. 17; 2015b, p. 261). Thus, 
Kemmerer was wrong in the historical evidence of the pre-war gold standard issues. For 
Selgin, it was the war that broke and ended the previous gold standard. Therefore, the 
development of central banking in the post-war era made it impossible to maintain the 
gold standard according to Selgin’s theory, which we demonstrated in the last paragraph. 
In this sense, the efforts of Kemmerer and his companions for establishing a stable gold-
standard central-banking system would not work. Selgin also believed that in the post-
war era, the intention of the establishment of central banking was not only to re-establish 
a gold standard but more to re-establish a durable system of fixed exchange rates.  
In Selgin’s view, it was precisely Kemmerer’s support for the establishment of 
the U.S. Federal Reserve that caused the collapse of the traditional gold standard (Selgin, 
2015b, p. 261). For Selgin, the conventional gold standard that relied on the free banking 
system was destroyed by the Fed’s central banking system. Thus, from Selgin’s 
perspective, Kemmerer himself clearly should bear some responsibility for the 
disappearance of the traditional gold standard. 
Selgin also criticized that historically the post-war central banking system was a 
tragedy that avoided the price fluctuation of neither inflation nor deflation. But with the 
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faith of the gold-standard central-banking system, Kemmerer and his companions went to 
different countries to propose the idea of the gold standard central banking system. 
Therefore, although Selgin did not fully agree with Kemmerer’s currency theory, he still 
affirmed Kemmerer’s efforts to return to the traditional gold standard (Selgin, 2015a, p. 
17).  
The contemporary Austrian School economist Joseph Salerno studied 
Kemmerer’s contribution to the definition of monetary supply and business arbitrage, the 
definition of inflation, and the gold standard (Salerno, 2010, p. 129, p. 342, p. 424). For 
the Bretton Woods system, Salerno pointed out that Edwin Kemmerer, along with 
another two American economists, Benjamin Anderson and Melchior Palyi, were all 
against the Bretton Woods agreement. The economists advocated a return to the prewar 
gold standard (Salerno, 1985/1992). As we have demonstrated, before the establishment 
of the Bretton Woods system, Kemmerer actively criticized the fiat money-based 
monetary system through a newspaper article, monograph, and the U.S. congressional 
hearing. However, he did not participate in the conference in Bretton Woods. Not to 
mention that the conference did not accepted his opinion in the Keynesian-dominated 
meeting.  
Furthermore, Salerno also reviewed Kemmerer’s contribution to the relationship 
between the price fluctuation and gold.1 Salerno agreed with Kemmerer that with the 
significance of the scarcity and durability of gold, the stability of the money supply 
would be realized. For Salerno, whether in the empirical sense, gold is scarce or not will 
not influence its characteristics of scarcity and durability (Salerno, 2010, p. 344). Besides, 
Salerno agreed with Kemmerer that as gold is scare and durable, a considerable reduction 
1 See Salerno (2010, pp. 343-345). 
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or increase in the cost of gold production will not cause the fluctuation in the annual 
supply of gold-based money.  
The Review of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory on How Central 
Banking Credit Expansion and Monetary Inflation Cause Price Inflation and 
Distort the Economy. Mises (1912/2009, 1949/1998), Hayek (1931/1935), Huerta de 
Soto (1998/2008), Rothbard (1962/2009, pp. 755-874, 1963/2008, pp. 3-81), and Salerno 
(2010) provide the version of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) on how 
central banking credit expansion and monetary inflation cause price inflation and distort 
the economy. The economists of the Austrian school argue that the unlimited issuance of 
central banking banknotes can cause price inflation or price hyperinflation, making the 
prices of consumption goods higher than the purchasing power that the consumers have, 
as the salaries of the consumers are fixed due to their labor contracts or the growth rate of 
the wages of the consumers are slower than the growth rate of the general prices. Among 
the aforementioned Austrian economists, Mises (1912/2009) firstly provided the 
analytical framework that we have demonstrated in this paragraph, who also argues that 
the destructed purchasing power of the banknotes that the consumers hold de facto cause 
the gap between the rich and the poor, as the people who first receive the central banking 
credit can provide product or consume without facing an inflating price that the latter 
consumers have to face (Mises, 1949/1998). We initially apply Mises’s theory of how 
central banking credit distorts the economic process in the institutional analysis of the 
causes and process of the price hyperinflation of Fabi and Gold Yuan Notes, causing 
price inflation. Mises’s argument will also be applied to argue the consequences of the 
monetary and price hyperinflation of Fabi and Gold Yuan Notes. 
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Based on the analytical framework of Mises, Hayek focused on how an artificially 
lowered interested rate and cheap bank credit distort the industrial production process. It 
is argued that after the central banking system issues more bank credit and banknotes, the 
producers who first received the bank credit would use it to initiate their production, 
which distorts the original production structures. This Hayekian theory is later sublimed 
in the ABCT of Huerta de Soto (1998/2006) that the cheap central banking credit distorts 
entrepreneurship as the entrepreneurs no longer produce in the same way before 
monetary inflation. As the Austrian school argues that entrepreneurship is the driving 
force of the market economy (Mises, 1949/1998, p. 249), entrepreneurs that receive 
cheap credit through cronyism are defined as destructive entrepreneurship (Foss and 
Klein, 2002). Though in the analysis of the wartime central banking situation, it is not 
necessary both theoretically and empirically to have a lower interest rate, the Hayekian 
theory of how monetary and price inflation triggered by the central banks can still be 
applied to analyze how this type of increase distorts the production process and 
entrepreneurship. We innovatively use the aforementioned Austrian theory of production 
and entrepreneurship to demonstrate the consequences of monetary and price 
hyperinflation of Fabi and Gold Yuan Notes, along with the criticism of the relevant 
monetary theories of the wartime Chinese economists. 
For solving the problem of economic crises and the negative consequences 
triggered by monetary and price inflation, the tradition of the economic thoughts of the 
Austrian school Gold proposes a 100% reserve gold standard. Mises (1912/2009) firstly 
argued that a 100% reserve gold standard could restrain the monetary issuance in a free 
banking system. Hayek (1937b) argued that a 100% reserve gold standard could possibly 
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stabilize the price level, which would in turn make the economy more stable. Based on 
the aforementioned theories of Mises and Hayek, Huerta de Soto (1998/2006) 
emphasized the separation of the deposit contract (a 100% reserve system) and the credit 
contract. Besides, Bagus (2010-2012) also furnished us with an Austrian view on the 
empirical analysis of the monetary crisis of the contemporary Euros, which provides us 
an insight of offering an Austrian-based analysis on the Chinese Civil War time monetary 
institutions. 
The Review of the Austrians on Central Banking and Wars. Mises (1949/1998, 
p. 439), Huerta de Soto (1998/2006, pp. 758-760), and Salerno (2010, pp. 237-265) 
provided an Austrian view on how the government uses a central banking system and its 
monetary inflation to support its wars causing price inflation and distorting the economy. 
They argued that wars could be avoided if the governments do not have central banks as 
the mechanics to inflate the monetary supply to support the war, proposing that a 100% 
gold reserve-based free banking system can avoid the government manipulation on 
currency issues and the wars. Mises (1919/2006, p. 110-146) also provided an empirical-
theoretical study of how Nazi Germany inflated its monetary system to support its 
expenses during World War II. 
The argumentations of Mises on the economic and social consequences of central 
banking credit expansion provide us another theoretical foundation and hypothesis to 
analyze hyperinflation during the Chinese Civil War. Mises (1978/2002, pp. 102-103) 
argued that the increasing prices (that result from the credit expansion) would 
permanently cause the redistribution of income and wealth due to the “the uneven timing 
of the price changes of the variety of goods and services” (p. 102). Salerno (2010, p. 206) 
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summarized Mises’s viewpoint as “every change in the quantity of money leaves 
indelible imprints on the relative-price structure and therefore on the pattern of wealth 
and income distribution.” Yet, the Misesian arguments only emphasize the economic and 
social consequences of the central bank credit expansion.  
Review of Hayek’s Comments on Monetary Nationalism in the 1930s. In his 
Monetary Nationalism and International Stability (1937b), Hayek provided us his views 
on the gold standard and monetary nationalism. Theoretically and technically, Hayek was 
against monetary nationalism, arguing that any kind of attempt to implement an isolated 
national monetary standard will face its failure, even if this system is based on the gold 
standard. He assumed that any kind of monetary inflation would cause capital flights if 
the ratio of the newly issued banknotes to bank deposits has changed due to monetary 
inflation. Thus, further, Hayek also argued that even if one country implements a gold 
standard, if that country has a monetary inflation policy, then capital flights will be 
inevitable given that international trade is not blocked. Therefore, a national monetary 
system with the gold standard would also face failure. However, Hayek still proposes the 
possibility of establishing an international gold standard to avoid the price fluctuation and 
the negative effects that it brings to the production process even though he also admitted 
that his proposal is probably “utopian” (Hayek, 1937b, p. 93). One of his doubts on his 
own proposal is his review of the failure of the British Currency School in the 19th 
century. 
Hayek also provided us the background for the reason that globally different states 
in the 1930s wanted to establish a central banking system based on the classical gold 
standard system that the British Currency School proposed. It was that these states 
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wanted to have a stable currency system to avoid economic and price fluctuation. The 
same economic thought trend was also happening in the 1920s and 1930s China (see 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). Moreover, as China was in a severe situation as a result of the 
Civil War from 1945 to 1949, the debate on how to establish a useful and effective 
national central banking system was continuing during the Civil War. Hayek’s 
monograph provided us a more global insight to understand the trend of Chinese 
monetary nationalism during the Civil War was connected to the monetary thought 
debates in the 1920s and 1930s, both in China and outside the country.  
The Review of Other Academic Contributions. Other academic contributions 
related to the thesis that have been made are the following, which benefit this research. 
Fairbank (1980, 1983, 1988), Second Historical Archives of China (1994), Adviser 
Chamber of People’s Bank of China (1986, 1991), Qian (1984), and G. Wu (1958) 
described Chinese economic and financial history, which provided particular and 
authoritative historical materials on monetary and banking data and evidence. Borg (1964) 
and K. Chang (1958) described the Sino-American economic relations, by which the 
establishment of the Chinese central banking structure was influenced a lot. D. Ma (2016) 
also explicitly reviewed how the institutional reasons affected the banking system in 
China from the Qing Dynasty in the late 1800s to the National Government in the 1920s. 
J. Zhu (2012) illustrated the general monetary history from 1927 to 1949 in China but 
didn’t mention the monetary thought debate very much. J. X. Zhang (2001) recorded the 
monetary thought debate among Chinese economists but didn’t specifically follow the 
change of monetary policies through the discussion. Du (2014) and Ji (2003) recorded 
how the interaction between the National Government and the Shanghainese bankers 
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happened when the banking system was facing reform. In addition, other academic 
literature related to Chinese monetary history also provided many historical files (see the 
references below). Based on the review of Sánchez Asiaín (2012) and the above 
references, we find that Francesco Franco, who was also a nationalist political leader, 
stopped Spain’s price inflation by listening to financial experts during the Spanish Civil 
War (1936-1939). On the contrary, Chiang Kai-shek did not take  the advice of financial 
experts led by T. V. Soong on curbing the vicious increase in prices by reducing currency 
issuance and controlling military spending during the Chinese Civil War, which 
ultimately led to the collapse of the Republic of China’s economy in the Civil War and 
indirectly caused the Chinese Communist Party’s occupation of mainland China. 
Research Objects 
This research has the following three main objectives:  
Revise the monetary thought debate from 1927 to 1949 among Chinese 
economists, politicians, and Western financial specialists on how to improve the Chinese 
monetary system and how to build an effective central-banking system during wartime.  
Demonstrate how the establishment of central banking was supported by the 
monetary theories provided in the monetary thought debate.  
Identify which parts of the above monetary thoughts caused the growing and 
enormous price inflation during wartime; discuss whether other thoughts in the debate or 
related financial thoughts were adopted as monetary policies and if they could have 
avoided the economic collapse and Communist occupation in 1949.  
Research Methodologies 
This research uses the two following methodologies:  
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Economic history: this thesis uses the methods of economic history (a 
combination of orthodox economic theory, the Austrian school’s view on central banking 
and price inflation, and quantitative methods, paying particular attention to institutional 
factors and the long run) to view the establishment of China’s central bank and the 
monetary debate behind it.  
Extensive use of primary sources located in archives: this thesis uses archives 
to demonstrate the above topics. The main archives being used in this thesis are found in 
the following location: the library of Bank of Spain in Madrid, Spain; the library of 
Fudan University in Shanghai, China; the library of Shanghai University of Finance and 
Economics in Shanghai, China; E. W. Kemmerer’s papers at the library of Princeton 
University in New Jersey, United States; A. N. Young’s papers at the library of Stanford 
University in Stanford (archives are initially from Hoover Institution), United States; 
Cato Institute in Washington DC, United States; personal collections from Prof. Dr. 
Jiaming Zhu.  
The Contents of Each Chapter 
The thesis is structured in three parts. The first part is about China’s general 
economic and banking situation (1912-1927) (Chapter 1). The second part demonstrates 
the monetary thought debates and silver standard currency reform from 1927 to 1937 
(Chapter 2 to Chapter 4). The third part focuses on central banking and wartime (1937-
1949) (Chapter 5 to Chapter 6). The contents of each chapter of the thesis can be briefly 
summarized as follows: 
Chapter 1: This chapter reviews China’s general economic and political situation 
from the 19th century to 1927. First, we discuss the comprehensive history of China from 
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the Qing Empire—the last Chinese dynasty—to the 1911 Republican Xinhai Revolution. 
The reform of the late Qing Dynasty had contributed mainly to China’s progress, 
especially the modernization of the Chinese economy and opening the Chinese market to 
the entire world. Still, stagnant political reform disappointed the social elite and caused 
the Xinhai Revolution. Since then, China was either in wartime or in Communist 
despotism, except the Nanjing Golden Decade (1927-1937). We argue that if the Qing 
Dynasty successfully implemented all necessary reforms, including banking reform, 
faster before people became angry, China could have been a developed, prosperous, and 
liberal society without authoritarian rule. Furthermore, we also introduce the Austrian 
school’s economic study of free banking institutions in the late 1890s in the Chinese 
southeastern coastal city of Fuzhou. Along with other studies, they revealed that China 
had a long-time history of free banking institutions before the 1920s, which is different 
from the later central banking patterns in China. This chapter also points out that unlike 
the Chinese Communist Party’s official negative opinions on the epoch of the Beiyang 
Government, independent researchers have found some positive elements that happened 
during the Beiyang era. Although some regional wars happened among the warlords, due 
to a pro-laissez-faire economic policy, the domestic economy was still growing, 
especially the industries that were not related to the war. Because of World War I, the 
energy of Western countries was placed on the European battlefield. Hence, there was no 
Western power to intervene in China’s domestic political and economic affairs, which on 
one side, avoided the wars that had happened in the late Qing Dynasty due to poor Sino-
foreign relations. In addition, we also argue that the improving economic situation and 
monetary ideas laid the foundation of the monetary policy debate and led to the 
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establishment of China’s first modern central bank since the late 1920s, especially during 
the Nanjing Golden Decade (1927-1937). 
Chapter 2: This chapter is an original synthesis that reviews the biography, 
monetary theories, and reports for China’s central banking institutions of Edwin 
Kemmerer. Most importantly, this chapter also includes our original review of 
Kemmerer’s 1929 reports for the construction of China’s first modern central banking 
experiment. These crucial reports sought to build an effective Chinese central banking 
system based on Edwin Kemmerer’s main theories, such as a central banking system with 
a 100% gold reserve. Kemmerer was an economics professor at Princeton University and 
the world-famous “Money Doctor” who helped build central banks in various countries in 
Latin America, Europe, and Asia.  
One originality of the research in this chapter is that we visited the original 
archives of Kemmerer’s research on China’s economic issues kept by the Hoover 
Institution at Stanford University. To start, we demonstrate the biography of “Money 
Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer and his monetary and gold theories. We not only review his 
general theory on central banking and gold reserves but also provide some commentary 
from a few Austrian economists on Kemmerer’s theory, as they both emphasized the 
function of a gold standard in banking systems. Secondly, we present Kemmerer’s reports 
from 1929 and our commentary on whether his project for China was well planned and 
practicable. We provide a detailed description of Kemmerer’s reports and present the 
critical reports on China’s banking system. Finally, we illustrate our commentary on the 
reports. In addition, the general political and economic background in China from 1927 to 
1937, which were related to Kemmerer’s reports, is presented in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3: This chapter reviews Arthur N. Young’s banking thoughts on 
China’s central banking reform from 1927 to 1937. As a member of Kemmerer’s Western 
monetary specialists’ group for China, who also influenced the decision-making of the 
Chinese National Government and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to adopt Western-
style central banking institutions, Young’s reports on his banking thoughts will be mainly 
checked in this chapter.  
One originality of the research in this chapter is that we visited the original 
archive of Young’s research on China’s economic issues kept by the Hoover Institution at 
Stanford University. This chapter also reviews Arthur Young’s biography. As a senior 
student graduating with a Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University, Young worked 
with “Money Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer and came to China as an essential member of the 
1929 Kemmerer Commission for China to analyze and study China’s currency and 
economic issues, making policy recommendations to the Chinese National Government. 
Kemmerer was his “teacher and colleague” who influenced Young’s economic thoughts. 
Also, we find that Young not only came to China as an international student proficient in 
Spanish but also visited Latin American countries and Spain to conduct research on the 
economic affairs of these countries. Furthermore, he also visited some European and 
Asian countries such as Poland and Vietnam to help them carry out economic and 
monetary policies. In the later sections, we review Young’s general comments on the 
modernization of Nationalist China and his central banking thoughts from 1927 to 1937. 
Chapter 4: This chapter studies how China established its first modern central 
banking system from 1927 to 1937, filling a gap in the previous international research on 
the entire process of establishing China’s first modern central bank. In Chapter 1, we 
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discussed that China had more than two thousand years of free banking, and silver tael 
was used as the main currency standard since the 15th century. However, the three central 
banking reforms that happened in the 1920s and 1930s fundamentally changed the status 
of China’s banking system. China, a country of using traditional and diverse metal 
standards, eventually established its first modern central bank in 1928. In 1933, the 
country abolished the traditional silver tael standard, setting its Silver Dollar standard, 
which was designed by the Sino and Western financial specialists of the National 
Government based one a decade discussion.  
Initially, due to the 1929 gold standard plan proposed by the U.S. financial 
specialist E. W. Kemmerer, the Silver Dollar standard would become a transition between 
the old silver tael standard and the future gold standard. However, due to the fragile 
internal financial condition and the 1934 US Silver Purchase Act, it became impossible 
for China to have sufficient silver to establish its Silver Dollar Standard, not mention the 
gold standard given that China was not a country that produced this scarce metal. Instead, 
from 1934 to 1935, after three rounds of Sino-Western negotiations, China was going to 
implement a fiat money system, Fabi, whose currency value was based on its exchange 
rates of the U.S. dollar and the British pound. The reform was taken in November 1935, 
which ended China’s two-thousand-year history of using metals as currency standards. 
The relatively stable political and economic conditions, along with the global trend of 
establishing a central banking system to strengthen the state power and the national 
financial system, made the birth of China’s first modern central banking system 
inevitable. Based on first-hand references, the monographs of the authoritative scholars, 
and the empirical data, this chapter focuses on the study of the history of the 
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establishment of China’s first modern central banking institutions, providing an original, 
in-depth synthesis and analysis of China’s first modern central banking establishment 
process. 
Chapter 5: This chapter analyzes the conditions of China’s first modern central 
banking institutions during the Second Sino-Japanese War. China established its first 
modern central banking in 1928, along with its 1933 silver-standard reform and its 1935 
fiat-currency reform. Due to the 1935 banking reform plan, the Chinese National 
Government would establish a modern central reserve banking system that was planned 
to control the currency issuance fully. However, the outbreak of the Second Sino-
Japanese War in 1937 delayed the ongoing central banking reform. Based on quantitative 
analysis and original synthesis of archives and previous research, this chapter studies 
China’s central banking institutions during the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945.   
To understand the wartime banking structure in China, it is crucial to review the 
relevant historical backgrounds. This is due to the complicity of the wartime China as the 
country was separated into Free China, Japanese-occupied China (along with Manchukuo) 
and Communist-occupied area. At the beginning of the analysis, this chapter provides the 
political and economic background during the Second Sino-Japanese War, along with an 
analysis of the disappearing local, private, and spontaneously free-banking systems. 
Secondly, this chapter deals with the background of the wartime banking policy. In the 
later sections, we discuss the process of the wartime expansionary monetary policy and 
price inflation and provide an in-depth discussion of the possible causes of the wartime 
price inflation, along with its consequences. 
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Chapter 6: This chapter analyzes the conditions and the collapse of China’s first 
modern central banking institutions during the Chinese Civil War. Although China 
established its first modern central bank in 1928, along with its 1933 silver-standard 
reform and its 1935 fiat currency reform, due to the outbreak of the Second Sino-
Japanese War, the banking reform deployed. Because China passed its first 
democratically created Constitution in 1946, becoming the world’s largest democratic 
country at the time, post-WWII China was originally expected to establish a stable 
banking system. However, during the following Chinese Civil War period, not only did 
the central banking experiment fail by massive price inflation and chaotic economic order, 
but the government of the Republic of China was also defeated militarily by the Chinese 
Communist Party.  
This chapter provides a quantitative, qualitative, and synthetic analysis of the 
collapse of China’s first modern central banking system and its price hyperinflation 
during the Chinese Civil War. Based on the above political background, this chapter 
provides a brief description of the Chinese economy during not only the Chinese Civil 
War, but also an in-depth analysis of the process and the reasons why two currency 
systems, the Fabi and the Gold Yuan Notes, collapsed successively during the Civil War. 
This chapter also synthesizes the economic, political, and social consequences of the 
wartime expansionary monetary policy and its price hyperinflation. The massive issuance 
of currency and its subsequent price hyperinflation in response to military expenditures 
later became the most prominent feature of China’s economy during the Civil War. We 
point out that President Chiang Kai-shek and the government of the Republic of China 
must bear the ultimate responsibility for the collapse of the monetary system and price 
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hyperinflation as they ignored all the suggestions of the Chinese and foreign economists. 
They opposed the payment of military spending through excessive monetary expansion 
policy.  
An original evaluation of the economic and monetary policy debates during the 
Civil War is provided in this chapter. Furthermore, we also point out that the Marshall 
Plan for China, which arrived lately in 1948, was useless to stabilize the Chinese 
economy and its monetary system. The chapter concludes by pointing out that the 
Chinese Civil War and the collapse of China’s first central banking system have had a 
profound impact on the contemporary cross-strait relationship among the Communist 
Chinese Mainland and the Republic of China on Taiwan since 1949.  
Conclusion: Finally, in the concluding chapter, we provide some conclusions 
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Chapter 1  
China’s General Economic and Political Situation from the 19th Century to 1927 
Abstract: This chapter reviews China’s general economic and political situation from the 
19th century to 1927. First, we review the comprehensive history of China from the Qing 
Empire—the last Chinese dynasty—to the 1911 Republican Xinhai Revolution. The 
reform of the late Qing Dynasty had contributed mainly to China’s progress, especially 
the modernization of the Chinese economy and opening the Chinese market to the entire 
world. Still, stagnant political reform disappointed the social elite and caused the Xinhai 
Revolution. Since then, China was either in wartime or in Communist despotism, except 
the Nanjing Golden Decade (1927-1937). We argue that if the Qing Dynasty successfully 
implemented all necessary reforms, including banking reform, faster before people 
became angry, China could have been a developed, prosperous, and liberal society 
without authoritarian rule. Furthermore, we also introduce the Austrian school’s 
economic study of free banking institutions in the late 1890s in the Chinese southeastern 
coastal city of Fuzhou. Along with other studies, they revealed that China had a long-time 
history of free banking institutions before the 1920s, which is different from the later 
central banking patterns in China. This chapter also points out that unlike the Chinese 
Communist Party’s official negative opinions on the epoch of the Beiyang Government, 
the independent researchers have found some positive elements that happened during the 
Beiyang era. Although some regional wars happened among the warlords, due to a pro-
laissez-faire economic policy, the domestic economy was still growing, especially the 
industries that were not related to the war. Because of World War I, the energy of 
Western countries was placed on the European battlefield. Hence, there was no Western 
power to intervene in China’s domestic political and economic affairs, which on one side, 
avoided the wars that had happened in the late Qing Dynasty due to poor Sino-foreign 
relations. In addition, we also argue that the improving economic situation and monetary 
ideas laid the foundation of the monetary policy debate and led to the establishment of 
China’s first modern central bank since the late 1920s, especially during the Nanjing 
Golden Decade (1927-1937). 
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To understand why China established the first modern central bank in 1928, we 
have to understand the related background in banking, economics, politics, and associated 
international events, especially in the period of Westernization and colonization from the 
1840s to the 1920s. This thesis is to study the process of the establishment of China’s first 
central bank in 1928. Still, to understand why China established the central banking 
system, it is necessary to review the historical, political, and economic backgrounds of 
China in the 19th century. It is also necessary to discuss whether or not China’s reform 
and modernization in the 19th century benefitted the later development of China’s 
economy and the central banking reform in the early 20th century. 
This chapter reviews the critical political and economic events that happened 
from the 19th century to the 1920s under Western influence. Section 1.2 provides the 
general political and economic situation of the late Qing Dynasty (1800-1912) before the 
establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1912. We mainly review how the Qing 
Dynasty reformed its political and economic situation and the causes of the Republican 
Xinhai Revolution in 1911. Furthermore, we also introduce the Austrian school’s 
economic study of free banking institutions in the late 1890s in the Chinese southeastern 
coastal city, Fuzhou. Along with other studies, they revealed that China had a long 
history of free banking institutions before the 1920s, which is different from the later 
central banking patterns in China. Section 1.3 examines the general political and 
economic conditions under the warlord time in the early years of ROC (1912-1927). 
Unlike the official negative opinions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the 
epoch of the Beiyang Government, the independent researchers have found some positive 
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elements that happened during the Beiyang era. Their arguments are provided in this 
section. In addition, banking and currency reforms in both the late Qing Dynasty and the 
early period of the ROC will be demonstrated. Section 1.4 is the conclusion. 
1.2 From the Chinese Empire to the 1911 Republican Revolution 
This section reviews the history of the 19th century Chinese Empire to the 1911 
Republican Xinhai Revolution. Subsection 1.2.1 is about the late Qing Dynasty before 
1840. Subsection 1.2.2 demonstrates the Opium Wars and the beginning of the Qing’s 
modernization reform. Subsection 1.2.3 reviews the Late Qing Reform and the 1911 
Xinhai Revolution. 
1.2.1 The Late Qing Dynasty before 1840 
Until 1820, China was still the biggest economy in the world.2 It seemed that 
China was still a very prosperous country, but trade bans and ideological control made 
the disparity between the Western countries and China become deeper and deeper.3 In 
1689, 45 years later after the Manchu people’s Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) started ruling 
China, John Locke published his famous Two Treatises of Government, studying the 
importance of the protection of private rights and the principle of limited government.4 
Meanwhile, China’s economy was still recovering from the war between the Ming 
Dynasty and the Qing Dynasty in 1644.5 Industry and commerce suffered a lot from the 
war, especially the most important economic center on the southern side of the Yangzi 
River. During the rule of Emperor Kangxi (1654-1722), the Literary Inquisition made it 
2 See Maddison (1996) and K. Deng (2016). 
3 See G. Deng (1997). 
4 See John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (1689). 
5 See Kishimoto-Nakayama (1984, pp. 227-256) and Twitchett & Fairbank (2002). 
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almost impossible to produce new thoughts in social science. 6 In 1776, Adam Smith 
published his famous The Wealth of Nations, who systematically studied economic 
science.7 
After that, in Western society, different economic and banking thoughts started 
developing prosperously, but China almost produced nothing. It was not sufficient to say 
that it was only the Literary Inquisition that brought the lack of economic thoughts. The 
sea ban and trade ban from 1655 to 1840 would possibly be another important reason 
why China did not have any progress on economic views.8 Not only material goods from 
the Western countries were banned during the majority of that period, but also the 
philosophy and thoughts of the West. The Chinese elites never had the opportunity to 
learn from Western social scientists like John Locke and Adam Smith in that epoch. 
Without new thoughts, it was impossible to reform any political and economic 
institutions. The whole political and economic system was running in the old way.9 The 
banking system in the Qing Empire, like in other dynasties, was a mix between central 
banking and free banking. Both the official and private money houses could issue silver, 
silver tael, and other metals as currency, which are called Multiple Metal Standard.10 
6 The Literary Inquisition is written as “᮷ᆇ⥴” in Chinese. For the references of the Literary Inquisition, 
see B. Zhang & Y. Zhang (2010, p. 10) and Wakeman Jr (1998, pp. 167-189). 
7 See A. Smith (1776). Before Adam Smith, the Spanish scholastics of the Salamanca School, such as Juan 
de Mariana, Diego de Covarubias, Xoan de Lugo, Martín de Azpilcueta, etc., were discussing the subjective 
character of value and the role of the entrepreneur in economic development. Thus, some pointed out that 
economic science already started its development before Adam Smith. For the related studies, see Juan de 
Mariana and the Spanish scholastics (Huerta de Soto, 2009/2010, pp. 204-210), New light on the prehistory 
of the theory of banking and the School of Salamanca (Huerta de Soto, 2009/2010, pp. 211-228), and La 
escuela española de economía (Fernández Álvarez, 2017). 
8 See Flynn and Giraldez (1995, pp. 429-448). The ban is trade ban. Since the late 17th century, the Qing 
Dynasty forbade imports, exports by not allowing any shipping doing business with foreigners through the 
seas. For more references, see Flynn & Giraldez (1995) and Brook (1988, pp.177-196). 
9 See J. Zhu (2012). 
10 The private money houses are also called the local banks, which are written as “䥒㦺” in Chinese. Silver 
tael is written as “䢰ޙ” in Chinese. the Multiple Metal Standard is written as “ཊݳᵜսࡦ” in Chinese. 
For the reference of the Multiple Metal Standard, see and N. Zhang (2007), Von Glahn (1996), and J. Zhu 
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Price inflation controlled through economic growth was very slow.11 Different currencies 
were circulating in different areas in China.12 This situation looked like a natural status 
by many Chinese historians. Still, we have to doubt that if China did not have a sea ban, 
if the Western-style modern banking system was introduced spontaneously, the Multiple 
Metal Standard could still exist at that time as a trade barrier. 
1.2.2 The Opium Wars and the Beginning of Qing’s Reform 
The Opium War in 1840 broke the natural status of the old Chinese political and 
economic system.13 The Qing Dynasty was beaten by the United Kingdom in the war and 
was forced to open some trade ports for international commerce. It should have been a 
good chance for the Qing Dynasty to reform its political and economic system at that 
time. Still, the Qing Regime did not pay attention to improving the institutions and 
delayed the reform again.14 
Because of famine in the countryside of southern China and the disappointment 
with the defeat of the Qing court, the angry peasants started their uprising in 1851. The 
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Movement (1851-1864) swept through almost the whole of 
southern China.15 This peasant uprising opened the prelude to the decline of the Qing 
Dynasty. The economy of the Qing Dynasty was destroyed severely. The price of gold, 
silver, and jewelry suddenly started fluctuating in the market because of the fear of 
people, which accelerated price inflation. The price of silver reached its peak in 1854, and 
(2012). 
11 See J. H. Zhang & G. Li (2008, p. 12). 
12 See N. Zhang (2007) and J. Zhu (2012). 
13 For more references of the Opium War, See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980), Lovell (2015), Fay (2000), Holt 
(1964), N. Zhang (2007), and J. Zhu (2012). 
14 See Lovell (2011) and Fay (2000). 
15 See Spence (1996) and Reilly (2011). 
56 
                                                                                                                                                 
the international economic exchange was destroyed.16 The Jiangnan area, which is one of 
the core economic centers of China around the Yangzi River near the Eastern China Sea, 
was eradicated.17 The loss of money, withered agriculture, and business made it hard for 
people to buy products as usual, which also promoted price inflation.18 In 1861, when the 
Qing Dynasty almost finished putting down the Taiping Rebellion, the Qing Empire 
started the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895), aiming to introduce Western 
technology, factories, military industries, and educational systems to revitalize the 
country.19 The Self-Strengthening Movement brought China a result of many Western 
and modern institutions. The modern postal system, Western-style educational system, 
Western-style army, railway, industries (shipbuilding industry, iron factory, textile 
industry, etc.) and banking system were gradually being introduced into China. Science, 
technology, ideologies, and religion from the Western society also entered China. 
Especially the introduction of republican and constitutional thoughts buried the seeds of 
the republican revolution in the early 20th century. The spirit of the business contract was 
also being introduced into China in the Self-Strengthening Movement. Many Western 
commercial banks were opened during that period. As a consequence, the Western 
banking system hit the traditional Multiple Metal Standard and banking institutions.20 
During the Self-Strengthening Movement, the Qing dynasty was trying to build 
a modern navy to strengthen the national defense. Unfortunately, the modernized Beiyang 
16 See J. Zhu (2012), Spence (1996), and Reilly (2011). 
17 Jiangnan Area is written as “⊏ইൠ॰” in Chinese. 
18 See Spence (1996), Reilly (2011), and J. Zhu (2012). 
19  The Self-Strengthening Movement is written as “㠚ᕧ䙻अ” or “⌻उ䙻अ” in Chinese. For the 
references of the Self-Strengthening Movement, see Kennedy (1974, pp. 3-35) and Hsü (1970, p. 484). 
20 See J. Zhu (2012) and N. Zhang (2007). 
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Fleet was defeated by the Japanese navy in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).21 
According to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Qing Empire lost many territories, including 
ceding Taiwan Island to Japan, and had to compensate for Japan a total of over 
276,000,000 troy ounces (8,600 ton) silver.22 The defeat shocked the whole of China, as 
top politicians and people thought that after almost a 30-year self-reform, the prosperity 
of the Qing Empire would be more robust than before, at least the strength of Qing would 
be the same as Japan. 23  The Japanese were also having their own Westernization 
movement, the 1868 Meiji Revolution.24 
On the contrary to the Qing Dynasty, after the Meiji Revolution, Japan gradually 
opened its market internationally, established monarchy constitutional government, and a 
modern central banking system. Compared to Japan, the Qing Dynasty did not produce 
any profund systematic reform like the Meiji Revolution. 25  The Qing Empire was 
defeated by the Japanese, which exposed the real weakness of the Qing Empire all around 
the world. 
The Chinese Communist Party regime’s official version of Chinese history 
usually claims the defeat of the First Sino-Japanese War made the Self-Strengthening 
Movement become a failure.26 However, to what degree can we say that the Movement 
per se was a failure? If we measure that the successful introduction of institutions of 
science, technology, industry, education, and finance from the Western countries, and the 
spread of Western thoughts in philosophy and social science, it would be more accurate 
21 For more about the Beiyang Fleet (े⌻㢖䲺), see Fairbank & K. Liu (1980), Rawlinson (1967), Hsü 
(1970), and Y. He (2007). 
22 For The Treaty of Shimonoseki (俜䰌ọ㌴), see Hurst (1972) and Kerr (1974). 
23 See Fairbank (1978), Rawlinson (1967), Hsü (1970), and Y. He (2007). 
24 For more about the Meiji Revolution, see Gordon (2003, pp. 61-137). 
25 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980) and Paine (2005). 
26 See Z. J. Chen & Jiang (2001), D. Hu & J. Song (2006), S. Zheng (2007), Z. X. Liu (1986), and S. Lv 
(1997). 
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to say that the Self-Strengthening Movement was successful. Without the successful 
introduction of the Western and modern banking system, it would have been impossible 
for Chinese people to have the chance to talk about whether they needed a modern central 
banking system or not in the 1920s. The 1920s modern banking system in China was 
based on the banking system in the late 1800s. At least, we can say that the Self-
Strengthening Movement was successful in introducing the Western-modern banking 
system in the late 1800s as the first step of banking reform. 
Nevertheless, as the defeat of the First Sino-Japanese War exposed the weakness 
of the Qing Empire, it was urgent for the top politicians of Qing to reform the system. 
The Hundred Days’ Reform was an experiment. 27 After the First Sino-Japanese War, 
leading politicians and intellectuals were arguing if the reform of the Self-Strengthening 
Movement was not sufficient in changing the fundamental political and economic 
institutions. Thus, at the suggestion of the aides, in 1898, Emperor Guangxu started trying 
to reform the whole political and economic system. In the educational part, modern 
universities, Western-style primary and secondary schools were established, including the 
private ones. Science, politics, economics, and mathematics were introduced into the new 
educational system instead of the traditional study of an eight-legged essay. 28 In the 
military part, the reform aimed to adopt the Western military system, which laid the 
foundations for military modernization in the 20th century. In a political aspect, the 
newspaper ban was canceled. The proposal of making a constitution was put on the list in 
the reform, before China was in an absolute monarchy. In the economic part, the reform 
encouraged both the state and private sectors to establish factories and industries, 
27 For the references of the Hundred Days’ Reform (ᠺᠼ䆺⌅), see Kwong (2000) and P. Ho (1951). 
28 The eight-legged essay is written as “ޛ㛑᮷” in Chinese. 
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encouraging people to do business. Still, it did not involve any systematic banking and 
currency reform. 
Almost all the programs of the reform started in less than three months. Thus, 
the intense reform caused a strong rebound in the top conservative politicians. On 
September 21, Empress Dowager Cixi launched a coup, arrested Emperor Guangxu, and 
abolished the 103-day reform. The only remaining result of the reform was the famous 
Peking University. 
The social crisis continued to spread after the Hundred Days’ Reform was 
abolished. Because of natural disasters like floods, drought, locusts and plagues, and 
conflict between Chinese and westerners, the Boxers, a peasant movement, killed many 
western missionaries. 29 The murder of German Plenipotentiary Clemens von Ketteler 
(1853-1900) by the Boxer Rebellion was the fuse of the war between the Qing Dynasty 
and the Eight-Nation Alliance, which was made of 8 western countries including Japan. 
The Eight-Nation Alliance finally defeated the Qing Dynasty. According to the Boxer 
Protocol (1901), Qing should pay 450 million taels of fine silver as the compensation to 
the Eight-Nation Alliance. The war reparations and other spending on restoring the 
economy after frequent wars against rebellions and western countries became an intense 
burden on the Qing Dynasty. After 1899, Qing Empire owed an external debt of £55 
million, which was equivalent to three years of China’s fiscal revenue at that time.30 The 
Chinese people’s complaint and the spread of the republican revolution made the Qing 
court gradually lose the heart of people. The reigning Empress Dowager Cixi and top 
29 For the Boxer Rebellion, see Preston (2000), Bickers & Tiedemann (2007), and Clements (1915). 
30 See J. Zhu (2012). 
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politicians finally realized that if they did not restore the previous reform, their regime 
would be forced to step down soon. 
1.2.3 The Late Qing Reform and the 1911 Xinhai Republican Revolution 
In 1901, Empress Dowager Cixi started the Late Qing Reform (1901-1911).31 
The new reform not only restored the suspended programs of the Hundred Days’ Reform 
but also created a more profound reform in broad aspects of politics, society, and 
economy. The Principles of the Constitution was made in 1908.32 During that period, the 
Conference Board in both central and provincial governments were established.33 Torture 
and collective punishment were suspended instead of the Western personal responsibility 
system, independent judicial system and responsible cabinet system were under 
construction. The imperial examination, which was run for more than 1,300 years in 
China, was also abolished instead of the Western educational system.34 The well-known 
military general Yuan Shikai trained the modern Western-style army in Tianjin. 
One of the most significant reforms in this period was economic reform.35 In 
1906, the Ministry of Finance started to be responsible for the central government’s fiscal 
revenue and expenditure. Before that time, different ministries were managing their own 
budget. After a few years of preparation, the Qing Dynasty finally made its first modern 
tax system and governmental and budget in 1910, which was also the first modern 
governmental budget in Chinese history. The regime also encouraged the construction of 
the railway. From 1900 to 1905, 1843.2 km of railways were built. The Chinese investors 
31 The Late Qing Reform is written as “␵ᵛᯠ᭯” in Chinese. For the references of the Late Qing Reform, 
see Reynolds (1993), Karl & Zarrow (2002), Judge (1996), Fewsmith (1983), and T. M. L. Lee (1998). 
32 The Principles of the Constitution is written as “Ⅽᇊ២⌅བྷ㏡” in Chinese. 
33 The Conference Board is written as “䄞䆠ᴳ” in Chinese. 
34 The imperial examination as written as “、㠹㘳䂖” in Chinese. 
35 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980) and J. Zhu (2013). 
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created only 201 km of it and foreign shares partly constructed the rest of the railway 
lines. The Qing Government also urged and encouraged people to do business in 
agriculture and industry. Some apartments were established to be a response to that issue. 
In addition, the Qing Dynasty finally started its first systematic banking and 
currency reforms. 36  As markets and business were developing faster than before, 
authorities finally decided to abolish the Multiple Metal Standard in favor of adopting 
any other single monetary standard. After several discussions of which kind of currency 
system was better and should be accepted, in 1910, the court finally decided to adopt the 
silver dollar standard instead of the silver tael standard as the official currency unit.37 In 
1905, the Bank of the Ministry of Revenue established and started to issue paper 
money.38 This establishment was the first time that China tried to develop a central bank. 
Although silver coins that were based on the silver tael standard were still circulating, as 
the central banking framework was established, sooner or later China would have a 
simple currency unit. However, as the majority of members of the first modern 
responsible cabinet in 1911 were royal family relatives, the elites who were in favor of 
the constitutional monarchy felt that the court cheated them.39 
At the same time, free banking was developing in a southeastern coastal city, 
Fuzhou, in China. Economist George Selgin provided a thorough study of the free 
banking institution in Fuzhou in the late 1890s. He said, 
Though not free from shortcomings Foochow’s free banking system— an 
example of complete laissez-faire in paper currency and banking— can be 
36 See N. Zhang (2007) and J. Zhu (2013). 
37 The silver dollar is written as “䢰ݳ” in Chinese separately. 
38 The Bank of the Ministry of Revenue is written as “ᡦ䜘䢰㹼” in Chinese. 
39 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980), (Wǀ & Schiffrin (1994), Harrison (2000), and Mitter (2011). 
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judged to have been largely beneficial. Real, it was based on an archaic copper-
cash system, with a confusing array of units of account. However, the local 
banks themselves were mainly a source of order, convenience, efficiency and 
stability. Their currency was widely preferred to cash, and it provided a superior 
unit of account. Native banks were an important source of loanable funds, and 
there is no evidence that they behaved recklessly. On the contrary: by all 
accounts the local banks of Foochow were among the most reputable ever to 
have operated in all of Chinese history. There were few losses to noteholders 
from local bank failures, and only smaller banks were vulnerable to runs (which 
were in any case encouraged by an unusual approach to unlimited liability). […] 
On the whole, local banks performed better than Chinese government banks 
either before or after the free-banking era. In China as elsewhere, decentralized 
currency supply was abandoned, not because of any inherent shortcomings of 
competitive note issue, but largely because the government wanted to improve 
its ability to borrow from particular banks. 
[…] The case of Foochow supplies further evidence that free banking is neither 
inherently unstable nor inferior in practice to centralized banking. It was, 
moreover, only one of numerous instances of free banking in China—of which 
many were more important and quite possibly more successful. (Selgin, 1992) 
Hence, China had both central banking and free banking institutions at that time. Due to 
Selgin’s study, the free banking system was working efficiently in the coastal city of 
Fuzhou. China’s free banking system was serving for many regional and national 
financial issues until it gradually disappeared due to the 1920s monetary reform. 
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The Railway Protection Movement that was against the nationalization of 
private railways triggered the 1911 Xinhai Republican Revolution. In 1911, the Qing 
Dynasty dissipated and their own soldiers became republicans who had accepted modern 
and western military training. Thus, all banking reforms ceased because of the Xinhai 
Revolution.40 On January 1, 1912, Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese Nationalist Party 
(also called Kuomintang or KMT), was sworn in as the first Provisional President of the 
Republic of China and became the father of the Republic of China. The Republic of 
China was the early constitutional republic in Asia, and its establishment also marked the 
complete end of the monarchy in China for more than 2,000 years. 
1.3 From the Warlord Era to Nationalist China 
In this section, we review Chinese history from the Beiyang warlord era (1912-
1928). Subsection 1.3.1 reviews the establishment of the Republic of China and its early 
currency reforms. Subsection 1.3.2 demonstrates the general situation of the Beiyang 
Government and the warlord era. Subsection 1.3.3 is about the New Culture Movement 
and the introduction of Communism. 
1.3.1 The Establishment of the Republic of China and Its Early Currency Reforms 
Just like the stories that happened in other countries, the end of the Qing 
Dynasty did not bring China a peaceful and stable society, but chaos and wars. It is clear 
that when there is a power vacuum that all political groups would like to try to fill the 
political vacancy. After the death of President Yuan Shikai in 1916, China entered a 
warlord era. This period is also called the Beiyang era, as the Beiyang Army reigned for 
the majority of  that epoch.41 The Beiyang Army and the Nationalist Army that were 
40 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980), (Wǀ & Schiffrin (1994), Harrison (2000), and Mitter (2011). 
41 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980), Harrison 2000, and Strauss (1997). 
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controlled by the Chinese Nationalist Party and other forces were fighting against each 
other in some periods and areas in China. As this civil war was not carried out nationwide 
the whole time, the Chinese economy had a noticeable growth even though western 
countries did not intervene in China because they were busy with World War I (1914-
1918). 
After the dissipation of the Qing Dynasty, the republicans finally established the 
Republic of China on January 1, 1912, in Nanjing. 42  The provincial representatives 
elected Sun Yat-Sen as the first Provisional President of the Republic of China. There 
were a lot of governing affairs that were needed to be dealt with by the new Provisional 
Government in Nanjing. One thing that the Provisional Government believed that it 
should do was to unify national finance and currency. President Sun and his government 
thought that the unification of national finance and currency was good for the future 
development and the unification of China. Thus, the plan of new currency and the central 
bank was on the list. 
After some discussion, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China in 
Nanjing was in favor of the gold exchange standard, aiming to fix the currency exchange 
rate of Chinese currency with some foreign currency based on a fixed quality of gold.43 
This policy was the earliest monetary plan of the ROC government, which was suggested 
by top Chinese politicians and economists. Unfortunately, the plan was not implemented. 
The Provisional Government in Nanjing only ruled China for less than three months. 
During these three months, it did not have enough time to establish any kind of central 
bank nor to ask provisional governments to issue a currency based on a gold exchange 
42 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980), (Wǀ & Schiffrin (1994), Harrison (2000), and Mitter (2011). 
43 The gold exchange standard is written as “䠁य़ݼᵜսࡦ” in Chinese. For the reference, see Adviser 
Chamber of People's Bank of China [ACPBC] (1986, p. 4), J. Zhu (2013) and N. Zhang (2007). 
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standard.44  Furthermore, President Sun’s request of nationalizing Jiangnan Mint, which 
belonged to the government of Jiangsu Province, was refuted.45 Thus, the Provisional 
Government could not establish its own central bank and issue money. The Government 
of Jiangsu province believed that the President did not have the right to change the 
coinage rights, which belonged to the local governments, according to European and 
American practice.46 As the Provisional Government in Nanjing was powerless to force 
the government of Jiangsu Province to transfer the ownership of Jiangnan Mint, the plan 
of building a central bank and unifying the national currency died. 
In February 1912, Qing’s Premier Yuan Shikai persuaded Emperor Xuantong to 
abdicate. Sun and Yuan agreed that if Yuan could successfully persuade the royal family 
to abdicate, Sun would resign as the President and recommend Yuan as the new 
Provisional President of the ROC. Sun Yat-sen then resigned the presidency and the 
Temporary Senate elected Yuan as the new Provisional President of the ROC. After Yuan 
swore his presidency in Beijing, the capital also moved from Nanjing to Beijing, and the 
Beiyang Army led by Yuan Shikai seized power.47 
As a senior politician, President Yuan quickly started to continue to reform 
China after the Late Qing Reform.48 It was reasonable to follow the previous reforms that 
were in the process without repealing all previous policies as a conditioned reflex. Yuan’s 
reform succeeded in the Qing Dynasty. In the political field, Yuan continually reform the 
civil service system by the reference of the Western system. He also continually 
44 See ACPBC (1986, p. 6). 
45 The Jiangnan Mint is written as “⊏ই䙐ᒓᔐ” in Chinese. For the reference, See ACPBC (1986, p. 9). 
46 See ACPBC (1986, p. 13). 
47 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980), (Wǀ & Schiffrin (1994), Harrison (2000), and Mitter (2011). 
48 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980), J. Zhu (2013), Harrison (2000), E. Young (1977), and Hu (1991). 
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supported the policy of local autonomy.49 In the educational realm, the reformed new 
educational system in the Late Qing Reform was reserved and developed during the Yuan 
administration. In the military part, Yuan continued to train the Chinese military by 
adopting a modernized Western system. 50  In the economic field, he encouraged the 
development of private sectors and the introduction of foreign investment. Yuan also 
unified national finance and was trying to unify the Chinese currency system.51 
As the Chinese economy had a dual economic structure, urban economy and 
rural economy, and the vast territory, different people were using separate currency units 
under the Multiple Metal Standard. It would have been difficult to unify Chinese 
currency, especially when the late Qing Dynasty did not have enough time to make it. 
Nevertheless, as President Yuan was a senior and prestigious politician, who stabilized 
the situation of China after the Xinhai Revolution, the reform became possible.52 
In 1912, the Bank of Daqing reorganized into the Bank of China and continually 
served as the central bank of the Republic of China, but the central bank did not function 
very well. As China was in political turmoil in the early months of 1912, some local 
governments were issuing silver currency without permission from the central bank. 
After Yuan became President, he started to rectify the monetary institutions. In March 
1912, Provisional Government in Beijing promulgated a new law, which said that the 
people who issued currency without permission from the central bank would be regarded 
as guilty of forging money, which would result in a maximum sentence of life in prison.53 
49 The local autonomy is written as “ൠᯩ㠚⋫” in Chinese. 
50 See E. Young (1977). 
51 See J. Zhu (2013). 
52 See J. Zhu (2013) and N. Zhang (2007). 
53 See ACPBC (1986, p. 7). 
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Besides the punishment on making unofficial currency, Yuan and his advisor were also 
making plans for a new currency. 
In 1913, the National Assembly elected Yuan Shikai as the President of the ROC, 
which further centralized the political power. In 1914, Yuan’s Government issued the 
National Monetary Regulations based on the 1910 one issued by Qing Dynasty. 54 
According to this new law, the silver dollar would be the new single currency unit, which 
meant that the Beiyang Government intended to adopt a silver standard. The initial plan 
was to use silver dollar as a substitution of the silver tael standard, copper dollar, and 
other currency units. However, as different types of currency units were in circulation, it 
was impossible to unify the currency immediately. Gradually until the spring of 1920, 
380 million silver dollars were issued, which also became the main currency being used 
in the monetary circulation at that time.55 
1.3.2 The Beiyang Government and the Warlord Era, 1912-1928 
However, things did not go that well and civil wars happened again.56 The loss 
of power made Sun Yat-sen and some Nationalists feel unhappy. After several political 
conflicts between Yuan and Sun’s Nationalists, in July 1913, in the call of Sun Yat-sen, 
some provinces led by the Nationalists fought against the Beiyang Army led by President 
Yuan. In 1914, President Yuan dismissed the National Assembly, which was controlled 
by the Nationalists as the majority. In January of 1916, Yuan proclaimed himself as the 
Emperor of China and abolished the Republic of China. This action quickly led to 
opposition all around the country. The warlords in different provinces started to fight 
54 The name of National Monetary Regulations is written as “഻ᒓọֻ” in Chinese. For the references, see 
J. Zhu (2013), and N. Zhang (2007). 
55 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 323). 
56 See Fairbank (1983) and Strauss (1997). 
68 
                                                 
against Yuan in the name of anti-monarchy. Although Yuan canceled monarchy in March, 
the war continued because Yuan still served as President after his abdication. In June, 
President Yuan died. 
The death of Yuan made China split.57 From 1916 to 1928, the warlords of the 
Beiyang Army fought against each other, and the Beiyang warlords also controlled the 
presidency. Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen was also trying to fight against the Beiyang 
Government. After the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, Kuomintang established the 
National Government in Guangzhou on July 1, 1925, with political and military help 
from the Soviet Union, being against the Beiyang Government in Beijing. Subsequently, 
northern and southern China launched a civil war, and the National Government used this 
opportunity to gradually eliminate the power of the Beiyang Government, known as the 
Northern Expedition War. In April 1927, the new leader of the Nationalists, Chiang Kai-
shek, moved the capital to Nanjing. In 1928, the last branch of the Beiyang 
government in Manchuria replaced all the flags with the National Government. Thus, the 
National Government nominally united China under one state. From 1927 to 1937, due to 
the relatively stable political situation, the Nationalists’ rule China entered the so-called 
Nanjing Golden Decade. 
Although the rule of the Beiyang Government was in the period of warlords, the 
economy was still growing, as wars only happened irregularly in local areas, and there 
was no national civil war that coincided. 58  World War I gave China an excellent 
opportunity to develop, whose economy was still growing sustainably, as western powers 
57 See Fairbank (1983) and Strauss (1997). 
58 See J. Zhu (2012) and N. Zhang (2007). 
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were busy fighting each other. 59  Industrialization accelerated during the rule of the 
Beiyang Government. During the period of the Beiyang Government, the electrical 
industry, the dye industry, the textile industry, and the chemical industry all flourished. 
From 1912 to 1920, the annual growth rate of Chinese industrial sectors was 13.8%.60 In 
1913, like other countries, China had no highways, but by 1921, it reached 736 miles.61 
Railway also became the main transportation among big cities. Shanghai, Tianjin, 
Guangzhou, Wuhan, and other coastal and riverside cities developed rapidly.62 Although 
there were regional wars, the development of foreign and private capital investment was 
not restricted a lot and population migration was free. This situation was quite contrary to 
the CCP ruled Chinese Mainland since its so-called 1978 market reform. The CCP 
economic pattern not only has a strong institution of state-owned enterprises, but 
migration inside the Chinese Mainland is also restricted.63 
As we have mentioned before, the Beiyang Government was also trying to build 
a robust single unit monetary standard and a functional central bank.64 The process was 
prolonged, but it laid the foundation of banking reform during the rule of the National 
Government. Besides, the main currency unit as silver dollar, silver tael, and copper 
dollar, paper money, was also in circulation during that period. The banknotes issued by 
the Bank of China (as a central bank from 1912 to 1928) and Bank of Communications 
could be exchanged for silver and copper dollars. The Bank of China used to be called the 
Ta-Ching Government Bank, which was the central bank of the Qing Empire. The Bank 
59 See Strachan (2003) and Hardach (1981). 
60 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 336) and Frölich (2014). 
61 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 336). 
62 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 337). 
63 See Ralston et al. (2006) and W. H. Wang & Vegas (2017). 
64 See J. Zhu (2012) and N. Zhang (2007). 
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of Communications was a state-owned bank established by the Qing Empire in 1909. 
From 1912 to 1919, the two banks issued a total of about 905,900 Chinese silver dollars, 
which was not a considerable amount by the cautious issuance.65 The cease of exchange 
in some areas like Beijing and Tianjin in 1916 caused a bank run.66 As the Beiyang 
Government was not stable because of the wars, the currency and central banking reform 
did not do very much.67 The issuance of the silver dollar still did not enter many rural 
areas and the traditional barters that sued silver tael as currency were still happening in 
many parts of China. 
To understand the political and economic situation in the period of the Beiyang 
Government, we also have to understand Sino-foreign relations, as the links became 
tighter than before. 68  Because western countries were fighting against each other in 
World War I and they were dealing with post-war issues, they did not intervene in China 
through territorial occupations. China gained a period for developing its economy. From 
1912 to 1920, the annual growth rate of Chinese industrial sectors was 13.8%. 69 
Economic growth was also due to the fact that the warlord warfare at that time only 
happened in scattered and different parts of the country. There was no national civil war. 
Meanwhile, as a result of the lack of western powers during World War I in China, Japan 
swooped in during that time.70 In 1915, Japan threatened to wage war against China to 
force President Yuan to sign some unequal treaties. Although President Yuan Shikai 
rejected Japan’s sovereignty claims on the Shandong Peninsula, China was still forced to 
65 See J. Zhu (2012). 
66 See Ding (2010). 
67 See J. Zhu (2012). 
68 See Strachan (2003) and Hardach (1981). 
69 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 336) and Frölich (2014). 
70 See Strachan (2003) and Hardach (1981). 
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transfer Germany’s privileges in the Shandong Peninsula to Japan. Japan also gained a 
monopoly in business in many areas in China, especially some railways in Manchuria, 
which laid the foundation of putting Japanese troops in Manchuria and the invasion of 
China in the 1930s. Japanese occupation became one of the most important reasons for 
establishing China’s first modern central bank in the late 1920s. Due to China’s fragile 
central finances at that time, the establishment of a strong central bank not only became 
the goal of the National Government, but also gained the support of the business 
community. 
In terms of money, World War I also influenced the domestic issues in China. 
Although World War I was physically European, as the Western powers did not have the 
time to intervene in China, the Chinese economy was developing. The world’s silver 
price rose from 23.69 pence/ounce in 1909 to 61.5 pence/ounce in 1918, which increased 
around 104.7 %. 71  After the establishment of ROC, China needed much funding to 
develop the economy when the Western power did not intervene in China. Due to the 
demand for silver that was caused by the outbreak of the economic crisis in Western 
countries in 1929, more than 300 million silver taels entered China from Western 
countries.72 We can assume that if the domestic situation in China would have been more 
stable, then this silver would have been more likely to help China to carry out economic 
construction. 
1.3.3 The New Culture Movement and the Introduction of Communism 
During the Beiyang era, as the control of the Beiyang Government was not 
strong, new thoughts from Western countries also quickly came into China. Intellectuals 
71 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 317). 
72 See N. Zhang (2007, p. 44). 
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were also debating in the New Culture Movement from the 1910s to the 1920s.73 During 
the New Culture Movement, the Chinese intellectuals were discussing which kind of 
political institutions China should adopt. “Science” and “Democracy” were the slogans in 
the New Culture Movement. The New Culture Movement in the period of Beiyang 
Government also gave Chinese people a chance to discuss what kind of monetary system 
China should adopt. As more and more Western thoughts were entering China in that 
period, people were arguing more on different social issues, including monetary thoughts. 
As many people in the Movement were so eager to use the Western ideologies as 
institutions to be instead of the traditional ones, some radical people introduced 
Communism during the New Culture Movement.74 In 1921, with the help of the Soviet 
Union, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was established in Shanghai. In 1927, the 
CCP established its own army. Therefore, whether it was the Beiyang Government, the 
National Government, or the Chinese Communist Party, each political force attempted to 
consolidate its political position by establishing its own army. In the same year, the 
National Government started to rule China. The Nationalists and the Communists were 
fighting against each other until the Communists finally occupied the whole of Chinese 
Mainland in 1949. 75  The wars between the Nationalists and the Communists also 
influenced the establishment, structure, and policy of the Central Bank of China.76 If we 
are going to draw a clear picture of the history of China’s first modern central bank, we 
also have to take this into account. 
73 See N. Lee (2009) and Schwarcz (1986). 
74 See Dirlik (1989) and Schwarcz (1986). 
75 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986). 
76 See D. Ma (2019). 
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1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter reviews China’s general economic and political situation from the 
19th century to 1927. In section 1.2, we have reviewed the comprehensive history of 
China from the Qing Empire to the 1911 Republican Xinhai Revolution. The reform of 
the late Qing Dynasty had contributed mainly to China’s reform progress, especially the 
modernization of the Chinese economy and opening the Chinese market to the entire 
world. Still, the stagnant political system reform disappointed the social elite and caused 
the Xinhai Revolution. Since then, China was either in wartime or in the Communist 
despotism, expect the Nanjing Golden Decade (1927-1937). We wonder that if the Qing 
Dynasty instituted all reforms, including banking reform, faster before people became 
angry, China could become a developed, prosperous, and liberal society without 
authoritarian rule. Of course, this is just an assumption. Still, chaos in Chinese society 
and the failure of its first central bank before the Communist Revolution in 1949 made a 
good reason for us to reflect if the premise is reasonable or not. Besides, we also 
introduce the Austrian school’s economic study of free banking institutions in the late 
1890s in the Chinese southeastern coastal city, Fuzhou. Along with other studies, they 
revealed that China had a long-time history of free banking institutions before the 1920s, 
which is different from the later central banking patterns in China. 
Unlike the CCP’s official negative opinions on the epoch of the Beiyang 
Government, as we have demonstrated in section 1.3, the independent researchers found 
some positive things that happened. Although some regional wars happened among the 
warlords in this time, the domestic economy was still growing, especially the industries 
that were not related to war. A few factors should be considered as the reasons for 
74 
economic growth. The first was the Beiyang Government’s pro-laissez-faire economic 
policy.77 The second was that the Western countries did not have the energy to intervene 
in China due to World War I.78 Because of World War I, the energy of the Western 
countries was placed on the European battlefield, so there was no Western power to 
intervene in China’s domestic political and economic affairs, which on one side avoided 
the wars that happened in the late Qing Dynasty due to poor Sino-foreign relations. The 
third was that the relatively free-speech environment brought space to economic 
innovation and entrepreneurial activities. 79  The improving economic situation and 
growing monetary thoughts laid as the foundation of the monetary policy debate and the 
establishment of China’s first modern central bank since the late 1920s, especially during 
the Nanjing Golden Decade (1927-1937). During this time, the Chinese and Western 
politicians and economists expressed their views on what kind of monetary system China 
needed to establish. These people included Chiang Kai-shek, Soong Tse-ven, Kung 
Hsiang-his, Edwin W. Kemmerer, Arthur N. Young, etc. As we have illustrated, wartime 
was a salient feature during the rule of the Beiyang Government, but also the relatively 
free and relaxed speech environment. Because of this condition, intellectuals and 
politicians had enough space to talk about the currency reform publicly. Now let us 
review the history altogether. 
For building a better and prosperous society, China had to reform its monetary 
system from the old urban and rural dual economy in the Beiyang epoch. For  better 
economic development, it was essential to monetize the entire economy. Nevertheless, 
whether imitating and copying other countries’ central banking policy was a wise 
77 See J. Zhu (2012) and N. Zhang (2007). 
78 See Strachan (2003) and Hardach (1981). 
79 See N. Lee (2009). 
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decision should also be considered again. The banking system should serve for Chinese 
people properly, which means all the banking reforms should match the spontaneous 
economic order itself. We have reason to doubt if the suggestion of establishing a single 
monetary standard in the era of the Beiyang Government in a short period was very 
urgent for the development of China.80 Perhaps the biggest problem was timing as the 
Beiyang Government only ruled China for 16 years. Also, whether eliminating the 
spontaneous traditional Chinese free banking institutions and adopting the Western-style 
central banking system was suitable for China remained a question to be investigated 
thoroughly. To answer these questions, in the next chapter, we start to review how 
Western monetary thoughts influenced China’s banking institutions since 1927. 
 
80 See J. Zhu (2012) and N. Zhang (2007). 
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Part 2   




Chapter 2  
Edwin Kemmerer’s Report for China, 1929 
Abstract: This chapter is an original synthesis that reviews the biography, monetary 
theories, and reports for China’s central banking institutions of Edwin Kemmerer. Most 
importantly, this chapter also includes our original review of Kemmerer’s 1929 reports 
for the construction of China’s first modern central banking experiment. These crucial 
reports sought to build an effective Chinese central banking system based on Edwin 
Kemmerer’s main theories, such as a central banking system with a 100% gold reserve. 
Kemmerer was an economics professor at Princeton University and the world-famous 
“Money Doctor” who helped build central banks in various countries in Latin America, 
Europe, and Asia. One originality of the research in this chapter is that we visited the 
original archives of Kemmerer’s research on China’s economic issues kept by the Hoover 
Institution at Stanford University. To start, we demonstrate the biography of “Money 
Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer and his monetary and gold theories. We not only review his 
general theory on central banking and gold reserves, but also provide some commentary 
from a few Austrian economists on Kemmerer’s theory, as they both emphasize the 
function of a gold standard in banking systems. Secondly, we present Kemmerer’s reports 
from 1929 and our commentary on whether his project for China was well planned and 
practicable. We provide a detailed description of Kemmerer’s reports and present the 
critical reports on China’s banking system. Finally, we illustrate our commentary on the 
reports. In addition, the general political and economic background in China from 1927 to 
1937, which were related to Kemmerer’s reports, is presented in this chapter. 
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This chapter is an original synthesis that reviews the biography, monetary 
theories, and reports for China’s central banking institutions of Edwin Kemmerer. Most 
importantly, this chapter also includes our original review of Kemmerer’s 1929 reports 
for the construction of China’s first modern central banking experiment. These crucial 
reports seeked to build an effective Chinese central banking system based on Edwin 
Kemmerer’s main theories, such as a central banking system with a 100% gold reserve. 
Kemmerer was an economics professor at Princeton University and the world-famous 
“Money Doctor” who helped build central banks in various countries in Latin America, 
Europe, and Asia.  
Section 2.2. demonstrates the biography of “Money Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer 
and his monetary and gold theories. Subsection 2.2.1 is about Kemmerer’s biography. 
Subsection 2.2.2 reviews his academic career as a “Money Doctor.” Subsection 2.2.3 
demonstrates his general theory on central banking and gold reserves. Subsection 2.2.4 
provides commentary from a few Austrian economists on Kemmerer’s theory, as they 
both emphasize the functions of a gold standard in banking systems. 
Section 2.3 is about the 1929 Kemmerer reports and our commentary on whether 
his project for China was well planned and practicable. Section 2.3.1 reviews the general 
political and economic background in China from 1927 to 1937, which is related to 
Kemmerer’s reports. Section 2.3.2 provides a detailed description of the reports. Section 
2.3.3 presents the critical reports on China’s banking system. Section 2.3.4 illustrates our 
commentary on the reports. 
Section 2.4 is the conclusion. 
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2.2 Biography of “Money Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer and his Monetary and Gold 
Theories 
Edwin W. Kemmerer was one of the key figures who played an essential role in 
establishing China’s first modern central bank in the late 1920s. An examination of his 
biography, especially his academic background and his general theory on central banking 
and gold reserves, will help us understand why he issued a central banking proposal in 
China. 81  Section 2.2.1 is about Kemmerer’s biography. Section 2.2.2 reviews his 
academic career as a “Money Doctor.” Section 2.2.3 demonstrates his general theory on 
central banking and gold reserves. Section 2.2.4 provides commentary from a few 
economists on Kemmerer’s theory. 
2.2.1 Edwin Kemmerer’s General Biography 
On June 25, 1875, Edwin Walter Kemmerer was born in Scranton, Pennsylvania, 
as the oldest son of Lorenzo Dow Kemmerer and Martha Hanna. His father was of Dutch 
and German ancestry. 82  The whole Kemmerer family, like other Dutch families in 
Pennsylvania at that time, was very devout to their religion. Lorenzo Kemmerer and his 
father were very active in the Methodist Church. Their passionate and determined faith 
also made the young Kemmerer very devout. To support his family, Lorenzo Kemmerer 
moved from a coal-mining city to a quiet village called Factoryville, where there actually 
was no factory. Although the financial condition of the Kemmerer family was not very 
good at that time, which made Edwin drop out of school once, he was still working hard 
at several jobs to support himself as a typical self-improving Dutch Christian in 19th-
century America. In his teenage years, Edwin Kemmerer already showed interest and 
81 See D. Kemmerer (1993, pp. 9-42), Leitch (1978, pp. 279-280), and Howard et al. (1946). 
82 See D. Kemmerer (1993, pp. 10-11). 
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excellence in economic studies. After Edwin went back to school, he was interested in 
debate and political economy, which led him to commit himself to be a professional 
economist for the rest of his life. When he was 16 in 1895, Kemmerer graduated from 
high school as the winner of Latin and essay prizes and as the valedictorian of his class.83 
Kemmerer graduated with his bachelor's degree from Wesleyan University with 
honors and a Phi Beta Kappa key in 1899.84 The Phi Beta Kappa key is an honor granted 
by one of the oldest and prestigious honor societies, Phi Beta Kappa Society, for the 
liberal arts and science in the United States.85 His senior thesis was to defend the quantity 
theory of money.86 In 1899, Kemmerer went to Cornell University to pursue a doctorate 
program. In 1901, he got a teaching position in Economics and History at Purdue 
University. In 1903, Kemmerer graduated with his Ph.D. degree from Cornell University. 
His Ph.D. thesis was Money and Credit Instruments in their Relation to General Prices.87 
This thesis was considered to be a leading study in quantitative economics.88 Because of 
the dissertation, Kemmerer was becoming a rising authority in monetary issues. 
Because of the excellent quality of his Ph.D. dissertation, in the same year of his 
graduation, the 28-year-old Kemmerer was appointed as Financial Advisor to the United 
States Philippine Commission.89 During his three-year stay in the Philippines and the Far 
East from 1903 to 1906, Kemmerer designed specifically the monetary system on a gold 
exchange standard. In addition, Kemmerer was also helping Iceland and Egypt to prepare 
83 See D. Kemmerer (1993, p. 13). 
84 See Howard et al. (1946)  
85 See Current (1990). 
86 See Leitch (1978, p. 279). 
87 See E. Kemmerer (1909). 
88 See Howard et al. (1946). 
89 See Howard et al. (1946) and D. Kemmerer (1993, pp. 15-16). 
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their currency reform. During that period, he started his career as the famous “Money 
Doctor.”90  
In 1912, Kemmerer went from Cornell to Princeton to continue his academic 
career, who served there until his retirement in 1943. The 31-year duration in Princeton 
should be Kemmerer’s most splendid academic period. Kemmerer was not only teaching 
in the university but also provided suggestions on both the US and international monetary 
systems. He also organized various academic activities related to political economy and 
banking issues.91 During his career at Princeton, Kemmerer also helped to establish the 
Federal Reserve of the United States.92 From 1917 to 1934, the “Money Doctor” Edwin 
Kemmerer worked as the governmental financial and central banking advisor of Mexico 
in 1917, Guatemala in 1919, Colombia in 1923, South Africa and Chile in 1925, Poland 
in 1926, Ecuador in 1926-1927, Bolivia in 1927, China in 1929, Peru in 1931, and 
Turkey in 1937.93 During that period, he was providing financial and banking suggestions 
to various American, European, and Asian countries, especially his “uncompromising” 
urge to return to the gold standard. Kemmerer’s work in these countries deeply 
influenced their banking structure.94  
Not only teaching and organizing academic activities, and providing policy 
suggestions, Kemmerer also published various books on banking theory and banking 
history. 95 Some of the Kemmerer’s most influential works are his Modern Currency 
Reforms (1916), The ABC of the Federal Reserve System (1918/1922), Gold and the Gold 
90 See Leitch (1978, p. 279). 
91 See Leitch (1978, pp. 272-273). 
92 See Betancourt (2008, 2010). 
93 See Leitch (1978, p. 279). For the money doctor in Mexico, see Babb (2005). 
94 See Howard et al. (1946). 
95 See Leitch (1978, pp. 279-280). 
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Standard (1944).96 Modern Currency Reform illustrated how to base banking reform on 
the quantity theory of money. 97  In this book, Kemmerer explained how to reform 
currency based on real cases in India, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and the Straight 
Settlements. 98  The ABC of the Federal Reserve System illustrated the principles and 
structures of the Federal Reserve System in the United States.99 In this book, Kemmerer 
said that the aim of this monograph was “to set forth in non-technical language the chief 
reasons why the federal reserve system was called into being, the main feature of its 
organization and how it works.”100 In the first four chapters, Kemmerer discussed four 
problems with the monetary system in the 1910s: the decentralization of the monetary 
system, the inelasticity of the credit system, the cumbersome exchange and transfer 
system, and the defective organization in monetary institutions. In the other four chapters, 
Kemmerer illustrated the respective remedies provided by the US federal reserve system, 
including legislative provisions of the monetary system and the progress of the currency 
system made to date. 
Kemmerer’s last published book, Gold and the Gold Standard, illustrated how a 
gold standard, especially a 100% gold reserve, works in the Kemmererian perspective.101 
In the first four chapters of the book, Kemmerer explained the history of the gold 
standard from ancient Asia to the 1920s when Western countries during the Great 
Depression.102 Chapter V demonstrated the characteristics of the gold standard, in which 
96 For the comments of the above E. Kemmerer’s books, see Dowrie (1919), Leitch (1978, pp. 279-80), 
Salerno (1985/1992; 1999). 
97 See E. Kemmerer (1916), D. Kemmerer (1993, p. 22), and Brown (1918). 
98 See E. Kemmerer (1905). 
99 See E. Kemmerer (1918/1922). 
100 See E. Kemmerer (1918/1922, p. 1). 
101 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009). For the book review, see Nichols (1945). 
102 Kemmerer was a life-long supporter of the gold standard, even during the Great Depression. On the 
contrary, scholars like Barry Eichengreen argued that the gold standard was the cause of the depression, 
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Kemmerer discussed the definition of the gold standard. Chapter VI illustrated the 
varieties of the gold standard in history, including the gold standard in a free banking 
system and a central banking system. In Chapter VII, Kemmerer described both the 
merits and defects of the gold standard, especially the merits of it. In the last chapter, 
Chapter VII, Kemmerer provided his perspective on returning to the gold standard, 
especially the gold exchange standard. Kemmerer also proposed that it is possible to 
return to the gold standard through the central banking system. In this book, Kemmerer 
treated monetary expansion policy and its consequence, price inflation, as a thief, who 
robs the money and fruit of honest people’s labor and creates chaos. 103  Obviously, 
Kemmerer’s view was different from the current global central banking policies that are 
generally adopted.104  
Not only did he write a lot of thoughtful books on monetary issues and the gold 
standard, Kemmerer also provided a remarkable literary style for “its lucid simplicity and 
the same quality marked his oral exposition.”105 Furthermore, Kemmerer also left his 
students with a deep impression on his detailed and brilliant explanations in class.106 
Therefore, Kemmerer was a professor of economics who did both research and lectures 
well. 
which was a completely different opinion than Kemmerer’s. For Barry Eichengreen’s opinion, see his 
Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939 (1992). For the Austrian school’s 
view of defending the gold standard, see Huerta de Soto’s Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles 
(2006). 
103 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009) and D. Kemmerer (1993, p. 23). 
104 The majority of modern economists, presented by Eichengreen (1992), and the old-fashioned gold 
standard promoter like Kemmerer, are all against extreme monetary expansion policy and price 
hyperinflation that could hurt the economy. Their main difference is that Kemmerer promoted a 100% gold 
standard and treated price deflation caused by the nature fluctuation of prices as a normal economic 
phenomenon, while the economics presented by Eichengreen argue that price deflation is a threat of the 
contemporary economy. 
105 See Howard et al. (1946). 
106 See Howard et al. (1946). 
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Kemmerer’s hard work in monetary policy suggestions made him receive many 
honors. 107  On the academic side, Kemmerer received honorary doctorate degrees at 
Wesleyan University (1926), Occidental College (1928), Oglethorpe University (1933), 
Rutgers University (1933), and Columbia University (1935). In 1927, the Central 
University of Ecuador and all the universities of Bolivia altogether awarded him an 
honorary doctorate, with no specific field of knowledge. On the non-academic side, 
Kemmerer received high-level awards from the government of Colombia (1923), the 
government of Poland (1926), the government of Ecuador (1927), and the government of 
Belgium (1937).108 
In July 1944, the Bretton Woods Agreement was established. As a result of the 
Bretton Woods system, countries around the world established a fixed exchange rate 
system, the US dollar set a fixed exchange rate with gold, and the traditional gold 
standard was abandoned. In the same year, Kemmerer published a monograph, Gold and 
the Gold Standard: The Story of Gold Money, Past, Present and Future which defended 
the traditional 100% gold standard. He also published articles in the media. In addition, 
he participated in a US congressional hearing to criticize the fiat money based on the 
Bretton Woods system and to defend the gold standard. 109  Yet despite Kemmerer’s 
efforts, the Bretton Woods system was established, and the conference did not accept his 
ideas. At the Bretton Woods conference, Keynes’s theoretical ideas that advocated 
abandoning the gold standard became the mainstream tone of the discussion. Kemmerer 
was critical of the attitude of the economic scholars attending the meeting that echoed the 
107 See Howard et al. (1946) and Leitch (1978, p. 280). 
108 It is worth mentioning that although Kemmerer designed the gold standard for China, the Chinese 
National Government did not award him any official honor. 
109 See Giovannini (1993) and Wintour (2017). 
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government’s opinion of abandoning the gold standard and establishing a fiat money 
standard.110 
After serving in academia and public monetary policymaking for decades, on 
December 16, 1945, the world-famous “Money Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer passed away 
at the age of 70 in Princeton, New Jersey, United States.111 Still, the influence of his 
thoughts continued to spread. After Kemmerer passed away, the professors from 
Princeton University gave him very high praise, they said: 
As a man he was singularly genial and unassuming. His strong convictions were 
always considerately expressed, and he never suffered doctrinal differences to 
cloud his personal regard for his opponents. On many of his missions he was 
exuberantly lauded by those in high office but he himself never lost his simple 
charm. His disciples were legion, and they will sorely miss him but, however 
highly his friends may rate him as a scholar, they will hold still more dearly the 
memory of the gentleman. (Howard et al., 1946) 
It is a pity that Kemmerer himself did not participate in the Bretton Woods meeting. It’s 
also a pity that the idea of returning to the traditional gold standard was also drowned out 
by Sir Maynard Keynes’s dominating proposal on the issuance of fiat money and the 
abolition of the metal standard. In the next section, we demonstrate Edwin Kemmerer’s 
academic career as a “Money Doctor.” 
2.2.2 Edwin Kemmerer’s Academic Career as a “Money Doctor” 
As we have demonstrated in the above section, throughout his entire life, Edwin 
Kemmerer held numerous positions both in academia and in government as a policy 
110 See E. Kemmerer (1945). 
111 See Machlup (1978). 
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advisor. Still, the biggest highlight of his career was being the famous “Money Doctor.” 
In this section, we mainly review Kemmerer’s career all around the world.  
After Kemmerer’s service in the Philippines (1903-1906) and his work on the 
monetary system of the Iceland and Egypt during his stay in the Philippines, he continued 
to work as the international “Money Doctor.” In 1917, Kemmerer was nominated as a 
financial advisor to the government of Mexico. In 1919, he started to serve the 
government of Guatemala. Kemmerer’s service in Mexico and Guatemala made him 
more and more prestigious and increased the demand for his help. As the monetary 
system is tightly connected with other institutions such as public budgets, taxation 
systems, banking systems, and foreign exchange, Kemmerer organized a group of 
specialists in the above-related areas to function more properly in monetary policymaking. 
In 1922, Kemmerer was nominated as the United States Trade Commissioner in South 
America. The Kemmerer Commission served Colombia in 1923 and 1930, Chile in 1925, 
Poland in 1926, Ecuador in 1926-1927, Bolivia in 1927, China in 1929, and Peru in 
1931.112  
In 1924-1925, Kemmerer worked with two groups to the return to the gold 
standard, the Union of South Africa (Vissering-Kemmerer Commission) and an economic 
survey for Turkey (Hines-Kemmerer Commission).113 In 1924 to 1925, he worked with 
the Dawes Commission in Europe, providing policy suggestions for the reorganization of 
the central bank of Germany, the Reichsbank, and for the stabilization of German 
112 See Howard et al. (1946) and Leitch (1978, p. 279). 
113 See Howard et al. (1946). 
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currency after the price hyperinflation after the World War I.114 In the next section, we 
review Edwin Kemmerer’s general theory on central banking and gold reserves. 
2.2.3 Edwin Kemmerer’s General Theory on Central Banking and Gold Reserves 
After illustrating Kemmerer’s biography and his career as the “monetary doctor,” 
we demonstrate Kemmerer’s general theory on central banking and gold reserves in this 
section. Subsection 2.2.3.1 is about the Kemmererian definition of the gold standard. 
2.2.3.1 The Kemmererian definition of the gold standard. We have 
demonstrated in section 2.2.1 that in 1944, Kemmerer published articles in the media and 
participated in a US congressional hearing to criticize the fiat money system based on the 
Bretton Woods system and defend the gold standard.115 In the same year, one year before 
Kemmerer passed away, he published his famous Gold and Gold Standard, which was 
his last book, and integrated his understanding of gold standard principles. After 
demonstrating the history of the gold standard from ancient Asia to the 1920s, when 
Western countries were facing the Great Depression, Kemmerer started to solidify his 
definition of the gold standard. Kemmerer treated the gold standard as a monetary system 
where prices are measured and exchanged by gold internationally and freely. He said, 
The generic gold standard may be briefly defined as a monetary system where 
the unit of value — in terms of which prices, wages, and debts are customarily 
expressed and paid — consists of the value of a fixed quantity of gold in a large 
international market that is substantially free. (Kemmerer, 1944/2009, p. 134) 
Kemmerer provided a classical definition of the gold standard. Although he did not 
express the meaning of the gold standard by providing specific kinds of the gold standard, 
114 For the reference of the two Kemmerer commissions, see Howard et al. (1946, p. 220) and Leitch 
(1978). For the German price hyperinflation after the First World War, see Sennholz (1979, pp. 79-108). 
115 See Giovannini (1993) and Wintour (2017). 
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he still illustrated the abstract sense and principle of it. He didn’t use the induction 
method to develop his definition, but the deduction method. 116  In fact, Kemmerer 
provided both his definition of the gold standard and some specific kinds of it (i.e., gold-
coin, free coinage of gold, gold-bullion standard, gold-exchange standard) to crystalize 
the Kemmererian gold standard. 117  However, the gold-exchange standard implies a 
monetary system under which the value of one country’s currency remains at parity with 
another currency based on the gold standard, which was different from the classical 
definition of the gold standard that Kemmerer provided. In this sense, Kemmerer’s 
definition had a small contradiction as the classical definition of the gold standard. In the 
classic definition, all currencies maintain a fixed price with gold, and there is no 
relationship between currencies directly linked to fixed and floating exchange rates. 
Further, Kemmerer provided some explanations of his definition of the gold 
standard. First, Kemmerer stressed that it is not necessary to provide a gold standard 
based on legal tender, the form of currency that is a satisfactory payment for any 
monetary debt. For Kemmerer, the gold standard can both exist and perform without a 
legal tender as the latter only started to develop in contemporary history.118 In addition, 
Kemmerer also pointed out that neither the Gresham Law nor the custom of using non-
legal tender119 could drive out the legal tendency. Gresham Law states that if there are 
two forms of commodity currency in circulation, consumers retain and store high-quality 
currencies with high precious metal content and use low-quality currencies in the market 
116 For the difference between the induction and deduction methodology in science, see Mises (1957/2007). 
117 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, p. 135). 
118 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, p. 135) and Hülsmann (2008). 
119 For the reference of the custom of non-legal tender, see Selgin (2015b), Huerta de Soto (2006, pp. 20-
36). For the reference of the origin of the government prerogative of making money, see Huerta de Soto 
(2006, pp. 41-58). 
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for market transactions. This means most of the circulation in the private sector is low-
quality and inferior currency while high-quality currencies with high precious metal 
content are not under market circulation. As we are describing in this paragraph and 
we’ve mentioned in section 2.2.1, Kemmerer treated price inflation as a thief, who robs 
the money and fruit of honest people’s labor and creates chaos. Kemmerer criticized the 
negative consequence caused by both the Gresham Law and the legal tender.120  
Secondly, Kemmerer believed that accepting the gold standard is the best choice 
for a nation as it was almost universal respected.121 But as his son Donald Kemmerer 
pointed out, there possibly would have been a high opportunity cost for underdeveloped 
countries to switch their currency system to the gold standard. In Kemmerer’s proposal, 
the relatively underdeveloped countries would choose the trustworthy developed 
countries’ gold-standard-based central banks for keeping their deposits, as they would be 
gold-guaranteed there. This choice would be challenging for underdeveloped countries 
because they would have to measure which banks were trustworthy or not.122 
Thirdly, Kemmerer also emphasized that there is no need to “mention in the 
definition of redeemability in gold (or its equivalent) of paper money and fiduciary 
coins.”123 Though redeemability is a privilege of paper money and fiduciary coins, the 
privilege per se is not necessary for a gold standard. For Kemmerer, the sufficient 
conditions for the redeemability in gold of paper money and fiduciary are restrictions of 
the issuance of paper money and of fiduciary, and the unlimited use of paper and 
fiduciary currency to pay tax and public debts. Kemmerer realized that many times in 
120 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, pp. 17-18). 
121 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, pp. 139-140). 
122 See D. Kemmerer (1993, p. 23). 
123 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, p. 136). 
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history, the government did not allow people to pay taxes and public dues, as the 
government clearly knew the value of the inflating fiduciary currency had been declining 
because of its over-issuance. 
Fourthly, Kemmerer also pointed that even with the following conditions; a 
particular kind of gold unit, a gold standard based on legal tender, a gold standard as the 
widest accepted currency standard in a country, and redeemability in gold, it is still 
possible that the gold standard would not be a real gold standard.124 He provided the case 
of the Union of South Africa in 1919 and 1920 to demonstrate his theory. During that 
period, the gold standard and price level in South Africa were not stable, caused by 
governmental manipulation of the issuance and the prohibition of exporting gold.125 Later, 
Kemmerer also pointed out that with a ban on the importation of gold in a country, the 
value of gold would artificially rise, which is not natural in a real free market and in the 
classic gold standard criteria. It is clear the Kemmererian precondition of a true gold 
standard is based on the free market exchange of gold, where there is no governmental 
restriction on both the exportation and importation of gold. Kemmerer also pointed out 
that it is not possible to call one currency standard is a true gold standard if its value is 
not based on the international free market evaluation. He said, 
Whenever the gold value of the monetary unit of a country is divorced from the 
market value of gold in the free markets of the world, the country cannot be said 
to be on a true gold standard. (E. Kemmerer, 1944/2009, p. 137) 
124 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, p. 136). 
125 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, pp. 136-137). 
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Therefore, for Kemmerer, a true gold standard not only requires no price controls in the 
domestic market but also in the international market. Only such a gold standard can 
genuinely reflect the market’s true price and demand for gold. 
Finally, Kemmerer made a very legible judgment that the value of a country’s 
currency is only valid if their government keeps it at parity with the value of the gold 
monetary unit reflected by the international free market. For Kemmerer, as we have 
demonstrated in the above paragraph, the global market should be available for both 
importation and exportation of gold, which means that it is an independent trade criterion 
that the government could not intervene the gold exchange. Thus, in the condition of the 
free market without government intervention in monetary issues, the gold standard would 
reveal itself naturally. A gold standard per se is not needed to maintain the value of a 
currency, but it is the result of the stability of currency itself. Kemmerer said, 
Regardless, therefore, of which of the many common means may be adopted by 
a nation to maintain the value of its money — such as convertibility, legal tender, 
and free coinage — the supreme test of the existence of the gold standard is the 
answer to the question whether or not the money of the country is actually kept 
at a parity with the value of the gold monetary unit comprising it, in the outside 
free international gold market, assuming, of course, that such a market of 
reasonable size actually exists. It is not a question of the means adopted to obtain 
a particular result, but rather, one of the results itself. The gold standard exists 
then in any country whenever the value of a fixed quantity of gold in a large and 
substantially free international market is actually maintained as the standard unit 
of value. (E. Kemmerer, 1944/2009, p. 138) 
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Therefore, for Kemmerer, if a country maintains a fixed price of gold and its own 
currency under the premise of a free market, then the choice of any currency is 
reasonable. For him, the choice of currency is only a technical result, and the real key lies 
in the fact that gold and currency are not subject to government price restrictions in the 
market. From his viewpoint, Kemmerer was not in favor of governmental manipulation 
of currency exchange through international trade, and the Kemmererian way of 
preserving the value of gold and the gold standard-backed currency is only through 
market activity. 
2.2.3.2 The theory of gold as a monetary unit. After establishing the definition 
of the gold standard, Kemmerer further developed his theory of gold as a monetary unit. 
In the first place, Kemmerer treated gold as a monetary unit, which is “a fixed weight, not 
a fixed value.”126 For Kemmerer, the valuation or the purchasing power of a unit of a 
gold standard currency “is attached at a particular moment to a fixed weight of pure 
gold.” 127  In addition, Kemmerer analyzed that because of the well-known physical 
qualities of beauty, scarcity and “its freedom from corrosion or solution” for keeping it 
for thousands of years, gold has been well recognized and prized highly as the universal 
demanded currency by both the most primitive and the most advanced peoples. 128 
Moreover, for Kemmerer, it’s not only the rugged durability that makes the value of gold 
very stable, but also the steady annual production rate of it. According to Kemmerer, the 
yearly production rate of gold before the First World War was around four percent of the 
known stock of monetary gold around the world.129  
126 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, p. 139). 
127 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, p. 139). 
128 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, p. 140). 
129 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, p. 141). The date of the annual growth rate of the world’s known gold is a 
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2.2.3.3 The theory of demand for gold. For Kemmerer, there are three reasons 
why gold has a highly elastic demand.130 The first is monetary demand. According to the 
demonstration of the characteristics of gold in Kemmerer’s theory of gold as a monetary 
unit in the last section, gold is naturally selected as a highly demanded monetary unit. 
The second reason why gold has a highly elastic demand is the demand for 
ornamentation. Kemmerer believed that gold “is the most widely treasured material for 
articles of beauty,” which means “most people in the world would like to have more gold 
ornaments than they do possess and would buy more if such articles were to become 
cheaper.”131 The last reason why gold has a high demand because of its hoarding demand. 
For Kemmerer, throughout human history, acting man hoarded gold as insurance to avoid 
famine and other misfortune. This is evidenced in China, India, and South Africa. Acting 
man would hoard gold as art or luxurious goods.132 
2.2.3.4 The theory of characteristics of gold in its relation to the gold 
standard. According to Kemmerer, there are three distinct characteristics of gold in its 
relation to the gold standard.133 The first characteristic is a fixed price. For Kemmerer, 
once the government adopted the gold standard, it “fixes the gold content of the monetary 
unit.”134 Kemmerer also gave the example of in the United States, how gold standards fit 
the monetary unit. Unfortunately, the fixed price between the gold standard and monetary 
unit was gradually destroyed by governmental manipulation until the disappearance of 
little bit different from another monetary specialist. According to Skousen (1990, pp. 269-271), the annual 
growth rate of the worldwide stock of gold is between one and three percent per year over the last 100 
years, which is not Kemmerer’s “four percent” before World War II. 
130 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, pp. 141-142). 
131 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, p. 142). 
132 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, pp. 147-148). 
133 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, pp. 143-146). 
134 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, p. 143). 
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the gold standard of the failure of Bretton Woods in 1971.135 However, Kemmerer did 
not explain how the government can maintain the value of gold. If, as Kemmerer pointed 
out, that market is the best way to trade and express the value of gold (though different 
trader’s subjective valuation of it), then it would be suspicious for the role of government 
to be dealing with gold standard issues. If the market per se could provide this kind of 
trading institution, then free banking emerges, where there would be no space for a gold 
standard central banking system. It would be much more compelling if Kemmerer could 
have written more on the difference between the above two different banking systems. 
The second characteristic is an unlimited market.136 For Kemmerer, the price of 
different forms of gold is not only always the same at the gold mine and its assay officers. 
Their price is also being checked in a proper way as a paying obligation in both the 
domestic and international market, where that could stabilize the price of gold. Though 
Kemmerer provided his demonstration of the characteristic of the unlimited market of 
gold, it would be much more compelling if Kemmerer illustrated whether it was good or 
not for fixing the price of gold in either the examining part or the market exchange part. 
The third characteristic is the production of gold, correlated inversely with the 
prices of other commodities.137 Kemmerer believed that though usually the output of gold 
increases if its market prices advance and the production of gold decreases while its 
market prices fall, the price of gold would not change, which has nothing to do with the 
increase or the reduction of the production of gold in a gold standard country. Kemmerer 
then argued the gold standard system fixed the price of gold instead of fixing the value of 
gold. But what’s still not clear is the Kemmererian distinction between the price of gold 
135 See Giovannini (1993). 
136 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009. p. 144). 
137 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, pp. 144-147). 
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and the value of gold. The price of a gold is a way to express the trader’s subjective value 
of it. Obviously, Kemmerer did not make a clear demonstration of the distinction between 
the price of gold and the value of gold in this part. However, Kemmerer did provide an 
example, which shows the price of pure gold at the mint was always $20.67 an ounce 
between 1879 and 1916.138 Furthermore, Kemmerer also pointed out that though the price 
of goods may be the same, the producers’ costs of producing goods may also change 
when the value of the purchasing power of gold changes. For Kemmerer, once there was 
an increase in production of goods related to the increasing demand for them, “the supply 
of monetary gold and other “money and deposit-currency circulation that is based upon it, 
[…] through increasing commodity prices, tends to make gold less valuable.”139 Once the 
demand for monetary gold and other related monetary standard increases, the commodity 
price increases, which makes the value of gold tend to decline. On the contrary, when the 
value of gold increases, the gold producers’ profit and the production of gold would also 
increase, Kemmerer also explained what would happen opposite to the increased gold 
production and the increased yield of it. He said, 
On the other hand, when the value of gold is increasing, i.e., when commodity 
prices are falling, the prices of the things that comprise mining costs tend to fall 
with the prices of other commodities. This reduces the cost of mining and, since 
the mine owner continues to sell all of his gold at the same mint price as before, 
his profits are increased, and gold production is stimulated. Therefore, the 
production of gold tends to increase when the value of gold rises and to decrease 
when that value falls. (E. Kemmerer, 1944/2009, p. 146) 
138 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, p. 145). 
139 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, p. 145). 
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Here, Kemmerer analyzed the relationship between the costs of gold mining and the 
prices of the market by using basic economic principles. Under other conditions that 
remain unchanged, when the price of gold rises, it will cause gold miners to feel 
profitable because the cost of producing gold is relatively reduced at this time. Kemmerer 
applied the economic theory of large-scale production of commodities to reduce the 
production cost of enterprises to the analysis of gold. 
2.2.3.5 The theory of monetary gold versus gold in arts. The last part of 
Kemmerer’s theory of the gold standard is the theory of monetary gold versus gold in the 
arts.140 For Kemmerer, if the value of gold falls and the commodity price rises, the price 
of gold in arts such as jewelry and utensils does not rise, “although the costs of other 
materials and labor involved in their manufacture and marketing will advance.”141 In this 
criterion, as the price of gold in arts decrease, more individuals would like to buy the 
gold-made luxurious goods. And on the contrary, when the price of commodity lowers, 
less money would be spent on gold-made art. Kemmerer said, 
When, on the other hand, commodity prices are falling and the value of gold is 
rising, we have the opposite situation. Then the prices of jewelry, ornaments, 
and other gold manufactures do not fall as much as the prices of most other 
things and as wages, because the price of gold itself does not fall. This makes 
gold products appear dear to the consumer and, therefore, lessens the demand for 
them. (E. Kemmerer, 1944/2009, pp. 147-148) 
Here, Kemmerer clearly saw the difference between the nature of art and gold 
commodities. If other conditions are the same, the demand for art is unstable compared to 
140 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, pp. 147-148) 
141 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009, p. 147). 
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gold, so their prices often fluctuate. Therefore, when the prices of artworks fluctuate, the 
owners of artworks are more willing to exchange artworks for relatively stable gold 
prices. In fact, here Kemmerer hinted at the stored value function of gold. This stored 
value function of gold is undoubtedly a function of risk aversion for those who trade in 
the art market full of uncertainty. 
2.2.4 A Short Review on the Commentary from a few Economists on Kemmerer’s 
Theory 
After we have demonstrated Edwin Kemmerer’s general theory on the gold 
standard, this section, we review some Austrian school commentary on Kemmerer’s 
theory. As we have shown above, Kemmerer’s gold standard proposal implies the 
establishment of a free banking system, which is on the contrary of his central banking 
proposal, we chose the economists of the Austrian school. The latter is in favor of free 
banking to present in this section. Section 2.2.4.1 is George Selgin on Kemmerer. Section 
2.2.4.2 reviews Joseph Salerno’s view on the Kemmererian theories. 
2.2.4.1 George Selgin on Edwin Kemmerer. The free banking theorist George 
Selgin criticized the theory of gold-standard central banking-system proposal by 
Kemmerer and his companions, both theoretically and historically.142 Selgin suggested a 
free-banking system without the regulation of deposit reserve. Fundamentally, Selgin 
claimed that the proposal of establishing a gold-standard central-banking system was 
theoretically wrong. For Selgin, it is the private-law which made the gold standard 
possible and credible, but not the governmental-law.143 And the commitments attached by 
sovereign immunity do not and cannot execute private sanctions if the banks break their 
142 For Selgin’s monetary theory, see Selgin (1988, 2015a, 2015b). 
143 See Selgin (2015b, p. 261). 
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promises, which will make the commitments to maintain a gold parity impossible and not 
credible. Moreover, central banks can use their monopolized power to devalue currency 
without punishment. They can even get benefit by doing this manipulation and can also 
make the currency holder of central banks afraid of the devaluation of currency. A gold 
standard based on the central banking system would be finally tempted by speculative 
attacks. Selgin said, 
Knowing that central banks can devalue with impunity, and that they may even 
profit by so doing, holders of a central bank’s currency have good reason to fear 
that it might devalue, especially if it has already done so in the past. […] Gold 
pegs enforced by central banks are for this reason just as likely as any central-
bank-based fixed exchange-rate scheme to eventually succumb to a speculative 
attack. (Selgin, 2015b, p. 261) 
Selgin claimed that historically, there was no relationship between the pre-WWI gold 
standard and manipulation from the central banking system. 144 Thus, Kemmerer was 
wrong in the historical evidence of the pre-war gold standard issues. For Selgin, it was 
the war that broke and ceased the previous gold standard. Therefore, the development of 
central banking in the post-war era made it impossible to maintain the gold standard 
according to Selgin’s theory, which we demonstrated in the last paragraph. In this sense, 
the efforts of Kemmerer and his companions for establishing a stable gold-standard 
central-banking system would not work. Selgin also believed that in the post-war era, the 
intention of the establishment of central banking was not only to reestablish a gold 
standard but more to reestablish a durable system of fixed exchange rates. Selgin said, 
144 See Selgin (2015a, p. 17; 2015b, p. 261). 
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The general proliferation of central banks, starting with the Federal Reserve’s 
establishment in 1914 […] thanks to campaigning by Edwin Kemmerer and 
Montagu Norman, […], may thus be said to have played no less important a role 
than World War I in sealing the fate of the gold standard, for it was that 
development that undermined, as war itself could not, the private legal 
foundation upon which the classical gold standard’s success had rested. […] 
[T]he same developments [of the establishment of the post-war central-banking] 
would ultimately doom not just attempts to reestablish some kind of gold 
standard, but all attempts to reestablish a durable system of fixed-exchange rates. 
(Selgin, 2015b, p. 261) 
In Selgin’s view, it was precisely Kemmerer’s support for the establishment of the U.S 
Federal Reserve that caused the collapse of the traditional gold standard. For Selgin, the 
conventional gold standard that relied on the free banking system was destroyed by the 
Fed’s central banking system. Thus, from Selgin’s perspective, Kemmerer himself clearly 
should bear some responsibility for the disappearance of the traditional gold standard. 
Selgin also criticized that historically the post-war central banking system was a 
tragedy that avoided the price fluctuation of neither inflation nor of deflation. But with 
faith of the gold-standard central-banking system, Kemmerer and his companions went to 
different countries to propose the idea of the gold standard central banking system. Selgin 
said, 
In particular, [the American gold-standard central-banking theorists] subscribed 
to the (in the event tragically mistaken) belief that, by taking part in an 
international gold “exchange” standard, […], a league of central banks would 
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make that reconstruction possible without heavy resort to either deflation or 
devaluation. The European effort in turn inspired Edwin Kemmerer, Princeton’s 
“Money Doctor,” to spread the same central-bank gospel around Latin America. 
(Selgin, 2015a, p. 17) 
Therefore, although Selgin did not fully agree with Kemmerer's currency theory, he still 
affirmed Kemmerer’s efforts to return to the traditional gold standard. In the next section, 
we review Joseph Salerno’s view on Kemmerer’s theory. 
2.2.4.2 Joseph Salerno on Edwin Kemmerer. The contemporary Austrian 
school economist Joseph Salerno studied Kemmerer’s contribution to the definition of 
monetary supply and business arbitrage, the definition of inflation, and the gold 
standard. 145 Here we focus on Salerno’s comments on Kemmerer’s views of Bretton 
Woods system and the gold standard. For the Bretton Woods system, Salerno pointed out 
Edwin Kemmerer, along with another two American economists, Benjamin Anderson 
and Melchior Palyi, were all against the Bretton Woods agreement, who advocated to 
return to the prewar gold standard.146 As we have demonstrated in section 2.2.1, before 
the establishment of the Bretton Woods system, Kemmerer actively criticized the fiat-
money based monetary system through a newspaper article, monograph, and the US 
congressional hearing. However, he did not participate in the conference in Bretton 
Woods. Not to mention that the conference did not accepted his opinion in the 
Keynesian-dominated meeting.  
145 For Salerno’s comments on Kemmerer’s contribution of the definition of monetary supply and business 
arbitrage, the definition of inflation and gold standard, see Salerno’s Money, Sound and Unsound (2010, p. 
129, p. 342, p. 424). 
146 See Salerno’s “Gold and the International Monetary System: The Contribution of Michael A. Heilperin” 
(1985/1992). For Benjamin Anderson’ monetary theory, see Cheap Money, Gold, and Federal Reserve 
Bank Policy (1924). For Palyi’s monetary theory, see his Liquidity (1936). 
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Furthermore, Salerno also reviewed Kemmerer’s contribution to the relationship 
between the price fluctuation and gold.147 Salerno agreed with Kemmerer that with the 
significance of the scarcity and durability of gold, the stability of the money supply 
would be realized. Salerno said, 
An increase of the supply of the money-commodity under the gold standard 
yields net benefits to society assuming there is still a nonmonetary demand for 
gold. […] Most importantly however, even in the case in which gold has 
completely lost its value in nonmonetary uses—certainly a theoretical possibility, 
if not an empirical likelihood—the money-commodity would still involve the 
use of scarce, and therefore costly, resources. […] Furthermore, since gold is an 
extremely scarce as well as highly durable commodity its annual production 
tends to be a tiny proportion of the existing stock. Consequently, even relatively 
large reductions or increases in its costs of production will not cause great 
fluctuations in the annual supply of money. The significance of the scarcity and 
durability of gold for the stability of the money supply has been vividly 
expressed by the monetary theorist, Edwin Kemmerer. (Salerno, 2010, p. 344) 
For Salerno, whether in the empirical sense, gold is scarce or not will not influence its 
characteristics of scarcity and durability. Besides, Salerno agreed with Kemmerer that as 
gold is scare and durable, a considerable reduction or increase in the cost of gold 
production will not cause the fluctuation in the annual supply of gold-based money. After 
introducing the biography of Edwin Kemmerer and his monetary and gold theories. In the 
next section, we review the 1929 Kemmerer reports for China.  
147 See Salerno (2010, pp. 343-345). 
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2.3 Kemmerer’s Reports and Commentary 
In the last section, we have reviewed Edwin W. Kemmerer’s general biography, 
especially his academic career as the world-known “Money Doctor,” his general theory 
on central banking and gold reserves and did a short review on the commentary from a 
few economists on Kemmerer’s theory. In this section, we demonstrate our comments on 
Kemmerer’s 1929 reports on China’s banking reform. Section 2.3.1 reviews the general 
political and economic background in China from 1927 to 1937, which are related to 
Kemmerer’s reports. Section 2.3.2 provides an in-detailed description of Kemmerer’s 
1929 reports. Section 2.3.3 presents the critical reports on China’s banking system. 
Section 2.3.4 illustrates our commentary on Kemmerer’s 1929 reports. 
2.3.1 Political and Economic Background of China, 1927-1937 
After World War I, the gold standard was suspended in many countries. On the 
contrary, as a former silver standard country, China was trying to adopt the gold standard 
in the 1920s, as influenced by American gold standard promoters like Edwin 
Kemmerer. 148  For understanding the policymaking in China and the impact of the 
American monetary specialists during the 1920s, it was essential to review the history of 
China at that epoch to understand their general situation. In this section, we survey the 
general political and economic background in China from 1927 to 1937, the beginning of 
Nationalist China, and the era of the Nanjing Golden Decade due to the economic growth 
that happened in China at that time. Subsection 2.3.1.1 reviews the general political 
conditions of China from 1927 to 1937. Subsection 2.3.1.2 demonstrates the economic 
background during that period.  
148 See D. Kemmerer (1993, p. 22). 
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2.3.1.1 The general political conditions during the Nanjing Golden Decade, 
1927-1937. Chinese politics before the establishment of the National Government were 
chaotic. As the political, economic, and social crises of the late Qing Dynasty continued 
erupting, the republicans launched the Wuchang Uprising on October 10, 1911.149 The 
Wuchang Uprising, as a part of the 1911 republication Xinhai Revolution, overthrew the 
Manchurian Qing Dynasty's 268-year rule in the Han majority China. Subsequently, on 
January 1, 1912, due to The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, Sun Yat-
sen, a republican leader and founder of the Kuomintang, was sworn in as the Provisional 
President of the Republic of China in Nanjing. 150  In February, Yuan Shikai, Prime 
Minister of the last modern western-style responsible cabinet of the Qing Dynasty and the 
leader of the Beiyang Army of the court, persuaded Emperor Xuantong and the Qing 
royal family to abdicate, which marked the suspension of China’s attempt to establish a 
constitutional monarchy. Later, Yuan Shikai moved the Republic of China’s capital from 
Nanjing to Beijing, the former capital of the Qing Dynasty, to control the political 
situation of the whole of China in his hands. In this way, the former military personnel of 
the Beiyang Army, represented by Yuan Shikai, began to rule China for 15 years. After 
Yuan died in 1916, the Beiyang Government was divided. In early 1917, Duan Qirui, 
Prime Minister of the Beiyang Government, announced the abolition of The Provisional 
Constitution of the Republic of China and the Congress. Duan’s controversial action led 
to the dissatisfaction of Kuomintang parliamentary members and its leader Sun Yat-sen. 
On July 17 of the same year, in the south China city Guangzhou, Sun Yat-sen established 
the Constitutional Protection Junta (also called the Military Government) to restore the 
149 For more about the political background before the establishment of the National Government, see 
Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
150 The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China is written as “ѝ㨟≁഻㠘ᱲ㌴⌅” in Chinese. 
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provisional constitution which was the predecessor of the later National Government. 
During the rule of the Beiyang Government, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was 
established in Shanghai in 1921, gradually becoming a significant political force during 
the period of the Republic of China on the Chinese Mainland. The CCP defeated the 
democratically elected government of the Republic of China led by the Chinese 
Nationalist Party during the Civil War from 1945 to 1949 and began a reign of terror of 
communist and totalitarian rule over Mainland China for more than 70 years. 
China’s political situation was gradually stabilizing with the gradual 
establishment of the National Government. After the establishment of the Military 
Government, Sun Yat-sen intended to use Guangdong Province as a southern base to 
restore the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China.151 On April 12, 1924, Sun 
Yat-sen published The National Government’s Outline for Founding the Nation, which 
became one of the essential principles of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or 
KMT) and its Military Government.152 As a result of this book, China would achieve a 
constitutional order through the Period of Military Government, the Period of Political 
Tutelage through the Kuomintang led Party-State and the Period of Constitutional 
Politics.153 To achieve the goal of establishing a constitutional order, at the military level, 
Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang also organized their own army, the National 
Revolutionary Army, which later became the national military force fighting against the 
Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).154 Chiang Kai-shek was 
nominated as an essential military official of the National Revolutionary Army. In May 
151 See X. Li & Z. Li (2011, pp. 125-187). 
152 See Y. Sun (1924). 
153 The Period of Military Government, the Period of Political Tutelage, and the Period of Constitutional 
Politics are written in Chinese as “䓽᭯,” “䁃᭯,”, and “២᭯” originally. 
154 See C. Wang (2011, p. 283). 
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1924, Chiang was appointed as the Superintendent of Republic of China Military 
Academy, who became the highest military leader of the National Government after Sun 
Yat-sen’s death, also known as “Generalissimo Chiang.” In March 1925, Sun Yat-sen 
died in Beijing when he was negotiating with the Beiyang Government in peace talks.155 
After Sun’s death, the peace talks between the Nationalists and the Beiyang Government 
broken down soon.  
In this situation, On July 1, 1925, the Chinese Nationalist Party officially 
established the National Government of the Republic of China to achieve the Period of 
Political Tutelage that the political party had promised to the Chinese people.156 With the 
breakdown of the peace talks between the National Government and the Beiyang 
Government, in July 1926, the National Government began the Northern Expedition to 
unify China and eliminate the Beiyang Government.157 On April 18, 1927, the National 
Government moved its capital to Nanjing. In the same year, the Nationalist Party and the 
Communist Party, which had initially cooperated in military and political affairs, split. 
The Communist Party began its military rebellion and gradually controlled Mainland 
China after 1949. In 1928, the Northern Expedition of the National Government 
succeeded, ending the rule of the Beiyang Government in north China and unifying the 
whole of China officially. In the same year, the National Government promulgated The 
Provisional Constitution for the Period of Political Tutelage of the Republic of China, 
formally starting to implement the Kuomintang led Party-State period that Sun Yat-sen 
155 See Luo et al. (2011, pp. 78-106). 
156 See Luo et al. (2011, pp. 503-507). 
157 Reference of the Northern Expedition and the establishment of the National Government see T. Yang 
(2011, pp. 341-345, pp. 358-361) and Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 10, pp. 111-115). 
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had designed. 158  After the Northern Expedition, the National Government controlled 
most of the Chinese Mainland except some small areas (only 7 of 18 provinces) that were 
mostly occupied by the Communist Party and the Japanese (especially in Manchuria).159  
The following years were Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership of the ROC National 
Government. Qiang became the de facto head of the National Government after it moved 
its capital to Nanjing in 1927. He served as President of the National Government from 
October 1928 to December 1931. From December 1931 to May 1946, he served as 
Chairman of the Military Commission of the National Government. In April 1938, he 
started working as the Director-General of the Kuomintang. On May 20, 1948, Chiang 
Kai-shek was elected as the President of the Republic of China by the First National 
Assembly, becoming the first head of state in Chinese history to be democratically 
elected like the Electoral College of the US presidential election.160 After the defeat in the 
Civil War in 1949, Chiang retreated to Taiwan, serving as the Director-General of the 
Kuomintang and the President of the Republic of China until he died in Taipei on April 5, 
1975. 
The ten years from 1927 to 1937 were a rare period of relative peace during the 
era of the Republic of China on the Chinese Mainland. That period from 1927 to 1937 
158 The Provisional Constitution for the Period of Political Tutelage of the Republic of China is written as 
“ѝ㨟≁഻䁃᭯ᱲᵏ㌴⌅” in Chinese. 
159 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 150). In the middle and late years of the Nanjing Golden Decade, 
the northern territory of the Republic of China was gradually invaded by the Japanese. Japan launched the 
Mukden Incident in 1931, and gradually occupied Northeast China (Manchuria) in the following months. In 
1932, the Japanese supported the establishment of Manchukuo (1932-1945) in northeast China. The 
investigation by the League of Nations identified it as the puppet regime of the Japanese. Therefore, some 
scholars believe that the Sino-Japanese War has broken out since 1931, rather than 1937 (Gordon, 2003, p. 
189). For a detailed description of this history, see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 492-519). For more 
about the political and economic situation in Japan before the Second Sino Japanese War, see Chapter 11 of 
A. Gordon’s A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (2003, pp. 182-203). For the 
wartime Japan, see Chapter 12 of the same book (pp. 204-225). 
160 In 1996, the Republic of China on Taiwan elected Lee Teng-hui as the President of the Republic of 
China through direct election of the people. In this way, the Republic of China fully realized its 
constitutional system in its Free Area. 
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was also called “the Nanjing Golden Decade.”161 As a result, the National Government 
was able to pursue its policies. The government and the Kuomintang adhered to Sun Yat-
sen's The Three Principles of the People: Chinese Nationalism, Government by the 
People, and Minshengism. Chinese Nationalism stands for equality among all ethnic 
groups in the Republic of China, and the use of traditional Chinese morals as the basis for 
peace among all the Chinese ethnic groups.162 Government by the People is about Sun 
Yat-sen’s proposition of the separation of the constitutional five powers, namely, the 
separation of administrative, legislative, judicial, examination, and political audit 
institutions. 163  This political system was first initiated in 1925 when the National 
Government was established. In 1946, the Constitutional National Assembly, which was 
elected through democratic procedures, adopted The Constitution of the Republic of 
China based on Sun’s separation of the five powers. 164 After the government of the 
Republic of China retired to Taiwan in 1949, it continued to use the basic structure of this 
constitution until now.  
Minshengism is about Sun Yat-sen’s proposals of economic policy, which can be 
literally translated as “the People’s livelihood.”165 Sun Yat-sen’s economic policy was 
neither a completely laissez-faire economic policy nor a Marxist communism proposal. In 
his view, a market economy can certainly promote economic development. Still, it 
requires state intervention to control capital and collect taxations (such as the land tax), 
avoiding a wide gap between the rich and the poor.166 Thereinto, the establishment of the 
161 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 116-167) and D. Ma (2012). 
162 See Y. Sun (1924/1927c). 
163 For Sun Yat-sen’s entire theory of Government by the People, see Y. Sun (1924/1927a). 
164 For more about the adoption of the 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China, see section 6.2.1 in 
Chapter 6. 
165 For Sun Yat-sen’s entire theory of Minshengism, see Y. Sun (1924/1927b). 
166 See Y. Sun (1924/1927b, pp. 30-35). 
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system of state-owned controlled by state capitals is an essential tool for achieving social 
equality in Sun Yat-sen’s thought. In the discourse of Minshengism, although Sun Yat-
sen had no systematic banking theory, he emphasized the necessity to establish a modern 
central bank system for China. He advocated the introduction of foreign capital to 
develop the Chinese economy, and a national central bank could play a role in financing 
the process of economic opening and development.167  
Though Sun Yat-sen did not propose any systematic theory of establishing a 
modern central banking institution, he still argued that it is necessary to issue banknotes 
to solve the financial shortage of the National Government. In contrast, he proposed that 
although the banknote reserves do not necessarily have to be 100% reserve when the 
government receives tax revenue, the previously issued banknotes that were used for 
supporting the government expenditure should be destroyed so that there would no price 
inflation which would distort the economy. 168  Thus, Sun supported a 100% reserve 
system and opposed monetary inflation and price inflation. Sun’s theories of 100% 
reserve and anti-price inflation were accepted by the National Government when it 
designed the central bank system in the late 1920s. However, we will show in later 
analysis in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 that although the Chinese and Western financial and 
economic experts agreed in principle with Sun Yat-sen's theories of 100% reserve and 
anti-price inflation, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek did not follow these two principles 
during the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, which eventually led to 
price hyperinflation causing the collapse of the Chinese economy during the Communist 
Revolution. 
167 See Tamagna (1942, pp. 48-49) and Y. Sun (1924/1927b, pp. 32-35). 
168 For more about Sun Yat-sen’s proposal of establishing banknote system, see Y. Sun (1912/1982). 
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2.3.1.2 The general economic conditions during the Nanjing Golden Decade, 
1927-1937. During the Golden Decade, China’s industries were developing rapidly. At 
the same time, investment, commodity size, market size, and import and export were all 
growing. Transportation and urbanization were also evolving. Despite the limited data at 
that time, we can still find the promising phenomenon of China’s economic growth 
during the Nanjing Golden Decade. Despite the lack of comprehensive statistics, existing 
research has revealed that the Chinese industries were developing very rapidly during the 
Golden Decade. In the 1920s, the development of the handicraft industry reached its peak, 
and its output value was comparable to that of agricultural products. 169 Knitting, silk 
weaving, dyeing, wool textile, and other industries continued to develop in the 1920s and 
1930s. Several industries also emerged, such as the electrical appliance industry, the 
motor industry, the fuel industry, the alcohol industry, and the saline-alkali industry. The 
development of the electrical appliance industry and motor industry also led to the growth 
of handicrafts. 170  In the 1930s, 93.5% and 89.6% of Chinese and foreign-invested 
industries turned a profit.171 
During the Nanjing Golden Decade, foreign investment, commodity size, market 
size, and import and export in China all increased compared to previous periods. From 
1911 to 1914, foreign capital invested in China reached 1.021 billion yuan, a proportion 
of 57.2% of the whole investment in China, which had an average annual growth rate of 
5.8%. 172 The period from the 1920s to the 1930s was the fastest period for foreign 
169 See C. Wu (2001, p. 298). 
170 See H. Huang (2007). 
171 See Chen Zhao (2007). 
172 See Zheng (2005, p. 560). 
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investment growth during the era of the ROC on Mainland China.173 In 1931, foreign 
investment reached 242.5 million yuan, of which 1.4 billion was a commercial 
investment, including 8,000 foreign banks, shops, hotels, and even various entertainment 
venues. Compared with 1920 and 1914, domestic capital investment increased from 
1.786 billion yuan to 2.597 billion yuan. From 1908 to 1920, the annual growth rate of 
commodities was 10.46%. From 1920 to 1936, the annual growth rate of commodities 
was 3.6%, of which the annual growth rate of industrial products was 7.55% (the factor 
of price inflation excluded). 174  From 1920 to 1936, China’s domestic investment 
increased from 9.244 billion yuan to 16.806 billion yuan, an increase of 2.7%.175 From an 
extended period, we can see it more clearly the degree of domestic investment growth in 
the Nanjing Golden Decade. From 1887 to 1922, the annual growth rate of domestic 
investment was only 1.00%, and the growth rate of consumption was only 0.67%. From 
1922 to 1936, the annual growth of domestic investment was 1.45%, while the percentage 
of consumption was 3.75%. 
Similarly, imports and exports were growing. Despite the lack of statistics from 
previous periods, China’s exports tripled in the first 30 years of the 20th century, while 
Japan only doubled, and India had almost no growth.176 Regardless of the Manchuria 
region, China’s import quota was C$1,298 million in 1927, and the highest import quota 
in the period of Nanjing Decade was reached in 1931, which was C$2,002 million, an 
increase of 54%. The export value in 1927 was C$980 million and in 1929 it reached the 
highest export quota in the same period, which was C$944 million. The total value of 
173 Data of the foreign investment from 1920s to 1930s see J. Zhu (2012, p. 334). 
174 See C. Wu (2001, p. 298) 
175 See D. Zhang (2005, p. 125). 
176 See Du (2004, p. 157). 
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imports and exports increased from C$2,278 million in 1927 to C$2,917 million in 1931. 
Although the total value of imports and exports fell to C$1,791 million in 1937 due to 
war issues, China’s imports and exports had developed to a considerable extent in the 
years before the Second Sino-Japanese War began. During this period, railway, shipping, 
and road transport all developed, but the development of road transport was the most 
significant.177 China had no highways in 1913 and the total mileage of highways grew to 
1185 kilometers in 1922 and 9,6078 kilometers in 1935, an increase of more than 80 
times in 15 years.178 In the 1930s, the urban population reached a growth rate twice that 
of the percentage of the national population. 179  The provinces that the major cities 
Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Shenyang were located in, accounted for 
only about 10% of China’s territory, but had 36.3% of the national population, and 84% 
of foreign trade of the whole country. 
Compared to the development of other industries, the situation of agriculture 
was entirely the opposite. Despite the lack of systematic statistics, studies based on some 
statistics and evidence point out that China’s agriculture was very underdeveloped at that 
time. In 1933, modern manufacturing, mining, and utilities accounted for only 3.4% of 
domestic products.180 Four of the five Chinese were farmers, and they contributed 65% of 
domestic products. 181 Although no systematic statistics are available, China’s 
backwardness can be seen from the mortality rate. In the 1930s, China had the highest 
mortality rate in the world. The mortality rate was 2.5 times that of the United States and 
even higher than India at that time. 
177 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 336). 
178 See D. Zhang (2005, p. 125). 
179 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 337). 
180 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 151) and T. C. Liu & Yeh (1965, p. 66, p. 89). 
181 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 151) and T. C. Liu & Yeh (1965, p. 66, p. 89). 
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In 1930, the Legislative Yuan passed the Land Law in an attempt to reduce the 
burden on farmers by rents of up to 37.5%. However, the reform was opposed by 
landowners. 50-70% of the main crop rents were still paid by farmers, while half of the 
Chinese farmers were still tenant farmers, so the reform failed. 182  Economist A. N. 
Young believed that the reason for the failure of the agrarian reform was that the 
government sympathized with the landlord class and was unwilling to offend them.183 
Historian of Chinese history L. E. Eastman considered that the cause of rural poverty was 
the unfavorable ratio between the rural population and food production. 184 However, 
from the capital theory of the Austrian school, the reason for poverty is that capital 
accumulation is underdeveloped. The lack of capital leads to the backward production 
technology and low labor prices, wherein workers cannot be transferred to higher-paying 
industries, and their marginal returns cannot be improved. 185 The land reform of the 
Republic of China’s government did not achieve results until it moved to Taiwan in 1949. 
From 1934 to 1936, the government adjusted the flood control facilities in agricultural 
areas and helped the farmers improve their production techniques.186 However, only four 
percent of government revenue was used to promote the economic development of 
farms.187 From 1936 to 1937, the survival of the peasants became more moderate. The 
temperate weather resulted in the best harvest in 20 years, while price inflation improved 
182 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 151-152). 
183 See A. Young (1971, p. 389). 
184 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 152). 
185 See Mises (1949/1998, pp. 669-680). 
186 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 152). 
187 See A. Young (1971, p. 437, p. 439). 
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the farmers’ nominal income. 188  In any case, in 1936, the National Government 
apologized for its ineffective agricultural policy.189 
The agricultural industry also faced a general price deflation during that 
period.190 Due to the lack of statistics, there is no corresponding data for other years in 
the Golden Decade. However, if the 1931 agricultural price index was taken as 100, then 
the index fell continuously in the next few years. From 1932 to 1934, the annual index 
was 72, 61, and 56. After the currency reform in 1935, the index rose. The index in 1935 
was 56, 57 in 1936, and 60 in 1937. Therefore, from the perspective of falling prices or 
price deflation, it is clear that farmers did not benefit from the Golden Decade. From the 
above data, we can see that the agricultural situation in the golden decade was not 
prosperous. Only after 1935, the year of the currency reform, the prices were deflationary 
in the agricultural industry, and the farmers were receiving more profits. It was indeed a 
“golden decade” for the development of industry, but not for agriculture. For more about 
the political and economic background during the Nanjing Golden Decade, see section 
4.2 in Chapter 4. 
2.3.2 A General Description of the 1929 Kemmerer Reports 
After reviewing China’s political and economic background from 1927-1937 
that were related to the 1929 Kemmerer reports, in this section, we generally demonstrate 
the reports. Subsection 2.3.2.1 demonstrates the general background of the 1929 
Kemmerer reports and his trip to China in 1929. Subsection 2.3.2.2 provides the 
description of the investigated Kemmerer China papers at Princeton University. 
Subsection 2.3.2.3 provides the description of the investigated Kemmerer China papers at 
188 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 153). 
189 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 153) and Holland & Mitchells (1937, p. 166). 
190 See A. Young (1971, p. 479). 
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the Hoover Institution Library and Archives. Subsection 2.3.2.4 is about the description 
of the investigated Kemmerer China papers in China. 
2.3.2.1 The general background of the 1929 Kemmerer reports and his trip 
to China in 1929. China built their first central bank in November 1928. But as it was not 
a central reserve bank and meanwhile China was facing the threat of Japanese and the 
Communists, the National Government and many economists believed that a proper 
banking system could help the Chinese overcome those challenges. Therefore, a proper 
banking system was an urgent priority for China’s politicians, bankers, and elites.191 The 
coming of the American monetary specialist group directed by E. Kemmerer provided an 
opportunity for China to fix those problems. 
The Republic of China and the United States had an excellent relationship 
during the 1920s. In 1928, Sun Yat-sen’s son Sun Fo came to the United States to start 
diplomatic activities in hopes of receiving US economic assistance. In the end, Sun Fo 
invited Edwin Kemmerer to China to investigate and provide advice on currency 
issues. 192  In February 1929, in the request of the Chinese National Government, 
Kemmerer went to China to design the reform program of China’s monetary system.193 
After 9 months of research, Kemmerer found that China did not have a single currency 
system issued by the central bank, and the multiple metal standard made it different from 
the currency standard in the United States, Europa, and Latin America. In November 
1929, Kemmerer submitted his plan, Project of Law for the Gradual Introduction of a 
Gold-standard Currency System of China, to the National Government, proposing that 
191 For a detailed analysis of the background of the Nationalists’ first central banking experiment and the 
process of the establishment of the Central Bank of China in 1929, see section 4.3.1 to section 4.3.3 in 
Chapter 4. 
192 See F. Sun (1973) and A. Young & Fuchs (1974). 
193 See Matsuoka (1939). 
115 
                                                 
China should adopt the gold standard to modernize its currency system. The gold content 
of the new currency unit would be called Sun. One Sun should be equal to the value of 
US$0.40, a shill of seven pence, or 0.825 Japanese Yen.194 This report was the final 
report which Kemmerer submitted to the National Government as the gold standard 
reform plan.195 
The Kemmerer Report for China included not only the above paper, but also 
many other documents for reforming China’s banking system in detail. This provides a 
general picture of Kemmerer’s monetary thoughts on China’s banking issues. Though not 
all the papers were included in his final report, it is still essential to understand 
Kemmerer’s general banking plan and thoughts form China through these papers. And, as 
we have demonstrated in the biography section, Kemmerer was very cautious, which 
provides us a chance to view the general political and economic condition of China 
behind Kemmerer’s reports. 
Primarily, we must establish how many papers Kemmerer prepared for China 
and what were the topics of his writings. Fortunately, the Princeton University Library 
and Hoover Institution Library and Archives kept almost all the most critical archives 
related to Edwin Kemmerer and his coworkers’ Chinese study. We investigated the 
scanned online archives of Princeton University Library, went to Hoover Institution 
Library and Archives in November 2016, and studied the scanned online archives from 
friends in Mainland China’s academia. 
194 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 340). The original name of Project of Law for the Gradual Introduction of a Gold-
standard Currency System of China in Chines is “₼⦚抟䇇㘰嫛摠㦻⇜ヲⓅ㽤㫗.” Sun (ⷺ) is the 
surname of Kuomintang’s founder, Sun Yat-sen. 
195 Our research finds that in the 1890s, American scholars raised the assumption that China needed to 
adopt the gold standard. For related content, see Conant (1903). 
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2.3.2.2 The description of the investigated Kemmerer China papers at 
Princeton University. According to the website of Princeton University Library, the 
documents of the 14-American-member Kemmerer Commission were located as a 
collection at Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. The papers cover the date 
from 1903 to 1943, which included both the documents from the Late Qing Dynasty 
(1903-1912), Nanjing Provisional of Republic of China (1912), Beiyang Government 
(1912-1928), and the National Government (1928-1943). The documents also cover the 
data and evidence of China’s political and economic situation, especially the financial 
and banking situation, and Kemmerer’s banking reform suggestions, most of which are 
written in 1929 when he submitted his 1929 report. 
In the collection of Kemmerer’s papers at the online archives of Princeton 
University Library, we found 13 boxes which included Banks and Banking (1903-1943), 
Budget and Accounting (1929), Coinage (1924-1931), Correspondence (1928-1935), 
Currency (1920-1940), Customs and Tariff (1929), Industry and Trade (1929), 
Kemmerer Commission of Financial Experts (1928-1933), Laws, Regulations and 
Proposals (1929), Match Monopoly (1929), Public Credit (1918-1930), Railroads (1928-
1930), and Reference Materials (1903-1941). The most relevant boxes for our thesis are 
the Kemmerer Commission of Financial Experts and Laws, Regulations and Proposals. 
2.3.2.2.1 The Box of Kemmerer Commission of Financial Experts. The first-
most relevant box related to Kemmerer’s gold standard plan on China, the box of 
Kemmerer Commission of Financial Experts, which is also the critical research result of 
Kemmerer and his commission, is mostly scanned. This box includes the following sub-
boxes: Interviews (1929, scanned and preserved in the online archive), Members and 
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Personal (1928-1929, scanned and preserved), Newspaper Clippings (1929-1933), 
Photographs (1929), and Reports by the Commission (1929, mostly scanned and 
preserved). 
The key sub-box, Reports by the Commission, contains the most crucial reports 
of Kemmerer Commission. The reports in the box Reports by the Commission includes 
the following 16 reports, Banking Law, General (1929, scanned and preserved), Central 
Reserve Bank (1929), Consumption Tax on Matches (1929), Consumption Tax on 
Portland Cement (1929), Currency (1929, scanned and preserved), Customs Duties on 
Gold Basis (1929, scanned and preserved), Customs Revenues (circa 1929 scanned and 
preserved), Department of National Debt (1929, scanned and preserved), Documentary 
Stamp Tax (1929, scanned and preserved), Introduction of Gold-Standard Currency 
System (1929), Public Credit Rehabilitation Law (1929, scanned and preserved), Public 
Credit Rehabilitation Law (1929, scanned and preserved), Railway Finance (1929), 
Revenue Policy (1929, scanned and preserved), Tariff Law (1929, scanned and preserved), 
and the Withdrawal of Copper Coins (1929, scanned and preserved). 
Central Reserve Bank is the first key to Kemmerer’s gold standard report in this 
box. The paper described the planned general characteristics and rules of the new central 
bank of China. 
Introduction of Gold-Standard Currency System is the second key report in this 
box, which is a description of the Kemmererian gold standard plan. Although the 
Princeton University Library unfortunately did not provide the scanned online version of 
it, we can still use the following two ways to track the gold standard principles provided 
by Kemmerer Commission. The first way is to investigate the theory of gold standard by 
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Kemmerer’s book Gold and the Gold Standard (1944), which has been illustrated in 
section 2.2.3 above. The second way is to track the rest of the available papers of 
Kemmerer Commission on the gold standard, including what we are going to describe in 
the rest of this chapter. 
2.3.2.2.2 The box of Laws, Regulations, and Proposals. The second most 
related box of is Laws, Regulations and Proposals, which contains eight papers. The 
eight papers are the following, Accounting (1929, scanned and preserved), Bankers 
Weekly Articles (1929), Banks and Banking (1929), Currency Reform and Currency 
Conditions (1929, scanned), National Government (1929), Public Credits (1929), 
Taxation (1929), and Translation of Tables of Contents and Selections (1929). 
The key paper related to the topic of our thesis is Currency Reform and 
Currency Conditions. This paper was the legal proposal which illustrated how to make 
currency reform and provided the conditions of making the currency reform. 
Unfortunately, many pages of this scanned paper were not clear enough to figure out the 
words. Thus, we could not go further to investigate it thoroughly. In this cause, we use 
other articles from Kemmerer’s Commission and the related papers of Arthur N. Young. 
He was also a member of Kemmerer’s Commission to describe the gold standard reform 
plan of Kemmerer’s Commission.  
The American economist and lawyer Arthur N. Young (1890-1984) received 
his Ph.D. degree in economics at Princeton University and a degree in law from George 
Washington University. After his graduation, Young started to teach at Princeton 
University and began to serve as the American financial specialist in Mexico, Spain, and 
Honduras and other Asian and Latin American counties all around the world like Edwin 
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Kemmerer.196 As a well-trained economist and excellent diplomat, Young also spoke 
fluent Spanish, which helped his work a lot in Latin American countries. 197 Young 
himself even called Kemmerer, “my teacher and my colleague.”198 From 1922 to 1928, 
Young served as the economic advisor of the State Department.199 Meanwhile, he was 
working as an American observer with the Reparations Commission in Paris, France.200 
In 1929, Young came to China to serve as the monetary specialist of the 1929 
Kemmerer Commission on China until 1946.201 In his 17-year serving time in China, as 
the monetary specialist, he helped to establish China’s first modern central bank from 
1928 to 1929 and switch it into the Central Reserve Bank of China in the late 1930s. 
During the Second World War and the Second Sino Japanese War, Young was 
nominated as the chairman of the Commission of the National Government on Relief 
and Rehabilitation. Young also served as one of the representatives from the Republic of 
China to the Bretton Woods Conference. After his service in China, Young returned to 
the US, starting to serve as a financial adviser for dozens of countries in Latin America, 
the Middle East, and Southeast Asia in the 1950s.202 In 1951, he worked as the leader of 
the Young Commission to Saudi Arabia, investigating the political and economic 
situation there. 203  Throughout his life, Young wrote three monographs on China’s 
political and economic situation during the era of Nationalist China from 1927 to 1949: 
China and the Helping Hand, 1937-1945 (1963), China’s Wartime Finance and 
Inflation, 1937-1945 (1965), China’s Nation-Building Effort, 1927-1937: The Financial 
196 See EARCHU (1963). 
197 See A. Young & Fuchs (1974). 
198 See A. Young & Fuchs (1974). 
199 See EARCHU (1963). 
200 See The New York Times (1984). 
201 See EARCHU (1963), and A. Young & Fuchs (1974). 
202 See EARCHU (1963). 
203 See The New York Times (1984), and A. Young &Fuchs (1974). 
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and Economic Record (1971).204 Young arrived in China in 1928 and left the country in 
late 1947. He spent nearly 20 years serving as a financial advisor of the Chinese 
government. During his service in China, he had an excellent personal relationship with 
T. V. Soong and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.205 On July 19, 1984, Young died at 
home in Claremont, California. The East Asian Research Center of Harvard gave Young 
very high praise as “a skilled foreigner invited, like Marco Polo or Robert Hard, to 
participate in the governing of China” and “a pioneer” in bringing the new foreign aid to 
during war times.206 For more about Young’s monetary theories and his activities in 
China, see Chapter 3. 
2.3.2.3 The description of the investigated Kemmerer China Papers in 
Hoover Institution Library and Archives. In Hoover Institution Library, we 
investigated that there are 7 reports of the Kemmerer Commission there. The reports are 
the following, Memorandum on Certain Matters Relating to the Currency (1929), Project 
of Law for the Gradual Introduction of a Gold-standard Currency System of China 
(1929), Report on railway finance (1929), Memorandum on the Withdrawal of Copper 
Coins from Circulation (1929), Report on Revenue Policy (1929), Summary of Projects of 
Law Dealing with Financial Planning, Budget Preparation, Budget Enforcement, 
Accounting, Fiscal Control, Supervisory Inspection and Audit, Together with Reports in 
204  In 1947, A. Young wrote another small pamphlet called China’s Economic and Financial 
Reconstruction. However, because the length of this book is too short, and many of its contents have been 
covered in his other three books, we do not list his book as his important monograph on China. 
205 See A. Young &Fuchs (1974). 
206 See EARCHU (1963). It was evident that Young’s interest in a healthy currency possibly had to do with 
US investment in China. Because Young was a financial expert sent by the US government to China, he 
took the task of the US government to stabilize the Chinese currency to China which would also benefit the 
US economically. However, this point does not contradict his belief in a healthier monetary system as a 
financial expert. The following discussion in this chapter will confirm that there is no negation between 
these two points. 
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Support Thereof (1929), Project of a Public Credit Rehabilitation Law, Together with a 
Report on the National Debt of China and the Rehabilitation of China's Credit (1929). 
The report, Project of Law for the Gradual Introduction of a Gold-standard 
Currency System of China, which is one of the key Kemmerer reports, has been 
authorized to be scanned partly by the personnel in Hoover Institution Library. Due to the 
requirements from Hoover Institution, we could not copy all the pages of the report. Thus, 
we chose the articles part of the report, which illustrates the principles of the gold 
standard conception of the Kemmerer Commission. 
In Hoover Institution Achieves, we also investigate the collection of Arthur N. 
Young’s papers, which also contain some of Kemmerer’s articles and letters for making 
the gold-standard banking reform. We will discuss Young’s papers in Chapter 3. 
2.3.2.4 The description of the investigated Kemmerer China Papers in 
China. With the help of academic friends in the Chinese Mainland, we investigated the 
online academic resources from Chinese literature. In our search, we sought out the 
Chinese version of the Project of Law for the Gradual Introduction of a Gold-standard 
Currency System of China, which has been cited or introduced in some Chinese 
literature.207 As we have both the Chinese version and English version of the report, we 
did a contrast reading of both versions, which would help us to understand the monetary 
reform of the Kemmerer Commission better. 
We conclude that there are four key papers of the Kemmerer Commission 
related to the gold-standard and central banking, which are, Project of Law for the 
Gradual Introduction of a Gold-standard Currency System of China, Introduction of 
207 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 340), Ministry of Finance (2016), and H. Zhu & J. Li (2007). For personal security 
reasons, the institutions and academic intellectuals from China will be anonymous in this paper. 
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Gold-Standard Currency System (which did not include in the scanned version in the 
Princeton University), Central Reserve Bank, and Currency Reform and Currency 
Condition (had been scanned but the scanned words were not able to be clearly 
investigated). In the next section, we present the aforementioned key Kemmerer papers 
on China’s banking system. 
2.3.3 Presentations of Kemmerer’s Key Reports on China’s Banking System 
After we have demonstrated the general description of the 1929 Kemmerer 
reports, in this section, we present the two investigated key papers of the Kemmerer 
Commission, Project of Law for the Gradual Introduction of a Gold-standard Currency 
System of China and Project of Law for the Creation of the Central Reserve Bank of 
China (the same as the described Central Reserve Bank). 
2.3.3.1 The presentation of Kemmerer’s paper of the law for gold standard 
in China. We will review the paper of the Kemmerer Commission, Project of Law for the 
Gradual Introduction of a Gold-standard Currency System of China, in this section. 208 
This paper was Kemmerer’s comprehensive proposal on how to reform China’s banking 
system in the central banking gold standard system in November 1929 after he visited 
China in February the same year. The paper has four chapters with 40 articles in total, 
which provides us a direct perspective of Kemmerer’s gold standard plan on China.  
Chapter I is “The Standard and Unit of Value.” This chapter only has one page 
with three articles, but it provided the elemental gold standard form for the National 
Government. Firstly, in Article I, the Kemmerer commission designed that the National 
Government would gradually adopt the gold standard, which means the adoption of the 
208 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b). 
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gold standard would not be realized immediately. Secondly, in Article II, the paper 
defined that the unit of value of the gold standard currency should “consist of 60.1866 
centigrams of pure gold,” which should be called “sun.” This article also defined that the 
symbol of the currency should be “S.” Thirdly, Article III represented the currency units 
of sun, which said that one sun should be “divided into 100 cents, and the cent into ten 
mills.”209  
Chapter II is “Coins and Coinage.” These two items defined the rules of coin and 
coinage in the new gold standard currency. Firstly, Article IV strictly explained that the 
coinage of the new currency should be made only in the mints strictly controlled by the 
National Government, which means that the new currency sun should be an entirely 
governmental central banking currency. Secondly, Article V defined that there should be 
four classes of coins, which composed of both silver and copper coins. Thirdly, this 
article also restrained the issuance of the two mill-copper coins only in the condition of 
“public interest,” and the National Government should designate the place where the 
currency should be circuited. When the paper described that only in “public interest” 
could the government issue new currency in a restricted method, it is evident that the 
Kemmerer Commission knew clearly the government could overuse its power to issue 
currency for some benefits, which would possibly have nothing to do with the public 
interest. Finally, from Article VI to Article X, the paper described the planned size, form 
of coins, and the limit of tolerance of silver coins.210 
Chapter III is “Legal Status of Gold-standard Currency.” This chapter described 
the legal status after the issuance of the gold standard currency. Firstly, Article XII 
209 For Chapter I of the Project, see Kemmerer Commission (1929a, p.1). 
210 For Chapter II of the Project, see Kemmerer Commission (1929a, pp.1-2). 
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described the process of how to adopt the gold standard. This article set that the National 
Government should announce the gold standard 60 days before it is adopted in the 
designated provinces. Secondly, this chapter also specified that the new gold standard 
currency should be used in all the economic aspects, including paying salary, debt, tax, 
and deposits. Thirdly, the chapter also defined how to switch the old currencies into the 
new gold standard currency system in the above economic aspects. Finally, this chapter 
also rules that the non-gold standard currencies should be exchanged as redemption in a 
particular rate decided by the Minister of Finance in consideration of public interest. Still, 
it also did not provide a specific mensuration of how to choose the “exchange rate in 
public interest.”211 
Chapter IV is “Maintenance of Gold-standard.” The chapter described how to 
maintain the gold standard though law. Firstly, according to the paper, the Ministry of 
Finance should establish a “Gold-Standard Fund” to stabilize the gold standard currency 
system specifically. The law ruled that the gold standard should always have at least 35% 
of the “total amount of gold-standard coins in circulation.”212 Secondly, the fund was 
forbidden to put its money as deposits in any banks. Nor were they to put Chinese or 
foreign banks in Chinese territory. The law allowed the fund to put its money as deposits 
in foreign countries that had a “free market.”213 This law also clearly showed that there 
should be a certain amount of gold standard funding to maintain currency circulation. 
Thirdly, the law also ruled new ways of withdrawing the damaged gold standard currency 
and ways of issuing the new currencies instead of the same amount of the damaged ones. 
Here, it is also clear that the Kemmerer Commission was trying to make a law to restrict 
211 For Chapter III of the Project, see Kemmerer Commission (1929a, pp. 4-7). 
212 For Chapter IV of the Project, see Kemmerer Commission (1929a, pp. 8-9). 
213 See Kemmerer Commission (1929a. pp. 11-17). 
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the currency issuance from government, as the government would possibly over-issue 
currency in the name of “using the new currencies instead of the same amount of the old 
ones.” Fourthly, the law also ruled that there should be an office under the Minister of 
Finance to manage the gold standard and that specific law for paying the salaries of the 
office should also be demonstrated by National Government. This means that the 
Kemmerer Commission wanted the management of the Gold-Standard Fund to be partly 
separate from politics. Finally, this chapter also issued specific rules for the National 
Government’s currency exchange, including the designated financial center in foreign 
countries (i.e., New York and San Francisco) for exchange, and the amount and process 
of the exchange. This rule also clearly pointed out that the Kemmerer Commission also 
had made some rules to guide the National Government to manage currency exchange to 
avoid damage to the Chinese economy. The problem was whether or not it was practical 
to execute this law, as the National Government was very authoritarian at the time.214 
Chapter V is the “Gradual Substitution of Gold-Standard Currency for Non-
Gold-Standard Currency.” The chapter described how to gradually adapt to the new gold 
standard instead of the old one. Firstly, this chapter illustrated that a National Currency 
Commission and the sub-provincial commissions should be established to prepare the 
transition from the old currency system to the new gold standard. 215 The job of the 
Commission included the arrangement of the currency transition, propaganda for the new 
currency system, and the study of “the different kinds of currencies in circulation and 
conditions” in every province of China. 216 Secondly, the chapter also formulated the 
214 See Kemmerer Commission (1929a, pp. 8-17). 
215  See Kemmerer Commission (1929a, p. 18). The original Chinese name of the National Currency 
Commission is “⏷⦚ヲⓅⱣ❰㦒.” 
216 See Kemmerer Commission (1929a, p. 20). 
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budget and salary rules of the Commission and the sub-provincial commissions to 
normalize the management of them. Thirdly, this chapter posited that the newly 
established gold standard currency system should also be strictly decided in “public 
interest.”217 Here, the Kemmerer Commission realized that politicians would take the 
opportunity of currency exchanging for their own benefit, rather than for the public. 
Fourthly, to avoid accidents, the law ruled that the Ministry of Finance should manage 
the transportation of the old currencies. In this part, we believe that the Kemmerer 
Commission was also very deliberate and cautious as they considered the possible chaos 
caused by the transportation of the old abolished currencies as some people would take 
advantage of filching the old currencies for their own benefits. Fifthly, the law ruled that 
old paper currencies should be abolished in circulation gradually after the settlement of 
the new paper currencies based on the new gold standard. According to the law, the 
announcement of establishing the Final Note Retirement Date should be at least one year 
and no more than two years before the debt exchange date. 218  The Kemmerer 
Commission at this moment issued a clear scheduled process of how to switch the old 
paper currency system into the new paper currency based on the gold standard. Sixthly, 
this chapter also ruled the terms and the forms of the government bonds that should be 
paid by the new currency standard. In the final part of this chapter, the paper illustrated 
that with any bank, if businessmen were insolvent, the “Superintendent of Banks” should 
liquidate the above institutions. In this part, the modern central banking concept 
217 See Kemmerer Commission (1929a, p. 21). 
218 The original Chinese name of the Final Note Retirement Date is “侨ヲ㦏㈛⥭㟅㡴.” 
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supervision has been introduced into Kemmererian law to solve the insolvent 
problems.219 
We conclude that the Kemmerer Commission cautiously made the law of gold 
standard in China to modernize the Chinese currency system. Still, it did not address the 
possibility of the National Government to reserve the law and did not fundamentally 
answer if the central banking system could function adequately to avoid price inflation 
and other economic disorders described from the Kemmererian perspective. 
2.3.3.2 The presentation of Kemmerer’s paper on the Central Reserve Bank. 
Now, let’s review the paper made by the Kemmerer Commission, Project of Law for the 
Creation of the Central Reserve Bank, in this section. 220  This paper was a general 
proposal of the structures of the gold reserved central reserve bank. After a 9-month 
investigation, on December 10, 1929, the Kemmerer Commission submitted a report, 
Project of Law for the Creation, Project of Law for the Creation of the Central Reserve 
Bank of China to the National Government, describing how to build an efficient and 
effective central reserve bank to resolve the problems that China was facing. With other 
working papers that Kemmerer and his group wrote, they emphasized building a central 
reserve bank with a gold reserve.  
The paper has eleven chapters in total, which provides us a direct perspective to 
see Kemmerer’s gold standard plan on China. Chapter I is the “Concession.” Chapter II is 
the “Capital and Shared of the Bank.” Chapter III is the “Board of Directors.” Chapter IV 
is “Statutes.” Chapter V is “Management.” Chapter VI is “Operations of the Bank 
Exclusive of Note Issue.” Chapter VII is the “Note Issue.” Chapter VIII is “Reserve.” 
219 See Kemmerer Commission (1929a, pp. 18-31). 
220 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b). 
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Chapter IX is “Supervision.” Chapter X is “Distribution of Profits.” Chapter XI is 
“Miscellaneous.” 
The first main point of the paper is the Restriction of the Minimum of the Central 
Reserve Bank. The report claimed that the China’s Central Reserve Bank should maintain 
a minimum legal reserve of 50% of its outstanding notes and deposit by gold and 
silver.221 
The second main point of the paper is the Character of the Central Reserve Bank. 
The article illustrated the characteristics of the central bank, which clearly defined that 
the vital role of the new central reserve bank was to be the fundamental bank to stabilize 
monetary conditions. The paper said,  
A central bank is not an ordinary type of bank with a different name but is 
fundamentally a banker’s bank charged with the responsibility of stabilizing the 
country’s monetary and banking conditions. (Kemmerer Commission, 1929b, p. 
53) 
The third main point of the paper is the Two Main Functions of the Central Reserve Bank. 
The article posits that there should be two main functions of a well-managed central 
bank.222 The first function is to carry on “extensive operations with other banks only in 
the time of emergency.”223 This means that this central bank should not manage monetary 
operations if there are no urgent economic issues. If the central bank overused its power, 
then the reserve power of it would be depleted. The second function of the central reserve 
bank is that it should not have direct control of the credit situation and that it should serve 
221 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 40). 
222 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, pp. 56-57). 
223 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b. p. 56). 
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the “public interest.”224 The central reserve bank should serve the public interest by being 
independent of the National Government. Additionally, the paper also compared two 
types of central banks. The first one was with operation period limitation, and the second 
one was without maintenance period limitation. According to his study, the better choice 
for China was to build a Central Reserve Bank with operation time constraints to prevent 
the abuse of power from the government.225 Thus, Kemmerer saw the crucial importance 
of a central bank that should be independent of political power. 
The fourth main point of the paper is the Headquarter and Leadership of the 
Central Reserve Bank. The paper defined the headquarters and the formation of the 
leadership of the central reserve bank. The operation time of the Bank was 30 years (to 
prevent the Government from abuse its power on the financial system.226 Headquarters of 
the Bank were in Shanghai, and some branches would be open in other places in China. 
The President and other leaders of the banks should be elected by 2/3 of the votes of the 
total members of the Broad of Directors. 227 The President, vice-presidents, and other 
leaders should be in office for one year and could be reelected.228 They could either be 
members of the Board or not. And all the members of the Board should be elected 
annually.229  
The fifth main point of the paper is the Capital of the Bank and the Operation of 
the National Government to it. The article defined the capital of the central reserve bank. 
224 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 57). 
225 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 66). 
226 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 1). 
227 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 21). 
228 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 21). 
229 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 4). 
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Firstly, the paper ruled that the initial capital of the Bank was C$100 million.230 The 
reserve of the Bank was the gold standard.231 The shares of the Bank consisted of three 
classes: Class A (by National Government), Class B (by affiliated banks), and Class C 
(by other individuals and financial institutions).232 Secondly, the paper also authorized 
that under the regulation of the law, the National Government could “sell any or all its 
shares of stock in the Central Reserve Bank” at any time and at a price “satisfactory to 
itself.”233 Thirdly, according to the paper, there were two functions of the capital of a 
Central Reserve Bank. The first was to provide “the initial cash funds with which the 
bank begins business.” The second was to serve “as a guaranty and pledge of good faith 
on the part of the stockholders to the public.”234 Finally, the paper also studied the capital 
of the leading central banks all around the world and then tried to figure out how much 
resources should allocated to the Central Reserve Bank of China’s reserves (Kemmerer 
Commission, p. 70). We can figure out that Kemmerer Commission was trying to adopt 
the principles from the leading central banks at that time as references to design China’s 
first modern central bank. 
The sixth main point of the paper is Directors of the Board of the Central 
Reserve Bank.235 The article also presented the rules of the Board of the Bank. Firstly, the 
230 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 3). “C$” was the symbol of Fabi (㽤ヲ), which literally means 
fiat money in Chinese. 
231 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 4). 
232 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 5). 
233 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 5). 
234 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 69). 
235  In Edwin Kemmerer’s The A B C of the Federal Reserve System (1918/1922), he illustrated the 
principles and structures of the Federal Reserve System in United States. In this book, Kemmerer said that 
the aim of this monograph was “to set forth in non-technical language the chief reasons why the federal 
reserve system was called into being, the main feature of its organization and how it works.” (Kemmerer, 
1918/1922, p. 1). In the first four chapters, Kemmerer discussed four problems of the monetary system in 
the 1910s: the decentralization of monetary system, the inelasticity of credit system, the cumbersome 
exchange and transfer system, and the defective organization in monetary institutions. In the other four 
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article defined the classes of the director of the board of the Bank. According to the 
article, there should be three classes of directors representing each class of share 
above.236 The Minister of Finance should appoint three directors of Class A, and three 
directors of Class B.237 For making the policy decision more democratic, there should be 
a Class D director, who should be businessmen, professional men, and/or farmers.238 
None of the leaders in all three categories should be paid by the Government to make the 
Bank independent. Secondly, the paper also ruled the area where the directors of the 
Board should live. The leaders of the Board should be near the city of Shanghai by a 
conventional means of travel within 24 hours. 239 All directors should serve for three 
years.240 Thirdly, the paper defined the three functions of the Board.241 The first function 
was to “prevent the Bank from tying up its funds in unsafe assets.” The second function 
was to “require the Bank to keep its assets in liquid form.” The last function was to “keep 
the Bank out of politics and politics out of the Bank.” Fourthly, according to the planned 
law, banker members cannot vote for their benefit. 242  Fifthly, the planned law also 
defined the travel expense and other costs of the directors of the Board of the central 
reserve bank. Finally, the Kemmerer Commission clearly pointed out that the danger of a 
central bank without regulation. It said, 
chapters, Kemmerer illustrated the respective remedies provided by the American federal reserve system, 
including both the legislative provisions of the monetary system recorded in each case, and the progress of 
the currency system made to date. Hence, although the organizational structures of the Federal Reserve and 
the Central Bank of China are different, it is evident Kemmerer wanted to design central banks with 
complicated structures that can make them separate from political power. 
236 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, pp. 11-17). 
237 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, pp. 11-12). 
238 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 16). 
239 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 11). 
240 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 11). 
241 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 52). 
242 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 16). 
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The world’s experience has shown that the two greatest dangers that beset a 
central bank are exploitation by the government and exploitation by the banks, 
and the provisions regarding the election of directors, as likewise the provisions 
regarding the types of operations the Bank may carry on, are designed to reduce 
these dangers to a minimum. (Kemmerer Commission, 1929b, p. 56) 
The seventh main point of the paper is the Duty and Obligations of the Bank. The article 
also ruled the duty and obligations of the central reserve bank, which are the following: 
(1) To buy and sell gold and silver bullion and Chinese and foreign money. 
(2) To buy and sell telegraphic transfers. 
(3) To buy and sell bills of exchange, drafts and checks payable at sight and 
drawn on banks and bankers of high standing located in China and abroad. 
(4) To buy, sell, and discount Chinese native bank orders. 
(5) To buy, sell, and discount drafts and bills of exchange payable abroad which 
arise from China’s export trade and import trade, the maturities of which do 
not exceed 120 days sight or, in the case of accepted bills, do not exceed 120 
days from the date of acquisition by the Bank. […] 
(6) To buy, sell and discount domestic banker’s acceptances, and domestic trade 
bills of exchange and promissory notes with maturities not exceeding 120 
days from date of acquisition by the Bank and arising from the production, 
fabrication, transportation or sale of goods. […] 
(7) To discount promissory notes with maturities not greater than 120 days from 
date of discount. […] 
(8) To receive non-interest-bearing deposits payable on demand. 
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(9) To buy, sell and own, and to accept as collateral security for credit 
instruments. […] 
(10) To receive pledges of real estate, produce, merchandise and securities of all 
kinds […] to protect itself. … 
(11) To act as agent for the collection of drafts, bills of exchange, checks, 
promissory notes, bonds, coupons and other credit instruments. 
(12) To provide for its customers facilities for the safe deposit of valuables. 
(Kemmerer Commission, 1929b, pp. 26-27)  
The eighth main point of the paper is Bank Note Issuance. The article defined that the 
Central Reserve Bank should maintain a minimum legal reserve of 50% of its outstanding 
notes and deposit by gold and silver.243 
The ninth main point of the paper is Taxation on the Bank. The article defined 
that the Central Reserve Bank should be tax-free (Kemmerer Commission, 1929b, p. 50) 
The last main point of the paper is Regulations of the Central Reserve Bank. The 
law also put some regulations on the Central Reserve Bank on issuing loans to the 
beneficially related banks, enterprises, and individuals.244 There are six restrictions below. 
First, the central reserve bank should “not make any loans for periods in excess of 120 
days,” and it should not “discount any paper with a maturity longer.” Secondly, the 
Central Reserve Bank should not “make any loan, discount or other advance to any 
affiliated bank, nor purchase any bill of exchange, draft, order, or other credit document.” 
Thirdly, the central reserve bank should not “make any loan, discount, or other advance 
to any individual, partnership, corporation or other private entity, except to affiliated 
243 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 40). 
244 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 31). 
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banks as authorized by law.” Fourthly, the central reserve bank should not “make any 
contracts for advances in current accounts, nor shall it make any new loans nor increase 
any existing loans repayable on demand.” Fifthly, the central reserve bank should not pay 
interest on deposits “except in the case of time deposits of trust funds made by 
governmental offices and courts of justice and of time deposits made by governmental 
railways and other governmental enterprises.” According to the law, the notes of the 
Bank should be no less than one sun as the Statutes of the Bank should provide.245 The 
law also settled the requirements of the redemption of the banknote.246 
2.3.4 Commentary on Kemmerer’s Report 
After we have demonstrated the gold standard and monetary theories of 
Kemmerer and the details of the 1929 Kemmerer Commission Reports on the 
establishment of China’s first modern central bank in the 1920s, in this section, we 
review the reliability of Kemmerer’s and Young’s work on China, the debatable 
questions in Kemmerer’s gold standard theory, and the debatable questions in 
Kemmerer’s gold standard proposal on China. 
2.3.4.1 The reliability of Kemmerer’s and Young’s work. Our investigation 
on the related academic work made by Edwin Kemmerer, Arthur Young, and 1929 
Kemmerer Commission proved that both the monetary theory by Kemmerer and the 
study of the political and economic situation by 1929 Kemmerer Commission were 
seriously made and recorded, which are the reliable reference of this thesis. For more 
about Young’s monetary theories and his activities in China, see Chapter 3. 
245 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, p. 36). 
246 See Kemmerer Commission (1929b, pp. 36-37). 
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2.3.4.2 The debatable questions in Kemmerer’s gold-standard theory. 
Kemmerer clearly expressed his gold standard central banking theory, but there are still 
two remaining questions which he did not answer. Kemmerer provided his definition of 
the gold standard and, thus, believed that accepting the gold standard was the best choice 
for a nation as it was almost universally respected.247 But Kemmerer did not answer the 
question of how developing countries should adopt the gold standard system, or whether 
or not objective standards for developing countries to adopt a gold standard central 
banking system exist. 
Kemmerer realized that it had been repeating in history many times that the 
government did not allow people to pay tax and public due as the government clearly 
knew the value of the inflating fiduciary currency had been declining because of the over-
issuance of currency.248 A Kemmererian precondition of a real gold standard is based on 
the free market exchange of gold, where there is no governmental restriction on both the 
exportation and importation of gold. However, once the National Government decided to 
intervene in the operation of the central bank, Kemmerer’s plan would become useless. 
Unfortunately, this was precisely what we have seen in history. Chapter 5 through 
Chapter 7 demonstrate how China’s first modern central banking experiment gradually 
become a failure. 
2.3.4.3 The debatable questions in Kemmerer’s gold standard proposal on 
China. There are also a few questions that Kemmerer did not answer in his proposal of 
the application of the gold-standard central-banking system in China. Firstly, it is obvious 
the 1929 Kemmerer Commission studied all the related aspects of China’s politics and 
247 See D. Kemmerer (1993, p. 22). 
248 See E. Kemmerer (1944/2009). 
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economics and provided a very considerable plan and laws for the establishment of 
China’s first modern central bank. This included the characteristics of the gold standard, 
the characteristics of the central reserve bank, the manipulation of the central reserve 
bank, and especially how to keep the independence of the central reserve bank from the 
National government. But Kemmerer did not answer how to restrain the abuse of power 
of Chiang Kai-shek. Of course, as a currency scholar, it is beyond his expertise to let 
Kemmerer study the Chinese political system, but we must point out that any scholar’s 
research scope is limited. Moreover, even if they propose a theoretically perfect design, 
as long as politicians abuse their power, no theory of economists can form a constraint on 
them. The later history of price hyperinflation in China in the 1930s and the 1940s 
already showed us the failure of the practice of the Central Bank of China.  
The second question is if the planned gold-standard central reserve bank was 
applicable (i.e., the ignorance of Kemmerer Commission on the dictatorship of China at 
that time, and the authoritarian traditions of China since the Ming Dynasty) in China at 
that time. In all of Kemmerer’s proposals on China ’s monetary system, we have not seen 
his comments on the authoritarian culture in the Chinese political system. Therefore, it is 
likely that Kemmerer was either not aware of the seriousness of the problem, or either 
that he thinks the national government can prevent illegal currency issuance, or he thinks 
other scholars, such as Young, would help the Chinese National Government because of 
long-term work in China. Since the current file does not tell us this answer, Kemmerer’s 
comment on the Chinese political system is temporarily a mystery. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter is an original synthesis that reviews the biography, monetary 
theories, and reports for China’s central banking institutions of Edwin Kemmerer. Most 
importantly, this chapter also includes our original review of Kemmerer’s 1929 reports 
for the construction of China’s first modern central banking experiment. Kemmerer was 
an economics professor at Princeton University and the world-famous “Money Doctor” 
who helped build central banks in various countries in Latin America, Europe, and Asia. 
In 1903, Kemmerer graduated with his Ph.D. degree from Cornell University. His Ph.D. 
thesis was Money and Credit Instruments in their Relation to General Prices. Since then, 
Kemmerer started to promote a 100% gold standard in his entire life. In 1912, Kemmerer 
went from Cornell to Princeton to continue his academic career, who served there until 
his retirement in 1943. The 31-year duration in Princeton should be Kemmerer’s most 
splendid academic period. Kemmerer was not only teaching in the university but also 
provided suggestions on both the US and international monetary systems. He also 
organized various academic activities related to political economy and banking issues. 
During his career at Princeton, Kemmerer also helped to establish the Federal Reserve of 
the United States. From 1917 to 1934, the “Money Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer worked as 
the governmental financial and central banking advisor of Mexico in 1917, Guatemala in 
1919, Colombia in 1923, South Africa, Chile in 1925, Poland in 1926, Ecuador in 1926-
1927, Bolivia in 1927, China in 1929, Peru in 1931, and Turkey in 1937. During that 
period, he was providing financial and banking suggestions to various American, 
European, and Asian countries, especially his “uncompromising” urge to return to the 
gold standard. Kemmerer’s work in these countries deeply influenced their banking 
138 
structure. Section 2.2.1 demonstrates Edwin Kemmerer’s general biography. Section 
2.2.2 reviews Edwin Kemmerer’s academic career as a “Money Doctor.” 
Section 2.2.3 reviews Edwin Kemmerer’s general theory on central banking and 
gold reserves. As an experienced monetary specialist, Kemmerer was seriously and 
carefully investigating banking theories and the application of them. His insistence on the 
gold standard reserve was impressive. In 1944, Kemmerer published articles in the media 
and participated in a US congressional hearing to criticize the fiat money system based on 
the Bretton Woods system and defend the gold standard.249 In the same year, one year 
before Kemmerer passed away, he published his famous Gold and Gold Standard, which 
was his last book, and integrated his understanding of gold standard principles. After 
demonstrating the history of the gold standard from ancient Asia to the 1920s, when 
Western countries were facing the Great Depression, Kemmerer started to solidify his 
definition of the gold standard. Kemmerer treated the gold standard as a monetary system 
where prices are measured and exchanged by gold internationally and freely. The 
following monetary theories of Edwin Kemmerer are reviewed in section 2.2.3: the 
Kemmererian definition of the gold standard, the theory of gold as a monetary unit, the 
theory of demand for gold, the theory of characteristics of gold in its relation to the gold 
standard, the theory of monetary gold versus gold in arts. 
Section 2.2.3 reviews the commentary from a few Austrian school economists 
on Kemmerer’s theories. George Selgin suggested a free-banking system without the 
regulation of deposit reserve. Although Selgin affirmed Kemmerer’s proposal that a 
stable gold standard may avoid price fluctuation, fundamentally, Selgin claimed that the 
proposal of establishing a gold-standard central-banking system was theoretically 
249 See Giovannini (1993) and Wintour (2017). 
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contradicted. For Selgin, it is private law which made the gold standard possible and 
credible, but not governmental law. And the commitments attached by sovereign 
immunity do not and cannot execute private sanctions if the banks break their promises, 
which will make the commitments to maintain a gold parity become impossible and not 
credible. Moreover, central banks can use their monopolized power to devalue currency 
without punishment. They can even get benefit by doing this manipulation and can also 
make the currency holder of central banks afraid of the devaluation of currency. A gold 
standard based on the central banking system would be finally tempted by speculative 
attacks. Joseph Salerno pointed out Edwin Kemmerer, along with another two American 
economists, Benjamin Anderson and Melchior Palyi, were all against the Bretton Woods 
agreement, who advocated to return to the pre-war gold standard. As we have 
demonstrated in section 2.2.1, before the establishment of the Bretton Woods system, 
Kemmerer actively criticized the fiat-money based monetary system through a newspaper 
article, monograph, and the US congressional hearing. However, he did not participate in 
the conference in Bretton Woods. Not to mention that the conference accepted his 
opinion in the Keynesian-dominated meeting. Salerno also reviewed Kemmerer’s 
contribution to the relationship between the price fluctuation and gold. Salerno agreed 
with Kemmerer that with the significance of the scarcity and durability of gold, the 
stability of the money supply would be realized. 
One originality of the research in this chapter is that we visited the original 
archives of Kemmerer’s research on China’s economic issues kept by the Hoover 
Institution at Stanford University. Section 2.3 reviews Kemmerer’s reports for China and 
our commentary on his works. Section 2.3.1 provides the general background of China 
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from 1927-1937, the Nanjing Golden Decade. The Republic of China was established in 
1912. From 1912 to 1927, it was the warlord based Beiyang Government that was ruling 
China. In 1927, the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) led National Government 
won the Northern Expedition. China entered a relatively peaceful period of economic 
development, though the Chinese Communist Party was carrying out small-scale military 
rebellions in southern China, undermining national peace and construction. The relative 
peace period was called the Nanjing Golden Decade. Based on evidence and empirical 
data, section 2.3.1 reviews how the National Government of the Republic of China led 
the Chinese people to build the nation’s political and economic institutions. 
Based on this background, in 1928, Sun Fo, the son of the founding father of the 
Republic of China and the Chinese Nationalist Party, invited the Princeton economics 
professor Edwin Kemmerer to visit China for banking issues when Sun Fo was visiting 
the United States for economic support. This situation shows that the Republic of China 
and the United States had a great relationship at that time. In February 1929, at the 
request of the Chinese National Government, Kemmerer went to China to design the 
reform program of China’s monetary system. After 9 months of research, Kemmerer 
found that China did not have a single currency system issued by the central bank, and 
the multiple metal standard made it different from the currency standard in the United 
States, Europa, and Latin America. In November 1929, Kemmerer submitted his plan, 
Project of Law for the Gradual Introduction of a Gold-standard Currency System of 
China, to the National Government, proposing that China should adopt the gold standard 
to modernize its currency system. The gold content of the new currency unit would be 
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called Sun. One Sun should be equal to the value of US$0.40, a shill of seven pence, 
0.825 Japanese Yen.  
This report was the final report Kemmerer submitted to the National 
Government as the gold standard reform plan. The Kemmerer Report for China included 
not only the above paper, but also many other documents for reforming China’s banking 
system in detail. This provides a general picture of Kemmerer’s monetary thoughts on 
China’s banking issues. Though not all the papers were included in his final report, it is 
still essential to understand Kemmerer’s general banking plan and thoughts form China 
through these papers. And, as we have demonstrated in the biography section, Kemmerer 
was very cautious, which provides us a chance to view the general political and economic 
condition of China. We investigated the scanned online archives of Princeton University 
Library, went to Hoover Institution Library and Archives in November 2016, and studied 
the scanned online archives from friends in Mainland China’s academia. 
With the help of academic friends in the Chinese Mainland, we investigated the 
online academic resources from Chinese literature. In our search, we sought out the 
Chinese version of the Project of Law for the Gradual Introduction of a Gold-standard 
Currency System of China, which has been cited or introduced in some Chinese 
literature.250 As we have both the Chinese version and English version of the report, we 
did a contrast reading of both versions, which would help us to understand the monetary 
reform of the Kemmerer Commission better. We conclude that there are four key papers 
of the Kemmerer Commission related to the gold-standard and central banking, which are, 
Project of Law for the Gradual Introduction of a Gold-standard Currency System of 
250 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 340), Ministry of Finance (2016), and H. Zhu & J. Li (2007). For personal security 
reasons, the institutions and academic intellectuals from China will be anonymous in this paper. 
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China, Introduction of Gold-Standard Currency System (which did not include in the 
scanned version in the Princeton University), Central Reserve Bank, and Currency 
Reform and Currency Condition (had been scanned but the scanned words were not able 
to be clearly investigated). Section 2.3.2 is the general description of the 1929 Kemmerer 
reports.  
In section 2.3.3, we present Kemmerer’s two key reports on China’s banking 
system. The first was Kemmerer’s paper of the law for the gold standard in China. The 
second was Kemmerer’s paper for the Central Reserve Bank. We believe that 
Kemmerer’s design of China’s central banking system fully considered in theory and 
practice that the central bank should operate independently from the government and that 
the central bank should be composed of private banks, independent public officials, and 
independent boards. This is to make it independent from the National Government, 
making currency issuance and supervision effective. However, we find that these two 
Kemmerer reports did not mention concerns about the possible abuse of power by the 
leaders of the National Government, nor did they comment on the negative impact of the 
authoritarian political system on the political and economic system in Chinese history. 
We believe that considering American scholars such as Arthur N. Young of the 1929 
Kemmerer Commission, who stayed in China since 1929 as a financial expert, Kemmerer 
may have handed them over to supervise the Chinese government. However, we did not 
find that Kemmerer pursued this work layout. Therefore, he may have also ignored 
China's actual political and economic situation. We also consider that there is possibly a 
contradiction between the gold standard and central banking structure in the 
Kemmererian perspective. As we have demonstrated in the details of the 1929 Kemmerer 
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reports, which was his plan for helping China build its first modern central bank, 
although Kemmerer and his commission did seriously study China’s political and 
economic situation, they ignored the possibility of the abuse of power by the National 
Government, especially in regards to central banking manipulation. In our analysis in 
Chapter 4 to Chapter 6, we will demonstrate how China’s first modern central banking 
experiment was gradually facing failure mainly due to war factors and mismanagement. 
Before the analysis, in Chapter 3, we will review the monetary theories of Arthur N. 
Young, who was Edwin Kemmerer’s student, who influenced China’s first modern 
central banking experiment. 
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Chapter 3  
Arthur Young’s Central Banking Thoughts on the Banking Reform, 1927-1937 
Abstract: This chapter reviews Arthur N. Young’s banking thoughts on China’s central 
banking reform from 1927 to 1937. As a member of Kemmerer’s western monetary 
specialists’ group for China, who also influenced the decision-making of the Chinese 
National Government and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to adopt the Western-style 
central banking institutions, Young’s reports on his banking thoughts will be mainly 
checked in this chapter. One originality of the research in this chapter is that we visited 
the original archive of Young’s research on China’s economic issues kept by the Hoover 
Institution at Stanford University. This chapter also reviews Arthur Young’s biography. 
As a senior student graduating with a Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University, 
Young worked with “Money Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer and came to China as an 
essential member of the 1929 Kemmerer Commission for China to analyze and study 
China’s currency and economic issues, making policy recommendations to the Chinese 
National Government. Kemmerer was his “teacher and colleague” who influenced 
Young’s economic thoughts. Also, we find that Young not only came to China as an 
international student proficient in Spanish, but also visited Latin American countries and 
Spain to conduct research on the economic affairs of these countries. Furthermore, he 
also visited some European and Asian countries such as Poland and Vietnam to help them 
carry out economic and monetary policies. In the later sections, we have reviewed 
Young’s general comments on the modernization of Nationalist China and his central 
banking thoughts from 1927 to 1937. 
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This chapter reviews Arthur N. Young’s banking thoughts on the central 
banking reform of China from 1927 to 1937. As a member of Kemmerer’s western 
monetary specialists’ group for China, who also influenced the decision-making of the 
Chinese National Government and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to adopt the Western-
style central banking institutions, Young’s reports on his banking thoughts will be mainly 
checked in this chapter. 
Section 3.2 demonstrates the methodology and description of the investigation 
process of Young’s academic works related to China’s central banking from 1927 to 1937. 
Section 3.3 introduces Arthur Young’s biography, who was a specialist in central banking 
and finance. Section 3.4 reviews Young’s central banking thoughts in 1929 when he was 
working for the Kemmerer Commission to submit the policy suggestions on the reform of 
China’s banking structure. Section 3.5 presents Young’s central banking thoughts from 
1927 to 1937. Section 3.6 is the conclusion. 
3.2 Methodology and Description of the Investigation Process of Young’s Academic 
Works related to China’s Central Banking from 1927 to 1937 
This section provides the methodology of this chapter and the description of the 
resource of Young’s banking thoughts from the 1920s to the1930s. Subsection 3.2.1 
demonstrates the investigation methodology of Young’s academic work related to 
central banking from the 1920s to the 1930s. Furthermore, subsection 3.2.2 provides the 
general situation of Young’s books and papers about China’s Central Banking from 
1927 to 1937 due to our investigation of his works. 
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3.1.1 The Methodology of Investigating Young’s Related Works 
The methodology of investigating Young’s academic work is economic history 
and the wide use of primary sources located in archives. After the investigation of the 
topics of the Chinese economic history, the Chinese history of economic thought, and the 
banking issues of the Republic of China before the 1949 Communist Revolution, we 
conclude that Arthur Young is one of the key figures who helped China establish the 
Central Bank in 1928.251 However, the related references did not systematically review 
Young’s banking thought, which made the research on this topic very necessary.  
3.1.2 Investigation Process in Spain and Online Archives 
Primarily, we discovered and investigated Young’s studies on China in the 
Library of Bank of Spain. 252  After we were authorized to research Young’s work, 
China’s Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937-1945, and according to the studies 
mentioned above in the last section, we conclude that for studying Young’s banking 
thoughts and China’s political and economic situation from 1927 to 1937, it is necessary 
to study Young’s China’s Nation-Building Effort, 1927-1937: The Financial and 
Economic Record (1971). In the second step, we bought one copy of Young’s China’s 
Nation-Building Effort from the online bookstore. It is worth mentioning that this book 
recorded important content related to the earliest currency reforms carried out by the 
National Government in the 1920s, covering the most primary areas of Young’s research 
on China’s economic and banking issues. After reading these books, we then wrote our 
general description of this book related to his banking thoughts and China’s political and 
251 For our relevant research and the related references, see Chapter 4 to Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
252 The Library of Bank of Spain in Spanish is: La Biblioteca del Banco de España. 
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economic conditions from 1927 to 1937, which are the key materials for the investigation 
of China’s central banking issue during the Nanjing Golden Decade, 1927 to 1937. 
3.1.3 Investigation in Hoover Institution 
After we investigated the existing files in person and using the online archives, 
we investigated the original Young’s papers on China’s banking and financial issues at 
the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University in the United States for further 
research on Young’s papers related to China. First, we were authorized by Hoover 
Institution Archives to investigate Arthur Young’s working papers located in Hoover 
Institution Library and Archives. When we were researching there, we found 116 boxes 
which include Young’s diary and his academic career as an economist and as a policy 
advisor all around the world. Apart from Box 2 to Box 5 that are related to banking and 
financial issues of Germany, France, Belgium, United States, Greece, Italy, Turkey, 
Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungry, etc., the boxes related to Young’s works on China are Box 
7 to Box 106. These files include first-hand data and evidence recorded by Young, 
records, news reports clippings of information of budgets, debts, loans, customs, 
industrial revenues, currencies, banking, central banking, banking policies, prices import, 
export, general economic conditions, governmental business, private business, etc., which 
covered almost all the areas of China’s economy at that time. Besides, Young’s working 
collection also includes his letters and telegrams with Edwin Kemmerer and other critical 
Chinese politicians and economists such as T. V. Soong and H.H. Kung.253  
After we reviewed the general situation of Young’s academic work related to 
China, we were authorized by Hoover Institution Library and Archives to scan his 
253 For Kemmerer’s banking theories on China, see Chapter 3. For the banking theories of T. V. Soong and 
H.H. Kung, see section 4.2.3.2 and section 4.2.3.3 in Chapter 4, and section 6.2.4.5 and section 6.2.4.7 in 
Chapter 6. 
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reserved documents, which were associated with the establishment of China’s first 
modern central bank and the political and economic conditions of China from 1927 to 
1949. All of these references are related to the research topics of our thesis. After that, we 
investigated the scanned documents and organized them for our thesis writing. We 
separated the part of the period from 1927 to 1937 (China’s central banking during the 
Nanjing Golden Decade) and the part of the period from 1937 to 1945 (China’s central 
banking during the Second Sino-Japanese War).254 The investigated documents related to 
China’s banking system from 1927 to 1937 will be mainly used in this chapter. 
Finally, after we finished our investigation in Hoover Library and Archives, we 
wrote our general description of Young’s academic works we had researched in Hoover 
Library Archives. By comparing Young’s books, China’s Nation-Building Effort, 1927-
1937: The Financial and Economic Record (1971), China’s Wartime Finance and 
Inflation, 1937-1945 (1965), and China and the Helping Hand, 1937-1945 (1963), 
Young’s collections in the Hoover Institution, and the related references that we have 
mentioned above, we conclude that Young’s research on China was seriously and 
cautiously made by evidence (especially the first-hand evidence of governmental data, 
news reports clippings, and telegrams, etc.) and by academic thoughts. After presenting 
the methodology of this chapter and describing the investigation process of Young’s 
scholarly works related to China’s central banking from 1927 to 1937, in the next section, 
we demonstrate Arthur N. Young’s biography. 
3.2 Arthur N. Young’s Biography 
In this section, we review the biography of Arthur Nicolas Young, who was one 
254 For the political and economic background of the Nanjing Golden Decade, see section 4.2.1 and section 
4.2.3 in Chapter 4. 
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of the key figures in the Kemmerer Commission on China in 1929.255 
The American economist and lawyer Arthur N. Young (1890-1984) was born 
in Los Angeles, California, in 1890.256 As a Californian, this put him in contact early 
with many Chinese people. His interest in economics started when his father introduced 
him to some materials of political economy when he was 15 years old. He graduated 
from Occidental College, one of the oldest liberal arts colleges on the West Coast of the 
US, while his father was one of the college’s founders.257 After finishing his bachelor’s 
study, Young received his Ph.D. degree in Economics at Princeton University and a 
degree in Law from George Washington University. After his graduation, Young started 
teaching at Princeton University and served as an American financial specialist in 
Mexico, Spain, Honduras, and other Asian and Latin American counties all around the 
world, such as Edwin Kemmerer did. 258  As a well-trained economist and excellent 
diplomat, Young also spoke fluent Spanish, which aided his work in Latin American 
countries.259 Young himself even called Kemmerer “my teacher and my colleague.”260 
From 1922 to 1928, Young served as an economic advisor for the State 
Department. 261  Meanwhile, he was working as an American observer with the 
Reparations Commission in Paris, France.262 In 1929, Young came to China to serve as 
a monetary specialist for the 1929 Kemmerer Commission on China until 1946.263 
Throughout his 17 years in China as a monetary specialist, he helped establish China’s 
255 For more of Young’s biography, see East Asian Research Center of Harvard University [EARCHU] 
(1963), A. Young & Fuchs (1974), A. Young (1974), and The New York Times (1984). 
256 See EARCHU (1963) and The New York Times (1984). 
257 See A. Young & Fuchs (1974). 
258 See EARCHU (1963). 
259 See A. Young & Fuchs (1974). 
260 See A. Young & Fuchs (1974). 
261 See EARCHU (1963). 
262 See The New York Times (1984). 
263 See EARCHU (1963), and A. Young & Fuchs (1974). 
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first modern central bank from 1928 to 1929 and transformed it into the Central Reserve 
Bank of China in the late 1930s. During the Second World War and the Second Sino-
Japanese War, Young was nominated as Chairman of the Commission of the National 
Government on Relief and Rehabilitation. Young also served as one of the 
representatives from the Republic of China at the Bretton Woods Conference. 
After his service in China, Young returned to the US and served as a financial 
adviser for dozens of countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia in 
the 1950s.264 In 1951, he worked as the leader of the Young Commission to Saudi 
Arabia, investigating the political and economic situation there.265  
Throughout his entire life, Young wrote three monographs on China’s political 
and economic situation during the era of Nationalist China from 1927 to 1949: China 
and the Helping Hand, 1937-1945 (1963), China’s Wartime Finance and Inflation, 
1937-1945 (1965), China’s Nation-Building effort, 1927-1937: The Financial and 
Economic Record (1971).266 Young arrived in China in 1928 and left the country in late 
1947, where he spent nearly 20 years serving as a financial advisor for the Chinese 
government. During his service in China, he had an excellent personal relationship with 
T. V. Soong and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.267 
On July 19, 1984, Young died at home in Claremont, California. The East 
Asian Research Center of Harvard gave Young very high praise as “a skilled foreigner 
invited, like Marco Polo or Robert Hard, to participate in the governing of China” and “a 
264 See EARCHU (1963). 
265 See The New York Times (1984), and A. Young &Fuchs (1974). 
266 Besides, in 1947, A. Young wrote another small pamphlet less than 100 page called China’s economic 
and financial reconstruction. However, because the length of this book is too short, and many of its 
contents have been covered in his other three books, we do not list his book as his important monograph on 
China. 
267 See A. Young &Fuchs (1974). 
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pioneer” in bringing new foreign aid during war times.268 The East Asian Research 
Center of Harvard University said, 
Mr. Young’s personal records concerning the Chinese Government’s financial 
problems and policies are in themselves of unique value; his critical analysis of 
foreign aid to wartime China, based on these and other records, is a unique 
contribution. He not only puts American aid programs in the context of foreign 
aid to China in general; he also views them from the receiving end. (EARCHU, 
1963) 
After we have reviewed Arthur Young’s biography, in the next section we demonstrate 
his general comments on the modernization of Nationalist China from 1927 to 1937 
during the Nanjing Golden Decade. 
3.3 Young’s General Comments on the Modernization of Nationalist China 
After we have reviewed Young’s biography, we demonstrate how Young 
commented on the modernization process of Nationalist China from 1927 to 1937 in this 
section. Young’s central banking thoughts are tightly related to his understanding of what 
happened in the first half of the 20th century. Comprehending what he thought about 
China from a general perspective can help us understand his central banking thoughts for 
China. As Young had systematically studied the political and economic situation in China 
in the first half of the 20th century, we can dig deeply on what Young thought about 
China’s general political and economic situation, especially how Young saw the crucial 
268 See EARCHU (1963). It was evident that Young’s interest in a healthy currency possibly had to do with 
the US’s investment in China. Because Young was a financial expert sent by the US government to China, 
he took the task of the US government to stabilize the Chinese currency to China which would also benefit 
the US economically. However, this point does not contradict his belief in a healthier monetary system as a 
financial expert. The following discussion in this chapter will confirm that there is no negation between 
these two points. 
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reforms and revolutions that happened in China during the first half of the 20th century. In 
this section, we review Young’s general praise and critique of the National Government 
from the 1920s to the 1940s, his general opinions on the government administration 
performance of the National Government during the Nanjing Golden Decade, the main 
difficulties that the National Government was facing during these ten years (according to 
Young), and his general views on the economic situation of China from 1927 to 1937.  
3.3.1 Young’s General Praise and Critique of the National Government from the 
1920s to 1949 
This section reviews Young’s general praise and critique of the National 
Government from the 1920s to 1949. Section 3.4.1.1 is about Young’s assessment of the 
reasons for the success of the 1949 Communist Revolution. Section 3.4.1.2 reviews 
Young’s criticism of the Chinese Marxists. Section 3.4.1.3 demonstrates Young’s opinion 
on corruption and government inefficiency issues. Section 3.4.1.4 illustrates Young’s 
general positive evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek. Section 3.4.1.5 presents Young’s 
comments on the non-achievement and deficiency of Chinese reform during the 
Nationalists’ rule. 
3.4.1.1 An assessment of the reasons for the success of the 1949 Communist 
Revolution. Young argued that the changes which happened in China after the collapse 
of Qing Dynasty were “swift” and “dramatic,” because of “[t]he warlords of the chaotic 
twenties,” the fights among the National Government, and the flights against Japanese 
aggression and the Communist revolt from the 1930s to the 1940s. 269  According to 
Young, it was because of the frequent wars and their consequences, such as price 
269 See A. Young (1971, p. v). 
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inflation and corruption from the 1920s to the 1940s, that caused the success of the 1949 
Communist Revolution, switching China from a free-market-oriented society to a 
totalitarian state. Young Said, 
The events of the war led, in turn, to the Communist takeover on the mainland in 
1949. Thus China changed from a pro-Western and fairly open society, based 
mostly on free enterprise, to a socialistic and totalitarian state. (A. Young, 1971, 
p. v) 
Obviously, due to what Young said in the selected sentences, he was in favor of the 
relatively open and free China before the 1949 Communist Revolution. He felt sorry for 
China’s change into a Communist dictatorship. Therefore, it is clear that Young was very 
disgusted with Communism and totalitarianism. And from his point of view that he 
regretted China because of Communism, he had a very positive motivation that the 
Eastern giant, China, could move toward freedom and prosperity. 
3.4.1.2 Young’s criticism of Chinese Marxists. Young also criticized a popular 
Marxist viewpoint from the scholars who claimed that after the collapse of the Qing 
Dynasty, the period of the Republic of China on the Chinese Mainland from 1911 to 1949 
was an inevitable interregnum for the 1949 Communist Revolution. He also argued that 
this viewpoint was not based on the evidence of the modernization process achieved by 
the Republic of China before 1949.270  Young said, 
270  See A. Young (1971, p. v). After the 1949 Communist Revolution, the central government, the 
parliamentary and the judicial institutions of the Republic of China moved to Taiwan until nowadays. 
Taiwan is still applying the 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China along with Additional Articles of the 
Constitution of the Republic of China. This Constitution has survived from the Civil War (1945-1949) and 
is still used effectively with some minor modifications, which shows that the Constitution itself is effective 
for stabilizing the constitutional system of the Republic of China on Taiwan. For more about the 1946 
Constitution of the Republic of China and the Chinese Civil War, see section 6.2.1 of Chapter 6. 
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[The Marxist viewpoint] ignores the major transformation which the Nationalists 
brought about after they had set up their capital at [Nanjing] in 1927. It also 
ignores China’s promising outlook in mid-1937, tragically interrupted by Japan, 
when on many fronts there has been great progress, with signs of future progress 
than collapse. […] The Nationalists put an end to major regional militarism; 
created a government able to speak internationally for China; and put the 
country on the road to becoming a strong, unified, and developing nation. (A. 
Young, 1971, p. v) 
Here, Young rightly pointed out that the Chinese Marxists ignored the outstanding 
achievements of the Chinese National Government before 1937: ending the melee of 
local warlords, establishing a unified government that can represent China internationally, 
and promoting economic development. At the same time, Young also pointed out the 
destruction of these achievements caused by the Second Sino-Japanese War. Such a 
relatively comprehensive evaluation is much fairer than the one-sided review of the 
National Government by Chinese Marxists. 
3.4.1.3 Corruption and government inefficiency. Despite criticizing the 
ignorant Marxist views on what the National Government achieved, Young also saw that 
the corruption problem resulted in government inefficiency. Young also realized that the 
charge that the National Government was corrupted and inefficient from the Communists 
was accepted by the people “uncritically and without regard for what had happened 
before the forties,” though the corruption and inefficiency were existing in the National 
Government.271 In this sense, what Young judged of the National Government was more 
fact-oriented and academically cautious. Regarding corruption, in his interview with 
271 See A. Young (1971, p. vi). 
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James R. Fuchs of the Harry S. Truman Library, he believed that in Chinese tradition, it 
was not necessarily seen as corrupt for officials to dip into public tax funds. Officials 
could take around five percent, but if the amount neared 15 to 20%, that would be 
considered corruption. He says, 
 In China they had a tradition that officials could squeeze and that for officials to 
benefit from their position was normal and ethical, as long as they didn’t carry it 
to extremes. In other words, an official who took a cut of maybe five percent on 
taxes or revenues passing through his hands was a good official. He was paid 
almost nothing and he had obligations to his subordinates and to contribute 
upward to the throne; so that was regarded as ethical. Whereas, if he took fifteen 
or twenty percent or some larger cut that was unethical. (A. Young & Fuchs, 
1974) 
Therefore, Young had a deep understanding of China’s politics and corruption. He did 
not have a superficial understanding of China’s political traditions as a foreigner. 
Furthermore, Young also argued that widespread corruption of the Chinese government 
only affected military and backward areas. Therefore, although corruption was a problem, 
it was not a decisive issue that lead to the failure of the National Government. And he 
considered that the corruption problem of the Chinese National Government was much 
lighter than that of other countries he had worked for. He said, 
[T]here was, of course, a perpetuation of much corruption, especially in the 
armies and the less modernized areas. But, I would say from my experience in 
quite a number of other countries, that during the Nationalist period before the 
war it was certainly no worse than in the other countries all over the world in 
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which I worked, perhaps better, and the situation was improving. The 
government was really putting together a pretty good administration by 1937 at 
the national level. (A. Young & Fuchs, 1974) 
Here we see that Young not only had a profound understanding of corruption in 
traditional Chinese politics but also compared the Chinese political corruption to other 
countries where he worked. This view illustrated his comprehensive knowledge of 
corruption and his international perspective as a diplomat. 
3.4.1.4 Young’s general positive evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek. Regarding 
Chiang Kai-shek, Young made a high assessment. He first affirmed Chiang Kai-shek’s 
integrity. Then, Young argued that Chiang had to rely on the corrupted officials who 
were loyal to him to govern. Young said, 
Not that he was personally corrupt, but that he tolerated them for reasons of 
loyalty, because he was not sure of the loyalty of others, and perhaps partly 
because he was sheltered from learning the real facts by people around him. (A. 
Young & Fuchs, 1974) 
Young also commented on Chiang Kai-shek’s contribution to China. He believed that 
Chiang Kai-shek’s economic knowledge was limited. Still, everyone has limitations and 
Chiang Kai-shek’s unification of China and his adherence to the War of Resistance had 
shown his strong leadership ability. Young saidˈ 
[A]s I say, he was a man for the times, and I think he deserves very high marks 
for the degree to which he was able to unify China by 1937, and preside over a 
government that carried out a great many financial reforms and also some 
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economic reforms that began, for example, doing many good things about 
agriculture. 
[…] 
So, some reforms were adopted, others proposed and some beginnings made. 
But, after the war came with Japan, nothing much could be done. And before 
that, preparation to meet Japan and to arm against Japan to establish unity, by 
putting down the warlords, and then by putting down the Communists to 
strengthen their central control and as a prerequisite to carrying out reforms, had 
to have the priority. So, you can explain the fact that he did not give attention 
adequately to social reforms. But, he and China had to pay later for this failure. 
One man can’t have all the talents and he didn’t have all the talents. (A. Young 
& Fuchs, 1974) 
Therefore, he argued that the effectiveness of Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership was affected 
by the dual factors of Japanese aggression and the CCP rebellion. It can be seen that 
Young had a profound understanding of the reasons for the failure of the National 
Government. He did not superficially push the responsibility to Chiang Kai-shek alone 
but analyzed the historical conditions at that time. Moreover, he also affirmed the 
National Government’s reforms to the country before the outbreak of the Second Sino-
Japanese War in 1937. 
3.4.1.5 Young’s comments on the non-achievement and deficiency of the 
Chinese reform during the Nationalists’ rule. Although Young gave high praise on the 
performance that the National Government achieved during the difficult times when the 
Communists and the Japanese aggressors challenged it, he also pointed out that the 
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National Government did not put enough effort to reform China’s economic and financial 
issues because of political reasons. He said, 
A weakness, however, was the inadequate attention to reforms in the traditional 
economic and social system-partly because […] attention has centered primarily 
on political events, notably on the Nationalist’s confrontation with the 
Communists and on China’s relations with Japan and the other powers. Financial 
and economic development during these years were of first importance but have 
been neglected or […] have been incorrectly presented. (A. Young, 1971, p. vi) 
Here, Young sharply pointed out that the National Government has ignored economic 
reform as a critical issue. Thus, we conclude that although Young criticized some 
performance of the National Government, especially the economic policy, he generally 
affirmed the accomplishments that the National Government achieved during the brutal 
war times while it was facing Communist and Japanese invaders from the 1920s to the 
1940s. These performances especially include that the National Government ended the 
chaotic warlord era from 1916 to 1927; established a government that can speak for 
China’s benefit internationally; and brought China on the path of achieving economic 
growth and development before 1937 when the Second Sino-Japanese War started. In 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we analyze how the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War 
became a decisive change of the fate for the Republic of China.272 Apart from what we 
272 In the Second Sino-Japanese War, although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) apparently announced 
its cooperation with the government to fight against Japanese invaders, the CCP actually continued to attack 
government forces and expand its territory. To some extent, this led to a balance between the strength of the 
government and the CCP after the war, which was also an indirect factor for the failure of the Republic of 
China on Mainland China. The number of CCP troops rose from more than 40,000 in the early days of the 
War of Resistance to more than 1.2 million by the end of the war.  During the war, the CCP expanded its 
territory by cracking down on the Japanese and attacking the army of the National Government.  The CCP-
occupied area expanded from 130,000 square meters before the war to more than 800,000 square meters at 
the end of the War of Resistance, and its population expanded from 1.4 million to over 2 million. For 
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have demonstrated in this paragraph above, we can also conclude that Young strongly 
disagreed that the 1949 Communist Revolution was inevitable as the ROC Government 
did so severely before 1949. In the next section, we demonstrate Young’s general 
opinions on the government administration performance of the National Government 
during the Nanjing Golden Decade. 
3.3.2 Young’s General Opinions on the Government Administration Performance 
From 1927 to 1937 
As we have demonstrated in section 3.4.1.3, Young admitted that the National 
Government had the problems of corruption and inefficiency. However, he also pointed 
out that it was normal for less developed countries to suffer from these two problems. By 
reviewing his own experience in and research on developing countries, as we have 
demonstrated in the last section, Young claimed that the corruption and inefficiency 
problems in the National Government were less damaging than other developing 
countries (i.e., in Latin America) he worked for and claimed that even in “many respects, 
indeed, the situation in China was better, and notable progress was being made,” 
including the financial and banking reforms.273 Young said, 
Many leaders and officials at every level were trying, often with much success, 
to improve public administration and eliminate abuses. (A. Young, 1971, p. vii) 
Not only pointing out what the National Government achieved and what it did not do 
enough, but Young also provided his perspective on which kind of government that can 
govern properly. For Young, the long-term efforts from public opinion, effective public 
administration, and an “adequately and regularly paid” bureaucracy are the keys to solve 
related analysis in detail, see section 5.2.1.3 of Chapter 5. 
273 See A. Young (1971, p. vi). 
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the problem of corruption and inefficiency, especially for developing countries who have 
their large tradition.274  
It is evident that Young was not and never completely satisfied with the 
administrative performance of the National Government because of the corruption and 
inefficiency according to his criteria that we have demonstrated. However, Young also 
pointed out that these two problems were common among developing countries, and 
China was even better than the other developing countries in which he worked. In the 
next section, we demonstrate the main difficulties that the National Government was 
facing from 1927 to 1937, according to Young. 
3.3.3 The Main Difficulties That the National Government Was Facing During the 
Nanjing Golden Decade According to Young 
Young diagnosed four main issues that challenged the National Government 
before it failed in 1949, which can be retrospected from the 1920s to the 1930s. They are: 
disruption from local warlords, the fight against the Communists, escalating war against 
the Japanese, and corruption that drained the finances of the National Government and 
caused its failure in 1949. This section demonstrates Young’s assessment of these four 
factors.  
3.4.3.1 The Warlords and the Communists. According to Young, the warlords 
and the Communists were the two main military problems that the National Government 
had to face from the 1920s to the 1930s.275 Although the Nationalists started to rule 
China in 1927, the warlords still did not completely disappear. For the issue of the 
warlords, Young argued that the regional militarists, who continued the partly serious 
274 See A. Young (1971, p. vii). 
275 See A. Young (1971, p. vii). 
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civil war until 1931, “were not prepared to disband their troops to central control” after 
the establishment of the National Government in Nanjing in 1927. And the Communists 
“remained in strength in Central China until 1934,” until they ran away to the 
northwestern part of the country.276 However, Young also claimed that the Communists 
in northwest China “remained a continuing though greatly diminished threat” for the 
National Government. 277 In addition, Young also pointed out that inside the Chinese 
Nationalist Party, which was the ruling party of the Chinese government, the main 
political and military conflicts still existed until the Guangdong Nationalist regional 
power was removed in 1936. Young argued that all these inner military conflicts put an 
intense burden on the National Government to reform China. He said, 
These pressing problems entailed a costly, drain on finances, and diverted 
resources and attention from development and reform. (A. Young, 1971, p. viii) 
Therefore, Young not only saw the problems within the National Government, 
and the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party to the peaceful development of the 
Chinese nation but also saw the instability brought to the country by the melee of local 
warlords. We argue that Young’s observation comprehensively revealed the threat posed 
by the war between local warlords at that time to the country’s economic development, 
peace, and stability. 
3.4.3.2 The Japanese occupation. Young believed that after Japan assassinated 
the last supreme leader of Beiyang Government, Zhuang Zuolin in 1928, the Japanese 
occupation on China became “probably inevitable.”278 For Young, Japanese power in 
China became much strong after Japan seized Manchuria in 1931-1932, which was one of 
276 See A. Young (1971, vii). 
277 See A. Young (1971, p. vii). 
278 See A. Young (1971, p. viii). 
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the “richest areas” of China.279 Young argued that the Japanese occupation of Manchuria 
made it harder for the National Government to receive revenue and made the cost of 
defeating the Japanese higher than before. 
3.4.3.3 Corruption. In section 3.4.1.3, we have demonstrated Young’s general 
opinion of the corruption problem of the Nationalists’ rule from 1927 to 1949. During the 
Nanjing Golden Decade, corruption in the National Government was also a problem 
considered by Young. 280  He described that “corruption went beyond what could be 
deemed excusable as due to [price] inflation and confusion.”281 Furthermore, Young also 
argued that the reform of being against corruption became effective only after the 
government of the Republic of China withdrew to Taiwan in 1949. 
3.3.4 Young’s General Views on the Economic and Financial Situation of China 
From 1927 to 1937 
Young claimed that although the military part of China was in chaos, it had 
achieved excellent performance related to “the growth of central authority” and “fiscal 
and monetary affairs.”282 Section 3.4.4.1 is about his description of the relatively stable 
situation in the Nationalist ruling area and the strong economic recovery and growth in 
the mid-1930s. Section 3.4.4.2 reviews Youngs’ record and understanding of the helpful 
foreign advice, aids, investment, and trade. 
3.4.4.1 The relatively stable situation in the Nationalist ruling area and the 
strong economic recovery and growth in the mid-1930s. According to Young, though 
the Japanese gradually occupied Manchuria from 1931 to 1932, the National Government 
279 See A. Young (1971, p. viii). The original Chinese name of Manchuria is “┯⍢.” 
280 See A. Young (1963, p. 422; 1971, p. vii). 
281 See A. Young (1963, p. 422). 
282 See A. Young (1971, p. viii). 
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still controlled the main parts of China until 1937, which allowed for the National 
Government to receive a large amount of revenue and reform the monetary system 
successfully in 1935.283 Table 3.1 below shows the revenues of the National Government 
from 1929 to 1937. Young pointed out that because the political situation was gradually 
becoming stable and the favorable policy in the Nationalist ruling area, China had a 
robust economic recovery and growth from 1935 to 1937.284 Table 3.2 below shows the 
real GDP in China from 1929 to 1938. He also pointed out that China’s economic 
performance was much better than most of the countries of the world who were suffering 
from deterioration in the mid-1930s.285 The main reason for the relative development of 
China’s economy during the decade from 1927 to 1937 was the relatively stable political 
and economic changes at that time before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
For the related analysis, see section 4.2.1 and section 4.2.2 in Chapter 4. 
  
283 See A. Young (1971, p. viii). 
284 See A. Young (1971, p. viii). 
285 See A. Young (1971, p. viii). 
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Revenues of the National Government, 1929-1937 
Year Revenue Growth rate 
1929 334 - 
1930 484 30.99% 
1931 558 13.26% 
1932 619 9.85% 
1933 614 -0.81% 
1934 689 10.89% 
1935 745 7.52% 
1936 817 8.81% 
1937 870 6.09% 
Table 3.1 Revenues of the National Government from 1929 to 1937. Tabke’s currency unit is one million Chinese 
dollars (C$). 




Real GDP in China, 1929-1938 
Year GDP Growth rate 
1929 273,991 - 
1930 277,467 1.26% 
1931 280,292 1.01% 
1932 289,200 3.17% 
1933 289,200 0% 
1934 263,996 -8.71% 
1935 285,300 8.06% 
1936 303,324 6.31% 
1937 295,937 -2.43% 
1938 288,549 -2.49% 
Table 3.2 Real GDP in China from 1929 to 1938. The unit of GDP is one million US dollars in the 1990 price level. 
Source: Maddison (2006, p. 192). 
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3.4.4.2 Helpful foreign advice, aids, investment, and trade. Along with the 
self-help which Chinese people accomplished, Young also pointed out that foreign advice, 
aid, investment, and trade also vitally helped China develop itself during the period from 
1927 to 1937.286 Table 3.3 below shows foreign trade from 1927 to 1937 (excluding 
Manchuria). Altogether, the National Government sold 187 million ounces of gold, 
receiving US$94 million to stabilize the Fabi and its exchange rate. Including the 
previous silver sale to the United Kingdom and the later one after the breaking out of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, the National Government sold a total of 362 million ounces 
and got US$157 million.287 Furthermore, Young also claimed that the American silver 
purchases also helped China financially and argued that foreign investment was playing 
an essential role in the progress that china achieved before 1937.288 For more about the 
economic development and foreign advice, aids, investment, and trade, see section 4.2.2, 
section 4.4.4.12, and section 4.5 in Chapter 4. 
  
286 See A. Young (1971, pp. vii-ix). 
287 See A. Young (1971, pp. 241-245). For a more detailed analysis, also see section 4.5.3.4 in Chapter 4. 
288 See A. Young (1971, p. ix). 
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Foreign Trade (Excluding Manchuria), 1927-1937  
Year Imports Growth Rate Exports Growth Rate 
1927 1,298 - 980 - 
1928 1,530 17.87% 1,041 6.12% 
1929 1,620 5.88% 1,070 2.79% 
1930 1,723 6.17% 944 -11.78% 
1931 2,002 16.19% 915 -3.07% 
1932 1,524 23.88% 569 -37.81% 
1933 1,345 -11.75% 612 7.56% 
1934 1,030 -23.42% 535 -12.58% 
1935 919 -10.78% 576 7.66% 
1936 941 2.39% 706 22.56% 
1937 935 -0.63% 838 18.70% 
Table 3.3 Foreign trade from 1927 to 1937 (excluding Manchuria). The unit of GDP is one million Chinese dollars. 
Source: A. Young (1971, p. 492). 
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But which factor was more important for China’s economic recovery and growth 
from 1927 to 1937? Young answered that it was Chinese people themselves who mainly 
achieved this performance.289 He also praised what China achieved compared to other 
less-developed countries at that time. Young said, 
China’s financial and economic progress in the prewar decade was a pioneer 
effort in the field of economic development. It antedated the widespread interest 
since World War II in the promotion of the progress of less developed countries, 
and the provision of large-scale foreign credits. China’s effort merits the careful 
attention of countries seeking development and of those providing aid. (A. 
Young, 1971, p. ix) 
We can figure out that Young gave a very high comment on what China achieved before 
the Second Sino-Japanese War, by not only comparing the less-developed countries in the 
pre-war time, but also after the Second World War. However, Young also pointed out the 
support of foreign credit for China’s economic development, which illustrated the 
situation of China’s external debt problem from another aspect. The Chinese were doing 
their best to pay foreign debts during the Nanjing Decade. For foreign bankers, China’s 
ability to pay the foreign debt was more impressive than the new currency situation. 
Despite the lack of statistics on external debt payments at the time, in 1928, the remaining 
railway debt was US$183 million. In 1937, two years after the currency reform, the 
remaining rail debt was only US$226,000! Table 4.2 shows some paid debts after the 
1935 currency reform.290 For more about the debt issues during the Nanjing Decade, see 
section 4.5.3.7 in Chapter 4.  
289 See A. Young (1971, p. viii). 
290 See Shiroyama (2008, pp. 196-197). 
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If Young’s assessment was correct, we could only imagine what grand 
achievements China could have accomplished if the Communists and totalitarianism did 
not interrupt the spontaneous developing process that China was marching toward, and 
how the great tragedy which Communism and totalitarianism brought to China could 
have been avoided. In the next section, we mainly focus on Young’s central banking 
thoughts on the related political and economic issues pertaining to our research of 
Young’s works we’ve mentioned in the previous parts of this chapter. 
3.4 Young’s Central Banking Thoughts From 1927 to 1937 
In section 3.4 above, we have discussed Young’s general comments on the 
modernization of China. We have concluded that Young thought that the National 
Government faced a lot of challenges from 1927 to 1937, especially from the banking and 
financial sectors. In this section, we mainly discuss Young’s central banking thoughts 
related to political and economic issues based on our research of Young’s works that we 
have mentioned in the previous sections. In section 3.5.1, we review Young’s central 
banking thoughts in the late 1920s. Later in section 3.5.2, we review his central banking 
ideas in the 1930s before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. 
3.4.1 Young’s Central Banking Thoughts in the Late 1920s 
In this section, we review Young’s central banking thoughts in the late 1920s. 
According to Young, the process of China’s monetary reform was not efficient. Of 
Young’s concerns, the fundamental problems of the Chinese monetary system were “the 
adoption of a definitive monetary standard” and “the creation of a uniform and 
convenient monetary circulation,” which had not been solved even since China had 
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started discussing banking reform at the beginning of the 20th century during the Qing 
Dynasty.291 
The National Government started reforming China’s banking system after 
discussion of monetary reform in the 1920s. For more about the debate on how to 
establish a better and robust monetary system for China, see section 4.2.3.4 in Chapter 4. 
For Young, the Chinese government needed to solve the problem of “chaotic monetary 
circulation” and the “choice between staying with silver standard or moving toward the 
gold standard.” 292 Thus, the National Government started to invite both Chinese and 
foreign monetary specialists to solve the problems. With the help of, and based on the 
suggestions of, the Kemmerer Commission, whom Young worked for in July 1928, the 
National Financial Conference decided to adopt the gold standard as the ultimate 
currency standard of China.293 Before the adoption of the gold standard, the Conference 
decided to adopt the Silver Dollar as the basic currency unit instead of the silver taels in 
the transition between the old and diverse currency system and the future gold 
standard. 294 According to the currency reform plan decided by the Conference, other 
subsidiary coins would also gradually be converted into the Silver Dollar. For more about 
the currency reform in the late 1920s, see section 4.3 in Chapter 4. 
After decades of debating and the settlement of new currency standard, on 
October 6, 1928, the National Government finally established the Central Bank of China, 
which started its operation on November 1, 1928. 295  With the C$20 million capital 
291 See A. Young (1971, p. 28). 
292 See A. Young (1971, p. 163). 
293 For more about the Kemmerer Commission, see Chapter 2 and Kemmerer (1929), A. Young (1971, p. 
28), and J. Zhu (2012, pp. 340-341). 
294 The reform of abolishing the silver tale to adopt the Silver Dollar is generally called “ᔒޙ᭩ݳ” in 
Chinese. 
295 See A. Young (1971, p. 27), J. Zhu (2012, p. 343), and Tamagna (1942, p. 122). 
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provided by the National Government, the Central Bank of China aimed to have the right 
“to issue banknotes, to mint and circulate coins, to deal in foreign exchange, and to 
handle the issuance and service of public loans.”296 Thus, in nature, this central bank was 
entirely a state bank. Due to the plan, in the beginning, the central bank planned to have a 
60% reserve in metals (silver, or gold coin, or bullion), and the remaining 40% reserve in 
government bonds or commercial papers.297 Here is a detail that deserves our attention. 
That is, the currency reform plan announced by the National Government and the US 
Silver Purchase Act of 1934 were entirely out of sync. Because the National Government 
announced that the monetary reserve contains silver, and the US Silver Purchase Act 
aimed to buy silver from the Republic of China as much as possible. It can be seen here 
that the policies of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration had neither been coordinated 
with Kemmerer Commission, nor with the Chinese National Government. For the policy 
discoordination, see section 4.5.1 in Chapter 4. 
Young praised the National Government for clearly seeing the necessity of 
building a new currency system to “end the chaotic medium and bring the standard of 
value,” which would also bring forward a stable relationship with the influential western 
countries at that time. 298  However, Young also pointed out that as the National 
Government was facing urgent fiscal problems, the fundamental reform of the monetary 
system was not practiced in 1928, and instead was deployed in the later 1930s. For the 
deployment of the banking reform in the late 1930s, see section 4.5 in Chapter 4. In the 
next section, we provide a detailed analysis of Young’s central banking thoughts in the 
1930s.  
296 See A. Young (1971, p. 27). 
297 See A. Young (1971, p. 27) and Tamagna (1942, p. 140).  
298 See A. Young (1971, p. 277). 
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3.4.2 Young’s Central Banking Thoughts in the 1930s 
After we have reviewed Young’s central banking thoughts in the late 1920s, in 
this section, we continue examining his banking thoughts in the 1930s before the 
breakout of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Section 3.5.2.1 and section 3.5.2.3 
are about Young’s central banking reform theory. We discuss his theory of adopting the 
Customs Gold Unit System and the theory of the transition and unification to a silver 
standard, respectively, in these two sections. Section 3.5.2.3 introduces his theory of 
stabilizing the silver standard through American silver purchases. Section 3.5.2.4 reviews 
Young’s theory of abolishing the silver standard and other currency reforms in 1935. 
Section 3.5.2.5 demonstrates Young’s commentaries of the strengthened and integrated 
governmental financial system under the Central Bank of China. Section 3.5.2.6 reviews 
his theory of why the central bank needed to be strengthened in 1937. Section 3.5.2.7 is 
about his theory of establishing a central reserve bank. Section 3.5.2.8 studies Young’s 
commentaries on the positive achievements regarding modernization of private banking 
institutions from 1927 to 1938. Section 3.5.2.9 is about his commentaries on the negative 
aspects of the banking institutions from 1927 to 1938. 
3.5.2.1 The theory of the central banking currency reform I: Adopting 
Customs Gold Unit system. The first of Young’s banking theory was his thoughts on 
adopting the Customs Gold Unit system (CGU). 299  For gradually adopting the gold 
standard, Young and other western specialists in the Kemmerer Commission suggested 
that the National Government accept the CGU, which would help the Chinese 
government receive more fiscal revenue. For more about the CGU, see section 4.4.1.1 in 
299 For the references of CGU, see A. Young (1971, pp. 277-278), Tamagna (1942, pp. 140-142) and J. Zhu 
(2012, p. 341). Customs Gold Unit is written as “⎧䰌䠁௞ս” or “䰌䠁ࡨ” in Chinese. 
174 
                                                 
Chapter 4. The Kemmerer Commission and Young also argued that by using the CGU 
system, while the price of silver was decreasing acutely, customs revenue would 
enormously increase, even both the internal and external situations were still challenging 
for the National Government.  
At the beginning of 1930, the National Government decided to adopt the CGU 
system as a transition towards the final gold standard:300 
The Customs Gold Unit, which was […] on the basis of a hypothetically pure 
gold content of 60.1866 centigrams; gold coins were never actually minted, 
however. The exchange of the Customs Gold Unit was fixed before March 1934. 
[…] The buying and selling of Customs Gold Units became a general practice, 
and importers found it convenient to keep duties by checks drawn on these 
accounts. […] The law required that these Customs Gold Unit notes be covered 
by a 100 per cent cash reserve. This reserve was to be in silver before November 
1935, and in silver and foreign exchange afterward. (Tamagna, 1942, p. 140) 
Here is another detail that deserves our attention. In section 3.5.1, we pointed out that the 
1934 US Silver Purchase Act was incompatible with China’s 1933 silver-standard 
central-banking reform. Here, the same policy inconsistency appeared again. The CGU, 
designed in 1930, was also considered by using the silver standard as the reserve fund. In 
the 1930 design, gold only existed as a CGU exchange rate unit, so gold was an 
imaginary standard for the CGU, while silver was the actual currency standard. However, 
the US Silver Purchase Act of 1934 disrupted the previous planning of CGU by the 
Chinese government and currency experts such as Young. 
300 See A. Young (1971, pp. 277-278), Tamagna (1942, p. 140), and J. Zhu (2012, p. 341). 
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There are four assumed benefits that the CGU system could bring, according to 
Young’s theories. 301  The first assumed benefit was that the system could help the 
National Government keep its credit, as the CGU system makes it possible for the 
government to pay foreign debts. The continuously paid debt could help the Chinese 
government keep its credit in the long run. The second assumed benefit was that, as the 
CGU system could keep the credit and reputation of the National Government, it makes 
the government pay their debt in other areas. As the National Government could keep its 
credit by paying back the debt through the revenue brought by the CGU system, it 
becomes possible to pay other previous debts. The third assumed benefit was that the 
CGU system could provide the flow of foreign currencies to the Central Bank of China. 
Foreign currencies could be gained by the revenue that the CGU system brings. The 
fourth assumed benefit was that the CGU system could become a transition between the 
adopted currency system and the gold standard. However, Young and the other specialists 
in the Kemmerer Commission suggested that the CGU system would be mainly used for 
paying customs duties as an internal circulation system, which should not enter the 
general currency circulation. Young argued, 
The advisers hoped that the CGU would be a step toward adopting the gold 
standard. To that CGU notes were issued. But they did not enter into general 
circulation, and their use was mostly for payment of customs duties. (A. Young, 
1971, p. 278) 
In the actual operation of CGU, it was only used to pay for foreign trade to avoid the 
impact of the Fabi’s price fluctuation on China’s foreign trade. Hence, in the practice of 
301 See A. Young (1971, pp. 277-278). 
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CGU, the National Government followed Young’s policy proposal. For more about the 
CGU, see section 4.4.1.1 in Chapter 4. 
3.5.2.2 The theory of the central banking currency reform II: The transition 
and the unification of currency units to a silver standard. The second of Young’s 
banking thoughts is his theory of the transition and unification to a silver standard.302 
Young and other western specialists in the Kemmerer Commission argued that the 
National Government should unify the currency system. As we have demonstrated in 
section 3.5.1, the gold standard would be the ultimate currency standard which China 
should adopt. However, Young and his colleagues in the Kemmerer Commission 
suggested that a silver standard and the Silver Dollar would be the transition before the 
adoption of the gold standard in the future. Young and his western colleagues believed 
that the old currencies like silver taels were outdated and should be abolished. Under this 
condition, what the National Government should do was to abolish the old unit of silver 
taels into the new Silver Dollar. For a detailed discussion of the 1933 currency reform 
and the transition from the silver tael standard to the central banking Silver Dollar 
standard, see section 4.4 in Chapter 4. 
Young and his western colleagues argued that the National Government should 
establish some institutions to execute currency exchanges from silver taels to the new 
silver-dollar system. The silver tael was a currency unit that China had used for at least a 
thousand years since the Song Dynasty (960-1276). Ordinary people often relied on small 
pieces of broken silver in the market to trade according to their weight, while the Silver 
Dollar is a paper currency based on the silver reserve. Naturally, the use of silver-based 
302 For the references of the transition and the unification of currency units to a silver standard, see A. 
Young (1971, pp. 178-183, p. 278) and Shiroyama (2008, pp. 168-171). 
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banknotes will be more convenient than the fragmented silver tael, as silver tael also 
needed to be weighed for trading, which costs time. However, China’s Silver Dollar 
reform in 1933 was at the expense of the centralization of the currency and the abolition 
of the free banking system. From the perspective of the Austrian school, such a bank 
reform may have an unstable impact on the currency system, and the government may 
abuse its currency issuance leading to price inflation and business cycles. While in the 
assumed new silver-dollar system by Young and his colleagues, it should also provide 
fractional currencies like nickel and copper, which were also widely used in China to 
make the circulation of Silver Dollar possible. However, considering the financial 
stability, Young and his colleagues assumed that the transition from silver tales into 
Silver Dollar should be practiced “smoothly.”303  
3.5.2.3 The theory of stabilizing the silver standard through the American 
Silver Purchase. The third of Young’s banking thoughts is his theory of stabilizing the 
silver standard though the American silver purchase.304 For Young, a silver purchase 
could be a step to adopt the gold standard finally. According to Young, as the western 
world faced an economic depression in the 1930s, the price of silver decreased 
dramatically, which would possibly cause the collapse of China’s foreign exchange 
system. However, Young also argued that though it seemed impossible for China to sell 
enough silver to receive foreign currencies to stabilize the currency exchange system, it 
was still possible for China to stabilize the currency exchange system through American 
silver purchases. Young wrote his idea in a letter to his friend, arguing that there were 
two pre-conditions of the successful exchange stabilization through the American silver 
303 See Young (1971, p. 278). 
304 For the references of stabilizing the silver standard though American silver purchases, see A. Young 
(1971, pp. 188-214, pp. 278-279), Shiroyama (2008, pp. 171-183) and J. Zhu (2012, pp. 353-372). 
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purchase. The first condition was that the purchase should undergo no unreasonable delay. 
The second was that the purchase should cause no financial collapse.305  
Furthermore, Young also provided two reasons why the American silver 
purchase was necessary for China to make the exchange stabilization possible. The first 
reason was that the purchase could make China “sell large amounts of silver at good 
prices” to avoid the rise of silver and “intolerable” price rising.306 The second was that 
the purchase should not break the market, as the manipulation of purchases was through 
the US government, not the market.  
Young also gave very high praise of the American silver purchase, arguing that 
it would be tough for China to fight against the Japanese occupation without the helping 
hand from the United States. Young said, 
Without the American silver measure, there is doubt whether China could have 
put through a comprehensive reform. (A. Young, 1971, p. 281) 
However, the facts were entirely contrary to Young’s judgment. After the pass of the 
Silver Purchase Act in 1934, the Chinese economy experienced depression and price 
deflation. Moreover, this kind of price deflation was not a natural price deflation that the 
Austrian school believes, but an artificial phenomenon related to the US acquisition of 
silver. 307  In June 1934, the US Congress passed the Silver Purchase Act, which 
authorized that the US government should purchase foreign silver with state machinery. 
Influenced by the Act, at the end of 1934, the world price of silver saw year-on-year rises 
of 26.7%, and in May 1935, the world price of silver reached a peak of $US 0.81 per 
305 See A. Young (1971, p. 278). 
306 See A. Young (1971, p. 278). 
307 For the Austrian school’s argumentation for a healthy price deflation after the depression of the business 
cycle, see Bagus (2015). 
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ounce.308 Banks in Shanghai stocks fell from C$563 million at the end of July to C$335 
million at the end of 1934.309 The interest rate of native banks rose from around six 
percent to 16% per annum. Small banks and small businesses were also facing 
bankruptcy. On February 4, 1935, the Central Bank stated that seven small banks, five 
other financial companies, 58 factories, and 99 stores were facing business failure, while 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange also plummeted nearly 50% in 4 years since its high in 
mid-1931.310 This caused national and local governments to also suffer financial woes.  
The performance of the central bank from 1933 to 1935 can also be judged by 
using two indicators, the currency issues, and the wholesale prices index. The monetary 
unit during this period was the Chinese Silver Dollar. Currency issuance plus currency 
deposits are the total money supply. The currency issuance in 1935 was 867,984,374 
yuan, a 62.3% increase from 535,190,933 yuan in 1933. The average annual increase is 
about 27.4%. The currency deposits in 1935 were 2,324,341,889 yuan, an increase of 
47.1% from 1,579,824,899 yuan in 1933. The average annual increase is about 21.3%. 
The total money supply in 1935 was 3,192,326,263 yuan, an increase of 50.9% from 
2,115,015,832 yuan in 1933. The average annual increase is about 22.85%. For the prices 
index, from 1933 to 1935, the prices index decreased from 103.9 to 96.4, which inherited 
the downward trend in prices from 1928. According to scholars’ research, the main 
factors of price deflation was due to the outflow of silver caused by the 1934 US Silver 
Purchase Act and the competitiveness of the economy at the time.311  Therefore, during 
308 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 358). 
309 See A. Young (1971, p. 221). 
310 See A. Young (1971, p. 221). 
311 For the references of price deflation during that period, see Friedman (1992), Friedman & Schwartz 
(1963, p. 483, pp. 489-491), Rawski (1989, p.15, pp. 312-400;1993), Silber (2019, pp. 38-89), and 
Richardson (2019/2020). 
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this period, despite the currency issuance, prices remained stable overall, and there was 
price deflation at that time. For more about the price deflation from 1933 to 1935, see 
section 4.4.2.4 in Chapter 4. 
Also, Young believed that the currency reform in 1933 was successful. However, 
when talking about the 1934 US Silver Purchase Act, he argued that although the US 
silver acquisition policy may be beneficial to China, it reflected the uncoordinated 
internal policies of the US government. He even pointed out that President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt simply did not understand the possible impact of the silver acquisition on the 
Chinese economy. Young said, 
We’d had a very successful currency reform on which I had been working, and 
in which we fought the United States because of its silver policy. I was in the 
strange position of writing notes to the American Government protesting the 
American policies, which was very curious, since I had been on the American 
side before. 
My friends in Washington knew that and they sympathized with me, because 
they did not favor what the Treasury and the President were doing about silver. 
The State Department was opposed to it; but Roosevelt never understood it, and 
so forth. Well, that’s a little by the way. 
We accomplished currency reform very successfully. It was going very well. 
The Central Bank, which I was advising, was going very well. I had been 
helping the Government with the negotiation of the defaulted debts, and we had 
succeeded in settling probably eighty to ninety percent of them and the rest were 
on the way. (A. Young & Fuchs, 1974) 
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Therefore, Young believed that the currency reform of 1933 was successful. 
Although he argued that the 1934 US Silver Act might be beneficial to China’s currency 
stability, he also saw the impact of sudden policy changes on the Chinese monetary 
system and the ignorance of President Roosevelt behind China’s economic situation. It 
can be said that Young’s view is very insightful because he keenly felt the stability of the 
US silver acquisition policy on the Chinese financial system, and he also saw the 
ignorance of policymakers like President Roosevelt. Only those who are deeply involved 
in policymaking like Young can discover these more profound issues. Therefore, this also 
reflects the importance of reviewing Young’s theory in understanding China’s currency 
reform from 1920 to 1930. 
3.5.2.4 The theory of the abolishment of the silver standard and the 
currency reform in 1935. The fourth of Young’s banking thoughts is his theory of the 
abolition of the silver standard and the currency reform in 1935, which is tightly 
connected with Young’s theory of stabilizing the silver standard though an American 
silver purchase.312 Due to the loss of silver caused by the 1934 US Silver Purchase Act, it 
was inevitable for the National Government to switch China’s currency standard into fiat 
money to stabilize its currency. In 1935, to stabilize the foreign exchange rate of the 
Chinese dollar, the National Government decided to abolish the silver standard, which 
was designed in 1928 and decided to nationalize silver and forbid the civil use of silver 
for stabilizing the foreign exchange rate of Chinese dollars. For the details of the 
stabilization of foreign exchange, see section 4.5.3.5 in Chapter 4. 
312 For the currency reform in 1935, see A. Young (1971, pp. 215-261, pp. 279-280), Shiroyama (2008, pp. 
183-185), and J. Zhu, 2012 (pp. 371-399). 
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Young illustrated that the direct cause of the nationalization of silver was the 
newly adopted “flexible export duty,” through which the National Government started to 
levy silver.313 Through this measure, the previously free exchange through silver was 
canceled, and the export tax was no longer in silver so that people can exchange foreign 
currency more freely due to the policy consideration. Young also argued that it was the 
flexible export that made people psychologically prepare for the abolishment of the free 
silver standard. 
Young considered that the foreign monetary policies of an American silver 
purchase had a strong influence on China, which made it more possible for China to 
make the gold-standard central banking reform, to abolish the silver standard, and to 
stabilize the foreign exchange rate. Furthermore, Young believed that the Chinese public, 
the market, and the related foreign countries were all in favor of the nationalization of 
silver, which laid the foundation for the reform of the Central Bank. 
In addition, commenting on the result of the nationalization of silver and the 
silver selling policy, Young praised that this policy helped China stabilize its foreign 
exchange rate. He also praised that as China did not link to either the US dollar or the 
British pound because of the silver selling policy, the exchange rate of the Chinse dollar 
did not suffer from the fluctuation of the exchange rate between the US dollar and the 
British pound. Young said,  
“China had stable rates of foreign exchange, firmly maintained by the Central 
Bank. […] China carefully avoided a link to either the dollar or the pound. After 
dollar-sterling rates fluctuated, the Central Bank widened the spread of rates to 
avoid having to tie to one or the other.” (A. Young, 1971, p. 280) 
313 See A. Young (1971, p. 279). 
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Thus, for Young, by connecting with the precious metals and stable exchange rates, the 
new Chinese fiat money Fabi could be stabilized. Furthermore, Young argued that there 
was a short-term effect that the monetary reform had, pointing out that the reform helped 
China recover its economy and build a good relationship with the related foreign 
countries for acquiring financial aid. He said, 
The immediate effects of the reform were highly favorable in clearing the war 
for economic recovery and accelerated progress, increased foreign trade, and 
coinage reform. In internal affairs, the government’s ability to use generally 
accepted banknotes for expenditures all over the country gave it a great 
advantage over regional dissenters who had no such opportunity. Broadly, the 
success of the reform gave the government greater strength and prestige both at 
home and abroad. (A. Young, 1971, pp. 281-282) 
Moreover, Young believed that there were also two long-term effects which the monetary 
reform supported by the 1934 US Silver Purchase Act. The first long-term effect was that 
Japan increased its hostility toward China and the United States, which made Japan 
accelerate its invasion of China. As we have briefly demonstrated in section 3.5.2.3, the 
US Silver Purchase Act caused not only the depression of Chinese economy and artificial 
price deflation, but also the sudden change into the fiat currency system in 1935, which 
was just two years after the silver standard currency reform in 1933. The second long-
term effect was price inflation caused by the monetary reform from 1927 to 1937. 314 
Young argued that although the reform helped China stabilize the currency exchange rate 
and helped China’s fight against Japanese aggression by adopting a fiat paper money 
system, price inflation, expansionary monetary policy, and war expenses made it hard for 
314 See A. Young (1971, p. 282). 
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the National Government to control the economy after the Second Sino-Japanese War 
ended in 1945. However, Young also believed that it seemed that the National 
Government had to choose either the silver standard, which would possibly not cause 
price hyperinflation in the later 1930s and 1940s, or the fiat money system adopted by the 
1935 currency reform, which would help China defeat Japan. For Young, the National 
Government was in a dilemma to choose either of the two options. He said,  
If by staying on a silver basis China had found herself unable to make prolonged 
resistance to Japan, the later events of World War II and its aftermath would 
certainly have been different. Whether for better or for worse is an interesting 
intellectual speculation. (A. Young, 1963, p. 34) 
Although Young’s words seem neutral, it is clear that for the people of the Republic of 
China, winning the fight against Japanese invaders and defending the freedom of the 
ROC was obviously an essential task. Otherwise, China would only fall further into the 
abyss of fascist dictatorship. Therefore, the adoption of any monetary system must 
consider the freedom and well-being of the people of the Republic of China, not short-
term dogmatic policy recommendations. On another side, due to the ongoing war against 
the Japanese, it seemed that it was impossible to accomplish neither the planned silver 
standard nor the gold standard, given that war expenses might be huge. Therefore, the 
Second Sino-Japanese War basically made the currency reform routes designed in the 
1920s and 1930s gradually impossible. 
3.5.2.5 Commentary on the strengthened and integrated governmental 
financial system under the Central Bank of China. The fifth of Young’s banking 
thoughts is his commentary on the strengthened and integrated governmental financial 
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system under the Central Bank of China (CBC).315 Young argued that the CGU system 
made the CBC successfully integrate the governmental financial system by 1937, as the 
fundraising of the National Government was dealt with independently by different 
governmental institutions. Young praised that the reformed governmental financial 
system and the CGU system “enabled the Central Bank to improve procedures of foreign 
debt payments and other payments in foreign currencies, while gaining experience in 
foreign exchange operations,” which made the Central Bank of China able to successfully 
operate exchange rates even after China abolished the silver standard in 1935.316 
3.5.2.6 The theory of what the Central Bank needed in order to be 
strengthened in 1937. The sixth of Young’s banking thoughts is his theory of what the 
central bank needed in order to be strengthened in 1937. Young argued that though the 
CBC planned to become a complete central bank, there were still two problems that 
remained in the management of the Central Bank of China in 1937. 
Young’s first concern was that the CBC was not successfully controlling the 
supply of money and the supply of credit. For Young, a real central bank should have the 
ability to constrain the supply of its currency. Thus, from Young’s perspective, the 
Central Bank of China should improve its ability to control the money supply instead of 
letting other government and private financial institutions issue the currencies without the 
permission of the CBC.317 In Chapters 5 and 6, we demonstrate that the Central Bank of 
China did not control the issuance of currency well, which led to price inflation during 
the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. Especially during the Civil 
War, the expansionary monetary policy and price inflation had a devastating impact on 
315 See A. Young (1971, pp. 283-285). 
316 See A. Young (1971, p. 283). 
317 See A. Young (1971, p. 283). 
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the economy of the Republic of China. It paved the way for the Communist Party to 
usurp the power of Mainland China. 
Young’s second concern was that the CBC was over-involved in supporting and 
financing the National Government, which was “continuously in deficit.”318 In this sense, 
Young argued that the CBC should be more independent and not use too much of its 
monetary resources to over-support the National Government. In chapter 2, we 
demonstrated that one of the goals of the Kemmerer Commission for establishing a stable 
central bank was to keep its independence. However, until 1937, after 10 years of 
management, the CBC was still deeply involved in government management and could 
not keep its monetary policy independence. However, we argue that it is difficult to 
guarantee the independence of any central bank during a war. The government will 
always take various measures to require the central bank to issue more currency and to 
meet the government’s wartime needs, which leads to price inflation and distortion of the 
economy.319 
3.5.2.7 The Theory of Establishing a Central Reserve Bank. The seventh of 
Young’s banking thoughts, which replicated Young’s theory of what the central bank 
needed to be strengthened, is his theory of establishing a central reserve bank.320 
The first aspect of Young’s theory of establishing a central reserve bank was to 
provide more liquidity of credit from the central banking system. Young and other 
monetary specialists argued that though the reduced reserve rate would cause price 
318 See A. Young (1971, p. 283). 
319 For the theory of war and wartime central banking expansionary monetary policy and price inflation, see 
Salerno (1995). 
320 See A. Young (1971, pp. 273-276, pp. 283-285), J. Zhu (pp. 371-398), and Shiroyama (2008, pp. 168-
199). 
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inflation, the result would be “profitable to the banks.”321 They planned to change the old 
reserve rules of 60% silver reserve against 40% securities into the new rules of 40% 
reserve against 60% securities plus deposits. 
The second aspect of Young’s theory of establishing a central reserve bank was 
to let the CBC monopolize the currency issuance. For Young and other monetary 
specialists, providing more liquidity of credit from the central banking system was just 
one part of strengthening the Central Bank of China, another part for enhancing the role 
of the Central Bank was to let it monopolize the currency issuance. They had planned that 
the Central Bank of China should monopolize the issuance of money before 1937. Still, 
as the “other government banks were reluctant to give up the issue privilege,” the plan 
was extended for another two years. 322  However, as Young argued, because of the 
conflicts between the CBC and other government banks, and because of the complicated 
situation during the war, the Central Bank of China’s currency monopolization was 
delayed until 1942. 
The third aspect of Young’s theory of establishing a central reserve bank was to 
control government borrowing from the Central Bank of China. Young and other 
monetary specialists argued that the National Government should be financially 
supported “by selling securities paid for from the savings of the republic rather than by 
Central Reserve Bank Credit,” which would make the CBC more independent and would 
allow for the CBC to control price inflation.323 This proposal implies that the state would 
be financed with public debt. However, Young and his colleagues also planned to let the 
CBC temporarily “finance current needs up to one-fourth of the previous fiscal year’s 
321 See A. Young (1971, p. 283). 
322 See A. Young (1971, p. 283). 
323 See A. Young (1971, p. 283). 
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revenue,” which made it also possible for the National Government to get the financial 
support from the Central Bank of China flexibly. 324 Empirically, Young argued that 
though there was pressure to overuse the central banking credit to support the National 
Government, the financial system was stabilized and would not be over-used, which also 
led to the improvement of revenues. Hence, for Young, China needed to construct an 
excellent monetary and credit system. Young said, 
Certainly the pressures would have been strong for excessive use of central bank 
credit, endangering in time the stability of the currency, …, [b]ut in the first half 
of 1937, revenues were improving with economic recovery and stabilization of 
the public finances was within reach. (A. Young, 1971, p. 284) 
3.5.2.8 Commentary on the positive achievements of the modernization of 
private banking institutions from 1927 to 1938. Young also had positive comments on 
the accomplishments of the modernization of private banking institutions from 1927 to 
1928.325 Young argued the spread of modern-style Chinese and foreign banks throughout 
China increased savings in the banking system. With the help of stable economic 
conditions and economic growth, banknote circulation and bank deposits grew a lot, 
which made it possible for private banks to support the development of the essential 
enterprises. He said, 
The sixfold growth of note circulation and threefold growth of bank deposits 
during the prewar decade mostly reflected greater use of modern financial 
instruments and growth of the economy. […] The Chinese and foreign banks 
324 See A. Young (1971, p. 283). 
325 See A. Young (1971, pp. 262-275, pp. 284-285). 
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were able to finance reasonably well the needs of the more important enterprises 
engaged in production and in domestic foreign trade. (A. Young, 1971, p. 284) 
However, although Young’s plan advocates market prices to determine bank credit 
conditions, this is obviously contradictory to the requirement he emphasized earlier to 
strengthen the central bank’s currency issuance. If local banks can decide their own 
interest rates and savings, then the role of central banks will be weakened. Additionally, 
Young also argued that the collaboration between the National Government and the 
private banks “provided a most important means to finance the government’s urgent 
needs” while it was trying to unify China and develop its own revenue system.326 When 
the National Government was fighting against inner-separatists (i.e., the CCP warlords) 
and the Japanese, there was waste and corruption and capital was diverted from private 
production and trade. However, private banking support for the government could have 
helped China establish better and more stable conditions for progress in the future. Young 
argued, 
[The private-banking support for the government to put down subversive 
movements and prepare to confront Japanese aggression] were, in principle 
designed to lead a situation in which production and trade would have better 
opportunity to progress. … [T]he end result in greater public order unity, and in 
clearing the war for financial and economic reforms, justifies on the whole the 
general politics followed. (A. Young, 1971, p. 284) 
Therefore, although Young did not have a more compelling argument for the relationship 
between local banks and central banks, he was aware of the importance of local banks in 
326 See A. Young (1971, p. 284). 
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serving local finance. At this point, he and the Austrian school’s theory of 
decentralization of knowledge are consistent.327 
3.5.2.9 Commentary on the Adverse Problems of the Banking Institutions 
From 1927 to 1937. The ninth of Young’s banking thoughts is his commentary on the 
negative problems of the banking institutions from 1927 to 1937. The first problem 
Young described was that the growth of Chinese modern-style private banks had a 
crowding-out effect on the provisional and native banks. The new banking system 
gradually made the local banks and other financial institutions lose their living space. For 
more about the reform of regional currencies and the decrease of traditional native banks, 
see section 4.5.3.9 in Chapter 4. Young argued that the decline of the native banks 
reduced the credit for the “numerous small traders and producers who were not in a 
position to obtain credit at a modern-style bank.”328  
The second problem Young described was the underdevelopment of banking 
credit in rural areas. He claimed that from 1927 to 1937, China had the problem of “the 
undue concentration of banking facilities in the treaty ports and lack of adequate rural 
productions.”329 Young also argued that even in the use of banking credit in rural areas, 
more credit was usurious and was used for personal needs rather than “financing 
production and improvements.”330 And the personal needs were also for dealing with the 
loss from the robbery by the military and from the stealing. Young said, 
327 For more about the theory of impossibility of central planning economic calculation and the subjective, 
creative, dispersed, and tacit qualities of information. See Mises (1949/1998), Hayek (1945), and Huerta de 
Soto (1992/2010). 
328 See A. Young (1971, p. 285). 
329 See A. Young (1971, p. 285). 
330 See A. Young (1971, p. 285). 
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Rural loans were commonly […] for personal needs, such as to tide over the 
period from late inter when food stock ran out until the new crops were ready. 
The personal needs were also for funerals, weddings, and in such emergencies as 
looting by troops or bandits. (A. Young, 1971, p. 285) 
The third problem Young described was that “the commercial banks were 
undercapitalized and often illiquid.” 331  With the help of Young and other monetary 
specialists, the National Government made two plans to solve the banking problem of 
under-capitalization and liquidity. The first plan was to establish an institution for solving 
the heavy mortgage burdens on commercial banks. The second plan was to improve the 
situation of agricultural credit in rural areas, which was claimed by Young as the “prime 
importance” as people were becoming more “receptive to communism” because of the 
over-use of usury and exploitation from local military and thieves.332 However, Young 
sadly argued that the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 prevented the 
fruition of “the plans to improve the credit system, by the creation of the Central Reserve 
Bank and of agencies for the mortgage and rural credit.”333 From the analysis in the 
following Chapter 4 to Chapter 6, we argue that it is not easy to establish a central reserve 
bank under the complex background of continuous foreign and civil wars. The idea of 
establishing a central reserve bank eventually failed in mainland China with the victory of 
the 1949 Communist Revolution. 
331 See A. Young (1971, p. 285). 
332 See A. Young (1971, p. 285). Chinese communism gradually began to develop in the rural direction after 
1935, and the Chinese Communists successfully used the rural platform to develop and strengthen their 
influence. For more about the economic activities of the Chinese Communist Party from the 1920s to 1949, 
see section 4.2.1 in Chapter 4, section 5.2.1 and section 5.5.13 in Chapter 5 and section 6.2.1 in Chapter 6. 
333 See A. Young (1971, p. 285). 
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In general, Young argued that the monetary reform from 1927 to 1937 made 
mainly by China itself and partly by the assistance of related foreign countries was 
“striking,” which brought China and other associated countries a “great benefit” in the 
transformation and modernization process of the currency system.334 However, he also 
argued that more reform should be made after 1937 as the gold standard was not achieved 
before this year. Furthermore, Young also argued that though the Central Bank of China 
was a central bank, it still was not a real central bank in 1937, as it could not successfully 
control the supply of currency and it was deeply involved in financially supporting the 
National Government that was constantly in deficit.  
3.5 Conclusion 
As a member of Kemmerer’s western monetary specialists’ group for China, 
who also influenced the decision-making by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the 
Chinese National Government, along with T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung and other western 
monetary specialists, Young’s argumentations on banking institutions are crucial and 
influential for the establishment of China’s first modern central bank in 1928. To 
understand the performance of China’s first modern central banking institutions from 
1927 to 1949, this chapter has systematically reviewed Arthur N. Young’s theories and 
comments on the establishment of China’s central banking institutions during the 
Nationalist rule from 1927 to 1949, especially his economic and monetary theories from 
1927 to 1937.  
In section 3.2, we provide the methodology and description of the investigation 
process of Young’s academic works related to China’s central banking from 1927 to 1937. 
334 See A. Young (1971, p. 277, pp. 280-281). 
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The originality of the research in this chapter is that we visited the original archive of 
Young’s research on China’s economic issues kept by the Hoover Institution at Stanford 
University. At the Hoover Institution, we extensively researched and read Young’s 
original manuscripts on China’s economic subjects, as well as his high-level telegrams 
with US and Chinese governments. We found that Young remarkably recorded and sorted 
out almost every detail of his work in China. We concluded that Young’s research on 
China was seriously and cautiously made by evidence (especially the first-hand evidence 
of governmental data, news reports clippings, and telegrams, etc.) and by his academic 
thoughts.  
In section 3.3, we reviewed Arthur Young’s biography, who was a specialist in 
central banking and finance. Young’s interest in economics began when his father 
enlightened him at the age of 15. At that time, Young began to pay attention to political 
and economic affairs. It can be said that this laid a solid foundation for his future career 
as an economist and diplomat. As a senior student graduating with a Ph.D. in economics 
from Princeton University, Young worked with “Money Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer and 
came to China as an essential member of the 1929 Kemmerer Commission for China to 
analyze and study China’s currency and economic issues, making policy 
recommendations to the Chinese National Government. Kemmerer was essentially his 
“teacher” and “colleague” who influenced on Young’s economic thoughts. Furthermore, 
we also found that Young not only came to China as an international student proficient in 
Spanish, but also visited Latin American countries and Spain to conduct research on their 
economic affairs. In addition, Young visited some European and Asian countries such as 
Poland and Vietnam to help them carry out economic and monetary policies. It can be 
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said that since Young has detailed practical investigations and studies on the economies 
and monetary issues of various countries, he should also be called “Money Doctor.” 
Moreover, we argue that as Young also participated in talks with politicians of various 
countries (such as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek) and made policy recommendations to 
various countries. He was also an outstanding diplomat. 
In section 3.4, we reviewed Young’s General Comments on the modernization 
of Nationalist China. Young believed that the 1949 Communist Revolution interrupted 
the pace of China’s modernization, especially the reform of the Chinese National 
Government in various political and economic fields before the outbreak of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War in 1937. For him, it was a pity that the Communist Revolution 
interrupted the modernization of Mainland China. He also regretted that Mainland China 
entered totalitarianism and Communism after 1949. Furthermore, Young also rightly 
pointed out that the Chinese Marxists ignored the outstanding achievements of the 
Chinese National Government before 1937: ending the melee of local warlords, 
establishing a unified government that represented China internationally, and promoting 
economic development. At the same time, Young also pointed out the destruction of these 
achievements caused by the Second Sino-Japanese War. Such a relatively comprehensive 
evaluation is obviously much fairer than the one-sided assessment of the National 
Government by Chinese Marxists. Hence, Young’s general opinions on the government 
administration performance from 1927 to 1937, the Nanjing Golden Decade, was positive, 
despite that he believed that corruption and the inefficiency of the Chinese government 
were the two biggest problems in China at that time.  
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For the corruption issue, we argue that Young had a deep understanding of 
China’s politics and corruption. He did not have a superficial understanding of China’s 
political traditions as a foreigner. From this point of view, Young had a deep 
understanding of Chinese politics. Furthermore, he also argued that the widespread 
corruption of the Chinese government only affected military and backward areas. 
Therefore, although corruption was a problem, it was not a decisive issue that lead to the 
failure of the National Government. Young considered that the corruption problem of the 
Chinese National Government was much lighter than that of other countries he had 
worked in. Here we see that Young not only had a profound understanding of corruption 
in traditional Chinese politics, but also compared Chinese political corruption to other 
countries he worked in. This view illustrated his comprehensive knowledge of corruption 
and his international perspective as a diplomat.  
Regarding Chiang Kai-shek, Young made a high assessment. He first affirmed 
Chiang Kai-shek’s integrity. Then Young argued that Chiang had to rely on the corrupted 
officials who were loyal to him to govern. Therefore, he argued that the effectiveness of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership was affected by the dual factors of Japanese aggression and 
the CCP rebellion. It can be seen that Young had a profound understanding of the reasons 
for the failure of the National Government. He did not superficially push the 
responsibility to Chiang Kai-shek alone but analyzed the historical conditions at that time.  
Moreover, Young also affirmed the National Government’s reforms for the 
country before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Young argued that 
the relatively stable situation in the Nationalist ruling area and the strong economic 
recovery and growth in the mid-1930s, and the helpful foreign advice, aids, investment, 
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and trade were the two important figures of the economic constitution during the Nanjing 
Golden Decade. Along with the self-improvement of the Chinese people, Young pointed 
out that foreign advice, aid, investment, and trade also vitally helped China develop itself 
from 1927 to 1937. But which factor was most important for China’s economic recovery 
and growth from 1927 to 1937? Young claimed it was Chinese people themselves who 
mainly achieved this performance. Young actually gave high praise on China’s 
achievements before the Second Sino-Japanese War, by not only comparing the less 
developed countries in the prewar time but also after the Second World War. However, 
Young pointed out that the support of foreign credit also aided China’s economic 
development, which illustrated China’s external debt problem from another aspect. The 
Chinese were doing their best to pay foreign debates during the Nanjing Decade.  
In section 3.5, we presented Young’s central banking thoughts from 1927 to 
1937. In the late 1920s, Young argued that the Chinese government needed to solve the 
problem of chaotic monetary circulation and the choice between staying with the silver 
standard or moving toward the gold standard. To improve the economy and the monetary 
system of China, the National Government started to invite both Chinese and foreign 
monetary specialists to solve their problems. With the help of, and based on the 
suggestions of, the Kemmerer Commission, whom Young worked for in July 1928, the 
National Financial Conference decided to adopt the gold standard as the ultimate 
currency standard of China. Before the adoption of the gold standard, the Conference 
decided to adopt the Silver Dollar as the basic currency unit instead of the silver taels in 
the transition between the old and diverse currency system, and the future gold standard. 
After decades of debating and settling the new currency standard, on October 6, 1928, the 
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National Government finally established the Central Bank of China, which started its 
operation on November 1, 1928. With the C$20 million in capital provided by the 
National Government, the Central Bank of China “aimed to have the right to issue 
banknotes, to mint and circulate coins, to deal in foreign exchange, and to handle the 
issuance and service of public loans.” Thus, in nature, this central bank was entirely a 
state bank. In the beginning, the central bank planned to have a 60% reserve in metals 
(silver, or gold coin, or bullion), and the remaining 40% reserve in government bonds or 
commercial papers. Young praised that the National Government clearly saw the 
necessity of building a new currency system to “end the chaotic medium and bring the 
standard of value,” which would also foster a stable relationship with influential western 
countries at that time. 335  However, Young also pointed out that as the National 
Government was facing urgent fiscal problems, the fundamental reform of the monetary 
system was not practiced in 1928, and instead was deployed in the later 1930s. 
In the 1930s, Young continued working for the Chinese National Government. 
Young argued that China should adopt the Customs Gold Unit System to transition and 
unify the currency unit to the silver standard. Due to Young and other economists’ 
suggestion, gold only existed as a CGU exchange rate unit, so gold was an imaginary 
standard for the CGU. At the same time, silver was the actual currency standard. 
However, the US Silver Purchase Act of 1934 disrupted the previous planning of CGU by 
the Chinese government and currency experts such as Young. Thus, Young provided his 
theory of how to stabilize the silver standard through an American silver purchase, while 
also pointing out that the US silver purchase could cause economic fluctuation. However, 
the facts were entirely contrary to Young’s judgment. After the Silver Purchase Act was 
335 See Young (1971, p. 277). 
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passed in 1934, the Chinese economy experienced depression and price deflation. 
Moreover, this kind of price deflation was not a natural price deflation that the Austrian 
school believes, but an artificial phenomenon related to the US acquisition of silver.336 In 
June 1934, the US Congress passed the Silver Purchase Act, which authorized the US 
government to purchase foreign silver with state machinery. Influenced by the Act, at the 
end of 1934, the world price of silver saw year-on-year rises of 26.7%, and in May 1935, 
the world price of silver reached a peak of US$0.81 per ounce.337 Banks in Shanghai 
stocks fell from C$563 million at the end of July to C$335 million at the end of 1934.338 
The interest rate of native banks rose from around 6 percent to 16% per annum. Small 
banks and small businesses were also facing bankruptcy. On February 4, 1935, the 
Central Bank stated that seven small banks, five other financial companies, 58 factories, 
and 99 stores were facing business failure, while the Shanghai Stock Exchange also 
plummeted nearly 50% in 4 years since its high in mid-1931.339 This caused national and 
local governments to also suffer financial woes. Thus, Young and the other economists 
(i.e., T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung) who worked for the National Government proposed 
the abolishment of silver standard and adopted fiat money currency in 1935 as a 
substitution. In 1935, to stabilize the foreign exchange rate of the Chinese dollar, the 
National Government decided to abolish the silver standard, which was designed in 1928, 
and decided to nationalize silver and forbid the civil use of silver for stabilizing the 
foreign exchange rate of Chinese dollars. Commenting on the result of the nationalization 
of silver and the silver selling policy, Young praised that this policy helped China 
336 For the Austrian school’s argumentation for a healthy price deflation after the depression of the business 
cycle, see Bagus (2015). 
337 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 358). 
338 See A. Young (1971, p. 221). 
339 See A. Young (1971, p. 221). 
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stabilize its foreign exchange rate. Thus, for Young, by connecting with the precious 
metals and stable exchange rates, the new Chinese fiat money Fabi could be stabilized. 
Furthermore, Young argued that there was a short-term effect that the monetary reform 
had, pointing out that the reform helped China recover its economy and build a good 
relationship with foreign countries for receiving financial aid.  Young argued that 
although the reform helped China stabilize the currency exchange rate and helped 
China’s fight against Japanese aggression by adopting a fiat paper money system, price 
inflation, expansionary monetary policy, and war expenses made it hard for the National 
Government to control the economy after the Second Sino-Japanese War ended in 1945. 
However, Young also believed that the National Government had to choose either the 
silver standard, which would possibly not cause price hyperinflation in the later 1930s 
and 1940s, or the fiat money system adopted by the 1935 currency reform, which would 
help China defeat Japan. 
The commentaries of the strengthened and integrated governmental financial 
system under the Central Bank of China (CBC). The theory of what the central bank 
needed to be strengthened in 1937. Young’s first concern was that the CBC was not 
successfully controlling the supply of money and the supply of credit. For Young, a real 
central bank should have the ability to constrain the supply of its currency. Thus, from 
Young’s perspective, the Central Bank of China should improve its ability to control the 
money supply instead of letting other government and private financial institutions issue 
the currencies without the permission of the CBC. Young’s second concern was that the 
CBC was over-involved in supporting and financing the National Government, which 
was “continuously in deficit.” In this sense, Young argued that the CBC should be more 
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independent and should not involve too much of its monetary resources to over-support 
the National Government. 
One of the important theories of Young was his theory of establishing a central 
reserve bank. Young and other monetary specialists argued that though the reduced 
reserve rate would cause price inflation, the result would be profitable to the banks. They 
planned to change the old reserve rules of 60% silver reserve against 40% securities into 
the new rules of 40% reserve against 60% securities plus deposits. The second aspect of 
Young’s theory of establishing a central reserve bank was to let the CBC monopolize the 
currency issuance. For Young and other monetary specialists, providing more liquidity of 
credit from the central banking system was just one part of strengthening the Central 
Bank of China. Another part for strengthening the role of the Central Bank was to let it 
monopolize the currency issuance. They had planned that the Central Bank of China 
should monopolize the issuance of money before 1937, but due to the outbreak of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, this plan was never implemented completely. The third 
aspect of Young’s theory of establishing a central reserve bank was to control 
government borrowing from the Central Bank of China. Young and other monetary 
specialists argued that the National Government should be financially supported “by 
selling securities paid for from the savings of the republic rather than by Central Reserve 
Bank Credit,” which would make the CBC more independent and would allow for the 
CBC to control price inflation. 
Young also provided commentary on the adverse problems of the banking 
institutions from 1927 to 1937. The first problem Young described was that the growth of 
the Chinese modern-style private banks had a crowding-out effect on the provisional and 
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native banks. However, we argue that although Young’s plan advocates market prices to 
determine more bank credit conditions, this is obviously contradictory to the requirement 
he emphasized earlier to strengthen the central bank’s currency issuance. The second 
problem which Young described was the underdevelopment of banking credit in rural 
areas. The third problem which Young described was that the commercial banks were 
undercapitalized and often illiquid.  
In general, Young argued that the monetary reform from 1927 to 1937 made 
mainly by China itself and partly by the assistance of related foreign countries was 
striking, which brought China and other associated countries a great benefit in the 
transformation and modernization of the currency system. However, he also argued that 
more reform should be made after 1937 as the gold standard was not achieved before this 
year. Furthermore, Young argued that though the Central Bank of China was a central 
bank, it still was not a real central bank in 1937 as it could not successfully control the 
supply of currency and was deeply involved in financially supporting the National 
Government who was constantly in deficit. We argue that although Young’s central bank 
theory contradicts his views on the development of local banks, and for the Austrian 
school, the spontaneous free banking system of non-central banks will have higher 
efficiency. From a practical perspective and empirical evidence, Young and other 
national currency experts did successfully implement the Silver Dollar standard of 1933. 
The failure of the fiat money reform in 1935, as Young himself said, had to do with the 
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the subsequent Communist Party 
rebellion from 1945 to 1949. Since Young’s analysis provides a large amount of 
theoretical and empirical data, in the following analysis from Chapter 4 to Chapter 6, we 
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use a large number of his outstanding works as important archives for the theory of 
China’s central banking system from 1927 to 1949 to make a more systematic evaluation. 
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Chapter 4  
Central Bank, Sliver Standard and Fiat Money 
Abstract: This chapter studies how China established its first modern central banking 
system from 1927 to 1937, filling a gap in the previous international research on the 
entire process of establishing China’s first modern central bank. In Chapter 1, we 
discussed that China had more than two thousand years of free banking, and silver tael 
was used as a main currency standard since the 15th century. However, the three central 
banking reforms that happened in the 1920s and 1930s fundamentally changed the status 
of China’s banking system. China, a country of using traditional and diverse metal 
standards, eventually established its first modern central bank in 1928. In 1933, the 
country abolished the traditional silver tael standard, establishing its Silver Dollar 
standard, which was designed by the Sino and Western financial specialists of the 
Nationalist Government based one a decade discussion. Initially, due to the 1929 gold 
standard plan proposed by the US financial specialist E. W. Kemmerer, the Silver Dollar 
standard would become a transition between the old silver tael standard and the future 
gold standard. However, due to the fragile internal financial condition and the 1934 US 
Silver Purchase Act, it became impossible for China to have sufficient silver to establish 
its Silver Dollar Standard, not mention the gold standard given that China was not a 
country that produced this scarce metal. Instead, from 1934 to 1935, after 3 rounds of 
Sino-Western negotiations, China was going to implement a fiat money system, Fabi, 
whose currency value was based on its exchange rates of the US dollar and the British 
pound. The reform was taken in November 1935, which ended China’s two-thousand-
year history of using metals as currency standards. The relatively stable political and 
economic conditions, along with the global trend of establishing a central banking system 
to strengthen the state power and the national financial system, made the birth of China’s 
first modern central banking system inevitable. Based on first-hand references, the 
monographs of the authoritative scholars, and the empirical data, this chapter focuses on 
the study of the history of the establishment of China’s first modern central banking 
institutions, providing an original in-depth synthesis and analysis of China’s first modern 
central banking establishment process. 
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This chapter studies how China established its first modern central banking 
system from 1927 to 1937. In Chapter 1, we have discussed that China had a more than 
two-thousand-year history of free banking and silver tael was used as a main currency 
standard since the 15th century. However, the three central banking reforms that happened 
in the 1920s and 1930s fundamentally changed the status of China’s banking system. 
China, a country of using the traditional and diverse metal standards, eventually 
established its first modern central bank in 1928. In 1933, the country abolished the 
tradition silver tael standard, establishing its Silver Dollar standard, which was designed 
by the Sino and Western financial specialists of the National Government of the Republic 
of China (ROC), resulting from a decade discussion. Initially, due to the 1929 gold 
standard plan proposed by the US financial specialist E. W. Kemmerer, the Silver Dollar 
standard would become a transition between the old silver tael standard and the future 
gold standard. However, due to the fragile internal financial condition and the 1934 US 
Silver Purchase Act, it became impossible for China to have sufficient silver to establish 
its Silver Dollar Standard, not mention the gold standard given that China was not a 
country that produced this scarce metal. Instead, from 1934 to 1935, after 3 rounds of 
Sino-Western negotiations, with the participation of the Sino-Western politicians and 
economists, such as Soong Tzu-wen, Kung Hsiang-hsi, and A. N. Young, China was 
going to implement a fiat money system (i.e. Fabi) whose currency value was based on its 
exchange rates of the US dollar and the British pound. The reform was taken in 
November 1935, which ended China’s long history of using metals as currency standards.  
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In 1927, the Chinese Nationalist Party (also called Kuomintang according to 
pronunciation with its abbreviation KMT or CNP) established the National Government 
of the Republic of China in Nanjing. One year later, its leader, Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek unified China. The relatively stable political and economic conditions, along 
with the global trend of establishing central banking system to strengthen the state power 
and the national financial system, made the birth of China’s first modern central banking 
system inevitable. Based on first-hand references, the monographs of the authoritative 
scholars, and the empirical data, this chapter focuses on the study of the history of the 
establishment of China’s first modern central banking institutions, providing an original 
in-depth synthesis and analysis of China’s first modern central banking establishment 
process. 
Section 4.2 of this chapter demonstrates the political and economic background 
from 1927 to 1937. As the political and economic situation was relatively stable during 
those 10 years, that era is called the “Nanjing Golden Decade” by many scholars. 
Essential historic events and data will be provided in this section to demonstrate how and 
why that 10-year history became a Golden Decade. Besides, we will also show in this 
section that the relatively peaceful environment provided Chinese politicians and 
economists a sufficient condition to discuss what kind of monetary system China should 
adopt. Section 4.3 deals the topics of the establishment of China’s first modern central 
bank, the Bank of China. Section 4.4 deals with the 1933 currency reform, a transition 
from the traditional silver tael standard to the new Silver Dollar standard. Section 4.5 
discusses the 1935 fiat money reform. Section 4.6 is the conclusion. 
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4.2 Political and Economic Background, 1927-1937 
In this section, we generally demonstrate the political and economic background 
of Nationalist China from 1927 to 1937. To perceive why the National Government 
desired to establish a central banking system, it is necessary to understand its historical 
background. Section 4.2.1 describes the political background from 1927 to 1937. Section 
4.2.2 deals with the economic background of this period. Moreover, the relatively relaxed 
political environment and economic prosperity also provided people a relatively 
sufficient space to discuss economic policy issues. In the Golden Decade, relevant 
politicians and economists were providing their opinions and suggestions on how to 
establish a new banking system in China, especially the modern central banking system, 
to promote prosperity for the country. Section 4.2.3 deals with this topic. 
4.2.1 The Political Background: The Establishment of the Nationalist Government 
This section reviews the political background from 1927 to 1937, the 
establishment of the National Government. Section 4.2.1.1 is about a short review of the 
political background before the establishment of the National Government. Section 
4.2.1.2 demonstrates the establishment of the National Government and Kuomintang’s 
practice of Yat-sen’s The Three Principle of the People. 
4.2.1.1 A short review of the political background before the establishment 
of the Nationalist Government. Chinese politics before the establishment of the 
Nationalist Government was chaotic. As the political, economic, and social crises of the 
late Qing Dynasty continued erupting, the republicans launched the Wuchang Uprising 
on October 10, 1911.340 Wuchang Uprising, as a part of the 1911 Republican Xinhai 
340 For more about the political background before the establishment of the National Government, see 
Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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Revolution, overthrew the Manchurian Qing Dynasty's 268-year rule in the Han majority 
China. Subsequently, on January 1, 1912, due to The Provisional Constitution of the 
Republic of China, Sun Yat-sen, a republican leader and founder of the Kuomintang, was 
sworn in as the Provisional President of the Republic of China in Nanjing.341 In February, 
Yuan Shikai, Prime Minster of the last modern western-style responsible cabinet of the 
Qing Dynasty and the leader of Beiyang Army of the court, persuaded Emperor 
Xuantong and the Qing royal family to abdicate, which marked the suspension of China’s 
attempt to establish a constitutional monarchy. Later, Yuan Shikai moved the Republic of 
China’s capital from Nanjing to Beijing, the former capital of Qing Dynasty in order to 
control the political situation of the whole China in his hands. In this way, the former 
military personnel of the Beiyang Army represented by Yuan Shikai began to rule China 
for 15 years. In 1916, Yuan Shikai announced that he would restore the imperial system, 
ascend the throne himself as the Emperor of China. His decision was opposed by elites 
from all walks of life across China. Yuan soon withdrew his plan of the new imperial 
system, restored the Republic’s provisional constitution, and died soon of uraemia in the 
same year. After Yuan’s death, the Beiyang Government was divided. In the early 1917, 
Duan Qirui, Prime Minister of the Beiyang Government, announced the abolition of The 
Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China and the Congress. Duan’s controversial 
action led to the dissatisfaction of Kuomintang parliamentary members and its leader Sun 
Yat-sen. On July 17 of the same year, in the south China city Guangzhou, Sun Yat-sen 
established the Constitutional Protection Junta (also called the Military Government) to 
restore the provisional constitution which was the predecessor of the later National 
Government. During the rule of Beiyang Government, the Chinese Communist Party 
341 The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China is written as “ѝ㨟≁഻㠘ᱲ㌴⌅” in Chinese. 
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(CCP) was established in Shanghai in 1921, gradually becoming an important political 
force during the period of the Republic of China on the Chinese Mainland. The CCP 
defeated the democratic elected government of the Republic of China led by the Chinese 
Nationalist Party during the Civil War from 1945 to 1949 and began a reign of terror of 
communist and totalitarian over Mainland China for more than 70 years. 
4.2.1.2 The establishment of the National Government and the Nationalists’ 
practice of Yat-sen’s Three Principle of the People. China’s political situation was 
gradually stabilizing with the gradual establishment of the National Government. After 
the establishment of the Military Government, Sun Yat-sun intended to use Guangdong 
Province as a southern base to restore the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of 
China. 342  On April 12, 1924, Sun Yat-sen published The Nationalist Government’s 
Outline for Founding the Nation, which became one of the important principles of the 
Kuomintang and its Military Government.343 Due to this book, China would achieve a 
constitutional order through the Period of Military Government, the Period of Political 
Tutelage through the Kuomintang led Party-State, and the Period of Constitutional 
Politics.344 To achieve the goal of establishing a constitutional order, at the military level, 
Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang also organized their own army, the National 
Revolutionary Army, which later became the national military force fighting against the 
Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).345 Chiang Kai-shek was 
nominated as an important military official of the National Revolutionary Army. On May 
1924, Chiang was nominated as the Superintendent of Republic of China Military 
342 See X. Li & Z. Li (2011, pp.125-187). 
343 See Y. Sun (1924). 
344 The Period of Military Government, the Period of Political Tutelage, and the Period of Constitutional 
Politics are written in Chinese as “䓽᭯,” “䁃᭯,”, and “២᭯” originally. 
345 See C. Wang (2011, p. 283). 
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Academy, who became the highest military leader of the National Government after Sun 
Yat-sen’s death, also known as “Generalissimo Chiang.” In March 1925, Sun Yat-sen 
died in Beijing when he was negotiating with the Beiyang Government in peace talks.346 
After Sun’s death, the peace talks between the Nationalists and the Beiyang Government 
soon broke down.  
In this situation, On July 1, 1925, the Chinese Nationalist Party officially 
established the National Government of the Republic of China to achieve the Period of 
Political Tutelage that the political party had promised to the Chinese people.347 Wang 
Jingwei was nominated as the first President of the National Government, while the 
power of controlling the military issues was in the hand of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek. In the later Second Sino-Japanese War, Wang and Chiang became political enemies 
as Wang was leading his Nanjing National Government as a puppet regime of the 
Japanese, being against Chiang Kai-shek’s legitimate National Government which 
withdrew to the southwest city Chongqing (as the Republic of China’s wartime capital till 
now due to the ROC laws) from Nanjing due to the wars.  
With the breakdown of the peace talks between the National Government and 
the Beiyang Government, in July 1926, the National Government began the Northern 
Expedition to unify China and eliminate the Beiyang Government.348 On April 18, 1927, 
the National Government moved its capital to Nanjing. In the same year, the Nationalist 
Party and the Communist Party, which had originally cooperated in military and political 
affairs, split. The Communist Party began its military rebellion and gradually controlled 
346 See Luo et al. (2011, p. 78-106). 
347 See Luo et al. (2011, p. 503-507). 
348 For reference of the Northern Expedition and the establishment of the Nationalist Government, see T. 
Yang (2011, pp. 341-345, pp. 358-361) and Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 10, pp. 111-115). 
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Mainland China after 1949. In 1928, the Northern Expedition of the National 
Government succeeded, ending the rule of the Beiyang Government in north China and 
unifying the whole China officially. In the same year, the National Government 
promulgated The Provisional Constitution for the Period of Political Tutelage of the 
Republic of China, officially starting to implement the Kuomintang led Party-State period 
that Sun Yat-sen had designed. 349  After the Northern Expedition, the Nationalist 
Government controlled most of the Chinese Mainland except some small areas (only 7 of 
18 provinces) that were mostly occupied by Communist Party and the Japanese 
(especially in Manchuria).350  
The following years were Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership of the ROC National 
Government. Qiang became the de facto head of the National Government after it moved 
its capital to Nanjing in 1927. He served as President of the National Government from 
October 1928 to December 1931. From December 1931 to May 1946, he served as 
Chairman of the Military Commission of the National Government. On April 1938, he 
began serving as the Director-General of the Kuomintang. On May 20, 1948, Chiang Kai-
shek was elected as the President of the Republic of China by the First National 
Assembly, becoming the first head of state in Chinese history to be democratically 
349 The Provisional Constitution for the Period of Political Tutelage of the Republic of China is written as 
“ѝ㨟≁഻䁃᭯ᱲᵏ㌴⌅” in Chinese. 
350 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 150). In the middle and late years of the Nanjing Golden Decade, 
the northern territory of the Republic of China was gradually invaded by the Japanese. Japan launched the 
Mukden Incident in 1931, and gradually occupied Northeast China (Manchuria) in the following months. In 
1932, the Japanese supported the establishment of Manchukuo (1932-1945) in northeast China. The 
investigation by the League of Nations identified it as the puppet regime of the Japanese. Therefore, some 
scholars believe that the Sino-Japanese War broke in 1931 and not 1937 (Gordon, 2003, p. 189). For a 
detailed description of this history, see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 492-519). For more about the 
political and economic situation in Japan before the Second Sino Japanese War, see Chapter 11 of A. 
Gordon’s A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (2003, pp. 182-203). For 
wartime Japan, see Chapter 12 of the same book (pp. 204-225). 
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elected in a manner similar to the Electoral College of the US presidential election.351 
After the defeat of the Civil War in 1949, Chiang retired to Taiwan, serving as the 
Director-General of the Kuomintang and the President of the Republic of China until his 
death in Taipei on April 5, 1975. 
The decade from 1927 to 1937 were a rare decade of relative peace during the 
era of the Republic of China on the Chinese Mainland. That period from 1927 to 1937 
was called “the Nanjing Golden Decade.”352 As a result, the National Government was 
able to pursue its policies. The government and the Kuomintang adhere to Sun Yat-sen's 
The Three Principles of the People: Chinese Nationalism, Government by the People and 
Minshengism. Chinese Nationalism stands for equality among all ethnic groups in the 
Republic of China and the use of traditional Chinese morals as the basis for peace among 
all the Chinese ethnic groups. 353  Government by the People is about Sun Yat-sen’s 
proposition of the separation of the constitutional five powers, namely, the separation of 
administrative, legislative, judicial, examination, and audit political institutions.354 This 
political system was first initiated in 1925 when the National Government established. In 
1946, the Constitutional National Assembly, which was elected through democratic 
procedures, adopted The Constitution of the Republic of China based on Sun’s separation 
of the five powers.355 After the government of the Republic of China retired to Taiwan in 
1949, it continued to use the basic structure of this constitution till now. It is worth 
mentioning that The Constitution of the Republic of China and its amendments currently 
351 In 1996, the Republic of China on Taiwan elected Lee Teng-hui as the President of the Republic of 
China through direct election of the people. In this way, the Republic of China fully realized its 
constitutional system in its Free Area. 
352 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 116-167) and D. Ma (2012). 
353 See Y. Sun (1924/1927c). 
354 For Sun Yat-sen’s entire theory of Government by the People, see Y. Sun (1924/1927a). 
355 For more about the adoption of the 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China, see section 6.2.1 in 
Chapter 6. 
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used in Taiwan still express the claim that Mainland China is the territory of the ROC. 
Therefore, once the Chinese Communist Party regime collapses, the Republic of China 
on Taiwan still has the constitutional possibility and responsibility to regain the Mainland 
China. 
Minshengism is about Sun Yat-sen’s proposals of economic policy, which can be 
literally translated as “the People’s livelihood.”356 Sun Yat-sen’s economic policy was 
neither a completely laissez-faire economic policy nor a Marxist communism proposal. In 
his view, a market economy can certainly promote economic development, but it requires 
state intervention to control capital and collect taxations (such as the land tax), avoiding a 
widening of the gap between the rich and the poor.357 Thus, the establishment of the 
system of state-owned controlled by state capitals is an important tool for achieving 
social equality in Sun Yat-sen’s thought. In the discourse of Minshengism, although Sun 
Yat-sen had no systematic banking theory, he emphasized the necessity to establish a 
modern central bank system for China. He advocated the introduction of foreign capital 
to develop the Chinese economy and a national central bank could play a role in 
financing the process of economic opening and development.358  
Though Sun Yat-sen did not proposal any systematic theory of establishing a 
modern central banking institution, he still argued that it is necessary to issue banknotes 
to solve the financial shortage of the National Government. While he proposed that 
although the banknote reserves do not necessarily have to be 100% reserve, when the 
government receives tax revenue, the previous issued banknotes that were used for 
supporting the government expenditure should be destroyed so that there is no price 
356 For Sun Yat-sen’s entire theory of Minshengism, see Y. Sun (1924/1927b). 
357 See Y. Sun (1924/1927b, pp. 30-35). 
358 See Tamagna (1942, pp. 48-49) and Y. Sun (1924/1927b, pp. 32-35). 
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inflation which distorts the economy.359 Thus, Sun supported a 100% reserve system and 
opposed monetary inflation and price inflation. Sun’s theories of 100% reserve and anti-
inflation thought were accepted by the National Government when it designed the central 
bank system in the late 1920s. However, we will show in later analysis in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 that although the Chinese and Western financial and economic experts agreed 
in principle with Sun Yat-sen's theories of 100% reserve and anti-price inflation 
argumentation, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek did not follow these two principles 
during the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, which eventually led to 
price hyperinflation, causing the collapse of the Chinese economy during the Communist 
Revolution. In section 4.3.1, we demonstrate the Nationalists’ early central banking 
experiment from 1924 to 1927 in details. In the next section 4.2.2, we review the 
economic background of the Nanjing Golden Decade, 1927-1937. 
4.2.2 The Economic Background: The Nanjing Golden Decade, 1927-1937 
The relatively stable domestic political stability provided the necessary condition 
for the formulation of relatively laissez-faire economic policies and economic 
development, being conducive to entrepreneurship and economic development. During 
the Golden Decade, China’s industries developed rapidly. Section 4.2.2.1 discusses this 
topic. Section 4.2.2.1 demonstrates the general background of the agricultural industry. 
4.2.2.1 The development of industries. During the Golden Decade, China’s 
industries were developing rapidly. At the same time, investment, commodity size, 
market size, and imports and exports were all growing. Transportation and urbanization 
were also evolving. Despite the limited data at that time, we can still find the promising 
359 For more about Sun Yat-sen’s proposal of establishing banknote system, see Y. Sun (1912/1982). 
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phenomenon of China’s economic growth during the Nanjing Golden Decade. However, 
relative to the development of industries, during this period, China’s agricultural 
development lagged. About 50% of Chinese farmers were tenant farmers, who needed to 
pay their landlords up to 37.5% of rent. The government hoped that farmers would be 
able to purchase the lands of their landlords to free them from attachment to their 
landlords. Unfortunately, the land reform failed because the government was not 
determined to reform the land system and were hindered by the landlord class. Section 
1.2.1.1 is about the rapid development of various industries. Section 1.2.1.2 is about the 
situation of agricultural industry during the Nanjing Decade. 
4.2.2.1.1 Rapid development of various industries. Despite the lack of 
comprehensive statistics, existing research has revealed that the Chinese industries were 
developing very rapidly during the Golden Decade. In the 1920s, the development of 
handicraft industry reached its peak and its output value was comparable to that of 
agricultural products.360 Knitting, silk weaving, dyeing, wool textile, and other industries 
continued to develop in the 1920s and 1930s. A number of new industries also emerged, 
such as the electrical appliance industry, the motor industry, the fuel industry, the alcohol 
industry, and the saline-alkali industry. The development of electrical appliance industry 
and motor industry also led to the growth of handicraft.361 In the 1930s, 93.5% and 89.6% 
of Chinese and foreign-invested industries had profits.362 
Figure 4.1 below shows the gross value of output (GVO) and net value added 
(NVA) of China’s industries (including Manchuria) from 1927 to 1937. To illustrate the 
industrial growth of the Golden Decade, we also add the corresponding data of 1912 and 
360 See C. Wu (2001, p. 298). 
361 See H. Huang (2007). 
362 See Z. Chen (2007). 
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1917 for comparison. Due to incomplete statistics at that time, statistics for other years 
are unknown. Taking the value of Fabi in 1933 and the corresponding indices as the 
benchmark units, in 1912, China’s GVO was only C$119.7 million with its index 11.9. In 
1917, the GVO data was only C$268.67 million with its index 26.7. In 1927, the GVO 
was C$670.1 million with its index 66.6. China’s industrial GVO was growing every year 
since then and reached its peak in 1936, with a GVO of C$1227 million and its index of 
122. In 1937, due to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the GVO index dropped to 
96 (C$965.8 million). Nevertheless, China’s industrial output value still increased by 
44% in 1937 compared with 1927. In terms of NVA data, in 1912, China’s NVA was 
only C$58 million with its index 15.7. In 1917, the NVA data was only C$118.3 million 
with its index 32. In 1927, the NVA was C$245.1 million with its index 66.3. China’s 
industrial NVA was growing every year since then and reached its peak in 1936, with an 
NVA of C$499 million and its index of 135. In 1937, due to the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese War, the NVA index dropped to 112.3 (C$415.2 million). Nevertheless, China’s 
industrial NVA still increased by 69.4% in 1937 compared with 1927. Therefore, it can 





Figure 4.1 Industrial production from 1912 to 1937.  
Sources:  GVO and NVA along with their indices from 1927 to 1936 are from A. Young (1971, p. 311), GVO and 
NVA indices of 1912, 1917, and 1937 are from J. Zhu (2012, p. 335). 
Notes: Young’s statistical data is based on 1927 and J. Zhu’s is based on1933. We calculate the GVP and NVA data of 
1912, 1917, and 1937 and their indices by unifying the statistical data base in 1933. Due to incomplete statistics at that 
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4.2.2.1.2 An Overview of investment, commodity size, market size, and imports 
and exports. During the Nanjing Golden Decade, foreign investment, commodity size, 
market size, and import and export in China all increased compared to previous periods. 
From 1911 to 1914, foreign capital invested in China reached 1.021 billion yuan, a 
proportion of 57.2% of the whole investment in China, which had an average annual 
growth rate of 5.8%.363 The period from 1920s to 1930s was the most rapid period for 
foreign investment growth during the era of the ROC on Mainland China.364 In 1931, 
foreign investment reached 242.5 million yuan, of which 1.4 billion was commercial 
investment, including 8,000 foreign banks, shops, hotels, and even various entertainment 
venues. Compared with 1920 and 1914, domestic capital investment increased from 
1.786 billion yuan to 2.597 billion yuan.  
From 1908 to 1920, the annual growth rate of commodities was 10.46%. From 
1920 to 1936, the annual growth rate of commodities was 3.6%, of which the annual 
growth rate of industrial products was 7.55% (excluding price inflation).365 From 1920 to 
1936, China’s domestic investment increased from 9.244 billion yuan to 16.806 billion 
yuan, an increase of 2.7%.366 From a longer period of time, we can see it more clearly the 
degree of domestic investment growth in Nanjing Golden Decade. From 1887 to 1922, 
the annual growth rate of domestic investment was only 1.00% and the growth rate of 
consumption was only 0.67%. From 1922 to 1936, the annual growth of domestic 
investment was 1.45%, while the rate of consumption was 3.75%.367 
363 See Zheng (2005, p.560). 
364 For data of the foreign investment from 1920s to 1930s, see J. Zhu (2012, p. 334). 
365 See C. Wu (p.2001, 298) 
366 See D. Zhang (2005, p. 125). 
367 See D. Zhang (2005, p. 220). 
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Similarly, imports and exports were growing. Despite the lack of statistics from 
previous periods, China’s exports tripled in the first 30 years of the 20th century, while 
Japan only doubled, with India having almost no growth.368 Regardless of the Manchuria 
region, China’s import quota was C$1,298 million in 1927 and the highest import quota 
in the period of Nanjing Decade was reached in 1931, which was C$2,002 million, an 
increase of 54%. The export value in 1927 was C$980 million and in 1929 it reached the 
highest export quota in the same period, which was C$944 million. The total value of 
imports and exports increased from C$2,278 million in 1927 to C$2,917 million in 1931. 
Although the total value of imports and exports fell to C$1,791 million in 1937 due to 
war issues, China’s imports and exports had developed to a considerable extent in the 
years before the Second Sino-Japanese War began.369 
4.2.2.1.3 Development of transportation and urbanization. During this period, 
railway, shipping, and road transportation all developed (road transportation being the 
most significant).370 China had no highways in 1913 and the total mileage of highways 
grew to 1,185 kilometers in 1922 and 96,078 kilometers in 1935, an increase of more 
than 80 times in 15 years.371 In the 1930s, the urban population reached a growth rate 
twice that of the rate of the national population.372 The provinces that the major cities 
Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Shenyang are located in, accounting for only 
about 10% of China’s territory, had 36.3% of the national population and 84% of foreign 
trade of the whole country.373 
368 See Du (2004, p. 157). 
369 For data of the import and export during the Nanjing Decade, see A. Young (1971, p. 492). 
370 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 336). 
371 See D. Zhang (2005, p. 125). 
372 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 337). 
373 See Cai (1954, p. 64). 
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4.2.2.2 The development of the agricultural industry. Compared to the 
development of industries, the situation of agriculture was quite poor. Despite the lack of 
systematic statistics, studies based on some statistics and evidence point out that China’s 
agriculture was very underdeveloped at that time. In 1933, modern manufacturing, 
mining, and utilities accounted for only 3.4% of domestic products. 374  Four of five 
Chinese were farmers and they contributed 65% of domestic products.375  
Although no systematic statistics are available, China’s underdevelopment can 
be seen in the mortality rate. In the 1930s, China had the highest mortality rate in the 
world. The mortality rate was 2.5 times that of the United States and even higher than 
that of India at that time.376  
In 1930, the Legislative Yuan passed the Land Law to reduce the burden on 
farmers by rents of up to 37.5%. However, the reform was opposed by landowners. 50% 
to 70% of the main crop rents were still paid by farmers, while half of the Chinese 
farmers were still tenant farmers, resulting in the reform’s failure.377 Economist A. N. 
Young believed that the reason for the failure of the agrarian reform was that the 
government sympathized with the landlord class and were unwilling to offend them.378 
Historian of the Chinese history L. E. Eastman considered that the cause of rural poverty 
was the unfavorable ratio between the rural population an food production.379 However, 
from the capital theory of the Austrian school, the reason for poverty is that capital 
accumulation is underdeveloped. The lack of capital leads to production technology 
374 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 151) and T. C. Liu & Yeh (1965, p. 66, p. 89). 
375 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 151) and T. C. Liu & Yeh (1965, p. 66, p. 89). 
376 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 151) and Buck (1964, p. 387). 
377 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 151-152). 
378 See A. Young (1971, p. 389). 
379 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 152). 
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stagnation and low labor prices, which cannot be transferred to higher-paying industries; 
and their marginal returns cannot be improved.380 The land reform of the Republic of 
China government was not realized until its move to Taiwan in 1949.  
From 1934 to 1936, the government adjusted the flood control facilities in 
agricultural areas and helped the farmers improve their production techniques. 381 
However, only 4% of government revenue was used to promote the economic 
development of farms.382 From 1936 to 1937, the survival of the peasants moderated. The 
clement weather resulted the best harvest in 20 years at that time, while the price inflation 
improved the farmers’ nominal income. 383  In any case, in 1936 the Nationalist 
Government apologized for its ineffective agricultural policy.384 
Figure 4.2 shows the generally declining agricultural prices index from 1931 to 
1937. Due to the lack of statistics, there is no corresponding data for other years in the 
Golden Decade. However, if the 1931 agricultural price index was taken as 100, then the 
index fell continuously in the next few years. From 1932 to 1934, the annual index was 
decreasing 72, 61, and 56. After the currency reform in 1935, the index rose. The index in 
1935 was 56 in 1935, 57 in 1936, and 60 in 1937. Therefore, from the perspective of 
falling prices or prices deflation, clearly, farmers did not benefit from the Golden Decade. 
From the above data, we can see that the agricultural situation in the golden decade was 
not prosperous. Only after 1935, the year of the currency reform, the prices were 
reflationary in agricultural industry and the farmers were receiving more profits.  It was 
indeed a “golden decade” for the development of industry, but not for agriculture. 
380 See Mises (1949/1998, pp. 669-680). 
381 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 152). 
382 See A. Young (1971, p. 437, p. 439). 
383 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 153). 
384 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 153) and Holland & Mitchells (1937, p. 166). 
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Figure 4.2 Agricultural prices index, 1931-1937.  
Source: A. Young (1971, p. 479).  
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4.2.3 The Background of the Big Discussion on Establishing a Modern Banking 
System 
During the Golden Nanjing Decade, not only was Chinese politics relatively 
stable with the industrial economy developing, but China also had a relative free speech 
environment. At that time, from policy makers to economic scholars, the Chinese were 
discussing many issues of the topic of establishing a new currency and banking system, 
as all of them believed that it was necessary to establish a new and strong banking system 
to build the Chinese economy. As the leader of the Nationalist Government, Chiang Kai-
shek’s understanding of the currency system played a decisive role in the final decision of 
the National Government. Section 4.2.3.1 is about Chiang’s position on monetary system. 
As the most important economic policy advisors and politicians of Chiang, Soong Tse-
ven and Kung Hsiang-hsi also played important roles in the formulation of the National 
government’s monetary policy. Section 4.2.3.2 introduces Soong Tse-ven and his 100% 
reserve central banking and anti-price inflation thoughts. Section 4.2.3.3 demonstrates 
Kung Hsiang-hsi and his monetary proposals. While other economists did not directly 
affect the final decision of the government, they also participated in the discussion of the 
currency system at that time. Section 4.2.3.4 deals with their argumentations. 
4.2.3.1 Qiang Kai-she’s position on establishing a modern central banking 
system. In the first place, it is essential to briefly outline Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek’s thoughts on central banking and fiat currency reform. As a believer in Sun Yat-
sen’s Three Principles of the People, Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) agreed with Sun Yat-
sen’s ideas on developing state capital and state-owned banks. In a speech before the 
1935 fiat money reform, Chiang Kai-shek proposed that the issuance of banknotes 
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(through the central banking system) and the abolition of metal currencies such as gold 
and silver “were the trends in social evolution.” 385  At a meeting of the National 
Government in 1941, he made it clear that the money policy was “exactly the monetary 
revolution advocated by Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China.”386 
However, as Chiang Kai-shek was not an economist, but rather a politician and policy 
maker, to understand his monetary thoughts and policy propositions it is necessary to 
inspect the National Government’s monetary policy. From section 4.3 to section 4.5 of 
this chapter, we will review the fiat money reform of the National Government. For more 
information about Chiang Kai-shek’s currency proposition during the Second Sino-
Japanese War, see Chapters 5 and Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
4.2.3.2 Soong Tse-ven and his 100% reserve central banking and anti-price 
inflation thoughts. In 1894, T. V. Soong was born in a wealthy entrepreneurial family in 
Shanghai.387 He went to study in the United States in 1912, received a bachelor’s degree 
in economics from Harvard University in 1915 and then went to Columbia University for 
graduate studies. In 1917 he returned to China to do business. In 1923 he went to 
Guangdong Province to follow Sun Yat-sen’ Nationalist Revolution. In 1924 at the 
invitation of Sun Yat-sen, Soong began to be responsible for the establishment of the 
Nationalist’s central bank in Guangzhou till 1928. From 1928 to 1933 he was Minister of 
Finance of the National Government, also serving as the first governor of the Central 
Bank of China, who was also the first governor of China’s first modern central bank. In 
1940, Soong Tse-ven and the National’s Government financial advisor Arthur N. Young 
went to the United States to seek the US government’s wartime financial support for 
385 See J. Zhang (2001, p. 1158). 
386 See ACPBC (1991, pp. 181-182). 
387 For references of T. V. Soong’s biography, see J. Wu (1992) and Kuo & Lin (2006). 
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China. He became Foreign Minister at the end of 1941 being based in the United States. 
After Soong returned to China, he served as Premier of the Republic of China from 1944 
to 1947. During the Prime Minister’s term, he experienced the issues of price inflation in 
the last two years of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the first two years of the Chinese 
Civil War. He worked hard to curb price inflation, but unfortunately failed and eventually 
resigned. Later, Soong also held some less important positions in the government. After 
the failure of the Republic of China government on the Mainland in 1949, Soong Tse-ven 
resigned and subsequently settled in New York City, USA. He died in San Francisco, 
California in 1971. 
Soong Tse-ven’s sister, Soong Ching-ling, was the wife of Sun Yat-sen, and his 
other sister, Soong Mei-ling, was the wife of Chiang Kai-shek. Hence, Soong Tse-ven 
and Chiang Kai-shek were not only political collaborators, but also in-law relatives. 
However, this does not mean that Soong and Chiang had completely identical views on 
economic policies. On the issue of monetary policy, T. V. Soong, like Chiang Kai-shek, 
advocated that China needed a unified national monetary system and to introduce the 
Western modern central banking system. 388 As for how to establish the central bank 
institution, Soong did not have a clear conclusion originally, but gradually evolved his 
monetary thought according to the development of the economic and political situation 
and the suggestions of other economists. The biggest difference between Soong Tse-ven 
and Chiang Kai-shek’s monetary policy is that Soong opposed expansionary monetary 
and price inflation policy, advocating limiting currency issuance to curb price inflation. 
As early as 1924 to 1925, Soong criticized the case of price inflation caused by the over-
388 References of Soong’s thoughts of monetary policies see J. Zhang (2001, pp. 1104-1106), and J. Wu 
(1992). 
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issuance of banknotes in various provinces in the south China, supporting the 100% 
reserve policy. He believed that “the circulation of currency depends on its credit, and its 
credit is no goldsmithing but being based on the 100% reserve that of what people 
save.”389 In fiscal policy, he also advocated austerity, opposing the government’s use of 
large amounts of expenditure for military spending. It can be said that these views of 
Song Ziwen have been implemented from the Golden Nanjing Decade to the term of his 
prime minister. Although Soong theoretically opposed price inflation policy, because the 
government’s final decision-maker was Chiang Kai-shek, he was unable to implement his 
opinions. Instead, he was forced to help the Chinese government sort out as much as 
possible the fiscal and monetary policies with the development of the economic situation 
and Chiang Kai-shek’s policy thinking. Largely, Soong Tse-ven was a Milton Friedman-
like monetarist and a laissez-faire financial scholar and politician. In the following 
sections this chapter, and the related analysis in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we will further 
introduce Soong’s monetary thoughts during the Second Sino-Japanese War and the 
Chinese Civil War. 
4.2.3.3 Kung Hsiang-hsi and his monetary proposals. H. H. Kung was born in 
1881 to a teacher’s family in Shanxi Province. With the opening of the society in the late 
Qing Dynasty, he began to study in the U.S-style Christian primary schools and middle 
schools and was baptized as a Christian. He began to contact Western culture and learn 
English since that time.390 In 1905, he graduated from Oberlin College in Ohio, USA. In 
1907 he graduated with a master’s degree in mineralogy from Yale University. After 
graduating, he returned to his hometown in Shanxi Province and started his own business 
389 See J. Zhang (2001, p. 1105). 
390 For references of H. H Kung’s biography see, S. Wang (2006) and C. Shou (1987). 
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of western-style primary and secondary education. After the Xinhai Revolution broke out 
in 1911, while doing business, he subsidized Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Revolution with 
money. Then gradually Kung became responsible for the financial affairs of the National 
Government. After T. V. Soong stepped down as Minister of Finance and Governor of 
the Central Bank in 1933, Kung took over these two positions. From 1935 to 1939, Kung 
successively served as the Premier of the National Government, becoming Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek’s most important financial policy assistant after Soong’ stepping down 
in 1933 and one of the important promoters to assist Chiang Kai-shek’s fiat money 
reform in 1935. In November 1944, a few months before the end of the Second Sino-
Japanese War, Kung stepped down as Minister of Finance, and in July 1945 stepped 
down as Governor of the Central Bank of China. Kung left Chinese politics in 1947 and 
settled in the United States. He died in New York in 1967. 
Like Chiang Kai-shek and Soong Tse-ven, Kung Hsiang-hsi also considered that 
the fiat money reform of the Nationalist Government inherited Sun Yat-sen’s monetary 
thinking.391 During the fiat money reform period, Kong argued that “if China wants to 
pursue financial stability and economic development, responding to its wartime necessity, 
it must abide by Sun Yat-sen’s teachings of [paper currency revolution] and completely 
reform the currency system.”392 Unlike Soong, Kung did not deem that the government’s 
policy of fiat money reform policy abandoned the 100% silver reserve standard. Kung 
said, “The unified issuance and centralized preparation of fiat currencies is to solve the 
outflow of silver [...] but not for monetary inflation, nor is it a banknote policy [without 
sufficient reserve], but a good policy for self-reliance in response to international trends 
391 For references of Kung’s monetary thoughts during the Golden Decade, see J. Zhang (2001, p. 1160) 
and Zhuo (1986). 
392 See Zhuo (1986, p. 435). 
227 
                                                 
and domestic conditions.”393 Therefore, although Kung’s point of view acquiesced in his 
understanding of supporting 100% silver reserve, he also supported fiat money policy 
with fractional reserve, which is contradictory. During his term of Finance Minister and 
Governor of the Central Bank of China from 1933 to 1945, Chiang Kai-shek’s request for 
additional currency was continuously acquiesced and released. Therefore, Kung did not 
have a very clear monetary theory and indulged Chiang Kai-shek’s policy on currency 
abuse in practice. Therefore, Kung Hsiang-hsi was completely different from Soong Tse-
ven’s tight fiscal and monetary policies practically, although he himself theoretically was 
against expansionary monetary policy and price inflation. In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we 
will further discuss Kung’s monetary policy propositions during the Second Sino-
Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. 
4.2.3.4 A short review of the arguments of the other economists and 
politicians who supported fiat money reform and/or 100% reserve. Before and during 
the currency reform around 1935, other economists also put forward their opinions and 
suggestions on China’s currency banking system and currency standard, although their 
voices did not directly affect China’s currency reform as the monetary ideas and policies 
of Chiang Kai-shek, Soong Tse-ven, and Kung Hsiang-hsi. The opinions and suggestions 
of these economists on monetary policy were mainly divided into three groups. The first 
group of scholars supported various forms of the silver standard, the second group of 
scholars supported various forms of physical articles standard, and the third group of 
scholars were radicals in supporting the policy of non-exchangeable banknotes.394 It is 
393 See Zhuo (1986, p. 435). 
394 Regarding the classification of the opinions of different scholars on the currency reform, we refer to the 
classification of the monograph of Ye, B. Li, & Zhong (2003). In the specific analysis, we include other 
scholars’ monetary ideas at that time into this classification framework. 
228 
                                                 
regrettable that in the literature we have found so far, no scholars of the Golden Decade 
were supporting the idea of returning to the traditional free banking silver standard or 
were influenced by the Austrian school supporting the modern Austrian position on free 
banking system. 
Among the schools that supported silver standard, Shou Miancheng (1901-1966) 
advocated a non-exchangeable paper currency policy in future, which was called 
“Scientific Silver Dollar Standard” by him.395 Considering China’s national conditions, 
he believed that the central banking fractional reserve silver standard should be 
implemented at this stage, and opposed the gold standard. He argued that the value of 
gold was “unstable” and therefore cannot be used as a currency standard. As for the silver 
standard, he advocated that the government adjust the silver price and exchange rate or 
adjust the number of silver dollars in circulation keeping the prices of silver standard 
stable. In addition, the “Limited Silver Standard” of scholar Liu Zhendong (1898-1987) 
and the “Silver Correction Policy” of Huang Yuanbin (1893-1956) are essentially the 
same to what Shou Miancheng proposed. Both of them supported the central banking 
fractional reserve silver standard and non-convertible banknotes that is based on a silver 
standard and the price and output regulations of silver.396 Also, in 1936, economist Cui 
Xiaocen supported a “Gold and Silver Mixed Standard” as the combination between the 
two metals “can bring about public confidence compared with fiat money standard.”397 
395 References of M. Shou’s monetary theories and his Scientific Silver Dollar Standard (、ᆨ䢰ᵜս), see 
M. Shou (1936a, 1936b), J. Zhang (2001, pp. 1107-1122), and Ye, B. Li, & Zhong (2003, pp. 324-327). 
396 References of Liu Zhendong’s Limited Silver Standard (ᴹ䲀䢰ᵜս), see Z. Liu (1930/1934), J. Zhang 
(2001, pp. 1113-1115) and Ye, B. Li, & Zhong (2003, pp. 327-330). References of Huang Yuanbin’s Silver 
Correction Policy (䢰⢙⸟↓ㆆ), see Y. Huang (1931, 1936), J. Zhang (2001, pp. 1115-1118), and Ye, B. 
Li, & Zhong (2003, pp. 330-334). 
397 See Cui (1936, p. 177). References of Cui Xiaocen’s Gold and Silver Mixed Standard (䠁䢰䙻⭘ࡦᓖ), 
see Cui (1936) and Ye, B. Li, & Zhong (2003, p. 365). 
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Among the schools that supported a physical-article standard, Liu Mianzhi 
(1872-1944) proposed the “Capability-based Standard.”398 He advocated the abolition of 
the metal currency standard, considering them as “sources of all evil” and causing war.399 
He advocated that individuals and institutions receive national currency vouchers from 
the government in accordance with a certain percentage of their property and income. In 
other words, the more income, the more money is obtained. This idea does not consider 
the actual circulation and the demand of money in the market. In fact, it is a system of 
unlimited banknotes without any reserve. Once implemented, it will inevitably cause 
price inflation, which is an exceedingly nonsensical plan. 400 Xu Qingfu (1879-1961) 
proposed the “Virtual Grain Standard,” which advocated the abolition of the metal 
currency system as metal currency  is the result of human greed, and suggested that grain 
can be used as the currency standard, which should be 100% reserve.401 However, the 
Virtual Grain Standard needs to take the stability of food prices as a premise, and China’s 
agricultural output and its prices at that time were unstable, making such a standard 
impossible to achieve. Yan Xishan (1883-1960), a politician of the National Government 
and Governor of Shanxi Province, also advocated the abolition of the metal currency 
standard and suggested  the use of property securities as a 100% reserve currency 
standard.402 Yan defined property security as a ticket that proves the market value of a 
398 References of Liu Mianzhi’s Capability-based Standard (㜭࣋ᵜս), see M. Liu (1927, 1928, 1930, 
1933), J. Zhang (2001, pp. 1118-1125) and Ye, B. Li, & Zhong (2003, pp. 334-340). 
399 See M. Liu (1927, p. 50). 
400 Economist Liu Ziya (1894-1970) agreed with Liu Mianzhi’s Capability-based Standard; see Z. Liu 
(1941) and Ye, B. Li, & Zhong (2003, pp. 341-342). 
401  For references of Xu Qingfu’s Virtual Grain Standard (㲋㌗ᵜս), see Q. Xu (1932a, 1932b, 
1932/1936), J. Zhang (2001, pp. 1125-1130) and Ye, B. Li, & Zhong (2003, pp. 344-349). 
402 For references of Yan Xishan’s “Property Securities Standard” (⢙⭒䅹ࡨᵜս), see Yan (1934/1941, 
1938), Y. Huang (1931, 1936), J. Zhang (2001, pp. 1130-1137), and Ye, B. Li, & Zhong (2003, pp. 349-
353). Yan Xishan served as Premier of the Republic of China from June 1949 to March 1950. After Li 
Zongren left office in November 1949, he acted as the president of the Republic of China from November 
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person’s property. However, to prove the market value of a person’s property, one must 
return to China’s traditional metal currency-price system at that time to calculate its price, 
which means that Yan’s Property Securities Standard is superfluous. In addition, Yan’s 
plan had the same features as Xu Qingfu’s proposal. They both proposed the currency 
standard that is based on property, which would inevitably lead to over-issuance of 
banknotes as there is no issuance limitation in their proposals. Shanxi Province, which 
was governed by Yan Xishan, once enforced his currency reform plan, but the result was 
price hyperinflation. The quota of banknotes’ issuance of Bank of Shanxi increased from 
8.256 million yuan in 1935 to 18.269 million yuan at the end of 1936, which obviously 
runs counter to Yan Xishan’s 100% reserve assumption. 403  In addition, scholar Hu 
Zhaonan advocated that the issuance of 20 billion yuan banknotes could solve all 
problems that China had at that time.404 He argued that within 15 years, people can 
redeem the value of banknotes by the income of the developed industries that they had 
invested in. However, this is undoubtedly an extremely ridiculous point of view, because 
Hu did not consider the problem of price hyperinflation that could be caused by huge 20 
billion-yuan banknotes in currency circulation. 
Among the schools that supported non-exchangeable banknotes, Li Quanshi 
(1895-1979) argued that the institution of non-exchangeable banknote is “the ultimate 
civilization of human being’s monetary institutions.”405 He considered that the value of 
money may depend on the cost of production or the amount of money.406 In 1932, Tang 
1949 to March until Chiang Kai-shek returned to office. He died in Taipei in May 1960. 
403 See M. Chen (1980, p. 850). 
404 See Hu (1931). 
405 See Q. Li (1930a). 
406 For references of Li Quanshi’s monetary theory, see Q. Li (1930a, 1930b, 1938), J. Zhang (2001, pp. 
1138), and Ye, B. Li, & Zhong (2003, pp. 353-358). Li Quanshi’s monetary views were different in the 
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Qingyong published an article supporting the abolition of silver tael and the 
establishment of central banking’s silver dollar institution. Although Tang did not 
advocate 100% reserves, he believed that the currency reserves must be sufficient to 
ensure the credit of the currency and to curb price  inflation.407 In 1934, Chu Fucheng 
published a monograph, also advocating the abolition of metal currency, using paper 
money as a voucher for goods, and supporting the use of various goods, including metal, 
as a 100% reserve.408 In June 1934, the US Congress passed the Silver Purchase Act, 
which authorized that the U.S government should purchase foreign silver with state 
machinery. The U.S purchase of silver led to price deflation in China (China’s net exports 
exceed 300 million yuan) and the collapse of Chinese businesses (44 financial institutions 
closed down in Shanghai in 1934 and 104 in 1935). 409  Therefore, according to the 
development of the situation, Chinese scholars gradually proposed the abolition of the 
silver standard. In 1934, Zhao Lanping also proposed a non-convertible centrally-issued 
paper currency system, advocating that there should be sufficient currency reserves, but 
not necessarily 100%, so as to ensure the “free expansion and contraction of 
banknotes.”410 In addition, scholars such as Gu Yiqun (1900-1992) also supported non-
exchange banknotes and central banking system.411 Besides, scholars such as Ma Yinchu 
above-mentioned monographs. He argued that the value of money may depend on the cost of production in 
The Value Theory of Money (1930b), while deemed that the amount of money decides the value of it in New 
Theory of Economics (1938). 
407 For references of Tang Qingyong’s argumentation, see Tang (1932, 1935) and J. Zhang (2001, pp. 1138-
1140). 
408 For references of Chu Fucheng’s monetary theory, see Chu (1934), J. Zhang (2001, pp. 1140-1143), and 
Ye, B. Li, & Zhong (2003, pp. 366-369). 
409 See Yu (1937, p. 102) and Ye, B. Li, & Zhong (2003, pp. 356). 
410  See L. Zhao (1936, pp. 15-16). For references of Zhao Lanping’s monetary theory, see Zhao 
(1934/1939, 1936), J. Zhang (2001, pp. 1143-1145), and Ye, B. Li, & Zhong (2003, pp. 369-375). 
411 For references of Gu Yiqun’s monetary theory, see Y. Gu (1933a, 1933b). For the other scholars who 
supported non-exchange banknotes and central banking system during the Nanjing Golden Age, see Y. Gu 
& Yao (1934), Y. Yang (1934, 1937), S. Zhang (1936), C. Gu (1934), Lewis & L. Zhang (1934). For the 
reviews of the monetary theories of the above authors, see J. Zhang (2001, pp. 1145-1153) and Ye, B. Li, & 
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clearly supported the abolition of the silver tael system and the establishment of central 
banking silver dollar system, who played important roles in promoting the National 
Government’s central bank policy.412 
It is worth to mention that, among the above scholars, in his monograph Trends 
in Modern Currency Thoughts and World Currency Systems (1938), Yao Qingsan (1911-
1989) systematically introduced the monetary theories of western scholars from the ones 
who supported gold standard (i.e., G. Cassel, J. Kitchin, G. F. Warren, and F. A. Pearson), 
the ones who supported to stabilize price levels (i.e., I. Fisher, A. Salter, P. Einzig, H. 
Strakosch, and D. H. Robertson), and the Keynesian monetary theories represented by J. 
M. Keynes.413 Especially, Yao Qingsan was probably the first Chinese economist during 
the Mainland period of the Republic of China who systematically introduced the Austrian 
school economics’ monetary theories into China. In Trends in Modern Currency 
Thoughts and World Currency Systems, Yao introduced F. V. Wiesser, J. G. K. Wicksell, 
F. A. Hayek, and L. von Mises’ business cycle theories. Due to these Austrian school 
scholars, prices including the prices of money is based on the marginal utility that the 
acting men value in his subjective value scales, interest rates are the result of acting 
Zhong (2003, pp. 359-375, pp. 385-389). 
412 For references of Ma Yin-chu’s monetary theory, see Y. Ma (1928, 1935, 1936/1937) and Y. Ma & B. 
Huang (1932). The other scholars who clearly supported the abolition of silver tael system and the 
establishment of central banking silver dollar system during the Nanjing Golden Age, see Li Yiqiu (1928), 
Xu Yusun (1928), Qian Yi (1928), Jing Ru (1928), Dai Ailu (1930), Zhang Naiqi (1932). For the reviews of 
the monetary theories of the above authors, see J. Zhang (2001, pp. 1153-1156) and Ye, B. Li, & Zhong 
(2003, pp. 359-375). 
413 For references of Yao Qingsan’s monetary theories see Yao (1935a, 1935b, 1935c, 1938). For the 
reviews of Yao’s monetary theories, see J. Zhang (2001, pp. 1147-1149) and Ye, B. Li, & Zhong (2003, pp. 
385-389). Interestingly, we found that Yao Qing-an is the grandfather of the 2015 Nobel Prize in 
Physiology or Medicine winner Tu Youyou. For reference of the relationship between Yao and Tu, see L. 
Shen (2011). Besides, Chen Zhenye (1934), Jiang Ting-fu (1936), Liu Juemin (1936), Ma Xian (1938), Wu 
Wenying (1938), and Mo Xuanyuan (1939) also introduced the western monetary theories but less 
systematically like Yao. For a short review of these references, see Ye, B. Li, & Zhong (2003, pp. 385). 
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men’s time preference, and artificial low interest rates can distort production structures, 
thus causing the business cycle.  
We have now finished the discussion of section 1 and the political and economic 
background from 1927 to 1937. In section 2, we will demonstrate the situation of China’s 
central banking from 1927 to 1933. 
4.3 Central Banking, 1927-1933 
In this section, we review the Chinese central banking from 1927 to 1933. 
Section 4.3.1 is about the Nationalists’ early central banking experiment from 1924 to 
1927. Section 4.3.2 review the central-banking gold-reserve reform plan of the Kemmerer 
Commission in 1929. Section 4.3.3 demonstrates the establishment of the Central Bank of 
China in 1928. 
4.3.1 The Prelude I: The Nationalists’ Early Central Banking Experiment, 1924-
1927 
Before the establishment of the Central Bank of China in 1929, the National 
Government already had an early experiment of trying to establish its own central 
banking financing the activities of the Nationalist Government.414 In August 1924, the 
Nationalists led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen established their first central bank in Guangzhou to 
finance its Northern Expedition (1926-1928). In the same month, Soong Tse-ven was 
414 For reference of this section, see Hong (2008, pp.57-60) and Shiroyama (2008, pp. 90-91). On January 
20th, 1927, the National Government also opened a branch of its first central bank in Hankou City, issuing 
its own banknotes. However, both the monetary expansion and price inflation happened again. From April 
to May, the branch of the Central Bank issued banknotes of 25.20 million yuan. The banknotes of the 
Hankou branch were issued by the central bank, the Bank of China and the Bank of Communication. On 
April 17th, 1927, when the Hankou branch of the central bank decided to monopolize banknote issuance 
with the two commercial banks, price inflation immediately occurred. The price of grain rose from 10 yuan 
in silver per picul to 20 yuan per picul; the black market of the banknotes issued by the Hankou branch of 
the Central Bank, the Bank of China and the Bank of Communication occurred: one needed to pay 3,900 
yuan to buy a product with its price of 1,000 yuan. For the references of the monetary expansion and price 
inflation of the Hankou branch of the central bank, see Hong (2008, p. 60) and Yu (1935, pp. 479-485). 
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nominated by Sun Yat-sen to prepare the functions of this central bank. Sun Yat-sen died 
on March 12th and the National Government was then led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek de facto. One year later, on July 7th, 1925, Soong was nominated as the governor of 
the Central Bank of China as the National Government was officially established on July 
1st of the same year. However, from August 1924 to July 1925, almost a year, Soong did 
not establish the framework of the central bank. As the Nationalists did not have 
sufficient money, the process of the preparation of establishing the central bank was not 
successful. Due to the constitution of the central bank, it would issue the banknotes of 10 
million local yuan in silver which was a 100% silver reserve standard. The local yuan 
legally could be redeemed into silver. However, in order to deal with military 
expenditures, the final currency issue amounted to 35 million yuan, which was 25 million 
more than the original designed amount of issuance 10 million yuan in silver. Due to 
insufficient currency reserves, these currencies could not be converted into silver by 1928. 
Another problem was that this central bank was not a real central bank for all of China 
since its currency circulation was only limited in the area of Guangdong Province. When 
the National Government established its formal Central Bank of China in November 1928, 
the former central bank in Guangzhou ceased to work.  
4.3.2 The Prelude II: The Central-Banking Gold-Reserve Reform Plan of the 
Kemmerer Commission in 1929 
In section 4.2.3, our analysis has pointed out that in the Nanjing Decade, in 
addition to political stability and economic development, politicians and economists also 
discussed what kind of banking system that China should adopt. Among them, President 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and economists and financial politicians Soong Tse-ven 
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and Kung Hsiang-his had a direct influence on the decision-making of the banking 
institutions. Besides, the central-banking gold-reserve reform plan presented by the US 
backed Kemmerer Commission also played an important role of the establishment of the 
Central Bank of China. In February 1929, invited by the National Government, the 
monetary specialist and economic professor of Princeton University Edwin Kemmerer 
came to China to help design the monetary reform plan. After a nine-month hard working 
with his colleagues, the Kemmerer Commission submitted its Project of Law for the 
Gradual Introduction of a Gold-standard Currency System of China to the National 
Government. The Kemmerer project laid the foundation of the central banking reform of 
China in the period of the 1920s to the 1930s.415 For more about the Kemmerer’s plan, 
see Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
The plan proposed that China would adopt a new gold standard called sun (ᆛ), 
which is with no actual gold circulation and is equal to US $0.40.416 Sun (ᆛ) is after the 
surname of Sun Yat-sen. The price of sun in dollar is also the approximate price of silver 
dollar in the autumn of 1929. Kemmerer Commission believed that making a connection 
among the price of sun, silver dollar and gold would be easier for China to adopt a gold 
standard eventually.  
Though sun was planned as a fiduciary silver coin, the Kemmerer Commission 
did not plan to unify the currency into silver standard, as the Commission planned gold 
standard as the ultimate standard for China. The reason why the Commission did not 
unify China’s currency standard into a pure silver standard of 100% reserve is that the 
415 For references of the Kemmerer plan, see Kemmerer (1929), J. Zhu (2012, p. 340-341), A. Young (1971, 
p. 178-183), and Shiroyama (2008, p. 168). 
416 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 340) and A. Young (1971, p. 179). 
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Commission thought that China would eventually implement the gold standard, making it 
unnecessary to achieve the silver standard of 100% reserve, and that the sun currency was 
enough to solve the problem of currency issuance at that time. 
4.3.3 The Establishment of the Central Bank of China in 1928 
This section demonstrates the process of the establishment of the Central Bank 
of China in 1928. Section 4.3.3.1 demonstrates the adoption of Chinese Silver Dollar 
standard and the abolition of the traditional silver tael standard. Section 4.3.3.2 illustrates 
the establishment of the Central Bank of China in 1928. Section 4.3.3.3 is about the 
structure and functions of the CBC. 
4.3.3.1 The adoption of Chinese Silver Dollar standard and the abolition of 
the traditional silver tael standard. In July 1928, the National Financial Conference 
decided to adopt the gold standard as the ultimate currency standard of China. And before 
the adoption of the gold standard, the conference decided to adopt the Chinese Silver 
Dollar as the basic currency unit instead of the silver tael in the transition between the old 
and diverse currency system and the future gold standard, while abolishing the silver tael 
standard.417 In the currency reform plan decided by the conference, other subsidiary coins 
would also gradually be converted into silver dollars.418 
4.3.3.2 The establishment of the Central Bank of China in 1928. Based on the 
policy suggestions from the Kemmerer Commission, after a few months of preparation, 
on October 6, 1928, the National Government established the Central Bank of China 
(CBC) in Shanghai, which started its operation on November 1, 1928. The Finance 
417 The Chinese Silver Dollar and the silver tael are written as “䢰ݳ” and “䢰ޙ” respectively in Mandarin 
Chinese. The Chinese texts of “the adoption of Chinese Silver Dollar standard and the abolition of the 
silver tael standard” are written as “ᔒޙ᭩ݳ” in most of the literatures that involve this topic. 
418 For references of the establishment of the Central Bank of China, see (A. Young, 1971, p. 27; J. Zhu, 
2012, p. 343; Tamagna, 1942, p. 122). 
237 
                                                 
Minister T. V. Soong was nominated as the governor of the newly settled central bank.419 
On the opening ceremony of the Central Bank of China, Soong announced three purposes 
of the establishment of the Central Bank of China: the first purpose was to unify the 
currency system of China; the second, to unify the national treasury; the third, to regulate 
the finance of China.420 Interestingly, the CBC continues to work as the central bank of 
the Republic of China on Taiwan today after the retreat of the ROC government and its 
people from the Mainland in 1949 because of the Chinese Communist Revolution. In 
2007, in order to eliminate the confusion between the name of the Central Bank of China 
of the ROC on Taiwan and the People’s Bank of China the central bank of the 
Communist China, the English name of the Central Bank of China was changed to “The 
Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan)”, and the abbreviation remained the 
previous CBC. 
It should also be pointed out here that from the perspective of the nature and 
historical evolution of the central banks, as China’s first modern central bank, the CBC 
did not evolve from a commercial bank, but was rather established by the state 
government. In contrast, the central banks of some countries, such as the Bank of 
England and the Bank of Spain, evolved from commercial banks.421 
4.3.3.3 The structure and functions of the CBC. The National Government 
provided the Central Bank of China C$20 million capital as its currency reserves, aiming 
the CBC have the rights “to issue bank notes, to mint and circulate coins, to deal in 
419 See A. Young (1971, p. 27). 
420 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 343). 
421 For more about the historical evolution of the central banks from commercial banks, see Goodhart 
(1988). For the cases in Spain and Latin America, see Díaz Fuentes et al. (2017). 
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foreign exchange, and to handle the issuance and service of public loans.” 422 In the 
original plan, the central bank would have 60% reserve in metals (silver, or gold coin, or 
bullion), and the rest 40% reserve was government bonds or commercial papers.423 The 
Central Bank was also permitted to recruit business shares, which should be less than 
49% of the whole capitals of the Central Bank.424 
However, the CBC did not have a monopoly situation to issue currency. 
According to the laws issued by the National Government, the two commercial banks, the 
Bank of China and the Bank of Communications, were also be authorized by the CBC to 
issue banknotes, as the CBC was sharing its issuance of notes with the two commercial 
banks. However, as these two banks were not asked to share their legal reserves with the 
CBC, the CBC could not completely control the two commercial banks, not to mention to 
control the whole Chinese monetary system.425 
Considering the strong sense of autonomy of Cantonese people, the former 
central bank of the National Government established in 1924 in Guangdong was still 
working as an independent local bank, issuing the named “Small Money” silver currency 
in Guangdong. “Small Money” was a typical currency in circulation in Guangdong since 
the 1890s of the Late Qing Dynasty.426 The Small Money of the Nationalist Government 
inherited the old small money institutions in Guangdong.427  The dollar of the “small 
money” represented “by five 20-cent depreciated coins that was worth around 70% to 
75% of the ordinary silver dollar.428 
422 See A. Young (1971, p. 27) and Shiroyama (2008, p. 169). 
423 See A. Young (1971, p. 27) and Tamagna (1942, p. 140). 
424 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 343). 
425 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 169). 
426 The original Chinese name of Small Money is written as “ሿ⌻” or “∛⌻.” 
427 See J. Zhang Nin (2007, p. 200). 
428 See A. Young (1971, p.28). 
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4.3.4 Performance of the CBC after the 1928 reform, 1928-1933  
This section reviews the performance of the CBC after the 1928 reform during 
the period of 1928 to 1933. Section 4.3.4.1 is about the increase of the CBC’s capital. 
Section 4.3.4.2 demonstrates the situation that more CBC local branches were opened. 
Section 4.3.4.3 illustrates the nationalization of China’s banking system. Section 4.3.4.4 
briefly shows other two reforms. Section 4.3.4.5 analyzes the status of currency issues 
and prices from 1927 to 1933. 
4.3.4.1 The increase of the CBC’s capitals. Since the Central Bank was 
established for the first time, its capital growth rate is naturally high. The assets, deposits 
and issued currency increased a lot after capitals of the Central Bank of China grew a lot. 
From 1928 to 1933, the total assets of the Central Bank increased nearly ten times. Its 
deposits increased by nearly seventy times and its currency issuance increased nearly 
seven times. The CBC’s net income increased by sixty times.429 
4.3.4.2 More CBC local branches were opened. The Central Bank of China 
also opened a lot of branches both in China and all around the world. Besides the 
headquarter of the Central Bank of China in Shanghai, the Central Bank opened its 
subsidiary banks in Nanjing, Hankou, Tianjin, Jinan, Xiamen and Hangzhou, and 
subbranches in other cities. To finance directly from Western countries, the CBC also 
opened its agencies globally in New York, Berlin, Geneva, London, Paris.430 
4.3.4.3 The nationalization of China’s banking system. The central banking of 
China started its nationalization of China’s banking system in 1928. 431  In 1928, the 
National Government forced the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications to 
429 See J. Wu (2002) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 343). 
430 See J. Wu (2002) and J. Zhu (2012, pp. 343-344). 
431 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 343). 
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relocate their headquarters from Beiping (Beijing) to Shanghai, raising the shares of the 
official stocks in the two banks.432 
However, as the National Government had to put more emphasis on the urgent 
fiscal problem of making the ends meet, and on unifying the separated central banking 
system before the North Expedition, more banking reform was delayed till the 1930s.433 
Besides, because bankers were in the opposition of the banking laws of the CBC, the 
general banking laws suggested by the Kemmerer Commission was to be delayed being 
executed until 1931.434 However, although the final reform of the Silver Dollar standard 
as a transition plan to the gold standard was realized in 1933, the gold standard plan 
proposed by Kemmerer has never been realized despite the previous extensive discussion 
of it. And in 1935, China entered the era of fiat money standard till now. 
4.3.4.4 Other two reforms. Though the Nationalist Government did not reform 
the monetary system completely in 1928, it was working as the central bank and did some 
other two reforms.435 The first reform was to redeem the worthless bank notes issued by 
the previous Wuhan Nationalists (led by Wang Jingwei when he was the political 
opponent during the Northern Expedition) into the new currency system in the value of 
C$45 million. The second reform was to issue new currency equaling to C$7.25 million 
in the need of financing the North Expedition.  
4.3.4.5 The status of currency issues and prices, 1927-1933. The performance 
of the central bank from 1927 to 1933 can also be judged by using two indicators, the 
432 Beiping (ेᒣ) was actually Beijing (ेӜ). Literally in Chinese, as “Bei” means the north, “Jing” 
means capital, and “Ping” means safety or peace in Chinese, Beijing means “northern capital”, and Beiping 
means “northern peace”. After the Nanjing National Government established in 1927, it changed the name 
of Beijing into Beiping. After the Communist Party occupied the city in 1949, it changed the name of the 
city from Beiping back to Beijing. More about the history of Beijing from 1927 to 1949, see Kang (2015). 
433 See A. Young (1971, p. 28). 
434 See A. Young (1971, p. 266). 
435 See A. Young (1971, p. 28). 
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currency issues and the wholesale prices index. Figure 4.3 shows the situation of the 
monetary supply and the wholesale prices from 1927 to 1933. The monetary unit during 
this period was the Chinese Silver Dollar. Currency issuance plus currency deposits is the 
total money supply. The currency issuance in 1933 was 451,590,418 yuan, a 72.3% 
increase from 262,164,410 yuan in 1927. The average annual increase is about 9.5%. The 
currency deposits in 1933 were 1,579,824,899 yuan, an increase of 125.6% from 
700,172,666 yuan in 1927. The average annual increase is about 14.5%. The total money 
supply in 1933 was 2,115,015,832 yuan, an increase of 119.8% from 962,337,076 yuan in 
1927. The average annual increase was about 14%. From the trend of the statistical chart, 
we can see that 1931 was the highest peak of the newly added currency issuance and 
currency deposits, reaching 393,367,870 yuan and 1,213,334,120 yuan, respectively. As a 
result, the total money supply in 1931 reached 1,606,701,990 yuan, an increase of 67% 
from 962,337,076 yuan in 1927. The total money supply in 1932 was less than in 1931 
and the total money supply in 1933 was more than that in 1932 and exceeded the 
previous years of the same period. As for the prices index, from 1927 to 1931, the prices 
index increased from 104.4 to 126.6. The fall in the prices index started a year later than 
the other three indicators in the figure. In 1932 and 1933, the prices index fell 
respectively at 112.5 and 103.9. Therefore, during this period, despite the currency 




Figure 4.3 Monetary supply and prices index, 1927-1933. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese dollars (C$). 
Source: Currency issues, currency deposits and total money supply from 1927 to 1933 is from K. Chang (1958, p. 376). 
Prices index from 1927 to 1930 (1926=100) was calculated by A. N. Young from the whole prices index of Shanghai, 
Tianjin and Guangdong Province. For the origin of the data, see A. Young (1972, p. 171). Prices index from 1930 to 
1933 (1930=100) is the Shanghai wholes sale prices index, which is from K. Chang (1958, p. 371). 
Notes: In order to enable prices index from the above two different sources to be displayed on the same statistical 
benchmark, we have processed the data from the above different sources according to the principle of proportionality 
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Now we have finished the discussion of section 2, the situation of China’s 
central banking from 1927 to 1933. In the next section 3, we will demonstrate the 1933 
currency reform and the transition from silver tael standard to central banking Silver 
Dollar standard from 1933 to 1935. 
4.4 The 1933 Currency Reform and the Transition from Silver Tael Standard to the 
Central Banking Silver Dollar Standard, 1933-1935 
After we demonstrated the central baking reform in the late 1920s, we now 
review the continuous banking reform in 1933. In section 4.3.3, we mentioned that the 
National Government already decided to abolish the silver tael standard and accept the 
Chinese Silver Dollar standard as a transition before the adoption of the gold standard. 
However, as the National Government was busy with other urgent issues, like its fiscal 
balance problem and unifying the central banking system, it did not finish executing the 
silver standard currency reform until the 1930s. After a few years of waiting and 
preparation, in 1933, the National Government finally adopted the silver dollar standard 
and abolished the outdated silver tael standard.436 The Nationalists made several steps to 
implement the Silver Dollar standard. Section 4.4.1 deals with the topics of how the 
Chinese government adopted the Silver Dollar standard in the 1933 currency reform. 
Section 4.4.2 illustrates the performance of the new Silver Dollar standard. 
4.4.1 The Process of Adoption the Silver Dollar Standard 
This section demonstrates the process of adoption of the Silver Dollar standard. 
Subsection 4.4.1.1 is about the adoption of the Customs Gold Unit System (CGU). 
Subsection 4.4.1.2 introduces the government’s policy of regulating foreign silver dollars 
436 See A. Young (1971, pp. 277-278) and J. Zhu (2012, pp. 347-350). 
244 
                                                 
and forbid the export of gold. Subsection 4.4.1.3 illustrates how the government asked the 
private financial and banking societies to support the Silver Dollar standard policy. 
Subsection 4.4.1.4 review the process of the exchange from silver tael to Silver Dollar. 
Subsection 4.4.1.5 reviews the centralization of the coinage right’s control. Subsection 
4.4.1.6 is about the issuance of new Silver Dollar standard and the abolishment of silver 
tale standard. 
4.4.1.1 The adoption of the Customs Gold Unit System (CGU). For gradually 
adopting gold standard, in the beginning of 1930, the National Government decided to 
adopt the Customs Gold Unit system as a transition towards the final gold standard, 
which could help the National Government receive more fiscal revenue due to the 
plan.437 
Due to the official design, the CGU was hypothetically based on pure content of 
60.1866 centigrams. However, the gold coins of CGU were never minted after its 
circulation. To keep government revenue stable, the exchange rate of the CGU into Silver 
Dollar notes was fixed before March 1934. The law of implementing the CGU required 
that these CGU notes be covered by a 100% cash reserve, which was to be in silver 
before 1935, and in silver and foreign exchange afterward.438 
After the law was implemented, importers and exporters used CGU for 
transactions, and importers found it convenient to maintain customs duties by writing 
checks on the CGU accounts.439 Therefore, CGU became a tool for import and export 
trade to avoid currency fluctuation caused by government currency reform. 
437 See A. Young (1971, pp. 277-278), Tamagna (1942, pp. 140-142), and J. Zhu (2012, p. 341). The 
Customs Gold Unit is written as “⎧䰌䠁௞ս” in Chinese. 
438 See Tamagna (1942, p. 140). 
439 See Tamagna (1942, p. 140). 
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4.4.1.2 To regulate foreign silver dollars and forbid the export of gold. In 
May 1930, the National Government started to regulate foreign silver dollars and forbid 
the commercial export of gold, which led the decrease of gold price in China.440 The 
embargo was enacted for dealing with the situation of the drastic slump of silver price 
during the administration of Financial Minster T. V. Soong. However, oddly enough, 
although both Soong and the foreign adviser of the National Government Arthur N. 
Young were against the embargo, it was approved by the National Government.441 The 
result of the embargo was that the price of gold decreased in Chinese market, which 
caused the Central Bank of China bought gold in cheaper price and gained more than 5% 
profit by exporting it. 442 
Table 4.1 shows the balance of trade in merchandise, silver, and gold from 1928 
to 1935. Despite the government’s ban on commercial gold exports in 1930, from 1930 to 
1935, gold exports continued to increase through the government transactions. From 1928 
to 1935, China’s imports of goods were always higher than its exports, which reflected 
the demand for foreign capital and products from China’s economic development at that 
time. From 1928 to 1931, China’s net import of silver was higher than that of exports, but 
its quota declined year by year. The net import quota in 1928 was C$166 million, in 1929 
440 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 347). 
441 See A. Young (1971, p. 257). In Young’s report, he argued that “[t]he reasons for the embargo were not 
clear” (1971, p. 257). And meanwhile, due to Young, Minster Soong also claimed that he was also against 
the policy. It is a quite weird situation. Till now we have not found any direct evidence, but it would be 
quite impossible for Soong not knowing the reason why the embargo was planned and who made the 
decision of it, as his duty was dealing with all the financial and fiscal policies at that time. What we can 
infer from the situation is that it would be possible that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, not Soong, made 
the decision of the embargo. And for avoiding a further argument with Young, Soong just told Young that 
he did not agree with the embargo without telling Young who made the decision. On another side, 
economist Zhu Jiaming criticized the implementation of the embargo of gold “started the precedent of 
China’s regulating economy in the 20th century”, as China had a relatively free banking institution before 
the 1930s currency reforms. More on Zhu’s criticism on the embargo and the abolishment of China’s free 
banking system, see J. Zhu (2012, pp. 350-532). 
442 See A. Young (1971, p. 257). 
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it was C$165 million, in 1930 it was C$104 million, and in 1931 it was C$71 million. 
However, from 1932 to 1935, due to the international market demand for silver, China’s 
silver exports exceeded imports, with export quotas of C$10 million, C$14 million, 
C$257 million, and C$49 million, respectively. In terms of gold, the net import of gold in 
1928 was C$9 million. From 1929 to 1935, there was a net export of gold. Although the 
government had a policy of prohibiting private gold exports in 1930, in order to obtain 
foreign exchange and maintain exchange rate stability, the government itself was still 
conducting silver export transactions. From 1929 to 1935, the net import quotas for gold 
were C$3 million, C$6 million, C$50 million, C$109 million, C$69 million, C$52 
million, and C$39 million, respectively. While data on silver smuggling from 1928 to 
1933 is not available, the estimated smuggled exports of silver in 1934 and 1935 were 
C$20 million and C$230 million, respectively. From the time the government’s gold 
export ban was promulgated in 1930 to 1933, the net export smuggling quota of gold 
increased every year, which was C$123 million, C$179 million, C$190 million, and 
C$1,120 million.  
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The Balance of Trade in Merchandise, Silver and Gold, 1928-1935 
Year 
Excess of merchandise 
imports over exports 
Silver exports Gold exports 
Estimated smuggled 
exports of silver 
Estimated smuggled 
exports of gold 
1928 483 -166 -9 -- -- 
1929 550 -165 3 -- -- 
1930 779 -104 26 -- 23 
1931 1087 -71 50 -- 70 
1932 955 10 109 -- 90 
1933 733 14 69 -- 120 
1934 495 257 52 20 60 
1935 343 59 39 230 30 
Table 4.1 The balance of trade in merchandise, silver and gold, 1928-1935. Table’s currency unit is one million 
Chinese dollars (C$). 
Source: A. Young (1971), p. 258. 
Notes: The date of the excess of merchandise imports over exports excludes Manchuria.  
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4.4.1.3 Asking the support from the private financial and banking societies. 
Only implementing the silver dollar standard policy was not enough to make it successful, 
the National Government also asked the public, especially the financial and banking 
societies to support the policy.443 On July 7, 1932, the Financial Minster Soong made an 
official meeting with the personages of the Shanghai’s financial and banking societies, 
explaining three principles of the policy of the abolishment of the silver tael standard and 
the adoption of the Silver Dollar standard.444 The first principle was that China would 
abolish the silver tael standard and adopt of the new Silver Dollar standard to unify the 
currency system. Minster Soong made the official position of the adoption of silver dollar 
standard clear when he was meeting with the financial and banking personages from 
Shanghai, which helped them prepare and adopt the new currency system. The second 
principle was that the old currency represented by silver tael was still in circulation 
during the currency transition process. Under this principle, the National Government 
would not forbid the use of old currency system immediately after the adoption of the 
new Silver Dollar standard, which would help to stabilize the confidence of market. The 
third principle was that as far as the official price of new currency was made, the issuance 
of new currency would be executed immediately. However, the prices of the new Silver 
Dollar were not decided at that time.445 
After this meeting, Soong (on July 22) and his Vice Minster Xu Kan (on July 15) 
separately met the personages from the financial and banking circles to discuss the new 
currency policy. Because of the commutation with these personages, the financial and 
banking societies had a strong public opinion on the policy of the abolishment of the 
443 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 347). 
444 See J. Zhang (2001, p. 1115). 
445 See J. Zhang (2001, p. 1115). 
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silver tael standard and adoption of the silver dollar standard, and only few people held 
the reservation of the new policy which were almost ignored by the society.446 
4.4.1.4 The exchange from silver tael to Silver Dollar. After the National 
Government decided to use Silver Dollar to be instead of the silver tael in 1929, Chinese 
people were gradually exchanging from silver taels to silver dollars.447 The Shanghai 
exchange rate of silver tael to Silver Dollar (C$) was between 72.01 and 72.69 taels per 
C$100 from 1921 to 1931, which was quite stable. However, in 1932, war and nature 
disaster caused the exchange rate of silver tael and Silver Dollar had a wider range of 
fluctuation around 8%, which was between 68 and 74 taels per C$100.448 In 1929, the 
average monthly exchange rates of silver tael to Silver Dollar from 1929 to 1933 were 
71.905 taels per C$100, 72.364 taels per C$100, 72.532 taels per C$100, 70.613 taels per 
C$100, and 71.4 taels per C$100, respectively. Due to the abolition of the silver tael 
standard in April 1933, the transaction price of Silver and silver Dollar in 1933 was only 
from January to April. 
The fluctuating rate of silver tael and Silver Dollar made the dollar lose its use as 
an instrument of avoiding monetary risk and caused a huge loss for the individuals who 
held the dollars as their assets and taels as debt. For solving the fluctuation of exchange 
rate, in July 1932, Minster T. V. Soong nominated a committee to design the weight, 
446 See J. Zhang (2001, p. 1155). 
447 See A. Young (1971, pp. 184-185). 
448 The first reason of the wilder fluctuation of exchange rate was the Japanese invasion on Shanghai (the 
January 28 Incident, аgҼޛһ䆺) in the beginning of 1932 (A. Young, 1971, p. 184; Fairbank & 
Feuerwerker, 1986, p. 502), which caused the more necessities on silver dollars. After the fire between the 
Japanese Kwangtung Army and the National Revolutionary Army ceased on March 3 because of the 
international mediation, the exchange rate dropped to the levels below 70 (A. Young, 1971, p. 184). The 
second reason of the fluctuation of exchange rate was the huge loss of crops caused by floods that happened 
in central China. After the loss, people in south China had to use their silver dollars to buy crops from other 
places, which caused the price of silver dollars became more expensive and the price of silver taels cheaper, 
which corrected the exchange rates (A. Young, 1971, p. 184). 
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fineness of a new silver dollar, the new exchange rate between silver tael and silver, and 
to provide some suggestions on monetary policies, public understanding, and confidence 
on the currency reform. The financial advisor of the Kemmerer Commission Arthur N. 
Young recorded, 
[The committee] proposed a dollar weighing 26.6971 grams (412 grains) 0.800 
fine, containing 23.493448 grams (362.56 grains) of fine silver. The latter figure 
was practically equal to the content of the old dollar less estimated minting 
charged of [1.75%]. Taels contracts would be converted to dollars at 71.15 
Shanghai taels per C$100. To promote confidence, the government should 
assure the free import and export of silver; free coinage of silver, with a minting 
charge of [1.75%]; minting of silver bars 999 fine in ingots of C$1000; 
dismantling all mints but that at Shanghai; and creation of a public board to 
verify the mint’s output. (A. Young, 1971, p. 185) 
Therefore, the government decided to centralize the issuance of currency in Shanghai, 
which abolished the past practice of minting official currencies in different regions. 
4.4.1.5 The control of the coinage right. From 1897 of the Qing Dynasty to 
1933 of the Republic of China, the mints were localized and decentralized by the 
provincial and local mints.449 In April 1929, the same year when China established its 
first modern central bank, inheriting the former local Shanghai Mint established in 1920, 
the National Government decided to establish the Central Mint.450 In 1932, the Central 
449 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 347). 
450 The original Chinese name of Shanghai Mint and Central Mint are written as “ к⎧䙐ᒓᔐ” and “ѝཞ
䙐ᒓᔐ”, respectively. The foreign hands also helped the establishment of the Central Mint. In 1931, “three 
well-qualified Chinese exports sent some time in the Philadelphia Mint, … preparing to act as department 
heads on return to Shanghai” (Young, 1971, p. 184). In 1932, a well-skilled American minting technician, 
Clifford Hewitt (1869-1942) was present as a minting advisor to help China adopt a better and matured 
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Mint was finally built. On March 1, 1933, the Central Mint started to mint the new silver 
dollar currencies as circulation coins, meanwhile, the National Government regulated the 
provincial and local mintages and abolished some of them, which started the unification 
of the coinage right. As the Central Mint was set, the next step of the National 
Government was issuing the newly designed silver dollar sun. 
4.4.1.6 The issuance of new Silver Dollar standard and the abolishment of 
silver tale standard. On March 8, 1933, the National Government enacted the coinage 
law, embodying the suggestions proposed by the monetary specialists. 451 Thus, the new 
silver dollar sun was prepared and was planned to be circulated.452 A. N. Young recorded 
the essentials of the law, 
Coinage was free but not gratuitous, as a coinage charge of [2.25%] was fixed. 
The mint also would make C$1000 “A” bars 0.999 fine, and C$1000 “B” bars 
0.880 fines, at a charge of [2.25%]. A refining charge might be added for certain 
kinds of silver tendered. Provision was made also for an advisory committee 
representing the public. (A. Young, 1971, p. 185) 
On March 10, 1933, Financial Minster T. V. Soong declared the official exchange rate of 
0.715 Shanghai taels per dollars.453 On April 5, 1933, the Ministry of Finance announced 
the Administrative Decree of Abolishing the Silver Tale and Adopting Silver Dollar, 
minting technology. More about Clifford Hewitt and his life of a minting technician, See Hill (2013). 
451 See A. Young (1971, p. 185), J. Zhu (2012, p. 348), The name of the coinage law can also be literally 
translated as Silver Standard Casting Regulations which was “䢰ᵜս䩴䙐ọֻ” in Chinese. For the law in 
Chinese, see Nationalist Government (1933b). 
452 The new Silver Dollar was not easy to be counterfeiting. “The new dollar coins had an attractive design 
with the head of Sun Yat-sen on one side and on the other a junk. To make the design harder to counterfeit, 
the junk was shown against rays of the sun and with three gulls flying overhead. The latter features were 
promptly criticized, on the ground that planes that had attacked. Shanghai in 1932. So, these features were 
at once removed. Counterfeiting of the dollars did not become serious. With the modern machinery of the 
new mint, the coins were the finest made in China and making facsimiles was not easy.” (A. Young, 1971, 
p. 185-186). Also see J. Zhu (2012, p. 348). 
453 See A. Young (1971, p, 186). 
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ruling that all public and private payments, contract bills, and all transactions shall be 
converted to Silver Dollars, and silver tale shall not be used for the above purposes 
again.454 The Decree of Silver Dollar also ordered that the people who had held silver 
tales may exchange for Silver Dollars in the offices of the Central Mint, the Central Bank 
of China and Bank of Communications.455 On April 6, according to the Administrative 
Decree, China finally banned the transactions of silver taels, “and the existing contracts 
were to be settled at [0.715] per dollar.”456 Thus, China entered the era of central banking 
silver dollar and said good bye to the more than one-thousand-year long history of using 
silver taels since Song Dynasty. Besides, as the new silver dollar currency was called sun, 
the previous issued silver dollar yuan-da-tou (the surname of the former President of the 
Republic of China, Yuan Shi-kai) was abolished.457 
4.4.2 Performance of the Chinese Silver Dollar, 1933-1935 
In the last section 4.4.1, we have demonstrated the process of adoption the Silver 
Dollar Standard. This section analyzes the performance of the Chinese Silver Dollar, 
from 1933 to 1935. Subsection 4.4.2.1 discusses the moderate transition from the old 
silver tael to the new Silver Dollar standard. Subsection 4.4.2.2 is about the high-quality 
coinage. Subsection 4.4.2.3 demonstrates the high demand of the new issued Silver 
Dollars. Subsection 4.4.2.4 illustrates the status of currency issues and prices from 1933 
to 1935. 
454 The name of the Decree of Silver Dollar in Chinese was “ሖ㹼ᔒޙ᭩ݳԔ.” For the law in Chinese, 
see Nationalist Government (1933a). 
455 See A. Young (1971, p. 186) and J. Zhu (2012, pp. 348-349). 
456 See A. Young (1971, p. 186). 
457 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 348). 
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4.4.2.1 A moderate transition from the old silver tael to the new silver dollar 
standard. The transition from the old silver tael to the new silver dollar was “smooth”.458 
Though the transition period was very short in 1933, the process was successful. Just in a 
few days, “exchange was quoted in dollars instead of tales”. The planned exchange rate 
of 0.715 silver tael per dollar was implemented triumphantly, which was accepted 
generally.  
4.4.2.2 High quality coinage. In the beginning, some foreign bankers and 
foreign businessmen were worrying about the new silver dollar system as Chinese 
government had history of tampering with coinage.459 The test of the quality of the new 
Silver Dollar currencies was under the supervision of the ROC Central Mint: Lott Wei, 
Robert J. Grant, Clifford Hewitt, and three other Chinese technicians who were well 
trained at the Philadelphia Mint. Young commented that “Repeated tests turned up no 
coins below standard. Some flight of capital was reported, but it was not of much 
consequence.”460 
4.4.2.3 High demand of the new issued Silver Dollars. The new issued silver 
dollars were also in huge demand.461 From March 1933 to October 1935, C$133 million 
in dollars and C$56 million in bars were minted.462 Though the Nationalist government 
started to nationalize silver on November 3, 1935, the mint of silver dollars continued till 
the end of this year. From October to December 1935, C$5 million more dollars were 
458 For reference of this section, see A. Young (1971, p. 186). 
459 For reference of this section, see A. Young (1971, p. 186). 
460 See A. Young (1971, p. 186). 
461 See A. Young (1971, p. 186). 
462 The “B” bars of C$1000 each were the most popular bars minted from 1933 to 1935 (A. Young, 1971, p. 
186).  The minted C$56 million bars were mostly the “B” category. 
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minted. C$5 millions of “B” bars were made after the 1935 currency reform till June 
1936.463 
4.4.2.4 The status of currency issues and prices, 1933-1935. During the three 
years of implementation of the Silver Dollar, the situation of currency issues and prices 
had been relatively stable. The performance of the central bank from 1933 to 1935 can 
also be judged by using two indicators, the currency issues and the wholesale prices index. 
Figure 4.4 shows the situation of the monetary supply and the wholesale prices during 
that period. The monetary unit during this period was the Chinese Silver Dollar. Currency 
issuance plus currency deposits is the total money supply. The currency issuance in 1935 
was 867,984,374 yuan, a 62.3% increase from 535,190,933 yuan in 1933. The average 
annual increase is about 27.4%. The currency deposits in 1935 were 2,324,341,889 yuan, 
an increase of 47.1% from 1,579,824,899 yuan in 1933. The average annual increase is 
about 21.3%. The total money supply in 1935 was 3,192,326,263 yuan, an increase of 
50.9% from 2,115,015,832 yuan in 1933. The average annual increase is about 22.85%. 
For the prices index, from 1933 to 1935, the prices index decreased from 103.9 to 96.4, 
which inherited the downward trend in prices from 1928. According to scholars’ research, 
the main factors of price deflation was from the outflow of silver caused by the 1934 US 
Silver Purchase Act and the competitiveness of the economy at the time.464 Therefore, 
463 A. Young (1971, p, 186) argued there are two years why the Nationalist Government continued minting 
silver dollars and the silver bars after the 1935 currency reform. The first reason was that the continuing 
coinage should be kept occupied “the planned early issuance of minor coins”, which was good for the 
working conditions for the minting machines in future use. The second was reason was that the Nationalist 
Government wanted to calm the “public attachment to silver” and show to the public that the silver dollars 
would not be evaluated after the 1935 currency reform.   
464 For the references of price deflation during that period, see Friedman (1992), Friedman & Schwartz 
(1963, p. 483, pp. 489-491), Rawski (1989, p.15, pp. 312-400;1993), Silber (2019, pp. 38-89), and 
Richardson (2019/2020). 
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during this period, despite the currency issuance, prices remained stable overall, and there 





Figure 4.4 Monetary supply and prices index, 1933-1935. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese dollars (C$). 
Source: Currency issues, currency deposits and total money supply from 1933 to 1935 is from Chang (1958, p. 376). 





























4.5 The 1935 Reform and the Establishment of Fiat Money System, 1935-1937 
After reviewing the 1933 silver standard currency reform, in this section, we 
discuss the 1935 currency reform. As the 1935 reform was tightly connected with the US 
silver purchase in the 1930s, we will review the international and diplomatic background 
of the 1935 currency reform in section 4.5.1. In section 4.5.2, we show the process of the 
currency reform. Section 4.5.33 deals with the performance of banking system from 1935 
to 1937, before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
4.5.1 The Prelude: The International and Diplomatic Background of the 1935 
Currency Reform 
The 1934 US Silver Purchase Act and the related international and diplomatic 
actions of financing China directly influenced the 1935 currency reform of adopting fiat 
money system. As we have demonstrated in the previous section 4.3 and section 4.4, the 
National Government’s aim of the currency reform was to adopt gold standard and give 
up silver standard completely in future. China’s most important reason for allowing the 
United States to buy silver was to gain foreign exchange to stabilize prices and financial 
order, while the United States also wanted to buy silver, to stabilize its prices, which 
seems like a solution for each. However, it did not work for China. The collapse of 
China’s silver standard caused by the US silver purchase and international economic 
fluctuation in the middle 1930s accelerated the process of leaving the silver standard, 
making the National Government and Chinese economy face a very difficult and 
complicated situation of what currency reform policies should be adopted to welcome a 
modern banking system in future. 
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4.5.1.1 The 1934 US Silver Purchase Act. Globally, since the 16th century, 
silver was produced in America and was demanded in Asia being intermediated by 
Europe. Thus, historically, China was a country that imported a lot of silver.465 However, 
as the output of silver was not sufficient, Chinese people relied a lot on the import of 
silver from foreign countries, especially from the late 1800s to the first half of the 20th 
century. Economist Zhu Jiaming described China’s general import and export situation of 
silver from the late 18th century to 1929: 
From 1888 to 1931, China imported 1.037 billion ounces of silver, most of 
which was imported from 1900 to the 1930s. Since 1918, China became a net 
importer of silver. Between 1928 and 1929, China became the biggest importer 
of silver around the world. In 1929, when the global economic crisis happened, 
the consumption of silver of China was 40% [of worldwide silver consumption] 
(J. Zhu, 2012, p. 353, own translation) 
However, since 1932, China became an exporter of silver. The global fluctuation of 
economy and currency exchange rate, the demand of silver in western countries made the 
silver of China be exported more to the western countries. Especially, the 1934 US Silver 
Purchase Act made the situation of the exhaustion of silver more serious in China, which 
played a very important role of influencing the currency reform in 1935.466 
Historically, the United States also consumed a lot of silver. In the 1930s, 32% 
of the world’s silver was produced in United States. 66% of the world’s silver were the 
capitals owned by the United States.467 This huge demand of silver in the United States 
implied that if there had some sudden fluctuation or drastically drop of economy, the 
465 See J. Dai (2005) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 353). 
466 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 354-355) and J. Zhang (2001, p. 211). 
467 See J. Dai (2005, p. 291). 
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price of would also be impacted. The Great Depression in 1929 made the price of silver 
in America drop sharply.468 The price of silver dropped from US$58 cents in 1928 to 
US$0.38 in 1930, and to US$0.25 in 1932.469 
The drop of silver and the economic recession made many Americans believed 
that it was necessary to expand money supply to raise the price of silver and stimulus the 
economy. Thus, purchasing the silver from foreign countries became the national policy 
of the United States. In the middle stage of the Great Depression, and under the pressure 
of the silver interest group in the US Congress, on June 19, 1934, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt signed the Silver Purchase Act of 1934, ordering the Secretary of the Treasury 
to purchase silver overseas till the price of silver was US$1.29 per ounce, or till the price 
of the silver reserve of the Treasury realized one quarter of the price of gold reserve.470 
However, the 1934 Silver Purchase Act broke what the United States promised 
in the London Silver Agreement of July 22, 1933, which was signed by the US, China, 
India and other six countries. 471  The purpose of the London Silver Agreement was 
“mitigating fluctuations in the price of silver” and its “effective stabilization,” providing 
some methods “for limitations on sales of silver by governments.”472 According to the 
Agreement, China undertook not to “sell silver resulting from demonetized coins” during 
the four years of 1934 to 1937, while “the United States and four other countries agreed 
to buy from their respective production 35 million ounces yearly,” and the “American 
468 For more about the Great Depression in United States, see Rothbard (1973). 
469 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 357). 
470 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 358), A. Young (1971, pp. 278-280), Shiroyama (2008, pp. 153-156), and ACPBC 
(1991, pp. 114-117). 
471 See (J. Zhu, 2012, p. 358), A. Young (1971, pp. 202-203), and ACPBC (1991, pp. 111-114). The London 
Silver Agreement of July 22, 1933 in Chinese is “1933 ㄃⦚椪䤌攏◣⸩”, or “1933㄃₥䟛䤌攏◣⸩”. 
472 See A. Young (1971, p. 203). 
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share was later set at about 24.4 million ounces.”473 The London Agreement strengthened 
the faith of the Chinese government to stabilize the silver price, resulting in China’s 
adoption of silver standard in the winter of 1933.474 
However, the 1934 Silver Purchase Act made the plan of stabilizing the silver 
price in international level become impossible. Moreover, the Silver Act was a flagrant 
violation of the London Agreement previously agreed by the US government. Influenced 
by the Act, in the end of 1934, the world price of silver saw year-on-year rises of 26.7%, 
and in May 1935, the world price of silver reached to the peak of $US 0.81 per ounce.475  
The Chinese economy was also influenced by the silver purchase.476 The stocks 
in the banks at Shanghai fell from C$563 million at the end of July to C$335 million at 
the end of 1934.477 The interest rate of native banks rose from around 6% to 16% per 
annum. Small banks and small business were also facing bankruptcy. On February 4, 
1935, the Central Bank stated that “seven small banks, three other financial companies, 
58 factories, and 99 stores” were facing business failure, while Shanghai Stock Exchange 
also had fallen by around 50% in 4 years since its high in the mid-1931.478 The national 
and local governments were also facing the drawn of money. 
While the Americans believed that the silver purchase could increase China’s 
external purchasing power and stimulus the Sino-US trade quota, Chinese banking 
sectors was strongly against the Silver Purchase Act. The Bankers Associations of China 
wrote a letter to President Roosevelt, clearly expressing its object to the Act, arguing that 
473 See A. Young (1971, p. 203). 
474 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 358). 
475 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 358). 
476 See A. Young (1971, p. 220-223) and Adviser Chamber of People's Bank of China [ACPBC] (1991, p. 
117-119). 
477 See A. Young (1971, p. 221). 
478 See A. Young (1971, p. 221). 
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the Act would result in the increase of silver price and the financial crisis in China due to 
the lack of silver.479 
The US government used its coercive power to artificially stimulate the 
international silver market through the Silver Purchase Act, which struck the Chinese 
monetary system and forced China to give up its silver standard, exploring the possibility 
of establishing a new monetary system. Another point we should argue is, it would be 
unfair to fully blame the depression on the American Purchase Act, as China started 
entering its depression in 1931 after the peak of the increasing prices of silver and 
exchange.480 We may argue that this price deflation partly was the nature consequence of 
the previous economic bubble, and the price deflation might help the economy of China 
to go back to the nature interest rate and recover from the economic boom and bust.481 
After the incident of the Silver Purchase Act, the Chinese government had to 
negotiate with the US government to discuss if there had the possibility of saving China’s 
monetary system. During the whole negotiation process, China was in a very difficult and 
unfavorable situation. In the next section 4.5.1.2, we demonstrate the complicated 
international relationship among China, Japan, the US and the UK concerning of China’s 
currency reserve system.  
4.5.1.2 The complicated relationship among China, Japan, the United States, 
and the United Kingdom, concerning of the issues of China’s currency reserves. 
Theoretically, before abolishing the silver standard, China should have “prepare[d] 
sufficient reserves other than silver, whether its new currency was linked to gold or to 
479 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 359). 
480 See A. Young (1971, p. 220). 
481 On more details of the theory of in defense of deflation after the economic boom and bust, see Bagus 
(2015). 
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foreign currencies such as the US dollars or the pound sterling.”482 Thus, China had to get 
the foreign reserves from the related foreign countries. However, the complicated 
international and diplomatic situation concerning of China’s currency reserves in the 
1930s made the reserve-getting process become very difficult and complicated. 
In the perspective of the National Government, the currencies of Japan, the US, 
and the UK were the main possible solutions of adding China’s currency reserves before 
the abolishment of the silver standard.483 The complicated international and diplomatic 
relationships among China, Japan, the US, and the UK were adding uncertainty of the 
international cooperation of helping China’s banking reform. 
Considering the funding aid, the attitude of these countries was contradictory. 
On one hand, they wanted to aid China for their own interest, regarding “China as a 
potential market for their exports” and investments; on another hand, due to the high 
foreign debt level that the National Government had, they doubted if it was possible for 
China to successfully reform its monetary system.484 
On the Japanese side, their diplomatic policies were also contradictory.485 The 
Japanese were occupying China (the Manchurian Incident in 1931 started Japanese 
occupation on Manchuria).486 On September 18, the Japanese Kwantung Army blew up a 
short section of the railway, slandering that it was the Chinese National Revolutionary 
Army who were responsible for the explosion. The military conflict started and Japanese 
quickly occupied Shenyang, the capital of Liaoning Province in Manchuria, one day after 
482 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 170). Economist Borg (1964, pp. 75-76) also holds the same opinion as 
Shiroyama. 
483 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 170). 
484 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 170). 
485 See Shiroyama (2009, p. 170) and Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, pp. 504-519). 
486 See Shiroyama (2009, p. 170) and Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, pp. 499-503). 
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the Manchurian Incident. Three months later, the Japanese army occupied the whole 
Manchuria. The hawks were getting more power that that time. On, January 28, 1932, a 
group of Kwangtung Army invaded Shanghai. This was the famous January 28 Incident 
(а ·Ҽޛһ䆺). The fire between the Japanese Kwangtung Army and the National 
Revolutionary Army ceased on March 3 because of international mediation. However, the 
relationship between China and Japan was still very tense.  
While Japan was occupying China, the Japanese still wanted peace talks with 
China.487 While Japan was trying to occupy the whole Manchuria, it still did not want to 
confront the Nationalist China and did not wanted to be isolated from international 
society. In April 1934, Japanese government claimed that it had the responsibility to keep 
peace in East Asia, willing to see the “national integrity, restore order and achieve 
unification.”488 However, so that there would be less competition in China from other 
powers, Japan wanted China to achieve all these goals by its own efforts and not to rely 
on foreign aids. In this sense, Japan was against any foreign aid to China, including 
military and financial aids. Another reason why Japan was reluctant to welcome foreign 
aids to China was that it was also recovering from the economic regression in the 1930s, 
which made Japan impossible to provide aids to China and compete with other western 
powers.489 
As the United States and the United Kingdom did not want to provoke Japan in 
the early 1930s, along with the inner disagreements, the loans to China was not 
implemented. The difficult situation did not stop the National Government of China to 
ask the foreign aids to reform its monetary system. 
487 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 170) and Fairbank& Feuerwerker (1983, pp. 509-519). 
488 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 170). 
489 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 171) and Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, pp. 493-498). 
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4.5.1.3 The continuous negotiation and the foreign financial aids. “Since the 
US Silver Purchase Act was the main factor roiling China’s money markets, China hoped 
the United States would absorb Chinese silver in exchange for US dollars or gold.”490 
However, the diplomatic negotiation between China and the US was not very successful. 
Though the diplomatic situation of getting foreign aids was tough, the Nationalist 
Government continued to work on this issue.491 After three negotiations, by selling more 
silver to the US, it successfully received the US dollars as financial aids to support its 
monetary system. However, the silver selling made China leave the silver standard. Thus, 
the Nationalist Government finally “chose” fiat money system as a substitution, as under 
the circumstances the only option that the Nationalist Government could think of was fiat 
currency (if they wanted to maintain and construct its newborn central banking system). 
4.5.1.3.1 The first international negotiation. The first international negotiation 
started in 1934.492 In September 1934, China’s financial minster H. H. Kung asked the 
US Secretary of State Cordell Hull by message if it was possible for China to get gold in 
exchange of silver stabilizing the monetary system and making the currency system based 
on gold. After a few times of bargain, China proposed a price US$0.50 per ounce of 
silver, which was equal to C$0.37, however, the US senator thought the price was high 
and rejected the proposal. 
4.5.1.3.2 The second international negotiation. The second international 
negotiation started in January 1935.493 As the economic situation became quite unstable 
at that time due to the fluctuation of monetary system, on January 31, the general 
490 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 171). 
491 See Shiroyama (2008, pp. 171-173), A. Young (1971, pp. 223-237) and ACPBC (1991, pp. 158-178). 
492 See Shiroyama (2008, pp. 171-173), A. Young (1971, pp. 223-225), and ACPBC (1991, pp. 119-132). 
493 See Shiroyama (2008, pp. 171-173) and ACPBC (1991, pp. 132-141). 
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manager of the Bank of China, T. V. Soong sent a message to the US federal government 
telling that Chinese monetary system would collapse in June making China under the 
control of Japan. In February 5, China’s financial minster H. H. Kung sent a new plan to 
the US for purchasing the silver of China. 
According to the plan drawn up by the Chinese government, China would offer 200 
million ounces of silver the first year, although it retained the right to make 
adjustments in the amount of up to 50 million ounces. In addition, in order to cope 
with the transition in the monetary system, the Chinese government asked for a 
government loan of US$100 million and the equivalent amount of long-term credits 
against the future delivery of silver. If the United States agreed, China would peg 
its currency to the US dollar. (Shiroyama, 2008, p. 173) 
At this time, the National Government clearly understand that it was better not to put all 
the eggs in one basket and planned to ask for many foreign aids to establish its financial 
system in case the US unilateral aids became impossible. H. H. Kung argued that it would 
be possible that Japan, Great Britain, the US, and France issued a multinational loan set 
up in 1920s.494 However, the British Government rejected helping China, considering 
that the huge debt that the Nationalist Government had would made it risky to issue loans 
to China. Kung later turned his eyes to Japan to see if they could be a helping hand or not.  
The negotiation between China and Japan was not very successful. 495 Kung 
realized the large loan that Japan intended to issue to China had the intention to control 
the Chinese economy, especially the north part of the country. Besides, Japan was also 
trying to sow discord between China and the US, suggesting that “China and Japan 
494 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 173). 
495 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 174). 
266 
                                                 
should unite in protesting the US silver purchase policy.”496 Kung also believed that the 
western powers knew that Japan may be a threat to China’s sovereignty, but they did not 
want to take the risk to help China. Kung said, “The Western Powers will not oppose 
Japan in this circumstance, because they have never taken a risk to rescue China.”497  
In February of 1935, in the US part, though the Treasury Department wanted to 
provided aids to China, the State Department refuted the proposal, with President 
Roosevelt not supporting either of the two departments.498 After a few negotiations inside 
the Federal Government of the US, the Secretary of State Cordell Hull compromised, 
saying that “if a group of other countries agree to support China’s plan, the United States 
would possibly support China.”499  
After several international negotiations, the British government finally agreed to 
help China.500 First, the British government responded the US multiple aid proposal, 
worrying about the risk of issuing loans to China. It seems that the British government 
softened its position.501 However, a similar situation happened on the British side: the 
British Treasury wanted to help China to stabilize its currency system, but the Foreign 
Office was more cautious to issue the loan.502 In the end, on March 8th, 1935, the British 
government informed China it would like to provide the aids if it could be cooperated and 
provided by the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Japan. On March 18, the 
Chinese Nationalist Government replied the UK, agreeing with the multiple loan plan. 
496 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 174). 
497 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 174) and ACPBC (1991, p. 161). 
498 See Shiroyama (2008, pp. 174-175). 
499 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 175). 
500 See Shiroyama (2008, pp. 175-176), ACPBC (1991, pp. 162-163), and A. Young (1971, pp. 228-229). 
501 See ACPBC (1991, p. 162). 
502 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 175). 
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Unfortunately, the hope of the multiple loan plan was soon gone. 503  The 
Japanese were not willing to issue the loan altogether with the other Western Powers. The 
US Government abandoned the plan as it did not want criticism its’ Silver Purchase Act. 
France also left the plan as Japan and the US would not participate. In the China part, as 
the Chinese government realized this loan plan would leak out the crucial information of 
Chinese economy to Japan, it decided not to apply this loan plan but directly ask the loans 
from Great Britain, the US, and France. 
4.5.1.3.3 The third international negotiation. In September of 1935, the third 
international negotiation started.504 In order to obtain assistance from Western countries, 
the National Government conducted three negotiations with Western countries in just one 
year or so. It is seen that the National Government believed that foreign assistance was 
important to stabilize China’s domestic economic situation. In the meeting with the chief 
economic adviser to the UK government Frederic Leith-Ross, T.V. Soong suggested that 
China should abandon silver standard and back the yuan with a foreign currency. This 
was the first proposal of establishing a fiat money system in China since this international 
negotiation. During the several meetings with Leith-Ross, both Soong and Kung 
expressed that it was necessary for China to reform its monetary system with foreign aids. 
However, the British government was very sensitive to the issue that if China could 
manage its own monetary system. After knowing the situation of China’s banking system, 
Leith-Ross gave few strong suggestions and criticisms on China’s central banking system. 
First, he strongly criticized that Chinese government did not make the Central Bank as 
independent as possible, suggesting that “the governor and deputy governor of the 
503 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 176). 
504 See Shiroyama (2008, pp. 177-178), A. Young (1971, pp. 229-237), and ACPBC (1991, p. 170-178). 
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Central Bank be nominated by the government but have a long tenure in office, as five 
years” and that the other members of the board of the Central Bank should also be elected 
by the shareholders.505 Second, Leith-Ross suggested that banks and public should have 
the rights to purchase from the Central Bank. Third, Leith-Ross opposed the Nationalist 
Governments proposal of the conversion of the internal debt with foreign loans, waring 
that his proposal would “only add to China’s balance-of-payment burdens” and he 
encouraged Chinese people to purchase long-term bonds.506 
In fact, before Leith-Ross’s visit to China proposing his monetary policy 
suggestions, the Nationalist had already drafted their monetary reform plans in June.507 
Some of them were the same as what Leith-Ross proposed later. The Nationalist 
Government responded to Leith-Ross’s proposal on October 11th in a new memorandum, 
accepting his suggestion as the monetary reform policies. First, the Nationalist 
Government agreed that China would open “the ownership and management of the 
Central Bank to the public”.508 Second, the Nationalist Government agreed that China 
would not make the conversion of the internal debt with foreign loan. Third, the National 
Government promised to balance its budget in 18 months. Fourth, the National 
Government would hire a foreign advisor for the Central Bank. Fifth, the National 
Government promised to issue long-term loans to consolidate its existing short-term 
bonds. Obviously, some top officials of the National Government itself already realized 
the existing problems of the management of the Central Bank before Leith-Ross’s trip. 
Thus, if these proposals were not being executed in future, the persons who should be 
505 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 179). 
506 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 180). 
507 See Shiroyama (2008, pp. 178-179) and A. Young (1971, pp.229-231). 
508 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 180). 
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responsible for the monetary failure were not the foreign specialists, but the Chinese top 
politicians themselves. 
Meanwhile in the September and October of 1936, Chinese people also felt very 
uncertain about the future of the monetary system.509 
[The] rumors of a government devaluation of the yuan, spurred people to 
exchange their cash not only for foreign currencies but also for basic 
commodities. September 1935, when they reached 6.4 percent below the level of 
the year before. … By October, the skittishness of the financial market had 
reached alarming proportions. Anticipating a devaluation, large groups of 
speculators, many of them said to be closely connected with politics, were 
actively purchasing foreign currencies. The value of the yuan dropped in relation 
to foreign currencies. (Shiroyama, 2008, p. 181) 
As the financial system of China was collapsing, the Nationalist Government continued 
to talk with the US asking for silver purchases as the aids.510 On October 26, Ambassador 
Alfred Sao-ke Sze told the US government that to stabilize the Chinese monetary system, 
China could offer the US 50 million ounces of silver at 65 cents per ounce for delivery 
within 2 months and another delivery of an extra 50 million ounces of silver in the next 4 
months. Besides, the US government could also have the option of taking another 100 
million ounces in the following 6 months. The Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau 
accepted this proposal from Ambassador Sze. After the talks between Morgenthau and 
President Roosevelt, on November 2nd, Morgenthau told Ambassador that President 
509 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 181) and A. Young (1971, pp. 232-233). 
510 See Shiroyama (2008, pp. 181-182) and A. Young (1971, pp. 233-237). 
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Roosevelt had approved that US would purchase 100 million ounces of silver with the 
following conditions, 
(1) that the proceeds would be used only for currency stabilization, (2) that the 
Chinese government would establish a currency stabilization committee that 
would include America bankers, and (3) that the new currency would be linked 
to the dollars and China would agree to make it convertible at a level of 
America’s own choosing. (Shiroyama, 2008, pp. 182-183) 
As the US government dealt purchasing China’s silver, the Nationalist Government 
immediately started its monetary reform plan on November 3, 1935.511 
4.5.2 The 1935 Currency Reform: Establishing a Fiat Money Central Banking 
System 
On November 3, 1935, Minister of Finance Kung Hsiang-his announced the 
final monetary reform plan.512 The reform had the following 6 articles,  
1. As of November 4, 1935, banknotes issued by the Central Bank, the Bank of 
China, and the Bank of Communications [shall be full legal tender] (fabi). 
Payment of taxes and the discharge of all public and private obligations shall be 
affected by legal tender notes. [No use of silver dollars or bullion for currency 
purposes shall be permitted]; in order to prevent the smuggling of silver, any 
contravention of this provision shall be punishable by confiscation of the whole 
amount of silver seized. Any individual found in illegal possession of silver with 
511 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 183) and A. Young (1971, p. 237). 
512 Shiroyama (2008) has translated the law and its articles from Chinese into English. For more details of 
the Chinese text of the law of central banking reform, see ACPBC (1991, pp. 181-182). For references of 
the announcement of the reform, see ACPBC (1991, pp. 1878-1880), Shiroyama (2008, p. 184), and A. 
Young (1971, pp. 237-239). 
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the intention to smuggle it shall be punished in accordance with the law 
governing acts of treason against the state. 
2. Banknotes issued by banks other than the Central Bank, the Bank of China, 
and the Bank of Communications, whose issue was previously authorized by the 
Ministry of Finance, shall not exceed the amount in circulation on November 3, 
1935. [The outstanding banknotes of these banks shall gradually be retired and 
exchanged for Central Bank banknotes within a period to be determined by the 
Ministry of Finance]. All reserves held against the outstanding banknotes, 
together with all unissued or retired notes from these banks, shall be handed over 
at once to the Currency Reserve Board [see article 3]. Notes previously 
authorized and in the process of being printed shall also be handed over to the 
board upon delivery from the printers. 
3. A currency Reserve Board shall be formed to control the issuance and 
retirement of legal tender banknotes and to keep custody of reserves against 
outstanding banknotes. Regulations governing the board shall be separately 
enacted and promulgated. 
4. As of November 4, 1935, banks, firms and all private and public institutions 
and individuals holding standard dollars, other silver dollars, or silver bullion 
shall hand over the same to the Currency Reserve Board or banks designated by 
the board in exchange for legal tender notes, at face value in the case of standard 
silver dollars, and in accordance with the net silver content in the case of other 
silver dollars or silver bullion. 
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5. All contractual obligations expressed in terms of silver shall be discharged by 
the payment of legal tender notes in the nominal amount due. 
6. For the purpose of keeping the exchange value of the Chinese dollar stable at 
its present level, the Central Bank, the Bank of China, and the Bank of 
Communication shall buy and sell foreign exchange in unlimited quantities. 
(Shiroyama, 2008, p. 184) 
According to this plan, the Central Bank of China (CBC) would be the banker’s bank, 
monopolizing the issuance of banknotes through fiat money system. Besides, the 
currency reform plan also set a currency reserve board to make the CBC independent 
from the Nationalist Government. This is the first time in the history of China that the 
central government made a law trying to monopolize the whole currency system through 
central banking and fiat money. Globally, it was a time of creation of central banks, a 
time that only found resistance among Austrian economists like Hayek who had doubts 
on central banking.  
Though all the central banks around the world are parts of government and it is 
very hard to keep them independent, the plan still emphasized the importance of the 
independence of banking system from daily government policies. The plan and the 
thoughts of making the CBC independent was the result of the monetary specialists from 
both the Chinese and internationally. However, whether this plan could work or not 
should be examined in detail (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this thesis). In the next 
section, we will present the applications and performances of the 1935 reform. 
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4.5.3 The Applications and Performances of the 1935 Currency Reform 
4.5.3.1 The nationalization of silver. For making the CBC become the banker’s 
bank, the first step of the application of the 1935 currency reform was to nationalize the 
silver reserves in China.513 However, the Nationalist Government found that both the 
Chinese and foreign commercial banks in China were against the nationalization of silver, 
as “silver was worth two-thirds more in the United States.”514 The commercial banks all 
had a huge amount of silver reserve, 
At the time of the reform, the three government banks [(the Central Bank, the 
Bank of China and the Bank of Communications)] held about 130 million 
ounces of silver at Shanghai, and other banks there held about 100 million. A 
further 100 million was in banks in other parts of China. Thus, total bank 
holdings were about 330 million ounces. Of this amount, foreign banks held 43 
million. (A. Young, 1971, p. 240) 
As the commercial banks had a huge reserve of silver, the free exchange of silver was 
good for the benefit of the bankers. For making the bankers feel satisfied, the Nationalist 
Government then introduced a new policy that if the Chinese banks submitted their 
silvers, it would back them as banknotes, and the Fabi (60% of the government payments) 
and government securities (40%) as bonds, stocks, and debentures. Besides, the Chinese 
banks could continue to receive the interest from the government securities. 515  For 
solving the disagreement with the foreign banks, the Nationalist Government provided a 
different proposal. The Nationalist government would provide a mutual exchange of 
deposits for the foreign banks instead of providing them the deposit of securities, 
513 See Shiroyama (2008, pp. 185-186), A. Young (1971, p. 240-241). 
514 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 185). 
515 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 185), A. Young (1971, p. 240), and ACPBE (1991, p. 207). 
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providing the foreign banks a 5% per annum interest rate benefit than the interest rate for 
the Chinese commercial banks.  
It seemed to be a good deal for the bankers, however, if the bankers and the 
Western governments analyzed the situation thoroughly, they might work together to be 
against the nationalization of silver (Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek knew almost 
nothing about economics and already had a very bad track record of abusing his power in 
monetary policies). Besides, the higher interest rate for the western banks was also not 
fair for the Chinese economy. If the Nationalist Government really wanted the Central 
Bank being independent from the other governmental administrations, then the 
discrimination of interest rates already broke the rule of law of the market. Finally, some 
of the foreign banks were forced to submit their silver to the Nationalist Government. 
One example is the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank submitted its silver under the pressure of 
the British Government.516 This was also not fair for the foreign banks who made their 
efforts to make benefit in the previous decades. This also was an invasion on the private 
properties of the foreign banks in China. 
4.5.3.2 The issuance of fiat money banknotes and the performance of prices. 
As the silver nationalization was settled, the central banking system started to issue 
banknotes in the form of Fabi. 517 As what the Currency Reform Plan announced by 
Minster of Finance Kung said, the Central Bank of China, the Bank of China, and the 
Bank of Communications all would have the privilege monopoly to issue the fiat money 
banknotes, Fabi. It was a shared monopoly of banknote issuance among the three state 
banks. After Kung’s announcement, the amounts of the new issued banknotes were rising. 
516 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 186). 
517 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 186-187) and Tamagna (1942, pp. 144-145). 
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According to Young’s statistics, “Note issues of the government banks grew from C$488 
million on November 2, 1935, to C$1,680 million on June 30, 1937, an increase of 
C$1,192 million.”518  
The annual data for the three years from 1935 to 1937 can better reflect the 
situation. Figure 4.5 shows the situation of currency issuances before after the 1935 
currency reform. The currency issues in 1935 were C$868 million, and in 1936 were 
C$1,633 million, an increase of 88.1% over the previous year. In 1937, due to the 
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the currency issue was C$1,640 million, an 
increase of 0.4% over the previous year. The currency deposits also increased 
significantly after the 1935 currency reform: it increased from C$2,324 million in 1935 to 
C$2,708 million in 1936, an increase of 16.5%. However, due to war, currency deposits 
declined in 1937, reaching C$2,019 million, a 25.4% decline from the previous year. As 
the total money supply was the result of currency issues plus currency deposits, the total 
money supply in 1935 was C$ 3,192 million, and C$ 4,816 million in 1936, an increase 
of 50.9% over the previous year. The total money supply in 1937 was C$3,659 million, a 
decrease of 24.1% from the previous year. In Figure 4.5, we find that the trends of the 
three indicators of currency issues, currency deposits, and total money supply were the 
same from 1935 to 1937. Their trend was also the same from 1926 until the currency 
reform of 1935. 
However, in terms of the prices index, the statistical data in Figure 4.5 shows an 
upward trend after the 1935 currency reform, which was the reverse of the situation of 
price deflation since 1931. For the analysis of the prices index before the 1935 currency 
reform, see section 4.3.4.5 and section 4.4.2.4 of this chapter. After the currency reform, 
518 See A. Young (1971, p. 251). 
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the prices index increased from 96.4 in 1935 to 108.6 in 1936, and then to 189.5 in 1937. 
The wholesale prices index of 1937 more than doubled since 1935. Therefore, price 
inflation caused a loss in the value of money in the hands of the people. “Due to the 
currency devaluation, now [people] have to pay more than C$100 to buy the imported 
products which could be bought in the price of C$100 in the best.”519 The lower income 
class suffered from this inflation. 
  
519 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 394). 
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Figure 4.5 Monetary supply and prices index, 1926-1937. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese dollars (C$). 
Source: Currency issues, currency deposits, and total money supply from 1927 to 1937 is from K. Chang (1958, p. 376). 
Prices index from 1927 to 1930 (1926=100) was calculated by A. N. Young from the whole prices index of Shanghai, 
Tianjin and Guangdong Province. For the origin of the data, see A. Young (1972, p. 171). Prices index from 1930 to 
1937 (1930=100) is the Shanghai wholesale prices index, which is from K. Chang (1958, p. 371).  
Notes: In order to enable prices index from the above two different sources (A. Young, 1971, p. 171; K. Chang, 1958, p. 
371) to be displayed on the same statistical benchmark, we have processed the data from the above different sources 
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4.5.3.3 Industries and agricultural industry. Figure 4.1 above shows the gross 
value of output (GVO) and net value added (NVA) of China’s industries (including 
Manchuria) from 1927 to 1937. In 1927, the GVO was C$670.1 million with its index 
66.6. China’s industrial GVO was growing every year since then and reached its peak in 
1936, with a GVO of C$1,227 million and its index of 122. In 1935, the year of the 
currency reform, the GVO was C$1,104 million, which continued the previous growth 
momentum. In 1937, due to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the GVO index 
dropped to 96 (C$ 965.8 million). However, China's industrial output value still increased 
by 44% in 1937 compared with 1927. In terms of NVA data, in 1927, the NVA was C$ 
245 million with its index 66.3. China's industrial NVA was growing every year since 
then and reached its peak in 1936, with an NVA of C$ 499.1 and its index of 135. In 
1935, the year of the currency reform, the NVA was C$552 million. In 1937, due to the 
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the NVA index dropped to 112.3 (C$415.2 million). 
However, China ’s industrial NVA still increased by 69.4% in 1937 compared with 1927. 
Figure 4-2 above shows (see section 4.2.2.2) the prices index from 1931 to 1937. 
From 1931 to 1934, the index fell. After the currency reform in 1935, the index rose. The 
index in 1935 was 56 in 1935, 57 in 1936, and 60 in 1937. Thus, the prices were 
reflationary in agricultural industry, who were receiving more profits while the price that 
they paid was more or less the same level.520 
As 75% to 80% of the Chinese families relied on agriculture for living before the 
Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the recovery and growth in agriculture was very 
important for the recovery of the economy of China. 521  In 1936, except the three 
520 See Shiroyama (2008, pp. 195-196). 
521 See A. Young (1971, p. 299). 
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provinces Sichuan, Henan, and Guangdong that suffered from natural disasters, most of 
the areas in China received a great harvest.522 Comparing with the average output value 
in 1933 and 1935, the agriculture grew C$1,700 billion, which was 40% higher than the 
average output in 1933 and 1935.523 Thus, both the agriculture and the industry recovered 
and grew after the 1935 currency reform due to the increased prices. 
4.5.3.4 The sales of silver. For stabilizing the exchange rate, the Nationalist 
Government had to executive commitments of selling silver to the United States. 524 
Though the Nationalist Government was hesitating that if the sale of silver would make 
people panic of the uncertain future of currency system and lied to the public that it 
would keep the silver standard, after a few diplomatic negotiations, the Nationalist 
Government started to sell its silver reserve.525 It sold 50 million ounces of silver between 
December 21st, 1935 and January 7th, 1936. In May 1936, the Nationalist Government 
agreed to sell 75 million ounces in eight months. In July 1937, 62 million ounces were 
planned to be sold to the United States. Altogether, the Nationalist Government sold 187 
million ounces of receiving US$94 million to stabilize the stability and exchange rate of 
Fabi. Including the previous silver sale to the United Kingdom and the later one after the 
breaking out of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Nationalist Government sold in total 
362 million ounces and received US$157 million. 
The sales of silver helped China receive foreign banknotes to stabilize the 
economy and financial system in the short times. However, we still must point out that 
this policy may be problematic. First, the sales of silver were based on coercion, which 
522 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 393). 
523 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 393). 
524 See A. Young (1971, pp. 241-245). 
525 See A. Young (1971, p. 241). 
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invaded the private property rights of many Chinese citizens, Chinese bankers, and 
foreign bankers. Second, the sales along with the monetary reform destroyed the 
spontaneous use of silver in Chinese economy and caused the inconvenience of 
exchanges of products in market. Lastly, the monopolization of the issuance of currency 
may have caused the Nationalist Government to abuse its power and issue unlimited 
paper money which could destroy the Chinese economy. The later hyperinflation in the 
Communist Revolution proved this hypothesis (the detailed analysis of this topic will be 
provided in chapter 5 and chapter 6 of this thesis). 
4.5.3.5 The stabilization of exchange. For managing the new currency system, 
the stabilization of Fabi was also an important task of the Nationalist Government.526 
However, the United States, the United Kingdom, and  Japan all insisted that it would be 
better for China to peg Fabi only to their own currency systems, threatening that Chinese 
currency stability would be unstable if China did not do this. The Nationalist government 
withstood the pressure and informed these countries that China would like to link Fabi to 
each of the countries.  
The first reason that why the Nationalist Government avoided to peg Fabi to a 
single currency was that it did not want to make conflicts with other Western powers. 
Minister of Kung argued,  
It would cause jealousy and suspicion among countries whose currency was not 
selected as a basis for China’s currency and therefore would tend to make 
China’s international position more difficult. (Shiroyama, 2008, p. 188) 
526 See Shiroyama (2008, pp. 189-192) and A. Young (1971, pp. 245-252). 
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For refuting the threat from the US side, Kung also made a very excellent argument when 
he was negotiating with the US government, making the US government clear that the 
plan would damage the interest of the US itself. He said, 
In managing the currency reform, we have carefully left the relationship of the 
yuan to foreign currencies unclear. One reason for that arrangement is to avoid 
opposition to any specific linkage. If we agree to link with the US dollars, is the 
US government ready to help us to explain to the Japanese government? 
(Shiroyama, 2008, p. 189)527 
The second reason that why the Nationalist Government avoided to peg the yuan to a 
single currency was that the Nationalist Government wanted the Chinese financial market 
“as open as possible.”528 They thought the whole currency stabilization process was made 
by the governmental manipulation on currency system, which was not based on the true 
free market purchase of currencies; but at least the top politicians like Minister of Finance 
Kung and Ambassador to the US Alfred Sao-ke Sze realized the problems and insisted 
that the Chinese yuan (Fabi) should be open to be exchanged to any of the above three 
currencies (the US dollar, the British pound sterling, and the Japanese yen). In this sense, 
the Nationalist Government kept its independence of the currency exchange policy 
making and adopted the concept of free currency exchange, at least in the issue of letting 
Chinese yuan be exchanged not only in one limited currency unit. 
The foreign exchange rates in the next few years were stabilized after the new 
planned exchanged rate on November 4th, 1935. 529  On that day, the Central Bank 
527 Shiroyama (2008) has translated the speech of Kung from Chinese into English. For more details of the 
Chinese text of the law of central banking reform, see ACPBC (1991, p. 246). 
528 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 189). 
529 See A. Young (1971, p. 237). 
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announce publicly the selling rates of yuan were 14-3/8 pence and US$0.29-1/2.Though 
the exchange rate had some fluctuation in some period, generally speaking, the rate 
remained stable.530 Figure 4.6 shows the foreign exchange rates from 1927 to 1937. From 
1935 to 1937, the exchange rate of Chinese yuan to US Dollar to were relatively stable. 
The lowest annual exchange rates from 1935 to 1937 were US$0.295, US$0.3025, and 
US$0.3025, respectively. And the highest rates were US$0.4213, US$0.2944, and 
US$0.2944. 
  
530 See A. Young (1971, pp. 247-252). 
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Figure 4.6 Foreign exchange rate from Chinese dollar to US dollar. Unit: US Dollar (cents per C$).  
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There are few reasons why the exchange rates were stabilized. The first was that 
China was continually receiving the foreign banknotes which maintained the exchanged 
rates. Secondly, the Nationalist Government communicated with the public sufficiently to 
let people trust that the new currency system would work. The third reason was that 
Chinese yuan was not pegged to a certain currency, which also made the market of yuan 
become relatively open. The fourth reason was that the Nationalist Government did not 
forbid the free convertibility of currency. All these four reasons made the public and 
market have strong faith in Fabi at that time which aided the maintenance of the currency 
exchange rate. The free convertibility of currency was not the only means of achieving 
the stable exchange rate, but also the aim of the monetary policy of the Nationalist 
Government. We will analyze this in the next section.  
4.5.3.6 The maintenance of the convertibility of currency. The maintenance 
of the convertibility of currency was also the important policy after the currency 
reform. 531  The free convertibility of currency was also the policy of the Nationalist 
Government. However, it was not easy to maintain this free convertibility as some people 
worried that the free convertibility contradicted the stability of exchange rate.532 Thus, 
inside the Nationalist Government, there was an argument if China should permit the free 
convertibility of currency. 
T.V. Soong expressed his objection on foreign exchange control when he was 
meeting Leith-Ross. Soong “believed that the effect of any exchange restrictions would 
be to accelerate the flight of capital.”533 From the perspective of economic theory, Song's 
point is reasonable. For Soong and some other monetary specialists, the restriction of 
531 See Shiroyama (2008, pp. 188-192) and A. Young (1971, pp. 243-244). 
532 See Shiroyama (2008 p. 188). 
533 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 192). 
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capital would damage the credibility of the currency, causing more and massive capital 
flee quickly, thus destroying the new monetary system.534 The opinions of Soong and 
other monetary specialist maintained the policy of free currency convertibility. 
4.5.3.7 The control of government budget and the balance of payments. The 
Nationalist Government clearly knew that the controlled budget, the restriction of the 
issuance of currency, and the balance of payments would make people trust the new 
monetary system after the 1935 currency reform.535 The 1936 national budget set the goal 
that the Nationalist Government would control the total expenditures which would not 
exceed the ones of the previous years.536 However, the truth is that things were not going 
as planned. Figure 4.7 shows the situation of expenditures, revenues, and deficits from 
1927 to 1937. After the currency reform in 1935, all three statistical indicators increased. 
Expenditures from 1935 to 1937 were C$941 million, C$1073 million, and C$1117 
million, respectively, with an average annual growth rate of 9%. Between 1935 and 1937, 
the revenues were C$745 million, C$817 million, and C$870 million, respectively, with 
an average annual growth rate of 8.1%. Therefore, the deficits from 1935 to 1937 were 
C$196 million, C$256 million, and C$297 million, respectively, with an average annual 
growth rate of 23.1%. The fiscal deficit as a percentage of expenditure was almost the 
same as the growth rate of fiscal expenditure during the three years. Obviously, after the 
currency reform, the government failed to reduce the fiscal deficit at a macro level. 
  
534 Besides Soong, the chief of the management office of the Central Bank of China, Demao Xi and the 
foreign monetary advisor of the Nationalist Government Arthur Young (1936) also expressed their 
disagreement on capital control. For the reference of Xi’s opinion, see Shiroyama (2008, pp. 192-193). For 
Young’s opinion, see A. Young (1936). For more details of the theory on the danger of capital control and 
the theory of the mobility of the investor, see Mises (1949/1998, pp. 514-517). 
535 See Shiroyama (2008, pp. 194-195) and A. Young (1971, pp. 257-260). 
536 See Second Historical Archives of China [SHAC] (1994, pp. 458-459). 
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Figure 4.7 Expenditures, revenues, and deficits, 1929-1937. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese dollars (C$). 
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4.5.3.8 The reform of coinage. Having strong control through  monopolizing 
the currency, the Nationalist Government was also reforming and monopolizing the 
coinage.537 Following the coinage reform in the early 1930s, the Nationalist Government 
approved the coinage plans “for issuing pure nickel 20-, 10-, and 50-cent coins, together 
with 1- and ½-cent coppers” recommended by Arthur Young and his colleagues.538 From 
February to the end of July 1937, the Shanghai Mint was producing these new currencies. 
The mint produced “about 200 million nickel coins of a total value of about C$21 million, 
and about 600 million copper coins valued at about C$6 million.”539  
4.5.3.9 The reform of reginal currencies and the decrease of traditional 
native banks. This monopolization and nationalization of the currency was just a part of 
the currency reform, as the Nationalist Government did not monopolize the whole 
currency system (it was not possible for the to control the whole monetary system). On 
another hand, the Nationalist Government was also reforming and controlling the local 
banking system.540 Despite Manchuria and the other occupied areas controlled by the 
Japanese, the Nationalist Government started to set down its central banking systems and 
issued Fabi in the Sichuan, Guangdong, and Shanxi provinces from 1934 to 1938. 
However, the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 stopped the 
centralization of banking system of the Nationalist Government. This was obviously 
against the purpose of the goals of the monetary policy of the Nationalist Government. 
However, this provided the opportunity of the local banks to survive despite the banking 
537 See A. Young (1971, pp. 252-254). 
538 See Young, (1971, p. 253) 
539 See A. Young (1971, p. 253). 
540 See A. Young (1971, pp. 254-256). 
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centralization, which maintained the local and free banking institutions of China at least 
in a short time. 
After the 1935 currency reform, the conditions of the traditional native banks, 
the modernly local and the free banking were worse after the 1935 currency reform.541 
The native banks played a very important role for thousand years before the western style 
modern banking system was introduced in China. Members of the native banks were 
strictly local, which could provide more credit rating between the borrowers and the 
lenders. However, because of the rise of modern private banking (1928 to 1937) and the 
1935 currency reforms, the numbers old traditional native banks were disappearing. They 
lost much business to the modern banks.542  
The depression hit [the native banks] hard and many failed. From 1927 to 1937, 
the number at Shanghai fell from 540 to 77 at [Guangdong]. The total number in 
1937 was estimated at 800, a drop of perhaps half from 1927. (Young, 1971, p. 
266) 
The modern local banking and the free banking developed tremendously from 1928 to 
1937.543 Some of them were even issuing bank notes playing the function of free banking. 
From 1928 to 1937, 124 new banks were established; there were 164 modern local 
banking and free banking with 1597 branches in 1937.544 The deteriorating conditions of 
local banks and the establishment of a new banking system had created a stark contrast. 
After the 1935 central banking reform, the free-banking system was abolished coercively, 
and the rest of the modernly local banking system was gradually controlled by the central 
541 See A. Young (1971, pp. 262-267) and ACPBC (1991, pp. 230-238). 
542 See A. Young (1971, p. 265). The “native bank” is written as “䥒㦺” in Chinese. 
543 See A. Young (1971, p. 264). 
544 See A. Young (1971, p. 265). 
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banking system. The new banking system and its regulation may have brought some new 
positive factors to the development of China’s banks. However, considering that the old 
banking system served the local financial needs, we cannot generalize that the old 
banking system must be inefficient for serving local finance. 
4.5.3.10 The increased Chinese silver and funds in foreign countries. The 
Chinese Silver and Funds in Foreign Countries also increased a lot after the 1935 
currency reform.545 In a confidential letter that the CBC sent to the Finance Minister 
Kung on May 7th, 1937, the Central Bank highly praised the increased Chinese Silver and 
capitals in foreign countries, appraising that the financial situation was stable both inside 
China and globally. The letter said, 
Enclosed herewith the cash position summary of the three largest banks as of 
April 30, 1937, including our accounts with the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, the quantity of our saved silver available for exchange abroad and in Hong 
Kong, and funds we save in New York and London banks, totaling 
US$169,725,174.94. Compared with the numbers in March, this figure shows an 
increase of US$13,213,957.1. (ACPBC, 1991, p. 276, own translation) 
The confidential letter also appraised that the financial situation was stable both inside 
China and globally. It said, 
We are optimistic that as long as the total balance available for foreign exchange 
continues to grow, our currency is sound, which has been proved in the last few 
calmly months. According to repeated confirmations received over the last few 
days, the U.S. government will not change her gold policy. The U.S. dollar has 
shown some improvement against the pound, and the price of all commodities 
545 See ACPBC (1991, pp. 276-283). 
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have increased. As far as our currency is concerned, we have a very wide margin 
of protection between the highest and the lowest [amount of our currency], 
unless there is a drastic monetary change in the major financial centers such as 
New York and London, which seems unlikely at this time. However, we are still 
cautiously watching all [the financial] developments in the United States and 
Europe and will report to you at any time. (ACPBC, 1991, pp. 276-277, own 
translation). 
The confidential letter shows the relatively stable financial situation in the 
Republic of China at that time, and foreign investors’ confidence in China. The relatively 
stable financial situation was also tightly related with the relatively stable currency 
policies after the 1935 currency reform. 
4.5.3.11 The recovered international trade, the more paid foreign debts and 
the increased foreign investment. Trade recovered after the 1935 currency reform.546 
Figure 4.8 shows the foreign trade condition from 1927 to 1937. For the general 
description of the foreign trade during the Golden Decade, see section 1.2.1.2. In 1935, 
China’s imports were C$919 million and were C$941 million in 1936, an increase of 
2.4% over 1935. China’s imports in 1937 were C$953 million, an increase of 0.01% over 
1936. In 1935, China’s exports were C$576 million and were C$706, million in 1936, an 
increase of 22.7% over 1935. China’s exports in 1937 were C$838 million, an increase of 
18.69% over 1936. Obviously, the increase in exports was higher than the increase in 
imports, which reflected the development of China’s industry. The average annual growth 
rate of total foreign trade in these three years was 9.5%. 
  
546 See A. Young (1971, pp. 325-329), Shiroyama (p 196), and J. Zhu (2012, p. 393). 
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Figure 4.8 Foreign trade, 1927-1937. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese dollars (C$).  
Source: A. Young (1971, pp. 494-494).  
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Though the foreign trade recovered after the 1935 currency reform, which was 
related with the reformed and the more stable central banking system giving investors and 
consumers’ confidence, we still must point out that the relatively stable fiscal policy and 
the relatively peaceful domestic conditions also played their role in strengthening the 
investors and consumers’ confidence and making the recovery of foreign trade possible. 
Besides, we also have to argue that the trade conditions might be improved more 
significantly if the Nationalist Government could eliminate more trade barriers such as 
tariffs as tariffs were more decisive for trade than currency given that the currency system 
was just born needing a stable economic and foreign trade situation to support it. 
Because of the more stable economic situation after the 1935 currency reform, 
the foreign investment had also increased significantly.547 The Nationalist Government 
was making a big effort to attract foreign investment after the 1935 currency reform.548  
One example was that the more paid foreign debts under the new central banking system 
attracted more trust from foreign investors. It seems that the new central banking system 
was helpful for China paying back more loans. One person who was close to a British 
financial official praised the efforts that the Nationalist Government made for improving 
the investment situation. He said, 
“London bankers were impressed by China’s resuming service on the railways 
loans. … China has come almost with one bound into the ranks of the credit-
worthy nations, and in the circumstances, it is perhaps natural that some support 
should be given to the idea of raising further large sums for reconstruction 
purposes in this country.” (Shiroyama, 2008, p, 196) 
547 See A. Young (1971, pp. 360-386), Shiroyama (2008, p. 196), and J. Zhu (2012, p. 394). 
548 See A. Young (1971, p. 360-361) and Shiroyama (2008, p. 196). 
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Obviously, for foreign bankers, China’s ability to pay foreign debt is more impressive 
than the new currency situation. Despite the lack of statistics on external debt payments at 
the time, in 1928, the remained railway debt was US$183 million. In 1937, two years 
after the currency reform, the remained rail debt was only US$226 thousand! Table 4.2 
shows some paid debts after the 1935 currency reform. 
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Some paid debts after the 1935 currency reform 
Time Who Amounts and Events 
From 1936-1937 The investors in the London market 
The Chinese bounds Reached a 20-year 
high in the London Market 
In the spring of 1936 The British government 
£1.1 million for the railway connected with 
Shanghai and Ningbo 
In July 1937 The British government £3 million for a railway in Guangdong 
In 1937 The US Import and Export Bank 
$1.5 million loan to China (in the condition 
of buying locomotives 
In 1937 
Thomas Lamont, the President of 
Morgan and Company 
Announced a new organization for 
investments in China 
In April 1937 Pan American Airlines 
Started the cross-Pacific fights between San 
Francisco and Shanghai 
In May 1937 ITT, American telephone company 
Opened the direct wireless telephone 
service between Shanghai and San 
Francisco 
Table 4.2 Some paid debts after the 1935 currency reform.  
Source: Shiroyama (2008, pp. 196-197).  
Notes: Table is organized by the thesis’s author based on the above reference. 
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4.5.3.12 The public reaction to the currency reform. Generally speaking, the 
China’s public supported the currency reform.549 The local press, the local areas (not only 
limited in Shanghai, but also in both the North and South China), and the technical 
markets were all very supportive. Though in some areas the fear of fiat money caused the 
rise of prices, but it “did not prove serious.”550  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter studies how China established its first modern central banking 
system from 1927 to 1937. In section 4.2, we review the general political and economic 
background during this 10-year period. We conclude that it can be said that the 
Nationalist Government gradually established a stable political system before and after 
1927 when it set down its capital in Nanjing. The relatively stable political institution also 
promoted the economic development of the Republic of China at that time. At the same 
time, generally speaking, due to the relatively peaceful domestic environment, the 
National Government was able to gradually implement policies of economic construction. 
From 1927 to 1937 was called “Gold Age” or “The Nanjing Golden Decade.” Our 
research finds that during the Golden Decade, although the rural economy in China was 
not relatively advanced and prosperous, due to the relatively stable politics, the urban 
economy, industrial economy, and modern banking system developed rapidly. In addition, 
coupled with a relatively free speech environment, politicians and economists at the time 
discussed extensively what kind of banking system China should establish. All this laid 
the foundation for the gradual establishment of China’s first modern central banking 
549 See A. Young (1971, p. 245). 
550 See A. Young (1971, p. 246). 
296 
                                                 
system. Section 4.2.1 and section 4.2.2 study the political and economic background, 
respectively. 
A relatively free social environment may not only be conducive to economic 
development, but also conducive to the generation of various social science ideas. At that 
time, from policy makers to economic scholars, the Chinese were discussing many issues 
of the topics of establishing a new currency and banking system as all of them believed 
that it was necessary to establish a new and strong banking system to build the Chinese 
economy. As the leader of the National Government, Chiang Kai-shek’s understanding of 
the currency system played a decisive role in the final decision of the National 
Government. Section 4.2.3.1 is about Chiang’s position on monetary system. Though 
Chiang did not have sufficient economic knowledge, he firmly believed that the issuance 
of banknotes through central banking system and the abolition of metal currencies such as 
gold and silver were the trends in social evolution. He also legitimized his proposal by 
claiming that the monetary revolution that he was managing was also advocated by Sun 
Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China. However, Chiang’s claim was not 
exactly what Sun Yat-sen proposed. Though Sun did not propose any systematic theory 
of establishing the modern central banking institution, he still argued that it was 
necessary to issue banknotes to solve the financial shortage of the National Government, 
but that the banknote reserves do not necessarily have to be 100%. While on the contrary, 
our research finds that Chiang never showed any strong interest in supporting a 100% 
reserve banking system. From the analysis of the following Chapters 5 and 6, we see that 
Chiang Kai-shek’s vague currency concept had buried an indefinite bomb for his next 
series of erroneous currency decisions. 
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As the most important economic policy advisors and politicians of Chiang, 
Soong Tse-ven and Kung Hsiang-hsi also played important roles in the formulation of the 
National government’s monetary policy. Section 4.2.3.2 introduces Soong Tse-ven and 
his 100% reserve central banking and anti-price inflation thoughts. Soong was Chiang 
Kai-shek’s brother in law. However, as an economist who once studied at Harvard 
University and Columbia University in the United States, Soong, who had economic 
theory and international vision, obviously did not agree with Chiang Kai-shek’s thinking 
in currency policy. On the issue of monetary policy, T. V. Soong, like Chiang Kai-shek, 
advocated that China needed a unified national monetary system and the introduction of 
the Western modern central banking system.  As for how to establish the institution of the 
central bank, Soong did not have a clear answer initially, but gradually evolved his 
monetary thought according to the development of the economic and political situation 
and the suggestions of other economists. The biggest difference between Soong Tse-ven 
and Chiang Kai-shek’s monetary policy is that Soong opposed expansionary monetary 
policy and price inflation, advocating limiting currency issuance to curb price inflation. It 
is worth mentioning that Soong’s 100% reserve proposal and the 100% gold standard 
reserve plan proposed by Edwin K. Kemmerer in 1929 complemented each other. Soong 
also supported Kemmerer’s plan at that time. In fiscal policy, he also advocated austerity 
for fiscal policy, opposing the government’s use of large amounts of expenditure for 
military spending. Because the government’s final decision-maker was Chiang Kai-shek, 
although Soong theoretically opposed price inflation policy, he was unable to act upon 
his convictions. Instead, he was forced to help the Chinese government sort out as much 
as possible the fiscal and monetary policies with the development of the economic 
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situation and Chiang Kai-shek’s policy thinking. Generally speaking, Soong Tse-ven was 
a Milton Friedman-like monetarist and a laissez-faire financial scholar and politician. 
From the understanding of the gold standard and 100% reserve, perhaps Soong may be 
the most libertarian among the financial policy makers of the National Government.  
Section 4.2.3.3 demonstrated Kung Hsiang-hsi and his monetary proposals. Like 
Chiang Kai-shek and Soong Tse-ven, Kung also considered that the fiat money reform of 
the Nationalist Government inherited Sun Yat-sen’s monetary thinking. After 1933, Kung 
became Chiang’s most important financial assistant instead of Soong. Unlike Soong, 
although Kung’s point of view acquiesced in his understanding of supporting 100% silver 
reserve, he also supported fiat money policy with fractional reserve, which is 
contradictory. Kung did not have a very clear monetary theory and indulged Chiang Kai-
shek’s policy on currency abuse in practice. Therefore, Kung Hsiang-hsi was completely 
different from Soong Tse-ven’s tight fiscal and monetary policies practically, though he 
himself theoretically was against expansionary monetary policy and price inflation.  
Before and during the currency reform around 1935, other economists also put 
forward their opinions and suggestions on China’s currency banking system and currency 
standard, though their voices did not directly affect China’s currency reform as the 
monetary ideas and policies of Chiang Kai-shek, Soong Tse-ven, and Kung Hsiang-hsi. 
The opinions and suggestions of these economists on monetary policy were mainly 
divided into three groups. The first group of scholars supported various forms of the 
silver standard, the second group of scholars supports various forms of physical articles 
standard, and the third group of scholars were radicals in supporting the policy of non-
exchangeable banknotes. It is regrettable that in the literature we have found so far, no 
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scholars of the Golden Decade were supporting the idea of returning to the traditional 
free banking silver standard or were influenced by the Austrian School supporting the 
modern Austrian position on free banking system. Section 4.2.3.4 deals with their 
arguments. It is worth mentioning that, among the above scholars, Yao Qingsan 
systematically introduced the monetary theories of western scholars from the ones who 
supported gold standard (i.e., G. Cassel, J. Kitchin, G. F. Warren, and F. A. Pearson), the 
ones who supported to stabilize price levels (i.e., I. Fisher, A. Salter, P. Einzig, H. 
Strakosch, and D. H. Robertson), and the Keynesian monetary. Especially, Yao Qingsan 
was probably the first Chinese economist during the Mainland period of the Republic of 
China who systematically introduced the Austrian School of Economics’ monetary 
theories into China. In Trends in Modern Currency Thoughts and World Currency 
Systems, Yao introduced F. V. Wiesser, J. G. K. Wicksell, F. A. Hayek, and L. von Mises’ 
business cycle theories.  
Section 4.3 reviews the central banking institutions from 1927 to 1933. In 
section 4.3.1, we demonstrate that National Government already had a failed central 
banking experiment in 1924 in Guangdong Province due to expansionary monetary 
policy and price inflation. Section 4.3.2 briefly reviews the 1929 Kemmerer project as we 
have analyzed systematically in Chapter 2. The plan proposed that China would adopt a 
new gold standard called sun, which had no actual gold circulation and was equal to US 
$0.40. Kemmerer Commission believed that making a connection among the price of sun, 
silver dollar, and gold would be easier for China to adopt gold standard eventually. 
Though sun was planned as a fiduciary silver coin, the Kemmerer Commission did not 
plan to unify the currency into the silver standard as the Commission planned the gold 
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standard as the ultimate standard for China. The reason why the Commission did not 
unify China’s currency standard into pure silver standard of 100% reserve is that the 
Commission was considering that China would eventually implement the gold standard, 
making it unnecessary to achieve the silver standard of 100% reserve because the 
currency sun was enough to solve the problem of currency issuance at that time. 
Section 4.3.3 demonstrates the establishment of the Central Bank of China in 
1928. In July 1928, the National Financial Conference decided to adopt the gold standard 
as the ultimate currency standard of China. Before the adoption of gold standard, the 
conference decided to adopt the Chinese Silver Dollar as the basic currency unit instead 
of the silver tael in the transition between the old and diverse currency system, and the 
future gold standard, while abolishing the silver tael standard. In the currency reform plan 
decided by the conference, other subsidiary coins would also gradually be converted into 
silver dollars. Although the Austrian School does not agree with central bank institutions, 
it agrees with the 100% gold standard, and, from an objective point of view, Edwin 
Kemmerer and the National Government’s plan to reform the monetary system was 
indeed detailed and rigorous. Thus, their efforts in the process of currency reform cannot 
be completely and simply neglected.  
Section 4.3.4 analyzes the performance of the CBC from 1928 to 1933. During 
that period, China’s banking system was in a process of nationalization. The CBC’s 
capitals were increasing, more CBC local branches were opened, and other reforms were 
also adopted. Section 4.3.4.5 studies the situation of the monetary supply and the 
wholesale prices from 1927 to 1933. The total money supply in 1933 was 2,115,015,832 
yuan, an increase of 119.8% from 962,337,076 yuan in 1927. The average annual 
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increase was about 14%. During that period, 1931 was the highest peak of the newly 
added currency issuance and currency deposits. As a result, the total money supply in 
1931 reached 1,606,701,990 yuan, an increase of 67% from 962,337,076 yuan in 1927. 
The total money supply in 1932 was less than in 1931, and the total money supply in 
1933 was more than that in 1932 and exceeded the previous years of the same period. As 
for the prices index, from 1927 to 1931, the prices index increased from 104.4 to 126.6. 
In 1932 and 1933, the prices index fell respectively to 112.5 and 103.9. Therefore, during 
this period, despite the currency issuance, prices remained stable overall and there was no 
significant price inflation. From 1931 to 1933, China was even in an era of price deflation. 
Our statistic results cooperate with the investigation of Milton Friedman, Thomas G. 
Rawski, and William L. Silber on price deflation phenomenon during these years.551  
Section discusses 4.4.1 the process of adoption the Silver Dollar standard. It 
should be said that the policies adopted by the National Government during this period 
were orderly. For gradually adopting the gold standard, in the beginning of 1930, the 
National Government decided to adopt the Customs Gold Unit (CGU) system as a 
transition towards the final gold standard, which helped the National Government receive 
more fiscal revenue due to the plan. CGU became a tool for importing and exporting 
trade to avoid currency fluctuation caused by government currency reform. Besides, price 
regulation and the ban on gold and silver were also adopted. In May 1930, the National 
Government started to regulate foreign silver dollars and forbid the commercial export of 
gold, which led the decrease of gold price in China. The result of the embargo was that 
the price of gold decreased in the Chinese market, which caused the Central Bank of 
551 For the references of price deflation during that period, see Friedman (1992), Friedman & Schwartz 
(1963, p. 483, pp. 489-491), and Rawski (1989, p.15, pp. 312-400;1993). 
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China to buy gold in cheaper prices and gained more profit by exporting it. Although the 
government had a policy of prohibiting private gold exports in 1930, in order to obtain 
foreign exchange and maintain exchange rate stability, the government itself was still 
conducting silver export transactions.  
Obviously, a government’s policies can hardly be advanced without the support 
of public opinion. Therefore, during this period, the National Government focused on 
dialogue with the financial sector, benefiting financiers and entrepreneurs from 
supporting its currency reform. Because of the commutation with these personages, the 
financial and banking societies had a strong public opinion on the policy of the 
abolishment of the silver tael standard and adoption of the silver dollar standard, and only 
few people held the reservation of the new policy which were almost ignored by the 
society. 
During the period from 1933 to 1935, the fluctuating rate of silver tael and Silver 
Dollar made the dollar lose the use as an instrument of avoiding monetary risk and caused 
a huge loss of the individuals who held the dollars as their assets and the taels as the debt. 
For solving the fluctuation of exchange rate, in July 1932, Minster T. V. Soong 
nominated a committee to design the weight and fineness of a new silver dollar, the new 
exchange rate between silver tael and silver, and to provide some suggestions on 
monetary policies, public understanding, and confidence on the currency reform. 
Therefore, the government decided to centralize the issuance of currency in Shanghai, 
abolishing the past practice of minting official currencies in different regions. Moreover, 
the government also controlled the right ofcoinage. On March 1st, 1933, while the Central 
Mint started to mint the new silver dollar currencies as circulation coins, the National 
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Government regulated the provincial and local mintages and abolished some of them, 
starting the unification of the coinage right.  
After adopting the above policies, the National Government finally carried out 
currency reform. On March 10th, 1933, Financial Minster T. V. Soong declared the 
official exchange rate of 0.715 Shanghai taels per dollars.  On April 5, 1933, the Ministry 
of Finance announced the Administrative Decree of Abolishing the Silver Tale and 
Adopting Silver Dollar, ruling that all public and private payments, contract bills, and all 
transactions shall be converted to Silver Dollars, and silver tale shall not be used for the 
above purposes again.  The decree also ordered that the people who had held silver tales 
may exchange for Silver Dollars in the government offices and the government banking 
institutions. Thus, China entered the era of central banking silver dollar and said goodbye 
to the more than one-thousand-year long history of using silver taels since the Song 
Dynasty.  
In section 4.4.2, we reviewed the performance of the Chinese Silver Dollar, 
1933-1935. Though the transition period was very short in 1933, the process was 
successful. Just in a few days after the beginning of the transition, exchange was quoted 
in dollars instead of taels. Besides, the coinage also had a high quality as both the 
Chinese (who had studied coinage issues in the US previously) and the West were 
participating in the process. There was a high demand of the newly issued Silver Dollars. 
The newly issued silver dollars were also in huge demand.  From March 1933 to October 
1935, C$133 million in dollars and C$56 million in bars were minted.  
The performance of prices is also an important indicator of the effectiveness of 
currency reform. The monetary unit during this period was the Chinese Silver Dollar. The 
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total money supply in 1935 was 3,192,326,263 yuan, an increase of 50.9% from 
2,115,015,832 yuan in 1933. The average annual increase is about 22.85%. For the prices 
index, from 1933 to 1935, the prices index decreased from 103.9 to 96.4, which inherited 
the downward trend in prices from 1928. According to scholars’ research, the main 
factors of price deflation was due to the outflow of silver and the competitiveness of the 
economy at the time.  Therefore, during this period, despite the currency issuance, there 
was smooth price deflation at that time.  
Section 4.5 discusses the 1935 currency reform and the establishment of the fiat 
money system from 1935 to 1937. In the beginning of this section we have pointed out 
that the 1934 US Silver Purchase Act and the related international and diplomatic actions 
of financing China directly influenced the 1935 currency reform of adopting fiat money 
system. The Great Depression in 1929 made the price of silver in America dropped 
sharply. The drop of silver and the economic recession made many Americans believed 
that it was necessary to expand money supply to raise the price of silver and stimulate the 
economy. Thus, purchasing the silver from foreign countries became the national policy 
of the United States. On June 19th, 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the 
Silver Purchase Act of 1934, ordering the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase silver 
overseas till the price of silver was US$1.29 per ounce, or till the price of the silver 
reserve of the Treasury realized one quarter of the price of gold reserve. However, the 
1934 Silver Purchase Act broke what the United States promised in the London Silver 
Agreement of July 22, 1933, which was signed by the US, China, India, and six other 
countries. The purpose of the London Silver Agreement was to mitigate fluctuations in 
the price of silver and its effective stabilization providing some methods for limitations 
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on sales of silver by governments. According to the agreement, China undertook to not 
sell silver resulting from demonetized coins during the four years from 1934 to 1937, 
while the United States and four other countries agreed to buy from their respective 
production 35 million ounces yearly, and the American share was later set at about 24.4 
million ounces. The London Agreement strengthened the faith of the Chinese government 
to stabilize the silver price, resulting in China’s adoption of the silver standard in the 
winter of 1933. The 1934 Silver Purchase Act made the plan of stabilizing the silver price 
in international level become impossible. Moreover, the Silver Act was a flagrant 
violation of the London Agreement previously agreed by the US government. Influenced 
by the act, in the end of 1934, the world price of silver saw year-on-year rises of 26.7% 
and in May 1935, the world price of silver reached to the peak of $US 0.81 per ounce. 
Besides, the Chinese economy was also influenced by the silver purchases. The 
stocks in the banks at Shanghai fell from C$563 million at the end of July to C$335 
million at the end of 1934. The interest rate of native banks rose from around 6% to 16% 
per annum. Small banks and small business were also facing bankruptcy. On February 4th, 
1935, the Central Bank stated that seven small banks, three other financial companies, 58 
factories, and 99 stores were facing business failure, while Shanghai Stock Exchange also 
has fell by around 50% in 4 years since its high in the mid-1931. The national and local 
governments were also facing the lack of money. Besides, we find that the research of 
Milton Friedman, Thomas G. Rawski, William L. Silber, and Gary Richardson all argued 
that 1934 Silver Act had a negative influence on China’s price deflation phenomenon 
during these years.552 Price deflation based on the spontaneous market activities might be 
552 For the references of price deflation during that period, see Friedman (1992), Friedman & Schwartz 
(1963, p. 483, pp. 489-491), Rawski (1989, p.15, pp. 312-400;1993), Silber (2019, pp. 38-89), and 
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helpful for an economy to recover from previous economic bubble. However, the US 
government’s coercive silver purchase distorted the economic order of China at time. 
Thus, generally the 1934 Silver Purchase Act was negative for China. Subsection 4.5.1.2 
analyzes the 1934 Silver Act and its consequences.  
During that period, for the topic of the aids to China, Japan, the US and the UK 
also had several diplomatic negotiations with China during that period. After three 
negotiations from September 1934 to September 1935, by selling more silver to the US, 
China successfully received the US dollars as the financial aids to support its monetary 
system. However, the silver selling made China leave the silver standard. Thus, the 
Nationalist Government finally “chose” the fiat money system as a substitution, as under 
the circumstances, it was the only option that the Nationalist Government could think of 
(especially if they wanted to maintain and build their newborn central banking system).  
Section 4.5.2 reviews the laws and decrees of the 1935 currency reform. Section 
4.5.3 provides an in-depth analysis of the applications and performances of the 1935 
currency reform. The following policies were also taken during that period: the 
maintenance of the convertibility of currency, the control of government budget and the 
balance of payments, and the reform of coinage. Besides, due to the reform, regional 
currencies and traditional native banks were decreasing. During that period, industries 
and agricultural industry were growing. The international trade was also recovering, 
while more foreign debts were paid, and more foreign investment entered China. 
Richardson (2019/2020). The book review of Richardson on Silber’s The Story of Silver proposed a chain 
of events: 1) the Silver Purchase Act (1934) doubled the price of silver and brought deflation to China; 2) 
the crisis caused a communist insurrection that further weakened the country; 3) this weakness was 
exploited by Japan to complete the invasion of China; 4) The United States helped China with embargoes 
on Japan; 5) Japan’s response was the bombing of Pearl Harbor; and 6) The United States entered World 
War II and the Communists ended up taking power in China. And all because Roosevelt had the idea of 
restoring the Silver Standard, as an alternative to the Gold Standard that he had abandoned the previous 
year, and incidentally securing the support of the senators from the West, where the silver mines were. 
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The situation of the issuance of fiat money banknotes and the performance of prices 
can shed light on the consequence of the reform. Subsection 4.5.3.2 deals with this topic. 
The total money supply in 1935 was C$3,192 million and C$4,816 million in 1936, an 
increase of 50.9% over the previous year. The total money supply in 1937 was C$3,659 
million, a decrease of 24.1% from the previous year. However, in terms of the prices 
index, the statistical data shows an upward trend after the 1935 currency reform, which 
was the reverse of the situation of price deflation since 1931. The prices index increased 
from 96.4 in 1935 to 108.6 in 1936 and to 189.5 in 1937. The wholesale prices index of 
1937 more than doubled since 1935. Therefore, price inflation caused a loss in the value 
of money in the hands of the people and the low-income class suffered from this 
inflation. 
Although it can be said that from 1933 to 1935, the Chinese government’s 
currency reforms advanced smoothly, relevant scholars have different views on the 
evaluation of the 1935 currency reform. Arthur N. Young, who was deeply involved in 
the proposal of the National Government’s monetary policy, had an obviously positive 
opinion. He considered that “The abolition of the tael accomplished a real and useful 
simplification of the currency”. Besides, he also believes that currency reform promoted 
the modernization of China’s currency minting, claiming that “the existence of a modern 
mint with qualified personnel cleared the way for basic coinage reform.” Thus, he 
thought that “After the 1935 currency reform, the mint was in position to concentrate on 
making token coins for use under the managed currency standard.”553 In March 1937, the 
Chairman of Bank of China T. V. Soong, who also deeply involved in the policy making 
of economic and financial issues, arguing that despite China’s successful currency 
553 See A. Young (1971, p. 187). 
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reforms before 1935 “There are no grounds for suggesting that China has left all her 
difficulties behind.” He believes that there was no evidence that in the 18 months before 
the currency reform, “the whole outlook in the country, politically, financially and 
commercially, changed completely and for the better future.” 554  Japanese scholar T. 
Shiroyama, who studied the history of modern Chinese economics, had a more 
complicated view. 555 Though she praised that silver was functioning as a safeguard 
against the government monetary interference till 1931, she also argued that the monetary 
system stopped working when it was facing the fluctuation of silver in the 1930s, 
especially in June 1934. Thus, she doubted if the free banking system was still working 
and proposed an effective central banking to solve the problem. However, she pointed out 
that as Chinese people, especially from the financial and banking sectors were in 
contradiction. On one hand, these individuals were worrying about the arbitrary note 
issuance by the government; on another hand, they also believed that currency and credit 
control were necessary. She suggested more studies should be made on the contradiction 
of Chinese public opinion.556 Professor Zhu Jiaming, a well-known Chinese economist 
who assisted the Chinese Communist Party regime’s Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang in 
carrying out market-oriented reforms in mainland China in the 1980s, believes that the 
fiat currency reform had the following characteristics. First, the reform of the fiat 
currency destroyed China’s entrenched old banking system, ending the silver-based 
currency system since the middle of the Ming Dynasty. Second, the reform ended China’s 
long “backward, diverse and chaotic” currency system. Third, the reform made China 
achieve the transition from the gold standard to the silver standard, and eventually 
554 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 197). 
555 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 169). 
556 See Shiroyama (2008, p. 169). 
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became the fiat money paper currency standard, and “cut off the possibility of 
implementing the gold standard again.” Fourth, the reform replaced metal money with 
credit money and “realized the modernization of China’s monetary system.” Fifth, the 
reform integrated China and the world’s monetary system, making China become a part 
of the world financial system. However, on the other hand, Zhu argued that the reform 
"fundamentally destroyed the traditional basis of China’s laissez-faire economy,” which 
in turn led to the subsequent occurrence of national capitalism, hyperinflation, and even 
communism.557 He says, 
China’s laissez-faire tradition was fundamentally shaken and subverted [because 
of the 1935 fiat money reform], thus laying a foundation for the state ownership 
in China’s history in the 20th century. The fiat money reform was even the 
foundation of Chinese communism and its public ownership. (J. Zhu, 2012, p. 
414, own translation) 
The 1935 central banking reform seemed to improve the economic and financial 
performance; however, it was the more restricted fiscal and monetary policies of the 
Nationalist Government and people and the financial cycle’s help made the improvement 
possible. Besides, the relatively stable economic situation in the National Government 
ruled area was also a key factor of the improved economic and financial performance. In 
this sense, we have to point out that it was the strong desire of improving the banking and 
economic situation, the understanding of the importance of a more restricted fiscal and 
monetary policies, and some correct and applied policies (more limited government 
deficit, more limited credit expansion, etc.) that helped Nationalist Government achieve a 
more stable financial system. However, the 1935 central banking reform also had some 
557 See J. Zhu (2012, pp. 412-414). 
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negative impacts. Due to the increased price, the declining purchasing power hurt the 
people who had lower salaries, which might cause a business boom and bust in the future. 
Finally, the destroyed native banking and free banking might also destroy the 
spontaneous economic orders in local areas. From the perspective of the Austrian School, 
the destruction of China’s free banking system is sympathetic. However, from the 
perspective of historical trends at that time, the establishment of the central bank system 
was almost inevitable. Although the central bank system is a manifestation of the 
expansion of government power, this does not mean that the central bank system is a 
communist system, let alone that the reasons for the subsequent Communist Revolution 
can be attributed to the establishment of the central bank system. Finally, it must be 
observed that the international environment at that time was towards the central bank 
system. Edwin Kemmerer and other “money doctors” established a central bank system 
based on the 100% gold standard in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, which became a 
major trend in the banking system at that time. Another major contribution of this chapter 
is that our research fills a gap in the previous international research on the entire process 
of establishing China's first modern central bank.558  
 
  
558 One example is the working paper of University of Geneva (Flores Zendejas, Lopez Soto, Sanchez 
Amador, 2020). While they forget about the creation of the central bank in China in the interwar period 
(probably due to lack of information), this paper revealed something important: the creation of these 
institutions was intended to make countries attractive to foreign investment and it was not successful.  
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Part 3  
Central Banking and Wartime, 1937-1949
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Chapter 5  
Central Banking in the 2nd Sino-Japanese War 
Abstract: This chapter analyzes the conditions of China’s first modern central banking 
institutions during the Second Sino-Japanese War. China established its first modern 
central banking in 1928, along with its 1933 silver-standard reform and its 1935 fiat-
currency reform. Due to the 1935 banking reform plan, the Chinese National 
Government would establish a modern central reserve banking system which was 
planned to fully control the currency issuance. However, the outbreak of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War in 1937 delayed the ongoing central banking reform. Based on 
quantitative analysis and an original synthesis of archives and previous research, this 
chapter studies China’s central banking institutions during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, 1937-1945. In order to understand the wartime banking structure in China, it is 
crucial to review the relevant historical backgrounds. This is due to the complicity of 
the wartime China as the country was separated into Free China, Japanese-occupied 
China (along with Manchukuo) and Communist-occupied area.  In the beginning of the 
analysis, this chapter provides the political and economic background during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War, along with an analysis of the disappearing local, private, and 
spontaneously free banking systems. Secondly, this chapter deals with the background 
of the wartime banking policy. In the later sections, we discuss the process of the 
wartime expansionary monetary policy and price inflation and provide an in-depth 
discussion of the possible causes of the wartime price inflation, along with its 
consequences. 
JEL Classification: B2, B53, E42, N15, N25, N45. 




This chapter analyzes the conditions of China’s first modern central banking 
during the Second Sino-Japanese War. In Chapter 4, we have demonstrated the 
establishment of China’s first modern central banking in 1928, along with its 1933 
silver-standard reform and its 1935 fiat-currency reform. Due to the 1935 banking 
reform plan, the Chinese National Government led by the Kuomintang (KMT, also 
called the Chinese nationalist Party) would establish a modern central reserve banking 
system which was planned to fully control the currency issuance. However, the 
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 delayed the ongoing central banking 
reform. Based on quantitative analysis and an original synthesis of archives and 
previous research, this chapter studies the Central Bank of China (CBC) and its 
institutions of the Republic of China (ROC) during the Second Sino-Japanese War, 
1937-1945. Due to the complicity of wartime China, it is crucial to review the relevant 
historical backgrounds to understand the wartime banking structure in China.  
Section 5.2 provides the political and economic background during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War. In sub-section 5.2.1, we review the complicated political 
background during that period, the Japanese aggression on China and the Chinese fight 
for liberty and their homeland. The Japanese invaders established its puppet Manchukuo 
(literally State of Manchuria, 1932-1945) in the northeast China (Manchuria) while set 
another puppet government Wang Jingwei regime (Occupied China, 1940-1945) to rule 
north China and the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River. On the side of 
wartime Free China, the National Government withdrew its capital from Nanjing to 
Chongqing, a southwest city in China during the wartime, who mainly ruled southwest 
and northwest China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also established its separate 
regime (Communist-occupied area) around a northwest Chinese town Yan’an while 
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nominally became a part of wartime Free China. The complicated political background 
also resulted in a specific wartime economy in Free China. Sub-section 5.2.2 reviews 
the economic background of the wartime Free China.  
Section 5.3 deals with the background of the wartime banking policy. Sub-
section 5.3.1 demonstrates the policy of strengthening the government banks’ 
supervision and control. Section 5.3.2 is about the mandatory conversion policy of 
silver and silver dollars to Fabi. Section 5.3.2 demonstrates the unrealized plan of 
central reserve bank and the financial and credit shortage due to the disappearing local, 
private, and spontaneously free banking institutions. 
Section 5.4 discusses the process of the wartime price inflation, 1937-1945. 
Sub-section 5.4.1 demonstrates the first stage of price inflation from 1937 to 1939. Sub-
section 5.4.2 analyzes the second stage of price inflation from 1940 to 1945. 
Section 5.5 is a discussion of the possible causes of the wartime price inflation, 
along with its consequences. From sub-section 5.5.1 to sub-section 5.5.13, we analyze 
in detail the topics of wartime price inflation and its consequences on people’s life; 
wartime military expenditure; the government’s taxation and fiscal policy; the 
expansion of private credit; interest rate policy; bank’s saving policy; the government 
sales of bonds, gold, foreign reserve along with the Sino-U.S.-British Stabilization 
Funds as the helping hand; agricultural harvest; the reduction of people’s confidence on 
Fabi; the trade and currency wars between Free China and the Japanese-occupied areas 
(Occupied China and Manchukuo); and the currency war between the Communists and 
the National Government. 
Section 5.6 is the conclusion of this chapter. 
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5.2 Political and Economic Background during the Second Sino-Japanese War, 
1937-1945 
To understand the inflation issues and the performance of the Central Bank of 
China, it is essential to review and comprehend the special political and economic 
background of China during the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945. This 
section deals with this topic. Section 5.2.1 is about the Japanese occupation and the 
Chinese fights for liberty during the war, along with a review of the background of the 
CCP’s separate regime. Section 5.2.2 demonstrates the general economic conditions of 
Free China during the war, along with a short review of the intensifying price inflation 
in section 5.2.2.6 before the in-depth analysis of the wartime price inflation in section 
5.3.  
5.2.1 The Japanese Occupation and the Chinese Fights for Liberty and Their 
Homeland, along with the Background of the CCP’s Separate Regime 
In this section, we will review the Japanese occupation and the Chinese’ fights 
for liberty. Section 5.2.1.1 deals with the background of the Second Sino-Japanese War 
and the founding of Manchuria. Section 5.2.1.2 demonstrates the process of the war and 
the Japanese controlled Wang Jingwei’s Regime. Section 5.2.1.3 is about CCP’s 
separatist regime during the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
5.2.1.1 The background of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the 
founding of Manchuria. In modern history, the relationship between China and Japan 
was generally calm before 1895. During the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), Japanese 
pirates invaded China’s coastal areas. However, that was not the beginning of Japan’s 
modern military aggression against China. Japan’s official invasion in China started 
from the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895. In the war, the Western-style modern navy of 
Chinese Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) was defeated by the Japanese navy. The Qing 
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Empire had to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan, paying JP¥361 million 
(worth about US$5 billion in 2015) and ceded the Taiwan island to Japan. Due to this 
deal, Korea, as a subsidiary state of the Chinese Empire, also declared independence. 
Korea gradually came under Japanese control after the First Sino-Japanese War and the 
Korean peninsula was completely annexed by Japan in 1910.559  
In 1901, in order to consolidate her authoritarian rule, the Chinese de facto 
ruler Empress Dowager Cixi declared war against eight foreign countries including the 
United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, and Italy. Defeated by these countries, China and the eight countries 
signed Boxer Protocol. According to the Boxer Protocol, Japan started in 1901 
stationing troops in Beijing and Tianjin in north China. This is the origin of Japan’s 
invading troops in the Chinese Mainland before the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
Historians generally believe that the reason why Japan was able to defeat the Qing 
Empire in the war was that while the Meiji Restoration of Japan, which began in 1860, 
allowed Japan to gradually establish a Western constitutional monarchy and develop 
Japan’s market economy, Japan’s national military strength was enhanced by 
mimicking Prussian militaristic politics.560 Militarism had laid the seeds of destruction 
for Japan’s constitutional democracy and laid the foundation for Japan’s militarization 
and totalitarianism in the 1930s. 561  Clearly, although the Qing Dynasty gradually 
reformed its political and economic institutions after its failure in the Opium War in 
1840, the reform process was not very smooth. Emperor Guangxu, who was dedicated 
to modernizing China and establishing a Chinese constitutional monarchy, was under 
559 For the modern history between China and Japan before 1895, see section 1.2 in Chapter 1, Gordon 
(2003, pp. 115-126) and Fairbank & K. Liu (1980, pp. 101-109, pp. 130-141, pp. 269-273). 
560 For more about the general conditions of the Meiji Revolution era, see Gordon (2003, pp. 61-137). For 
the development of Japanese industries and the state-owned enterprises in the Meiji era, see T. C. Smith 
(1955), For the constitutional political institutions of the Meiji Era, see Akita (1967). For the development 
of political thoughts of the Meiji era, see Pittau (1967). For the theoretical and historical origin of 
Nazism, see Mises’s Omnipotent Government (1944/2011). 
561 See Gordon (2003, pp. 182-203). 
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house arrest in 1898 by Empress Dowager Cixi for her personal political ambition.562 
The emperor was allegedly murdered by his aunt and adoptive mother Empress 
Dowager Cixi in 1908.563 The dictatorship of Cixi laid the seeds for the destruction of 
the Manchurian dynasty and the Chinese monarchy. 
In 1912, the last Emperor of the Qing Dynasty Puyi abdicated. The abdication 
edict announced that the newly established Republic of China was Qing’s legal 
successor, inheriting the legitimacy, sovereignty, and diplomatic relationship of the 
Qing Dynasty. The ROC was the first constitutional republic in Asian history. However, 
changes in the political system did not mean that the country would become stronger in 
an instant. The military strength of the newly born Republic of China was still 
insufficient to defeat Japan in a short time. Japan’s power in north China, especially its 
military’s presence in north China, gradually expanded with the signing of the Twenty-
One Demands, a treaty between China and Japan in 1915 and the subsequent treaties.564 
In 1928, the National Government was gradually winning the battles in the Northern 
Expedition, and the Beiyang government steadily retreated.565 Zhang Zuolin, the last 
supreme leader of the Beiyang government, was killed by the Japanese troops stationed 
in north China during a train journey from Beijing to Manchuria.566 This marked the 
expansion of the Japanese ambition. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese army in 
China blew up a railway in Manchuria, saying that it was done by the Chinese army, 
and immediately occupied the entire territory of northeast China (Manchuria), all within 
three months. This even is called the September 18th Incident. One year later, Japan 
562 For Emperor Guangxu’s reform efforts in 1898, see Wakeman (1977, pp. 199-224). 
563 See Zhong (2008), S. Zhao (2004), and Su (2011). 
564 Despite pressure from domestic public opinion, the Yuan Shikai administration did not sign the 
Twenty-One Demands eventually. However, its follow-up treaty still caused damage to China's 
sovereignty and further formed Japan’s semi-colonial rule over some territories in north China. For more 
about the Twenty-One Demands, See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980, pp. 92-99) and Gordon (2003, pp. 173-
181). 
565 For more about the Northern Expedition, see section 4.2.1.2 in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
566 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980, pp. 113-114) and Gordon (2003, p. 187). 
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established its puppet regime Manchukuo (literally the State of Manchuria). Puyi, the 
last emperor of the Qing Dynasty, was selected by the Japanese as the puppet emperor 
of Manchukuo until its fall when the Japanese surrendered in 1945.567 
5.2.1.2 The process of the war and the Japanese controlled Wang Jingwei 
Regime. After the Xi’an Incident in December 1936, the Chinese National Government 
decided to cooperate with the Chinese Communist Party to resist Japan.568 On July 7, 
1937, the Japanese army seemed to concoct another version of the September 18th 
Incident of 1931, which was called the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The Japanese army 
that garrisoned in the Beiping (Beijing) area pretexted that one Japanese soldier was 
missing during a military exercise (although the Japanese soldier was found afterwards), 
so the Japanese began to attack the Chinese army. Although it is still uncertain whether 
this incident was planned by the Japanese army or not, Japan finally started a total war 
of aggression against China. At the end of July, the Japanese army occupied the entire 
Beijing and Tianjin area.569 On July 17, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek delivered his 
567 See Gordon (2003, p. 189). 
568 Zhang Xueliang is the son of Zhang Zuolin, the last leader of the Beiyang government. In 1928, Zhang 
Xueliang announced that the northeast China (Manchuria), would fly the flag of the National 
Government, which helped the Nationalists complete its Northern Expedition and the reunification of 
China. Zhang Xueliang was subsequently appointed the senior general of the National Government. The 
cause of the Xi’an Incident was that Zhang Xueliang was persuaded by the CCP that the Chinese 
government must cooperate with the anti-government CCP warlords to resist Japan in order to win the 
Japanese aggressors. Therefore, Zhang Xueliang and his men detained Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in 
Xi’an on December 16, 1936. During the detention, Chiang Kai-shek initially promised Zhang Xueliang 
to fight against Japan together. On the 26th, Chiang Kai-shek was escorted by Zhang Xueliang and 
returned to Nanjing, the capital of the Republic of China, ending the Xi’an Incident. Although the 
National Government officially started to cooperate with the CCP to resist Japan in 1937, historical facts 
show that the CCP did not sincerely resist the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War but 
continued to expand its territory and accumulate its strength during the war. This action helped the CCP 
to finally overthrow the governance of the democratically and constitutionally elected Republic of China 
government in Mainland China in the Chinse Civil War (1945-1949). After the 1949 Communist 
Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party carried out several political campaigns on the Chinese 
Mainland, including the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the June 4th, 1989 Tian’anmen 
Massacre. As a result, Mainland China has become a catastrophe, at least tens of millions of people have 
lost their lives in various political movements, and traditional Chinese character values, morals, religion, 
ethics and pro-market culture have been destroyed. The indirect consequences of Zhang Xueliang’s illegal 
detention of the government leader of China can be regarded as one of the culprits and ethnic sinners of 
the 20th century communist history in China. For literature on the Xi’an Incident and its influences, see 
Fairbank & K. Liu (1980, pp. 609-613), Garver (1993), T. Wu (1984), and Zhang Xueliang’s own memoir 
(1989). 
569 For more about the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the succeeding Japanese occupation, see Fairbank 
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famous Lushan statement, emphasizing that “there is no distinction between east and 
west China, north and south; and regardless of age and gender, there is the 
responsibility of all the Chinese individuals to guard their homeland and fight against 
the Japanese aggression to the end.”570 On July 30, Chiang delivered another speech 
saying that he would lead the Chinese people fight the war to the end.571 Subsequently, 
in order to stabilize the defensive front, the main force of the Chinese army retreated to 
Shanghai area to defend. The Battle of Shanghai that began on August 13 was very 
fierce. 572  Because of the Japanese reinforcements, the 80,000 Chinese troops that 
initially had the advantage (the original Japanese army was only 12,000) gradually lost 
their defense against the Japanese. 573 In the following three months, about 270,000 
Chinese troops, or 60% of the members of the National Government’s defense forces, 
were killed or injured, compared with only 40,000 casualties on the Japanese side.574 
On December 12, 1937, the Chinese capital Nanjing, fell into the hands of the Japanese. 
In the following 7 weeks at least 42,000 Chinese people were brutally killed by the 
Japanese, known as the infamous Nanjing Massacre.575 Subsequently, Japan gradually 
occupied the entire north China. In the summer of 1938, the military situation 
deteriorated, and China’s wartime capital moved from Hankou to Chongqing for the 
first time, and Free China decided to continue fighting.576 Finally, although Free China 
had several victories on the battlefield, it retreated to the southwestern region with 
& K. Liu (1980, pp. 547-551) and Gordon (2003, pp. 204-207). 
570 See J. Wu and Cao (2011, p.20). 
571 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980, pp. 550-551). 
572 The original name of the Battle of Shanghai in Chinese is “␎├ᡠᖩ.” 
573 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980, p. 551). 
574 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980, p. 552). 
575 There are still no conclusions about the specific death figures of Nanjing Massacre. So far, the 
government of the Republic of China on Taiwan and the Chinese Communist Party on the Chinese China 
all claim that at least 300,000 people were killed in Nanjing Massacre, but this number has not been 
confirmed from a rigorous perspective as yet. For the reference, see Fairbank & K. Liu (1980, p. 552). 
576 See A. Young (1971, p. 207). 
321 
                                                                                                                                               
Chongqing as its wartime capital.577 In northwestern China, due to the government and 
the CCP’s announcement of cooperation and joint resistance against Japan, the CCP 
nominally cancelled its separatist regime, so the National Government also nominally 
had dominion over northwest China.578 
During the Japanese occupation of north China, several puppet governments 
were established. In 1940, the Japanese unified all its previous puppet governments 
under Wang Jingwei’s Nanjing National Government. Thus, Wang Jingwei’s Nanjing 
National Government nominally ruled the Japanese occupied areas in North China and 
some parts of South China. However, the actual effective rule of Wang Jingwei regime 
was limited to parts of South China. Wang Jingwei himself died in a medical treatment 
in Nagoya, Japan in 1944 at the age of 61. In August 1945, Japan surrendered, and the 
Wang Jingwei regime was dissolved.579 Scholars believe that Wang Jingwei’s Nanjing 
National Government was similar to the Vichy government in France during the Second 
World War. 580 Considering that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei were political 
opponents in the early days of the National Government (see section 4.2.1.2 in the 
previous chapter), and that the CCP was trying to thwart any Nationalist’s actions in the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, although Wang Jingwei in contemporary Mainland China 
and Taiwan’s historical circles are generally negatively evaluated, but some 
conversations and letter contents of Wang Jingwei at the time showed that he was 
willing to bear the stigma of “traitor” in order to protect the Chinese people in Occupied 
China as much as possible. 581  Therefore, the evaluation of Wang Jing-wei by the 
577 See J. Wu and Cao (2011, pp. 39-207) and Fairbank & K. Liu (1980, pp. 566-575). 
578 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980, pp. 611-613). 
579 For more about the Wang Jing-wei regime, see J. Wu and Cao (2011, pp. 208-295). 
580 See Boyle (1972). 
581 One example among the most critical post-1949 criticism of Wang Jingwei’s performance in the war is 
the reference in the previous footnote (J. Wu and Cao, 2011, pp. 208-295). This document was published 
in 2011, at which time the CCP and the Kuomintang had reached a political reconciliation, so in the 
literature, there are more positive comments on the National Government’s leadership in the Second Sino-
Japanese War and its active resistance to the Japanese invaders. This description is completely different 
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Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese historians may require a new approach that is 
separate from the political ideology of both the Kuomintang and the CCP. 
After the Pearl Harbor incident and the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, 
China officially declared war on Japan. At this point, China’s War of Resistance 
officially became part of the Second World War.582 Although the Chinese army was 
outdated, it resisted until 1945, the end of the Japanese surrounding. The United States, 
the Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and other countries all provided military 
assistance to Free China. The United States provided Flying Tigers led by General 
Claire Chennault supporting Free China in Yunnan Province which was near Myanmar 
to fight against the Southeast Asia’s Japanese army.583 In fact, in early 1945, before the 
Japanese surrender, the Chinese army had begun a strategic counterattack because of the 
Allied restraint of Japanese military forces in Asia and the patient resistance of the 
Chinese military and civilians.584 Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, and China 
won the War of Resistance. Japan initially only wanted to win the war in three months 
and did not expect that the Chinese people could resist the Japanese invaders with their 
tenacious will for 8 years.585 The Chinese showed a strong love for freedom and a 
determined will of defending their own nation during the war. Due to the hard work 
from the political propaganda of the Chinese Communist Party’s claim that the Kuomintang was “faking 
it being resisting the Japanese while was truly fighting against the Communists” (RCLH, 2002, p. 77, p. 
235, p. 377). The CPP occupied Mainland China in 1949, while the Republic of China government 
retreated to Taiwan island. On the Taiwan side, the mainstream of the historical circles still believes that 
Wang Jingwei was a traitor due to his operation of the puppet regime during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War. This comment has not changed much in Taiwan’s academic circles even after the complete 
democratization of Taiwan since 1987. In recent years, scholars from Mainland China and Taiwan have 
conducted academic research on modern Chinese history. Their conclusion is still a negative attitude 
towards Wang Jingwei’s actions in the Second Sino-Japanese War. For the representative reference of the 
negative evaluation of Wang Jingwei performance in the the Second Sino-Japanese War by both the 
Mainland Chinese and the Taiwanese historians, see J. Wang & K. Wu (2016). In recent years, there also 
have been some studies that affirmed Wang Jingwei’s contribution to the protection of the Chinese people 
in the Occupied China during the war. For related references, see S. Lin (2000), K. Wang (2001), Z. Y. Li 
(2014) and Y. Hsu (2018). 
582 See Y. Shi, Jin, & J. Shi (pp. 1-6). 
583 See Y. Shi, Jin, & J. Shi (pp. 414-479) and Coble (2007).  
584 See Y. Shi, Jin, & J. Shi (pp. 504-565). 
585 See C. Ho & D. Li (2014). 
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during the Second-Sino Japanese War, the unequal treaties signed between China and 
Western countries were abolished after the war.586 In the same year, the Republic of 
China joined the United Nations, became a permanent member of the Security Council, 
and became one of the top five powers in the world along with the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Soviet Union and France. This lasted until 1971 when the CCP 
regime replaced the seat of the Republic of China in the UN. 
5.2.1.3 The CCP’s separatist regime during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War. Although the CCP officials claimed that it actively resisted Japan during the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, historic evidence does not support this opinion. During the 
war, Mao Zedong called on the CCP to preserve its strength and expand its territory.587 
When meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Takataaka Tanaka in 1972, Mao even 
publicly thanked Japan and expressed his gratitude to Japanese invasion in China during 
the Second Sino-Japanese War. He even said, “without Japan’s aggression against 
China, ... [the CCP] cannot develop and finally gain power. [...] if we don’t have your 
help [to fight against the Chinese National Government during the Second Sino-
Japanese War], I cannot see you in Beijing today.”588 Objective statistics also support 
this claim. The number of CCP troops rose from more than 40,000 in the early days of 
the War of Resistance to more than 1.2 million in the end of the war.589 During the war, 
the CCP expanded its territory by cracking down the Japanese and attacking the army of 
the National Government.590 The CCP-occupied area expanded from 130,000 square 
meters before the war to more than 800,000 square meters at the end of the War of 
Resistance, and its population expanded from 1.4 million to over 2 million. 591 
586 See Y. Shi, Jin, & J. Shi (pp. 479-503). 
587 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980, pp. 678) and Van Slyke (1967, p. 159). 
588 See Mao (1961/1999), Li Zhisui (1994, p. 543) and Barmé (2005). 
589 See Fairbank & K. Liu (1980, p. 613 and p. 710) and Lewis (1970, p. 110). 
590 See Y. Ho (1955). 
591 Regarding the square meters of the CCP base areas before the War of Resistance, see Fairbank & K. 
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Throughout the war, the CCP army continued to launch various attacks on government 
forces.592 During the War of Resistance, the CCP only had two general-level soldiers 
die, while government forces lost more than 206 generals when fighting against the 
Japanese.593 Therefore, the claim of Taiwanese historians and politicians that the CCP 
did not really resist the Japanese invasion, but actively developed its base is supported 
by evidence.594 After the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP blatantly violated the 
Constitution of the Republic of China that was adopted in 1946 through the 
constitutional procedures and democratic voting, relying on the strength accumulated 
during the Second Sino-Japanese War to launch a civil war.  They then launched a 
number of appalling political campaigns after stealing Mainland China in 1949.595 In 
the next section 5.2.2, we will demonstrate the economic background from 1937 to 
1945. 
5.2.2 The Economic Background, 1937-1945 
The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War not only changed the political 
conditions of the whole China, but also modified the economic conditions in Free China, 
as the areas of Free China led by the National Government were much smaller than its 
controlled territory before the war. In this section, we will review the general economic 
background during the wartime. Before a detailed analysis of the wartime price inflation 
in section 5.4 and section 5.5, a brief review of China’s overall economic situation at 
the time would help us clarify the conditions and the dilemma faced by the Chinese first 
modern central banking system. 
Liu (1980, pp. 678). Regarding the square meters of the CCP base areas before the end of the war, see K. 
Jiang (2009, p. 683). 
592 See Y. Ho (1955). 
593 See Ho (1955). 
594 For the memories of the former military generals of the Republic of China on the content of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, see Hau (2011), Ho (1972), and Wang Wen-hsieh (2015). 
595 In this sense, the hypocrisy of the CCP’s utopian myth that it “liberated the Chinese people” written in 
its regime constitution is evident. 
325 
                                                                                                                                               
5.2.2.1 The migration and increasing funds for economic construction. 
Though Free China was facing a tough military situation as we have demonstrated in 
section 5.2.1, there was a migration and increase of funds which was supporting the 
economic constriction during the wartime. These increasing funds included more 
deposits, bank credit, and foreign aids that were supporting the economic construction.  
5.2.2.1.1 The increasing deposits in Free China. The deposits were increasing 
in Free China due to the migration of funds.596  Figure 5.1 below shows the conditions 
of government bank, commercial, and provincial bank deposits from 1937 to 1945. The 
data that we collect include the current government bank deposit (GBD), the fixed GBD, 
the savings of the GBD, the total GBD, the commercial and provincial banks all 
deposits, and total deposits of all banks. Because the magnitude of the change in the 
value was large, in order to show the trend and the change of data, all data in the 
statistical chart is logarithmic. To demonstrate in text, we use the original data sans 
logarithm. Due to the lack of statistics at that time, there is no complete data on fixed 
and savings deposits in the commercial and provincial banks.597 In 1937, total deposits 
of all banks were C$3,306 million.598  In 1938, total deposits of all banks were C$4,153 
million, which was a 25% increase over 1937. In 1945, total deposits of all banks were 
C$537,912 million, which was a 16,170.8% increase over 1937. The fixed deposits of 
commercial banks were also increasing.599 In the example of Bank of China, in 1936, 
the amount of the fixed deposits was C$450 million, and the current deposits were 
C$366 million. In 1938, the amount of the fixed deposits was C$485 million, which 
596 References of the increase of deposit see J. Zhu (2012, pp. 406-407), K. Chang (1958, p. 191), A. 
Young (1965, p. 163), Shou (1944, p. 71), and Current Affairs Research Association, [CARA] 
(1940/1957, p. 71, pp. 304-305). 
597 See K. Chang (1958, p. 191). 
598 References of the total deposits from 1937 to 1945, see K. Chang (1958, p. 191); also see A. Young 
(1963, p. 163). 
599 References of the data of fixed deposits can also be found in J. Zhu (2012, p. 406) and CARA 
(1940/1957, pp. 304-305). 
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raised 7.8% more than the year of 1936, and the current deposits were C$460 million, 




Figure 5.1 Government bank, commercial and provincial bank deposits, 1937-1945. Figure’s currency unit is one 
million Chinese dollars (C$). 
Source: K. Chang (1958, p. 191).  
Notes: The data that we collect include the current government bank deposit (GBD), the fixed GBD, savings of the 
GBD, and the total GBD, the commercial and provincial banks all deposits, and total deposits of all banks. Because 
the magnitude of the change in the value was large, in order to show the trend and the change of data, all data in the 
statistical chart is logarithmic. In our subsequent analysis, we will use the original data for analysis. Due to the lack 









1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945






Commercial and provincial banks all deposits
Total deposits (all Banks)
328 
5.2.2.1.2 The increase of credit to support the economic construction. The 
funds that were provided to different industries were also increasing. 600  Table 5.1 
below shows the amounts of the loans that the Joint Committee of the Four Government 
Banks provided to the National Government for different sectors, including food and 
agriculture, salt, communications, industry, and mining, etc.601 In table 5.1, the data 
from 1937 to 1949 ranges from September 1937 to December 1939. Data for 1945 are 
statistics from January to December 1945. Due to the lack of data, the balance at end of 
1945 in the chart is the data for the entire year of 1945. In the period of September 1937 
to December 1939, the annual loans authorized to these sectors were C$636 million. In 
1938, the amount was C$642 million, which was a 16% increase in the period of 
September 1937 to December 1939. In 1945, the annual loans authorized to these 
sectors were C$42,358 million, which was a 6,560 % increase by in the period of 
September 1937 to December 1939. By the end of 1938, the amount of total agricultural 
loans in Free China was around C$25 million.602  According to other statistics from 
Arthur N. Young, by the end of 1938, the amount of accumulated agricultural loans was 
around C$56 million, which was 31% higher than the amount C$24 million in 1937. 
Besides the above data, the government provided a total of more than C$9 million for 
the migration, the construction, and the liquidity of factories and enterprises.603  The 
government provided C$4 million and the bank paid the rest (C$5 million) which was 
guaranteed by the government itself. 
600 References of this paragraph see CARA (1940/1957, pp. 304-305), J. Zhu (2012, p. 406), and A. 
Young (1965, p. 335) and Tsao et al. (1946, pp. 608-610). 
601 According to the customary terminological usage, the full name of the Joint Committee of the Four 
Government Banks (ഋ㚟㑭㲅) in Chinese is “ѝཞ䢰㹼ǃѝ഻䢰㹼ǃӔ䙊䢰㹼ǃѝ഻䗢≁䢰㹼㚟ਸ
㑭䗖һ㲅ഋ㚟㑭㲅”, whose abbreviation in Chinese could be written as  “䋬᭮င଑ᴳ”, “ഋ㚟㑭ᴳ”or 
“ഋ㹼㚟ਸ䗖һ㲅.” References of the loans that the Joint Committee of the Four Government Banks 
provided to government for different sectors, see A. Young (1965, p. 335) and Tsao et al. (1946, pp. 608-
610). 
602 References of the agricultural loans, see Shou (1944, p. 71) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 407). 
603 References of the loans for the migration, construction and liquidity of factories and enterprises, see 
CARA (1940/1957, pp. 305) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 406). 
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Advances through the Joint Committee of the Four Government Banks, 1937-1945 












1937 to 1939 636 - 16 52 21 30 17 
1940 642 435 66 247 21 147 137 
1941 1551 1227 207 879 176 158 155 
1942 2012 1865 238 420 263 918 434 
1943 9512 10282 741 1014 1444 6639 767 
1944 28999 32211 901 4695 909 23822 1970 
1945 42358 74855 2927 15519 4653 37436 5707 
Table 5.1 Advances through the Joint Committee of the Four Government Banks, 1937-1945. Table’s currency unit is 
one million Chinese dollars (C$). 
Source: A. Young (1965, p. 335).  
Notes: In the chart, the data from 1937 to 1949 ranges from September 1937 to December 1939. Data for 1945 is 
statistics from January to December 1945. Due to the lack of data, the balance at end of 1945 in the chart is the data 
for the entire year of 1945.  
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5.2.2.1.3 Foreign aids. During the war, foreign aids also increased.604 Figure 
5.2 below shows the conditions of foreign aids of credits and lend-lease to Free China 
from 1937 to 1945. These aids included military, supplies, nonmilitary purchases, 
currency stabilization, motor truck purchase, lend-lease, etc. The Soviet Union, France, 
United States, and Great Britain were all providing aid to Free China. The total amount 
of aids of all these years to China was US$634.5 million. Among them, the total amount 
of the US loan and lend-lease aids reached US$251 million, accounting for 39.56% of 
the total foreign aids. In the following section 5.2.2.4, we analyze in detail the exchange 
stabilization funds provided to China by the US and the UK. These aids helped China 
stabilize the exchange rate, boosted people’s confidence, and delayed the decline of 
Fabi’s value. In section 5.5.9, we analyze how foreign reserve aids were used to 
stabilize the Chinese dollar Fabi. 
  
604 References of the foreign aids to Free China during the Second Sino-Japanese War, see A. Young 
(1965, pp. 97-117, pp. 344-346), J. Zhu (2012, pp. 404-405), Hong (2008, pp. 421-434), and Fairbank & 
Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 576-579). For more about the US aids to China, see A. Young (1965, pp. 102-105, 
pp. 109-112) and Hong (2008, pp. 421-434). For more about the military aids from the western countries, 
see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 576-579). 
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Figure 5.2 Foreign aids (credits and lend-lease) to China, 1937-1945. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese 
dollars (C$). 
Source: A. Young (1965, pp. 344-345).  
Notes: These aids included military, supplies, non-military purchases, currency stabilization, motor truck purchase, 
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5.2.2.2 The increase of enterprises and factories in Free China. Although 
China was in a very unfavorable situation on the battlefield against the Japanese 
invaders, the Chinese people, the National Government, and the military had strong 
confidence in the War of Resistance, showing a tough will of beating the Japanese 
aggressors. Moreover, as essential materials, machines, and personnel that had been 
migrated from the Japanese-occupied areas to inner China, the economic strength of 
Free China was enhanced. Because of the war, many enterprises and factories migrated 
to the rear areas in Free China.605 Figure 5.3 below shows the increase of factories (left 
axis) and the capitalization of new plants in 1937 currency (right axis) during the 
Second Sino-Japanese War. Though there is no data on the total numbers of Chinese 
factories at that time, as of the end of 1938, in total, there were 404 factories migrated 
from the war area to the rear areas of Free China.606 Factories being defined by official 
definition as ones that use power machinery and employ at least 30 workers. 607 
Moreover, the numbers of the newly built or restored factories were 104 in total.608 In 
1936 and before, there were 300 new opened factories in Free China. Due to the 
reduced territories of Free China caused by the war, the numbers were reduced to 63. In 
1938, the numbers of newly opened factories were 209, which increased by 231.7% 
compared with 1937. In 1944, one year before the end of the Second World War and the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, the numbers of newly opened factories were 3,419, which 
increased by 61.9% compared with 1937. Before the end of the war, the number of new 
factories in each year after 1937 was higher than in 1937. The capitalization of new 
factories was also increasing. Although the 1944 data were C$549 thousand, which was 
605 For more of the migration of enterprises and factories in Free China during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, see CARA (1940/1957, p. 305) and J. Zhu (2012, pp. 406-407). 
606 See CARA (1940/1957, p. 305) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 406). The original references lacked data of the 
total numbers of Chinese factory at the time. 
607 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 593). 
608 The original references lacked data of the total numbers of Chinese factories at that time. For more of 
the migration of enterprises and factories, see J. Zhu (2012, p. 406) and Sheng (1940). 
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about half of the amount C$1,049 in 1943, the 1944 data was still 771.4% higher than 




Figure 5.3 Factories in Free China, 1937-1944. Unit of the currency of the capitalization of new plants in the figure is 
one million Chinese dollars (C$). 
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As entrepreneurship is the driving force of the market economy, though China 
was suffering from the brutal wartime, the increased industrial enterprises and factories 
showed the positive aspect of the economic construction of Free China during the 
Second Sino-Japanese war. 609 Meanwhile, agricultural production was also growing 
during the wartime. In the next section 5.2.2.3, we will demonstrate the conditions of 
agricultural production in Free China. 
5.2.2.3 The growing agricultural production in Free China. While the 
industrial economy was growing, the performance of agricultural was also positive.610 
In 1937, China’s agricultural economy accounted for about four-fifths of the total 
economy, which was about C$778,477 million. 611  Table 5.4 below shows the 
agricultural production indexes from 1931 to 1945. 612  Since 1940, rice production 
reduced for six consecutive years. Rice production in 1945 was only 87% in 1937. 
However, wheat, sweet potatoes, and cotton were generally growing or were retaining 
the relatively same level of 1937. Wheat production in 1945 increased by 30% 
compared to 1937. Sweet potatoes production in 1945 increased by 44% compared to 
1937. Cotton production in 1945 increased by 47% compared to 1937. Livestock 
production in 1941 decreased by 13% compared to 1937.  
  
609 More about the theory of entrepreneurship as the driving force of an economy, see Mises (1949/1998, 
pp. 245-261) and Klein (2010). 
610 References of the agricultural conditions in this paragraph, see A. Young (1965, pp. 22-23, p. 300), K. 
Chang (1958, pp. 377-378) and Maddison (2003, p. 172). 
611 See A. Young (1965, p. 22). Due to Maddison (2003, p. 172), China’s GDP in 1937 was US$295,937 
million (calculated at the price of the US dollar in 1990). Excluding price inflation factor, China’s GDP in 
1937 was about US$32,605 million dollars. According to the average exchange rate of the US dollar 
against Fabi in December 1937 (see A. Young, 1965, p. 360), China’s GDP in 1937 was about C$973,096 
million. Thus, China’s agricultural economy accounted for C$778,477 million (of GPD in 1937). We must 
note that, given the lack of statistical data at the time and the limitations of statistics itself, our statistical 
results can only reflect the general situation of China's agricultural economic output in 1937, which may 
not accurately reflect the economic output. 
612 Reference of the agricultural data from 1937 to 1945, see A. Young (1965, p. 300) and K. Chang 
(1958, pp. 377-378). 
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Figure 5.4 Agricultural production index, 1937-1945. Unit: 1937=100.  
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5.2.2.4 Exhausted foreign exchange reserves and exchange stabilization. At 
the beginning of 1939, the Chinese government’s own foreign exchange reserves were 
also exhausted, causing the dropping of exchange rates and instability of the monetary 
and financial system. After that, from 1939 to 1944, the United States and the United 
Kingdom provided a total of US$134 million in funds to stabilize the exchange rate. 
These funds also played an essential role in China’s wartime financial and economic 
stability. In this section 5.2.2.4, we will generally review the exhausted Chinese foreign 
exchange reserves and the exchange stabilization movement from the US and the UK. 
5.2.2.4.1 The exhausted foreign exchange reserves. In just two years after the 
start of the war in 1937, the government’s foreign exchange reserves were almost 
exhausted.613 The declining foreign exchange reserves made the National Government 
challenging to maintain the exchange rate. After the beginning of the war, the 
government decided to maintain the original exchange rates of British 14.5d. and 
US$0.30.614 Therefore, the central bank had to supply unlimited foreign exchange in 
Shanghai and other cities according to this exchange rate. As a result, foreign exchange 
reserves started plunging. Before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the 
Chinese government had about totaled the equivalent of US$378.9 million in foreign 
exchange.615 Just six months after the outbreak of the war, it lost half of its foreign 
exchange reserves. 616 One year after the war began, in the spring of 1938, foreign 
exchange reserves were reduced to less than US$100 million.617 At the beginning of 
1939, the Chinese government’s own foreign exchange reserves abroad were 
exhausted. 618  Figure 5.5 below shows the exchange rate during the Second Sino-
613 For more references, see J. Zhu (2012, pp. 404-405). 
614 See A. Young (1965, p. 131) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 404). 
615 See A. Young (1965, p. 132) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 405). 
616 See A. Young (1965, p. 198). 
617 See A. Young (1965, p. 206). 
618 See A. Young (1965, p. 214) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 404). 
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Japanese War. We can see that from 1937 to 1945, China’s Fabi was depreciating 
relative to the US dollar, while the official exchange rate was always higher than the 
market exchange rate, which reflected the overvaluation of the official exchange rate 
and also reflected the market confidence in Fabi was not as strong as the official 




Figure 5.5 Foreign exchange rates (US dollars), 1937-1945. Unit: One Chinese dollar (C$) per US dollar (US$). 
Sources: Source: K. Chang (1958, p. 382).  
Notes: Data for all years are taken from December of that year. Since only official exchange rate data was available 
in 1937, in order to show statistical trends in the chart, we used the official exchange rate data of that year to place it 
in the statistical item of market exchange rate. Since the market exchange rate data was only available from 1938 to 
1940, in order to show the trend of the data, we used the market exchange rate data at this stage to place it in the 
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5.2.2.4.2 Exchange stabilization. Subsequently, the government had to rely on 
stabilization funds to maintain foreign exchange reserves. 619  Before the foreign 
exchange reserves were exhausted in early 1939, the government had begun to take 
measures to stabilize foreign exchange reserves and exchange rates.620 The stabilization 
funds of foreign exchange was a relatively right solution. 621  Because although the 
average prices of Fabi rose by 40% in the middle of 1938, the average price of foreign 
currencies doubled. In June 1937, the average prices of US$1 and UK£1 were 
respectively C$3.35 and C$16.6. Nevertheless, according to the lowest exchange rate in 
June 1938, the value of these two currencies rose to nearly C$6 and C$30 respectively. 
Since the exchange rate of the free market was higher than the general price level, 
theoretically, as long as China was buying and selling foreign exchange, it could save 
the exchange rate without much cost (because through the free market, China could 
spend less foreign exchange and earn back more Fabi). 622  In early June, Bank of 
China’s Pei Tsu-yee623 proposed this plan, and President of Bank of China T. V. Soong 
and the US financial advisor A. N. Young recommended the plan to Minister of Finance 
H. H. Kung, who later agreed on it.624 T. Pei and the British financial expert Cyril 
Rogers were supervising the operation. 
Beginning in June 1938, the government began to stabilize exchange rates 
through stabilization funds. 625  On June 13, 1938, the day before the start of the 
exchange stabilization, as the Chinese military lost Kaifeng (the Capital of Henan 
Province) and other unfavorable military rumors, the exchange rates had fallen to a low 
619 See A. Young (1965, p. 206). 
620 See A. Young (1965, p. 207). 
621 For the foreign exchange rates at that time in this paragraph, see A. Young (1965, p. 207). 
622 Reference of stabilization funds in this paragraph, see A. Young (1965, p. 207). 
623 More about Pei, see Prial (1982). Pei Tsu-yee (䋍⾆䋭) is the father of the famous Chinese architect I. 
M. Pei (䋍㚯䣈, 26 April 1917 – 16 May 2019). I. M. Pei always held the nationality of the Republic of 
China before his death showing his loyalty of the Free China. 
624 See A. Young (1965, p. 207). 
625 See A. Young (1965, p. 207). 
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of the British 9.125d., and US$0.1675.626 From June 1938 to April 1939, China sold a 
total of about US$12 million in foreign exchange reserves through Bank of China, 
making the foreign exchange reserves stable between 8-9d. and US$0.155-0.17, which 
sustained the public’s morale.627 The British-Sino foreign exchange stabilization from 
April to August 1939 further stabilized the exchange rate. 628  According to the 
agreement, the UK would provide China with a stabilization fund of approximately £10 
million (US$47 million), while China paid a preferential interest rate of 2.75% to the 
UK for repayment of loans. Due to the agreement, the Chinese government committed 
to stabilizing interest rates. By July 17, the stabilization fund provided a total of £10.7 
million. Subsequently, despite the factors of the stabilization fund withdrawal, the 
deterioration of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the 50% decline of exchange rate 
from July 17 to August 18 (due to the pessimistic market before the Nazi’s Invasion of 
Poland on September 1, 1939), the overall exchange rate remained relatively stable.  
This was partly caused by the decline of exchange rates in Western currencies. 629 
Therefore, though Free China was facing an unfavorable situation on the battlefield, the 
leveling fund stabilized the market and the confidence of the Chinese people. In 
December 1940, after a long period of negotiations, the United States and the United 
Kingdom decided to provide China with a total of US$100 million and £10 million 
pounds of loans. Half of them were to be used to stabilize the exchange rate and half to 
purchase materials.630 In the summer of 1941, China, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom jointly established a new Stabilization Broad with US$100 million funds to 
626 See A. Young (1965, p. 208). 
627 See A. Young (1965, p. 210). In a memorandum on October 23, 1938, A. Young also supported the 
further exchange stabilization funds. On January 14, 1939, with the authorization of the National 
Government, to stabilize the market confidence, Young published a spokesman’s stateman in the press in 
the provisional capital Chongqing, expressing his support for the government's previous stabilization, 
urging for further stabilization measures. For related content, see A. Young (1965, pp. 208-209). 
628 References of this stabilization operation, see A. Young (1965, pp. 210-223) 
629 See A. Young (1965, p. 223). 
630 See A. Young (1965, p. 232). 
343 
                                                 
stabilize the exchange rate of Fabi.631 Since the United States had military bases and 
military expenditures in China, after consultations, the expenses of the United States 
and China’s arrears against the United States were offset; finally, China did not owe 
money  to the Americans.632 In 1944, China repaid the principal and interest of the 
British stabilization fund totaling £2.25 million.633 From the first phase of 1939 to 1941, 
the United States and the United Kingdom provided a total of US$34 million in the 
stabilization fund to China, and in the second phase from 1941 to 1944, there was a 
US$100 million stabilization fund. Adding two phases, China received a total of 
US$134 million stabilization funds. 
5.2.2.5 Fiscal deficits. In 1939, one year after the war began, the government’s 
fiscal deficit rose sharply. 634  Figure 5.6 below shows the government budget, 
expenditure, revenue, and deficits conditions from 1929 to 1945. For the analysis of the 
government’s fiscal conditions from 1927 to 1937, see section 4.5.3.7 in Chapter 4. Our 
analysis here focuses on the government’s financial situation from 1937 to 1945. And 
by listing the data from 1929, it is obvious that the government’s fiscal situation has 
gradually deteriorated since 1937. In June 1938, the government’s fiscal deficit rate 
reached 75%.635 Subsequently, in the mid-1938, through transactions with the public, 
the government recovered C$499 million by selling foreign exchange and recovered 
C$255 million by selling public debt, reducing the deficit to C$777 million and the 
deficit rate to 37%.636 However, due to war factors, government spending continued to 
increase. In 1945, the government’s fiscal deficit increased by 51,054% compared to 
631 See A. Young (1965, p. 249-255). 
632 For more about the military expenditures of the US in China during the wartime, see A. Young (1965, 
pp. 269-274, p. 279). 
633 See A. Young (1965, p. 279). 
634 See A. Young (1965, pp.12-21). 
635 See A. Young (1965, p. 206). 
636 See A. Young (1965, p. 206). 
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1937. The National Government adopted the method of issuing new currency to make 




Figure 5.6 Expenditure, revenue and deficits, 1929-1945. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese dollars (C$). 
Sources: Data from 1929 to 1937, see A. Young (1971, p. 38). Data from 1938 to 1945, see A. Young (1965, p. 12). 
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5.2.2.6 The intensifying price inflation. At the beginning of the war’s first 
year, the rate of price inflation rose by 40%.637 Despite this, due to the government’s 
policy of exchange stabilization fund and foreign exchange, the foreign exchange 
regulation policy, and the silver sale policy, the public still had strong confidence in 
Fabi.638 In section 5.2.2.4, we stated that the exchange rate did not significantly reduce 
in 1938 (one year after the war’s start) which was partly due to the policy stabilization 
fund. However, price inflation was inevitable due to war factors. The currency issue in 
1945 increased by 62,820.7% compared to 1937. The annual wholesale price in 1945 
increased by 162,629.5% compared to 1937. In the next section, we will provide a more 
detailed analysis of price inflation during the period of the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
5.3 Background of the Wartime Banking Policy and Conditions: A More 
Centralized Banking Policy 
Besides the relatively more pro-Free China economic conditions, the National 
government was also made some measures to enhance its power in Free China during 
the wartime. The first measure was strengthening the government bank supervision and 
control. Our analysis of this measure is in section 5.3.1. The second measure was the 
mandatory conversion of silver and Silver Dollars to Fabi (fiat money). Our analysis of 
this measure is in section 5.3.2. Besides, in section 5.3.3, we will also demonstrate the 
conditions of the local, private, and spontaneously free banking institutions. 
5.3.1 Strengthening the Government Banks’ Supervision and Control  
In 1939, the National Government enacted The Outline of the Methods for 
Strengthening the Central Financial Institutions in Wartime to strengthen the 
government bank supervision and control, formalizing the new joint office Joint 
637 See A. Young (1965, p. 206). 
638 See A. Young (1965, p. 206). 
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Committee of the Four Government Banks which was in the request of the outline.639 
The new joint office integrated the decision-making power of the Central Bank, the 
Bank of China, the Bank of Communications and the Farmers Bank of China, being 
responsible for guiding the operations of wartime financial and economic institutions, 
and for formulating wartime financial decisions. 640  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 
served as the Chairman of the Joint Office, making the final banking decision.641 
It would be more proper to have someone who knew and understood the 
financial system very well to be in charge of the position as the Chairman of the Joint 
Office instead of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, as the pros and cons of government 
economic regulations must be analyzed under specific historical conditions by the 
persons who had the knowledge of economic theories. In China during the war against 
the Japanese aggression, it was clear that a central bank that had a restraint on currency 
issuance and respected the rules of the market’s prices had less negative impacts on the 
market than a central bank that proliferates currency, as well as  been more conducive to 
the protection of private property rights and enhanced national defense.642 However, 
Chiang Kai-shek didn’t have any clear monetary thoughts while he was making the final 
decision of currency issuance, ignoring the advice of Chinese and foreign monetary 
specialists such as T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung, and A. N. Young. Besides, evidence and 
records had shown that Chiang’s monetary policies caused the chaos and financial 
639 The Outline in Chinese is “㇘㗪‍ℐᷕ⣖慹圵㨇㥳彎㱽䵙天.” See J. Zhu (2012, p. 406). 
640 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 406). 
641 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 406). 
642 The Austrian school economics has a negative attitude towards the central bank, arguing that the 
central bank should be gradually replaced by the free banking system in reforms. The analysis in this 
chapter does not involve discussing the banking theory of the Austrian school. From the specific political, 
economic, and military situation in China at the time, it became clear that a constrained central bank must 
be better than an unconstrained central bank. For how the Austrian school criticize the central banking 
system, see Mises (1912/2009) and Huerta de Soto (2006). 
348 
                                                 
fluctuation before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.643 The later 
section 5.5 deals with the negative consequences of the wartime central banking policy. 
5.3.2 The Mandatory Conversion of Silver and Silver Dollars to Fabi 
After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the National 
Government continued to apply its policy of mandatory conversion of silver and Silver 
Dollars to Fabi.644 To fight against the Japanese aggressors, the withdrawn silver and 
Silver Dollars were used to purchase arms internationally and to stabilize the 
government revenue.645 
As the National Government had the ability to use generally accepted bank 
notes for expenditures all over the country [which] gave it a great advantage over 
regional dissenters who had no such opportunity, it was not accurate to say that the 
conversion was completely mandatory.646 The conversion had some voluntary elements. 
As, generally speaking, the Chinese people in Free China supported the National 
Government to fight against the Japanese aggression, they accepted the price inflation 
caused by the more printed banknotes and placed their faith in Fabi. Most of the citizens’ 
acceptance and faith in Fabi stabilized the political, economic, and military conditions 
in the wartime, which helped the National Government fight against the Japanese. An 
alternative option was to issue more government bonds to avoid price inflation. 
However, though the general acceptance of Fabi helped the National Government a lot 
during the wartime, the economic damage caused by the more printed banknotes in the 
post war era was very serious. The postwar financial problems and the related issues are 
analyzed in Chapter 6.  
643 More details of Chiang’s disability in financial issues, see section 4.1.3. in Chapter 4 and section 
6.2.4.1 of Chapter 6. 
644 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 286). 
645 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 286). 
646 See A. Young (1971, p. 281). 
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5.3.3 The Unrealized Plan of the Central Reserve Bank and the Disappearing 
Local, Private, and Spontaneously Free Banking Institutions  
The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War shelved making the Central 
Bank of China a central reserve bank.647 Previously in Chapter 4, we discussed the plan 
of establishing the Central Reserve Bank. The plan was approved on June 25, 1937 by 
the Legislative Yuan after few modifications from the original Kemmerer Plan. 
Voting rights were given to the government’s shares to provide for greater 
control; the period for withdrawal of notes other than of the Central Bank was 
fixed at four instead of two years; reserves against notes and sight deposits were 
reduced from 40 to 35 per cent; and the provision for temporary government 
borrowing was set at one-fourth instead of one-sixth of the previous fiscal year’s 
revenue. But the essential elements of the committee’s plan were approved. (A. 
Young, 1971, p. 276) 
However, just two weeks after the plan of establishing a Central Reserve Bank was 
approved, the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out on July 7, 1937, which laid aside 
the further execution of the Central Reserve Bank.  
Some opinions argued that if the Central Reserve Bank plan could be executed, 
it would have helped China a lot to improve its financial and economic situations, 
especially the improvement and modernization of the credit system (i.e. the agricultural 
credit and the real estate mortgage).648 In the perspective of improving the functions of 
a central reserve bank, it is quite understandable to say how the Central Reserve Bank 
would benefit China. However, unfortunately, because of the Second Sino-Japanese 
War outbreak, there was no time for the National Government to uniformize the 
currency issuance; meanwhile the old banking systems had been destroyed, and the new 
647 See A. Young (1971, p. 276), J. Zhu (2012, p. 401). 
648 See A. Young (1971, p. 276), J. Zhu (2012, p. 401). 
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Fabi system didn’t have obvious effects on improving the financial and economic 
performance. Before the Second Sino-Japanese War outbreak, the monetary system was 
not completely monopolized by the National Government, which means that it could 
not bring the benefits that the Kemmerer Plan proposed. In this sense, if the local, 
private, and spontaneously free banking systems were not destroyed by the new central 
banking system after the 1935 currency reform, China would still have the chance to use 
its the local, private, and spontaneously free banking to provide sufficient credits. On 
the other hand, other perspectives argued that a centralized banking institution could 
help China avoid the chaotic old banking institutions when facing a severe movement 
such as the Japanese aggression.649  
In a pragmatic way, the new central banking system might provide China some 
funding to improve the financial and economic performance if it could completely 
monopolize the financial market. However, considering that there could have a time lag 
between the negative consequences of the abolition of the local, private, and 
spontaneously free banking systems, and the potentially positive effects that the fiat 
money system might bring to the financial and economic system, the local, private, and 
spontaneously free banking systems should be kept in some certain degrees to provide 
sufficient the credits and financial supports that the central banking could not do in the 
short run. Besides, considering that the immaturity of the fiat money system, the 
competition among the central banking system and the local, private, and spontaneously 
free banking systems might also improve the performance of the central banking system. 
Finally, because of the removal effect that the 1935 central banking reform brought, we 
also must analyze the unseen consequences of the local, private, and spontaneously free 
banking systems’ abolition. 
649 D. Ma & L. Zhao (2020). 
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The cost of abolishing the local, private, and free banking systems was 
extremely damaging and disastrous, especially that there was not enough time and space 
for the National Government to establish a new monetary system completely in the 
short run as China was gradually entering the war time against the Japanese occupation. 
In this sense, we conclude that whether the National Government really wanted a 
central reserve banking system or not, it should have kept the local, private, and 
spontaneously free banking systems working to provide enough credit for the Chinese 
economy (at least in the short run). In this section, we have demonstrated the 
background of the wartime banking policy and conditions. In the next section 5.4, we 
will demonstrate the process of the inflation during the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
5.4 The Process of the Wartime Price Inflation, 1937-1945 
In this section we demonstrate the process of the wartime price inflation from 
1937 to 1945. Section 5.4.1 deals with the first stage of price inflation, which was from 
1937 to 1939. Compared to the second stage, the growth of price inflation in this stage 
was relatively mild. We also provide our original integration of the possible causes of 
why the price inflation was relatively not severe based on the previous research of other 
scholars. Section 5.4.2 deals with the second stage of wartime price inflation from 1940 
to 1945. In this period, compared with the previous stage, the price inflation was 
growing more rapidly. The in-depth analysis of the causes and consequences of the 
second stage of price inflation is provided in section 5.5. 
5.4.1 The First Stage of Price Inflation, 1937-1939 
From 1937 to 1939 was the first stage of price inflation.650 Figure 5.7 below 
shows the values of note issue in terms of prewar prices. In order to enable price indices 
from different sources to be displayed on the same statistical chart, in the statistic chart, 
650 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, pp. 585-587) and J. Zhu (2012, pp. 407-408). 
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we have processed the data from different sources according to the principle of 
proportionality. In the next sections of this chapter, we will also use the data in figure 
5.7 to demonstrate the price inflation issues during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Due 
to the huge difference of the different data, we use logarithms to evaluate and express 
all the listed statistic items. All data in figure 5.7 has been evaluated by logarithms. To 
demonstrate in text, we use the original data. Comparing the later stage (1940-1945), 
the price inflation grew slower in the first three years of the war. The Free China’s price 
index in 1937, 1938 and 1939 was 189.5, 247.6, and 415.9, respectively. The average 
annual price increase during this period was 49.4%. Based on the references from figure 
5.7, if we assume the price index in 1947 was 100, prices increased 31 points from 1937 
to 1938, 89 points from 1938 to 1939, and 293 points from 1939 to 1940. The annual 
note issue from 1937 to 1940 was C$1,640 million, C$2,310 million, C$4,290 million, 
and C$7,870 million, respectively. The annual growth rate of note issue from 1937 to 




Figure 5.7 Monetary supply and prices index, 1926-1945. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese dollars (C$). 
Source: Currency issues, currency deposits and total money supply from 1926 to 1945 is from K. Chang (1958, p. 
376). Prices index from 1926 to 1937 (1930=100) is the Shanghai wholes sale prices index, which is from K. Chang 
(1958, p. 371). Prices index from 1937 to July 1945 (1930=100, adjusted by the thesis’ author) is the whole Free 
China index, which is from K. Chang (1958, p. 371). 
Notes: In order to enable price indices from different sources to be displayed on the same statistical chart, we have 
processed the data from different sources according to the principle of proportionality in the static chart. Due to the 
huge difference of the different data, we use logarithms to evaluate and express all the listed statistic items. All data 
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Theoretically and general speaking, common people are very sensitive about 
food price, as food price affects the basic quality of life and currency purchasing power. 
Fortunately, during the first three years of the war, the common Chinese people and 
consumers suffered less from price inflation as the “prices of consumer goods rose more 
slowly than those of producer goods.”651 The food price rose only a modest 8.5% in 
Chongqing during the first two years of the war.652 Figure 5.8 below shows the prices of 
food and the prices of other living products in the wartime provisional capital 
Chongqing from 1937 to 1945. Due to the huge difference of the different data, we use 
logarithms to evaluate and express all the listed statistic items. To demonstrate in text, 
we use the original data without logarithms. From 1937 to 1939, the growth rate of the 
prices of good and clothing were lower than the growth rate of the prices of metal and 
products, building martials, fuel and light, and other products. We can see from figure 
5.8 that the indices of all the categories listed below, including food, clothing, metals, 
products, building materials, fuel and light, and miscellaneous (other products) were all 
increasing. A general index of the wholesale prices of groups of commodities in 
Chongqing from 1937 to 1945 was provided by the original source in this figure. As the 
trend of the growth of these indices are very similar due to the statistic result in the 
figure, we use the general index to describe the general situation of prices in Chongqing 
during the wartime. In the figure, price index of the period February-June 1937 was 1. 
The annual general price indexes were 1.15 and 1.6 relatively in 1937 and 1938, which 
had a very smooth growth rate. Price index in 1939 was only 3.16, which increased 
compared to the previous years. However, compared to the 1940 price index 11.3, the 
growth of price index in 1939 was also very smooth. Both figure 5.7 and figure 5.8 
651 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, p. 585). 
652 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, p. 585). 
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show that the price inflation process from 1937 to 1939 was different from the second 




Figure 5.8 Wholesale prices of groups of commodities in Chongqing, 1937-1945. 
Sources: A. Young (1965, p. 353). Price index of the period February-June 1937=1. 
Notes: Due to the huge difference of different data, we use logarithms to evaluate and express all the listed statistic 
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Treating the prices in Chongqing as the example, there are some explanations for 
why the prices grew gradually from 1937 to 1939. The main reason why the prices of 
food grew slower than prices of cloths and other daily necessities was that the 15 
provinces in Free China had an 8% higher harvest rates in agriculture than the prewar 
average production.653 The growth of the production of food hedged the growth of the 
monetary issuance.  
Due to this explanation, it was normal for prices to start rising slowly in the first 
three years of the war in Free China. However, as the monetary expansion gradually 
increased, the increase of food prices in the later period, and the effect of wage-
stickiness, the quality of life of common people would become worse and the 
purchasing power of their money would certainly decline (see section 5.5.1 of this 
chapter). 
The second explanation for why prices were growing slower in the first three years 
of the was people’s trust and faith in Fabi and their support on the National Government 
fighting against the Japanese. By buying the government bonds, the issuance of Fabi 
was reduced which eased the fiscal pressure on the burden of the National 
Government.654 The Chinese bond market was not altered by internal wars, but by the 
external ones, especially the Second Sino-Japanese War.655 Table 5.2 below shows the 
conditions of the wartime government bonds. Before the outbreak of the Second Sino-
Japanese War, in 1936, the National Government issued 5 different types of government 
bonds, valued at C$1,460 million. These bonds consolidated the previous bonds that had 
issued both by the Beiyang government and the National Government, which were 
named as Consolidation bonds A, B, C, D, and E (hereafter CBA to CBE in table 5.2). 
Another statistic result also shows that the annual bond sales covered 1.5%, 1.9%, 10%, 
653 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, p. 585). 
654 See K. Chang (1958, pp. 257-258) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 407). 
655 See C. Ho & D. Li (2014). 
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and 1.5% of the government deficit from 1941 to 1945 respectively.656  
  
656 K. Chang 1958 (p. 258). 
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Six Major Chinese Domestic Government Bonds, 1936-1942 
Table 5.2 Six major Chinese domestic government bonds, 1936-1942. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese 
dollars (C$). 
Source: C. Ho & D. Li (2014).  
Notes: Our table is a simplified version of the eleven major Chinese domestic government bonds from 1921 to 1942 
based on the above reference. 
  




To swap six 
bonds and loan 
certificates 
March 1936 150 6% Mar. 1936-Dec. 1942 
CBB 
To swap five 
bonds and loan 
certificates 
March 1936 150 6% Mar. 1936-Dec. 1942 
CBC 
To swap nine 
bonds and loan 
certificates 
April 1936 350 6% Apr. 1936-Dec. 1942 
CBD 
To swap eight 
bonds and loan 
certificates 
April 1936 550 6% Apr. 1936-Dec. 1942 
CBE 
To swap five 
bonds and loan 
certificates 
April 1936 260 6% Apr. 1936-Dec. 1942 
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Here, we also need to emphasize the influence of price fluctuations on human 
beings’ subjective psychological reactions. Although the newly issued banknotes will 
generally reduce the purchasing power of the money that many people hold, it does not 
mean that the currency will rise mechanically. 657  In order to resist the Japanese 
aggression, many sellers in Free China subjectively did not want to increase the prices 
of their products. Besides, to a certain extent, the public debt policy of the National 
Government indeed eased the increase of prices at that time. Although we are not in 
favor of the expansionary monetary policy of the National Government, as the increased 
currency issuance could cause economic discoordination, we still have to point it out 
that the purchase of public debt was conducive to the stability of prices, considering that 
the Fabi had already become an almost completely monopolized currency at that time in 
Free China, meaning that there was no other fiscal and monetary alternative in the short 
term. 
The third reason was the National Government’s sale of foreign exchange and 
international trade. The government’s sales in Shanghai as well as the presence of 
American and British industrial raw materials and products partly stabilized prices in 
Free China.658 Due to the gold export ban before the outbreak of the war (see section 
4.4.1.2 in Chapter 4), the Chinese government were mainly collecting gold in the first 4 
years of the war. About US$21.5 million gold and US$9.5 million silver were collected 
and exported from 1937 to 1941.659 The gold sale was more evident in the second stage 
of price inflation from 1940 to 1945. We will analyze the gold sale of that stage in 
section 5.5.7. Figure 5.9 below shows the comparison of the domestic, import and 
export whole prices in Chengdu, a city of Free China, during the war time. Due to the 
huge difference of the different data, we use logarithms to evaluate and express all the 
657 See Mises (1949/1998, p. 576). 
658 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, p. 587) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 408). 
659 See A. Young (1965, p. 282). 
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listed statistic items. All data has been evaluated by logarithms. We can see from figure 
5.9 that the indices of all the categories listed below. The indices include domestic 
goods, import goods, and export goods. A general index of the wholesale prices of the 
commodities in Chengdu from 1937 to 1945 was provided by the original source in this 
figure. As the trend of the growth of these indices are very similar due to the statistic 
result in the figure, we use the general index to describe the general situation of prices 
in Chongqing during the wartime. In the figure, price index of the period July 1936-
June 1937 was 1. The annual general price indices were 1 and 1.45 respectively in 1937 
and 1938, which had a very smooth growth rate. Price index in 1939 was only 3.33, 
which increased compared to the previous years. However, compared to the 1940 price 
index 10.33, the growth of price index in 1939 was also very smooth. We can also find 
the same trend of the increasing prices of the other listed items in figure 5.9. Figure 5.7, 
5.8 and 5.9 all show that the price inflation process from 1937 to 1939 was different 




Figure 5.9 Domestic, import, and export’s wholesale prices in Chengdu, 1937-1945.  
Source: A. Young (1965, p. 354).  
Notes: Due to the huge difference of different data, we use logarithms to evaluate and express all the listed statistic 
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The sale of foreign goods in China indeed eased the increase of prices at that time. 
However, there still were some problems with these sales. The first problem was that 
the foreign-exchange reserves soon became exhausted and thus this method was no 
longer available.660 Secondly, since the sales had the character of dumping, we must 
consider whether these sales would lead to economic and currency discoordination in 
the exporting countries. Behind the dumping of US and British goods was the 
expansionary monetary policy of these two countries; so, expansionary monetary policy 
and price inflation might appear in these countries in long run. As these exporting 
countries exchanged their products for Fabi, they would eventually use Fabi for the 
purchase of Chinese goods, which would lead to the return of it to China. Therefore, 
even if there was no subsequent civil war between the National Government and the 
Communist Party, the hidden danger of temporary price inflation was still likely to 
become a reality in future. 
The fourth reason was the difficulties of carrying cash in the beginning of the war 
made the cash spending slower which also slowed down the growth rate of prices. 
Though there is no statistic data available on this issue, recorded evidence demonstrates 
that Chinese people were facing difficulties of taking their cash to Free China when 
they were migrating.661 
The fifth reason was that businessmen would like to hold cash as they were 
worrying about if the banks could have the ability to pay them in cash. 662  The 
entrepreneurs’ cash holding activities and their wait-and-see attitude reflected the 
sensitivity of entrepreneurs to market uncertainty. However, considering the 
expansionary monetary policy in the second stage of price inflation (1940-1945), the 
cash holding measure of entrepreneurs in the first stage became invalid. 
660 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, p. 587) 
661 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 408). 
662 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 408). 
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The sixth reason was the use of metal currency as a replacement for Fabi. 
More than a year after the start of the war, price inflation did not occur a lot, which was 
also related to factors such as the replacement of some Fabi. Besides, Free China’s 
people were also storing currency and banks had the necessity to hold Fabi in response 
to emergencies. Thus, not all the issued new banknotes were entering into the market 
for circulation.663 Moreover, as the banking industry was damaged by the war, many 
businesses had to be conducted in Fabi, which also increased Fabi’s value.664 Therefore, 
even in Occupied China, Fabi had higher credit than the Japanese puppet currencies.  
Therefore, despite the combination of the above factors that led to the slower 
increase of price, the increased issuance of Fabi resulted in a more serious price 
inflation in the second stage (1940-1945). Under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, it 
seems that the National Government did not want to restrain money printing. The 
economists who warned the danger of expansionary monetary policy and price inflation 
were dismissed.665 Though some economists who knew the importance of the restriction 
on fiscal spending and money printing (e.g., like T.V. Soong) remained serving the 
National Government, their voices were not heard. Obviously, Chiang Kai-shek did not 
fully understand monetary theory, which led to more mismanagement of monetary 
policies. In the next section 5.4.2, we will analyze the second stage of price inflation 
(1940-1945). 
663 See A. Young (1965, p. 207). 
664 See A. Young (1965, p. 207). In April 1939, despite the availability of the Sino-British Stabilization 
Fund, the price of Fabi was 109% higher than the pre-war level, and prices rose by about 50% in ten 
months (A. Young, 1965, p. 212). This shows the instability of people’s confidence on the wartime 
currency valuation. 
665 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, p. 587). 
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5.4.2 The Second Stage of Price Inflation, 1940-1945 
The situation of price inflation became worse since 1940 till the end of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War in 1945.666 The restriction on monetary issuance before the 
war had already sown damaging seeds.667 As we have demonstrated in section 5.3 on 
the general background of the expansionary monetary policy, before the outbreak of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Central Bank of China had already failed to 
keep the 60% cash reserves and 40% bank guarantees rules. The outbreak and the 
process of the war made the execution of the monetary policy even less possible. On 
September 8, 1939, the National Government issued the Outline of Financial 
Consolidating Measures, declaring that the 60% cash reserves and 40% bank guarantees 
rules were no longer valid and the four big banks could print money with the receipt of 
the loans from the Ministry of Finance.668 This means that the restriction on monetary 
issuance, as one of the core parts of the 1929 Kemmerer Plan was completely abolished. 
In 1940, the monetary policy became even worse. The Central Bank of China 
monopolized all the issuance of Fabi which caused price inflation.669 Figure 5.7 above 
shows the monetary supply and price index from 1926 to 1945. In section 5.3.2.1, we 
already analyzed the first stage of wartime price inflation, 1937-1939. Here we focus on 
the analysis of the second stage of wartime price inflation. In order to enable price 
indices from different sources to be displayed on the same statistical chart, we have 
processed the data from different sources according to the principle of proportionality. 
Due to the huge difference of different data, we use logarithms to evaluate and express 
all the listed statistic items. All data has been evaluated by logarithms. In the text 
analysis, we use the original data without logarithms to demonstrate the situation. In 
666 See J. Zhu, 2012, p. 407-410). 
667 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 408). 
668 The original name of this outline in Chinese is “䶿പ䠁㶽䗖⌅㏡㾱.” See J. Zhu (2012, p. 408). 
669 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 408). 
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1940, the National Government issued C$7,870 million. Along with the currency 
deposits, the total monetary supply (TMS) in that year was C$12,185 million. The TMS 
in 1939 was C$7,504 million. The TMS in 1940 was 87.5% higher than the previous 
year. TMS in 1941 was C$50,791 million, which was 316.8% higher than the previous 
year. The annual growth rate of TMS from 1942 to 1945 were 316.8%, 97.27%, 174.6%, 
and 447.7% respectively. From figure 5.7, it is obvious that the second stage of wartime 
price inflation represented a much higher annual growth rate of TMS. In the side of 
price index, in 1940, the wholesale prices index was 969.6 (1926=100). The wholesale 
price index from 1941 to 1945 were 2,449.4, 7,371, 23,702.5, 81,642.3 and 308,372.4, 
respectively. From figure 5.7, it is obvious that in the second stage of wartime price 
inflation, general prices in each easy were going much higher than the previous year. 
Along with the data on the TMS, the tendency in the second stage was from price 
inflation towards price hyperinflation. In the next section, we analyse the cause of the 
wartime price inflation, along with its consequences. 
5.5 A Discussion of the Possible Causes of the Wartime Price Inflation, along with 
its Consequences 
In this section, we will analyze the possible causes of the wartime price 
inflation (especially in the second stage of price inflation since 1940) and its 
consequences. As the related policies of the National Government, people’s 
psychological reaction on price inflation, and the Japanese and Communist’s economic 
and monetary actions could all have impacted price inflation in Free China, in this 
section we will briefly analyze all the related factors in detail. In each subsection in 
section 5.5, we will provide the hypotheses of the possible causes of the wartime price 
inflation that were argued by scholars and we will use empirical data and evidence to 
exam these hypotheses. Section 5.5.1 to section 5.5.10 are about the possible policy 
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failures of the National Government that led to the wartime price inflation. These 
policies included the over-issuance of banknotes, military expenditure, the increased 
taxation on common people, the government’s fiscal policy, the failed control of the 
expansion of private credits, interest rate policies, bonds and gold sales, and the 
reduction of foreign reserves. Section 5.5.9 discusses whether agricultural harvest was 
one of the causes of the wartime price inflation. Section 5.5.11 demonstrates people’s 
psychological confidence on Fabi. Section 5.5.12 to section 5.5.13 are about how the 
Japanese’s and the Communists’ trade war and currency wars affected the price 
inflation in wartime Free China. 
5.5.1 Wartime Price Inflation and its Consequences on People’s Life 
This section deals with wartime price inflation and its consequences on 
people’s life. Section 5.5.1.1 will briefly review the wartime price inflation process that 
we have demonstrated. Section 5.5.1.2 illustrates how the wartime price inflation 
affected people’s lives negatively.  
5.5.1.1 The over issuance of Fabi. Section 5.4 along with figure 5.7 above has 
demonstrated the process of the wartime price inflation, 1937-1945. In the first stage of 
price inflation from 1937 to 1939, compared with the later stage from 1940 to 1945, 
both monetary expansion and price inflation grew slower in the first three years of the 
war. The Free China’s price index in 1937, 1938 and 1939 was 189.5, 247.6 and 415.9, 
respectively. Based on the references from figure 5.7, if we assume the price index in 
1937 was 100, then prices increased 31 points from 1937 to 1938, 89 points from 1938 
to 1939, and 293 points from 1939 to 1940. The annual note issue from 1937 to 1940 
was C$1,640 million, C$2,310 million, C$4,290 million and C$7,870 million, 
respectively. The annual growth rate of note issue from 1939 to 1940 was 40.9%, 85.7%, 
and 83.5% respectively. The situation in the second stage of wartime price inflation was 
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more severe than the first stage. In 1940, the National Government issued C$7,870 
million. Along with the currency deposits, the total monetary supply (TMS) in that year 
was C$12,185 million. The TMS in 1939 was C$7,504 million. The number of it in 
1940 was 87.5% higher than the previous year. TMS in 1941 was C$50,791 million, 
which was 316.8% higher than the previous year. The annual growth rate of TMS from 
1942 to 1945 were 316.8%, 97.27%, 174.6%, and 447.7%, respectively. From figure 5.7, 
it is obvious that the second stage of wartime inflation represented a much higher 
annual growth rate of TMS. In the side of price index, in 1940, the wholesale prices 
index was 969.6 (1926=100). The wholesale prices index from 1941 to 1945 were 
2,449.4, 7,371, 23,702.5, 81,642.3 and 308,372.4, respectively. From figure 5.7, it is 
obvious that the second stage of wartime price inflation was going much higher than the 
previous stage. Along with the date of the TMS, the tendency in the second stage was 
from price inflation towards price hyperinflation. 
5.5.1.2 Wartime price inflation’s consequences on people’s life. 
Dynamically speaking, the consequences of the policy mistakes of the National 
Government were becoming more and more serious when the war was in process. This 
section demonstrates how the wartime price inflation policy gradually dried the quality 
of people’s life. We use the related indices and cases to demonstrate this. Figure 5.10 
below shows the impacts of price inflation upon salaries and entrepreneurial accounting 
loss from 1937 to 1943 in wartime Free China. This figure shows the indices of the 
salaries of Free China’s teachers and public servants (including the salary indices of 
college teachers, middle school teachers, primary school teachers, primary school 
teachers, and government officials), the salary indices of labors of provisional capital 
Chongqing, the salary indices of soldiers, industrial production indices (including 
production goods index, consumer goods index, and exported goods index), and Free 
369 
China’s indices of cost of living. Due to the huge difference of different data, we use 
logarithms to evaluate and express each index in this figure. In the text demonstration, 
we use the original data without logarithms. The annual indexes of cost of living were 
110, 142, 282, 118, 293, 629 and 1830, respectively. 670 The annual indices of the 
salaries of Free China’s teachers and public servants were 88, 96, 120, 213, 532, 942 
and 3,095, respectively. 671  The annual indices of the salary indices of labors of 
provisional capital Chongqing were 100, 124, 95, 76, 78, 75, and 69, respectively.672 
The annual indexes of the salary indexes of labors of provisional capital Chongqing 
were 100, 93, 64, 29, 21, 10, and 57, respectively.673 Compared with the increasing cost 
of living, the actual income of Chongqing workers was decreasing, while the salary of 
soldiers also had a decreasing trend in general. Though the industrial production indices 
(including production goods index, consumer goods index, and exported goods index) 
were growing during the wartime, compared with Free China’s cost of living, the 
increasing prices of these products lagged behind the cost of living.674 Thus, the value 
of industrial production was actually depreciating and the entrepreneurs were suffering 
from their loss. From the Second World War to the Chinese Civil War, the deteriorating 
price inflation forced some university professors to engrave fake college stamps to get 
government subsidies, and some professors committed suicide because of poor 
living.675 From figure 5.10, we perceive that the index of Free China’s cost of living 
was growing much faster than the salaries of Free China’s teachers and public servants. 
Compared with the increasing cost of living, the actual income of Chongqing workers 
and Chinese soldiers was decreasing, while the factual value of industrial production 
670 See A. Young (1965, p. 321). 
671 See A. Young (1965, p. 321). 
672 See P. Yang (1963, p. 138). 
673 See D. Wu (1945, pp. 34-35). 
674 See P. Yang (1963, p. 146). 
675 See P. Yang (1963, p. 144). 
370 
                                                 
was actually depreciating. Entrepreneurs were suffering from wartime expansionary 





Figure 5.10 Wartime indices of salary and industrial production, 1937-1943. 
Sources: For college teacher’s salary index, middle school teacher’s salary index, primary school teacher’s salary 
index, government official’s salary index, and the index of the all above four groups (1936-1937=100), see A. Young 
(1965, p. 321). Indices above are for December of each year. For Chongqing factory workers index (1937=100), see 
P. Yang (1963, p. 138). For Sichuan farmers index soldier salary index (1937=100), see D. Wu (1945, pp. 34-35). For 
industrial production index (1938=100), see P. Yang (1963, p. 146).  
Notes: Due to the huge difference of different data, we use logarithms to evaluate and express each index in this 
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5.5.2 Wartime Military Expenditure 
The wartime military expenditure played an important role of the wartime Free 
China’s monetary expansion. In section 5.2.2.5, we have already demonstrated the 
wartime fiscal conditions of Free China. In this section, we focus on the wartime 
military expenditure issue. Figure 5.11 below shows the military expenditure as a 
percentage of fiscal expenditure during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Due to the huge 
difference of different data, we use logarithms to evaluate and express each index in this 
figure. In the text demonstration, we use the original data without logarithms. We find 
the annual military expenditure played an important proportion of the government fiscal 
expenditure during the wartime. The annual fiscal expenditures were C$20.91 million, 
C$11.69 million, C$27.97 million, C$52.88 million, C$100.03 million, C$245.11 
million, C$588.16 million, C$1,716.8 million and C$12,150.89 million from 1937 to 
1945 respectively. The military expenditures were C$13.68 million, C$6.98 million, 
C$16.01 million, C$39.12 million, C$66.17 million, C$152.16 million, C$429.39 
million, C$1,387.26 million, and C$6,843.67 million from 1937 to 1945 respectively. 
The bank advances were C$11.95 million, C$8.53 million, C$23.1 million, C$38.34 
million, C$94.43 million, C$200.81 million, C$408.75 million, C$1,400.9 million, and 
C$10,432.57 million from 1937 to 1945 respectively.676 The financial advances were 
mainly supported by additional currency issuance.677 Based on the data on wartime 
fiscal deficits, we calculate that the ratios of military expenditure to fiscal expenditure 
were 66.4%, 59.7%, 53.7%, 74%, 66.2%,62.1%, 73%, 76.3%, and 87.3% from 1937 to 
1945 respectively. We calculate that the average annual military expenditure during the 
Second Sino-Japanese War was 68.8%. From figure 5.11, we find that the trend of 
increasing fiscal expenditure, military expenditure, and fiscal deficit was almost the 
676 See Lu & Q. Fang (1991, p. 555, p. 557). 
677 See J. Li (2007). 
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same during the wartime, while both price inflation and wartime military expenditures 
were also shown an increasing trend. As military expenditures were mainly financed by 
financial advances, and financial advances were mainly supported by additional 
currency issuance, we conclude that military expenditures were mainly supported by 
new issued banknotes. Therefore, the biggest use of the government’s new issued 
banknotes was to pay for war costs. In the previous section 5.5.1, we have pointed out 
that the additional currency led to a decline in the wage levels of people in Free China 
and led to an increase in the cost of living and the cost of production of enterprises. 
Therefore, we conclude that although the issue of additional currency during the war did 
temporarily resolve the issue of military expenditures, it had a very serious negative 
impact on the wartime economy, which would inevitably bring many difficulties to the 
post-war economic reconstruction. The empirical result of our research matches as the 
same of what economic theory teaches us on how war could distort the economy 
causing wartime price inflation.678  
In summary, the cost of living and consumer goods price indices were 
generally higher than other indices during the war, especially from 1940 to 1943, both 
of which were higher than the wage indices of the four major occupation categories 
(including the salary indices of college teachers, middle school teachers, primary school 
teachers, primary school teachers, and government officials) in the statistics. It can be 
seen that because of the rising cost of living and the increasing price of consumer goods, 
both the ordinary people and entrepreneurs’ production and living conditions were 
worsening due to wartime price inflation. 
 
  
678 For the theory of war and wartime central banking expansionary monetary policy and price inflation, 
see Salerno (1995). 
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Figure 5.11 Military expenditure and wartime price inflation, 1937-1945. Figure’s currency unit is one million 
Chinese dollars (C$). 
Sources: Lu & Q. Fang (1991, p. 555, p. 557).  
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5.5.3 The Government’s Taxation and Fiscal Policy 
The wartime taxation just covered a very small portion of the government 
expenditures, which did not have an impact on suppress the wartime price inflation. In 
section 5.2.2.5, by showing the statistic result of figure 5.6, we have demonstrated the 
wartime fiscal condition. In order to demonstrate the relationship between the wartime 
price inflation and Free China’s fascial situation, we repeat some of the previous 
conclusion in this section. In 1939, one year after the war began, the government’s 
fiscal deficit rose sharply. Figure 5.6 above in section 5.2.2.5 shows the government 
budget, expenditure, revenue and deficits conditions from 1929 to 1945. By listing the 
data from 1929, it is obvious that the government’s fiscal situation has gradually 
deteriorated since 1937. In June 1938, the government's fiscal deficit rate reached 75%.  
Subsequently, in the mid-1938, through transactions with the public, the government 
recovered C$499 million by selling foreign exchange and recovered C$255 million by 
selling public debt, reducing the deficit to C$777 million and the deficit rate into 37%.  
However, due to war factors, the government spending continued to increase. In 1945, 
the government’s fiscal deficit increased by 51,054% compared to 1937. The National 
Government adopted the method of issuing new currency to make up for the fiscal 
deficit and fiscal expenses, which led to wartime price inflation. However, taxation was 
not enough to cover the wartime government deficit. The government expenditures 
totaled C$2,626,343 million during the wartime, while only C$158,470, or 6% of the 
amount of expenditures were covered by taxation. 679  The above empirical analysis 
shows that wartime taxation just covered a very small portion of the government 
expenditures, which did not have an impact on suppress the wartime price inflation.  
679 See K. Chang (1958, p. 244). 
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In section 4.2.2.2 of Chapter 4, we have analyzed that the government was 
relying on direct taxes like the land tax and the salt tax during the Nanjing Decade from 
1927 to 1937, during which period a modern indirect taxation system was not 
established to help the government to collect more taxes. The same story repeated itself 
during the wartime. Only 2.1% or the wartime revenues were derived from direct taxes, 
which impeded the possible money income of the agricultural classes.680 The National 
Government started to collect land taxation through central government’s institutions in 
July 1941. However, it was still a direct tax, which was less efficient than indirect in 
money.681 
Though taxation was just a small part of the government’s revenue to pay its 
wartime expenditure, it already reduced the incomes of common people and 
entrepreneurs. Along with the increasing wartime consumption that we have analyzed in 
section 5.4.1 (also see figure 5.8. and figure 5.9 above) and speculation, the taxation 
caused an increase of price of consumption during the wartime.682 Thus, taxation was a 
double-edged sword to the stability of prices in Free China. If the National Government 
avoided to collect taxation from the consumption side and tried to collect indirect tax, it 
would probably be useful to suppress the general trend of wartime price inflation and 
not hurt common people’s life and enterprises’ production. Besides, the more taxation 
charged on common people, the less products that would be produced. 683  Thus to 
establish an efficient and just taxation system was a tough job, which was failed by the 
wartime Free China. 
680 See K. Chang (1958, p. 245). 
681 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, p. 586). For more about wartime Free China’s taxation system, 
also see A. Young (1965, pp. 22-31). 
682 See K. Chang (1958, pp. 244-245). 
683 This is also demonstrated by the theory of Laffer Curve. For more about an alternative taxation system 
which is more efficient and brings less burdens on common people and entrepreneurs, see Mitchell (1996, 
2008). However, we must mention that the above economic theories in this footnote deals with about 
peace time economic construction. The wartime taxation system is not only a theoretical issue, but also an 
empirical one given that every war has its specific patterns to be dealt with. 
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5.5.4 The Expansion of Private Credit 
The National Government failed to control the expansion of private credit. 
Though the 1935 currency reform established a fiat-money fractional reserve central 
banking system, the previous existed private, local, and spontaneously free banks still 
could issue credits in Free China’s currency Fabi. Figure 5.12 below shows the 
expansion of private credit. Due to the huge difference of different data, we use 
logarithms to evaluate and express each statistic item in this figure. To demonstrate in 
the text, we use the original data. From figure 5.12, we find that private credits of 
government banks, private credits of commercial and provincial banks, rural credits, 
and advances to the government were all increasing during the wartime. The amount of 
increase of private credits of government banks in 1938 was C$225 million, which 
jumped into C$121,661 million in 1945. The percentage increase of previous year also 
had a climbing trend. In 1939 it was 392%, which became 899% in 1945. As the 
government took some measures to suppress the increase of private credits in 1940, the 
previous year’s percentage increase decreased to 25.3% in 1940. The amount of 
increase of private credits of commercial and provincial banks in 1938 was C$102 
million, which jumped into C$7,947 million in 1945. The percentage increase of 
previous year also had a climbing trend. In 1939 it was 160%, which became 258% in 
1945. The amount of increase of rural credits in 1938 was C$32 million, which jumped 
into C$2,411 million in 1945. The percentage increase of previous year also had a 
climbing trend. In 1939 it was 147%, which became 233% in 1945. The amount of 
increase in advance to the government in 1938 was C$143 million, which jumped into 
C$645 million in 1945. The increase of private credits in price levels were also 
increasing during the wartime. The percentages of annual increase were 27%, 68%, 
133%, 153%, 201%, 222%, 244%, and 278% from 1938 to 1945 respectively, which 
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demonstrates that the government failed to suppress prices inflation though control 
private credits.684   
684 See K. Chang (1958, p. 249). 
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Figure 5.12 The expansion of private credit, 1938-1945.  
Source: K. Chang (1958, p. 249).  
Notes: Due to the huge difference of different data, we use logarithms to evaluate and express each statistic item in 
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5.5.5 Interest Rate Policy 
The increased interest rate did not help to suppress the increase of price. Figure 
5.13 below shows the wartime annual average market interest rates per month and the 
indices of Free China’s wholesale price index from 1937 to 1945. Due to the huge 
difference of different data, we use logarithms to evaluate and express the item of price 
index in the figure. In the text demonstration, we use the original data without 
logarithms. In figure 5.13, we have the data on interest rates from five Free China cities 
including Chongqing, Guiyang, Kunming, Xi’an and Lanzhou. The interest rates of all 
these cities all had a climbing trend during the wartime. Take, for example, Free 
China’s wartime capital Chongqing. The annual interest rates from 1937 to 1945 were 
1%, 1.2%, 1.3%, 1.5%, 1,9%, 2.8%, 6%, 9.3%, and 10.1%, while the annual price index 
jumped severely from 189.5 in 1937 to 308,372.4 in 1945, the year the Second-Sino 
Japanese War ended.685 The statistic result shows that the increasing interest rate, as a 
common tool for modern central banks to suppress bank credit expansion and price 
inflation, did not help to suppress the increase of Chinese wartime prices.  
  
685 See K. Chang (1958, p. 254). 
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Figure 5.13 Market interest rate and price indices of Free China, 1937-1945.  
Source: K. Chang (1958, p. 254).  
Notes: Due to the huge difference of different data, we use logarithms to evaluate and express the price indices of 
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5.5.6 Bank’s Saving Policy 
The government failed to use banks’ savings to suppress the wartime price 
inflation. Figure 5.14 below shows the relationship among the government banks’ total 
savings, the government banks’ percentage ratio of savings to total deposits, the 
commercial and provincial banks’ ratio of total loans to total deposits, and wholesale 
price index during the wartime. Due to the huge difference of different data, we use 
logarithms to evaluate and express the data on government bank’s total savings and 
government banks’ percentage ratio of savings to total deposits in this figure. To 
demonstrate in the text, we use the original data without logarithm. The government 
banks’ total savings are defined as a combination of ordinary savings, government 
savings schemes, and the sales of U.S. dollars certificates and gold saving deposits of 
the government banks. The data on government banks’ total savings and the 
government banks’ percentage ratio of savings to total deposits were only available 
from 1940 to 1945. The government banks’ total savings were increasing from 1940 to 
1945, which were C$533 million, C$1,104 million, C$2,976 million, C$7,387 million, 
C$15,456 million and C$55,693 million in these years respectively. While at time same 
time period, the government banks’ percentage ratio of savings to total deposits 
remained in a similar status, which were 8%, 10%, 15%, 24%, 16%, 16%, and 11% 
respectively. From 1937 to 1945, the commercial and provincial banks’ ratio of total 
loans to total deposits had an increasing trend, which were 67%, 73%, 71%, 60%, 70%, 
98%, 110%, 84%, and 151% respectively. 686 The wholesale prices were increasing 
during the wartime, which presents that the government failed to use bank’s saving to 
suppress the wartime price inflation. 
  
686 K. Chang (1958, pp. 256-257). 
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Figure 5.14 Government bank's saving policy, 1937-1945. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese dollars (C$). 
Sources: For the data on government banks’ total savings, see K. Chang (1958, p. 256). For the data on government 
banks’ percentage ratio of savings to total deposits, see K. Chang (1958, p. 257).  
Notes: Due to the huge difference of different data, we use logarithms to evaluate and express the data of government 
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5.5.7 Sales of Bonds 
The government also tried to use the sales of bonds to restrain the wartime 
price inflation. Table 5.2 above in section 5.4.1 shows the conditions of the wartime 
government bonds. Before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, in 1936, the 
National Government issued 5 different types of government bonds, which valued in 
total at C$1,460 million. These bonds consolidated the previous bonds that had issued 
both by the Beiyang government and the National Government, which were named as 
Consolidation bonds A, B, C, D, and E (hereafter CBA to CBE in table 5.2). Another 
statistic result also shows that the annual bond sales covered 1.5%, 1.9%, 10%, 1.5% 
from 1941 to 1945, respectively. While at time same time period, prices were increasing 
annually, which presents that the government’s sales of bonds did not have a significant 
impact on suppressing the wartime price inflation. 
5.5.8 Sales of Gold 
From 1940 to 1945, the Chinese government tried to sale gold to stabilize the 
prices. Figure 5.15 shows the relationship between the sales of U.S. dollar certificates 
and gold savings deposits. Due to the huge difference of different data, we use 
logarithms to evaluate and express the data in this figure. To demonstrate in text, we use 
the original data without logarithms. The annual sales were C$5 million, C$6 million, 
C$446 million, C$1,910 million, C$4,042 million, and C$9,956 million from 1940 to 
1945, respectively.687 However, the statistic result shows that the sales of gold also did 
not help to suppress the wartime price inflation.  
687 K. Chang (1958, p.256). 
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Figure 5.15 The sales of US dollar certificates and gold savings deposits, 1940-1945. Figure’s currency unit is one 
million Chinese dollars (C$). 
Source: K. Chang (1958, p. 256).  
Notes: Due to the huge difference of different data, we use logarithms to evaluate and express the data in this figure. 
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5.5.9 The Sales of Foreign Reserve and the Sino-U.S.-British Stabilization Funds 
as the Helping Hand 
In section 5.2.2.1.3 we introduced the general condition of the wartime foreign 
aids (see figure 5.2 above). The kinds of aids included military, supplies, nonmilitary 
purchases, currency stabilization, motor truck purchase, lend-lease, etc. The Soviet 
Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France were all providing aids to Free 
China. The total amount of aids of all these years to China was US$634.5 million. In 
this section, we analyze the results of the sales of foreign reserve and the Sino-U.S.-
British stabilization funds as the helping hand to stabilize the Chinese currency Fabi. 
Section 5.5.9.1 is about the early attempt to stabilize Fabi from 1937 to 1937. Section 
5.5.9.2 demonstrates the three Sino-U.S.-British stabilization funds as the helping hand 
from 1939 to 1945.  
5.5.9.1 The early attempt to stabilize Fabi before 1939. The National 
Government also failed to manage foreign currency reserves causing a huge reduction 
of it. Foreign reserves would be a useful tool to be sold as to stabilize the exchange rate 
therefore stabilize the Chinese currency Fabi. In May 1937, the government had C$830 
million ($250 million) silver and gold reserves.688 This amount might be not enough to 
be sold to stabilize the exchange rate of Fabi given that the ongoing war expense. In 
August 1937, the government sold about US$ 40 million foreign exchanges. 
Theoretically, during the war time, if other conditions stay the same, foreign 
exchange will become scarcer, which means that the foreign currencies could exchange 
for more domestic currencies. In this sense, the National Government should allow Fabi 
devaluated naturally during the war time. However, after the war started, the National 
Government insisted on the previous exchange rate of C$1 for US $0.30 in the 
688 K. Chang (1958, p. 287). 
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Shanghai International Settlement before the war time, which caused the exchange rate 
of foreign currencies became much higher in the black market than the official rate.689 
After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese government soon 
consumed  nearly US$100 million to stabilize its Fabi in one month, which was two-
fifths of its total foreign exchange reserve.690 Because of the unbalance between the 
official rate and the unofficial rate, the Japanese were also using Fabi to get more 
China’s foreign currency reserves. In the beginning of 1939, the foreign currency 
reserves of the National Government were exhausted.  
5.5.9.2 The Sino-U.S.-British stabilization funds as the helping hand, 1939-
1945. Though later during the wartime, the United States and the Great Britain provided 
totally around US$1,000 million foreign currency reserve, the National Government 
still allowed the foreign currency exchange in an unnaturally lower rates, which caused 
the continuous loss of the foreign currencies. 691 And all the foreign reserves of the 
three-time management exhausted quickly. In 1939, the Sino-British Exchange 
Stabilization Found provided £10 million in the next two years through the Central 
Bank of China and some other commercial banks both in Free China, Hong Kong, India, 
and Australia.692  
In April 1941, a new Stabilization Board of China, the U.K., and the U.S. was 
established instead of the previous one that was settled in 1939. Before the Pacific War, 
the Board provided totally US$90 million foreign exchange to China, including US$70 
million from the U.S. side and £5 million for the British side.693 The Board totally sold 
689 The Shanghai International Settlement in Chinese is “к⎧』⭼.” Though Shanghai was occupied by 
the Japanese, the Shanghai International Settlement was still a relatively free land before the outbreak of 
the Pacific War. Thus, the National Government could still exchange its Fabi in the Shanghai 
International Settlement. See J. Zhu (2012, p. 405). 
690 See K. Chang (1958, p. 288). 
691 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 404). 
692 See K. Chang (1958, p. 291). 
693 See K. Chang (1958, p. 295). 
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US$28 million to stabilize Fabi. However, as the Chinese government feared the 
potential foreign intervention from the Board and the outbreak of the Pacific War, the 
Board ceased its activities in 1944.  
After the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941, the British aid was 
cut off as Hong Kong was occupied by the Japanese, being unable to provide the 
financial sponsors to Free China. However, the U.S. still did its efforts continuing to 
support Free China. Statistics shows that in the end of 1945, the Central Bank of China 
held foreign exchange worth about US$140 million, the gold and silver taken from the 
Japanese and the Occupied China worth US$60 million, along with the American loans, 
the repayment of American military expenditures, and the Central Bank’s own assets, 
which totaled about US$900 million. This is the biggest amount of the foreign reserves 
that the ROC government held before the 1949 Communist Revolution.694 
Table 5.3 below shows the official and market exchange rates compared with 
the retail price indices from 1937 to 1945. From 1937 to 1940, the Chinese government 
held an artificial low and fixed interest rate, which was C$1 for US$1. Since 1941, the 
Chinese government finally devalued the Chinese dollar Fabi, setting C$5.6 for US$1. 
The official rate was set as C$5.95 for US$1 from 1943 till the end of the war in 
1945.695 Though the market rate was much lower than the official rate, to maintain 
people’s psychological trust in Fabi, the government chose to lose a small amount of 
foreign exchange.696 In the side of market exchange rates, it was increasing during the 
wartime, which were 1.01, 1.82, 3.98, 5.23, 14.5, 25, 170, 870, and 392 from 1937 to 
1945, respectively.697 Though as we have demonstrated, the U.S. and the U.K. thrice 
provided the Chinese government foreign aids, totaling around US$1,000 million, the 
694 See K. Chang (1958, pp. 302-303). 
695 See A. Young (1965, p. 264). 
696 See K. Chang (1958, pp. 302). 
697 See A. Young (1965, p. 264). 
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value of Fabi was constantly decreasing during the wartime while the prices were also 
increasing. The foreign reserve aids did not help China to stabilize the wartime inflation. 
From table 5.3 below we can also see that because the constant increase in prices led to 
the depreciation of Fabi, the exchange rate of Fabi to the US dollar continued to rise 
during the war. Therefore, although the difficult situation during the war allowed Free 
China to obtain a certain amount of foreign exchange, price inflation itself offset some 
of the prices that can be stabilized by foreign exchange, which shows the difficulty of 
Free China’s financial situation during the war. 
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Official and Market Exchange Rates along with Price Indices, 1937-1945 
Year Official rate for US$ 
Average market exchange rate 
for US$  
(June 1937=1) 
Price indices 
(the first half of 1937=1) 
1937 1.00 1.01 1.18 
1938 1.00 1.82 1.76 
1939 1.00 3.98 3.23 
1940 5.6 5.23 7.24 
1941 5.95 (from August 18) 8.65 (November) 19.77 
1942 5.95 (from July 10) 14.5 66.2 
1943 5.95 25 228 
1944 5.95 170 755 
1945 5.95 870 2,593 
Table 5.3 Official and market exchange rates along with price indices, 1937-1945. 




5.5.10 The Agricultural Harvest 
In section 5.2.2.3, we have analyzed the growing agricultural production in the 
wartime Free China. In 1937, China’s agricultural economy accounted for about four-
fifths of the total economy, which was about C$778,477 million.698 Figure 5.4 above in 
section 5.2.2.3 shows the agricultural production indices from 1931 to 1945.699 Since 
1940, rice production reduced for six consecutive years. Rice production in 1945 was 
only 87% in 1937. However, wheat, sweet potatoes, and cotton were generally growing 
or maintaining the relatively same level of 1937. Wheat production in 1945 increased 
by 30% compared to 1937. Sweet potatoes production in 1945 increased by 44% 
compared to 1937. Cotton production in 1945 increased by 47% compared to 1937. 
Livestock production in 1941 decreased by 13% compared to 1937. The poor harvest 
also partly caused the increase of price in a very short period during the wartime. In 
1940 agricultural production fell 10% below that of 1939 and declined an additional 
13% per the next year.700 The agricultural industry could be improved if the National 
Government could make the trade among Free China and other Western countries. A 
free trade policy can import more food and to strengthen Free China, which might also 
help to solve the problem of the rising price of food partly. During the wartime, details 
could make a difference. If the decision making of the National Government could be 
more overall, the loss of the war could be reduced as much as possible. 
698 See A. Young (1965, p. 22). Due to Maddison (2003, p. 172), China’s GDP in 1937 was US$295,937 
million (calculated at the price of the US dollar in 1990). Excluding inflation factor, China’s GDP in 1937 
was about US$32,605 million dollars. According to the average exchange rate of the US dollar against 
Fabi in December 1937 (see A. Young, 1965, p. 360), China’s GDP in 1937 was about C$973,096 million. 
Thus, China’s agricultural economy accounted for C$778,477 million (of GPD in 1937). We must note 
that, given the lack of statistical data at the time and the limitations of statistics itself, our statistical 
results can only reflect the general situation of China's agricultural economic output in 1937, which may 
not accurately reflect the economic output. 
699 Reference of the agricultural data from 1937 to 1945, see A. Young (1965, p. 300) and K. Chang 
(1958, pp. 377-378). 
700 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, p. 586). 
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5.5.11 The Reduction of People’s Confidence on Fabi  
In section 5.5.1, we have analyzed in detail the wartime price inflation and its 
consequence on Free China people’s life. The uprising price make people gradually 
losing their confidence in Fabi, causing both the farmers and businessmen started to 
hoard their products to overcome the difficulties and speculate to sell their products in 
the assumed higher prices in future.701 Food prices in the wartime capital Chongqing 
during 1940 and 1941 consequently shot up nearly 1,400% and industrial, transport, and 
other workers, as a result, demanded and received substantial wage boosts.702 Hoarding 
and speculation in price inflation are the normal reactions of people dealing with the 
currency problem. If the final decision maker of the National Government 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had the knowledge of business cycle, Free China would 
have avoided to issue too much Fabi. 
The mismanagement of price hyperinflation caused a lot of problems in the 
second stage of price inflation. However, after the war ended in 1945, Chinese people 
were still suffering from the price inflation spiral started in 1937, causing more serious 
consequences. 
5.5.12 The Trade War and Currency War Between Free China and the Japanese-
occupied China 
The Japanese occupation made the economy of the Japanese-occupied areas 
(Wang Jingwei regime and Manchukuo) separately from Free China. The economy of 
the Occupied China (Wang Jingwei regime) was controlled in the hands of the Japanese 
due to a treaty between Japan and the Wang Jingwei regime.703 The Japanese control of 
Occupied China’s trade and monetary issues were included in this treaty. The outbreak 
of Pacific War also caused a short time value fluctuation of the prices of Fabi in 
701 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, p. 586). 
702 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, p. 587). 
703 See Tamagna 1940 (pp. 332-337). 
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Occupied China. From January to June 1939, Shanghai’s price index rose by only 
21.1%, and due to the concerns about the outbreak of Pacific War, the index rose 58.6% 
in the second half of the year. However, this factor is only temporary for fluctuations in 
currency values in Occupied China. There are other complex reasons.704 More factors 
that related with Occupied China and Free China’s monetary issues should be analyzed 
in detail. This section deals with the trade war and currency war between Free China 
and the Japanese-occupied areas. Section 5.5.12.1 briefly introduces the general trade 
conditions of the wartime Free China. Section 5.5.12.2 deals with the topic of the trade 
ban between the Free China and the occupied areas. Section 5.5.12.3 analyzes how the 
Japanese occupation caused the reduction of Fabi’s circulation. Section 5.5.12.4 Japan’s 
expansionary monetary policy on Occupied China. Section 5.5.12.5 demonstrates the 
Japan’s creation of fake Fabi and its use of Fabi to get foreign currencies. 
5.5.12.1 The general trade conditions in Free China, 1937-1945. Due to the 
war factor, while some international trade data is available before the outbreak of 
Pacific War in December 1941, compared with the previous period the Nanjing Decade 
(1927-1937), there’s no complete data of the imports and exports of the wartime Free 
China, especially the lack of data after 1941 the outbreak of Pacific War.705 The imports 
of wartime Free China were inelastic, which included cereals, raw cotton, and 
petroleum as the main items.706 Due to the 1935 currency reform and the currency 
devaluation exports recovered to 87% of imports, which was still 70% of that of 1928 
due to war factor and Great Depression.707 While in the side of exports, China only 
exported a few agricultural products and mineral ores, which were not significant in the 
704 See A. Young (1965, pp. 218-219). 
705 For the general economic background in the Nanjing Decade, see section 4.2.2 in Chapter 4. 
706 See Chou (1963/1969, p. 159). 
707 See K. Chang (1958, p. 322). 
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global market at that time.708 From August 1937 to July 1938, the export trade in Free 
China were only 41% of the whole China compared with the previous period. In July 
1938, the government issued an order which only allowed 10% of the total exports to be 
sold by the merchants, with the remaining 90% being sold to the government as an 
obligation.709 
On the other hand, although no specific statistics was available, evidence 
shows that in order to purchase export goods, the Chinese government relied on printing 
currency to make up for its fiscal deficit. The Chinese government must purchase goods 
like tungsten, tin, tea, and tung oil and ship them to the Soviet Union, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Germany in order to repay their purchase loans and trades. 
Therefore, these goods cannot increase the foreign exchange supply of the market. 
Since the central government in the wartime capital Chongqing did not fully control the 
government of Yunnan Province, the local authority insisted on exporting tin for foreign 
exchange. The agencies that purchased export goods must pay locally at a certain price 
to maintain production. The shortfall of funding was maintained by the additional 
banknotes that were newly printed. Therefore, the government’s foreign trade policy has 
also caused price inflation to a certain extent.710 
5.5.12.2 The trade ban between the Free China and the Occupied China. 
The trade ban between Free China and Occupied China not only also caused the trade 
difficulties, but also affected the wartime price inflation. The factories in Free China 
were far away from providing the sufficient products that the people there needed, 
meaning that the lack of products comparing to the more printed Fabi was also one of 
the reasons of the wartime price inflation. Though the National Government gradually 
released the trade ban after July 1939 step-by-step, the lack of sufficient products in 
708 See Chou (1963/1969, p. 159). 
709 See K. Chang (1958, p. 328). 
710 See A. Young (1965, pp. 212-213). 
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Free China remained as a critical problem.711 Fighting against Japanese didn’t mean the 
trade ban was necessary. Free trade between Free China and Occupied China could also 
be a way to release the tension between the two sides, enhancing the connection 
between the Chinese in Free China and Occupied China.712  Though Japan also had the 
intention of banning trade between the two sides, people could still trade by smuggling. 
If the National Government allowed free trade between the two sides, the negative 
effects caused by the Japanese ban on trading could also be reduced a lot. 
5.5.12.3 The reduction of Fabi’s circulation area caused by the Japanese 
occupation. The reduction of the circulation area of Fabi caused by the Japanese 
occupation also partly caused Free China’s price inflation.713 During the war period, 
Japan gradually controlled one third of the Chinese territories including Manchuria. 
After the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan established at least 20 banks in the 
Japanese-occupied areas (Manchukuo and Occupied China of Wang Jingwei regime). 
Before the Victory over Japan Day on September 2, 1945, in Occupied China and 
Manchukuo, 155 pro-Japan currencies were issued, which was a huge variety. These 
currencies became the substitutions for Fabi in occupied areas. The Japanese occupation 
caused the reduction of Fabi’s circulation in the whole China, both in the free area and 
the occupied ones. 
Japan compulsorily collected Fabi in Occupied China. Besides, Japan also 
forced the Chinese people in Occupied China to convert their Fabi to the Japanese 
puppet currencies. The Chinese person who had more than C$60 would be executed.714 
As we have mentioned in Chapter 4, Chinese people and banking sectors were generally 
711 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1983, p. 586). 
712 For more about the theory of free trade, See Mises (1949/1998, pp. 737-741, pp. 741-749). 
713 See J. Zhu (2012, pp. 401-402). 
714 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 403). 
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and strongly support the 1935 fiat money currency reform.715 Thus by coercion and 
threat, the Japanese cancellation of Fabi deprive the rights of the Chinese people who 
wanted to use Fabi, which distorted the economic coordination in Occupied China. 
5.5.12.4 Japan’s expansionary monetary policy and price inflation in 
Occupied China, along with Manchuria. In Occupied China and Manchuria, the over 
issuance of currencies caused the problems of price hyperinflation.716 Because of the 
over issuance, the Japanese manipulated currencies were devaluating quickly.  
It is estimated that in November 1938, the amount of Japanese military yen 
issued in Central China and South China was 30 million yen. By the end of 
1941, the circulation of Japanese military yuan was from 600 million yen to 1.2 
billion yen. As a result of the over-issuance of currency, the Japanese 
manipulated currency quickly devalued. This can be clearly seen from its 
exchange rate with gold. … In May 1942, [the exchange rate] was 21,000 yen. 
In late January 1944, it was 102,100 yen.… Taking the wholesale price index 
of 1936 as 100, by 1941, the index in Shanghai rose to 1099.3, and the index in 
the North China rose to 450.2.  … and the Japanese currency quickly devalued. 
This is evident from its comparison with gold. In May 1942, it was 21,000 
yuan. In late January 1944, it was 102,100 yuan. The wholesale price index in 
1936 was one hundred. By 1941, Shanghai had risen to 1939.3 and in northern 
China it had risen to 45.25. (J. Zhu, 2012, p. 403, own translation) 
To demonstrate the price inflation situation in Japanese-occupied areas, we choose two 
currencies to compare. The first is the Manchukuo Yuan (MCB) that was issued in the 
Japanese puppet state Manchukuo (Manchuria). The second is Wang Jingwei regime’s 
Federal Reserve Bank Dollars. Figure 5.16 below shows the currency issues of 
715 See section 4.5.3.12 in Chapter 4. 
716 J. Zhu (2012, p. 403). 
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Manchukuo Yuan from 1936 to 1944. In 1936, Manchukuo issued banknotes of 
MCB¥274,691 million. In the next few years, every year Manchukuo issued more 
banknotes compared with the previously year. In 1944, one year before the end the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, it issued more than MCB¥7,709,251 million, which was 
2706.5% higher than the amount in 1936. The price indices were also increasing during 
these years. The price index was 100 in 1936 in Changchun, the capital of Manchukuo. 
It increased into 358.3 in 1944.717 Figure 5.17 below shows the currency conditions of 
Wang Jingwei Regime from 1938 to 1945. As we have demonstrated in section 5.5.12.3, 
the Japanese-occupied areas had at least 155 currencies. To analyze the currency 
conditions of the Wang Jingwei Regime, we choose a representative and official 
currency of it, the Federal Reserve Bank Dollars (FRB), to analyze. In 1938, Wang 
Jingwei Regime issued banknotes of FRB$20 million. In the next few years, every year 
Wang’s regime issued more banknotes compared with the previously year. In 1945, the 
last year of the Second Sino-Japanese War, it issued more than FRB$142,399 million, 
which was 711,895% higher than the amount in 1938. The price indices in north China 
were also increasing during these years. Due to the lack of data, price indices of north 
China in 1937, 1938, 1944, and 1945 are not available. The price index was 100 in 1939 
and it jumped into 1,176.67 in 1944.718 The statistics results show that the in Japanese-
occupied areas, both the Wang Jingwei Regime and Manchukuo had a very severe 
tendency of wartime price inflation caused by the over-issuance of currency. The 
wartime price inflation policy destroyed the monetary value, causing both the loss of the 
people’s banknotes and the public’s psychological panic. However, in another 
perspective, the chaotic monetary and economic condition in Japanese-occupied areas 
717 See P. Yang (1963, p. 55) and Research Group of the Northeast Materials Regulatory Commission 
[RGNMRC] (1948, p. 37, pp. 154-155). 
718 See P. Yang (1963, p. 56) and G. Wu (1958, pp. 45-47). 
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also made the Japanese invaders difficult to manage occupied areas, becoming a 





Figure 5.16 Currency conditions in Manchuria, 1936-1944. Figure’s currency unit is one million Manchukuo Yuan 
(MCB¥).  





















1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
Wholesale price indices of Changchun, 1936-1944 
Wholesale price indexes of Changchun (1936=100)
Currency issues of Manchukuo yuan ( in millions)
400 
 
Figure 5.17 Currency issues of Federal Reserve Bank Dollars, 1938-1945. Figure’s currency unit is one Federal 
Reserve Bank dollar (FRB$).  
Sources: Data on currency issues of federal reserve bank dollars and the wholesale price indices of north China from 
1938 to 1945, see P. Yang (1963, p. 56) and G. Wu (1958, pp. 45-47).  
Notes: Data on 1933 is the monthly data on March 1933 when the issuance of Federal Reserve Bank Dollars was 
initiated. Data on 1944 is the monthly data on October 1944; data on 1945 is the monthly data on October 1945. Due 
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5.5.12.5 Japan’s creation of fake Fabi and its use of Fabi to get foreign 
currencies. Japan also created fake Fabi trying to cause price inflation and to distort the 
economy in Free China. Japan counterfeited C$4 billion, which was 22.7 times the 
number of Fabi issued by the National Government in 1937. The National Government 
took some countermeasures too. First, it forbade the circulation of fake Fabi in Free 
China. Second, the National Government cooperated with the United States to create 
fake Japanese puppet currencies, undermining the economic stability in the occupied 
areas. Besides, the National Government also used their fake Japanese puppet 
currencies to buy some urgent products.719 
The Japan’s creation of fake Fabi not only caused the currency discoordination 
in Free China, but also lifted a stone only to drop on its own feet. The National 
Government’s countermeasures of creating the fake Japanese puppet currencies also 
distorted the economy in occupied areas. In the perspective of the National Government, 
it was a way to fight against Japanese in the sense of a currency way. However, the 
innocent Chinese also suffered from the economic discoordination caused by fake 
Japanese puppet currencies.  
Japan was also using Fabi as a tool to get foreign currencies.720 From May 
1939 to July 1941, Japan temporarily allowed the circulation of Fabi in Occupied China, 
and later used exchanging Fabi for foreign currencies in the official rates. Then, Japan 
used the foreign currencies to buy products to control the import. The foreign currencies 
brought by the export in Occupied China were also controlled by Japan. After the 
outbreak of Pacific War, the international trade was almost ceased. Then, Japan bought 
the Chinese strategic supplies (which were bought by China by using its own foreign 
719 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 404). The monetary manipulation was also used in the Spanish Civil War. For a 
short analysis of the comparison between the monetary manipulation in the Chinese Civil War and the 
Spanish Civil War, see the introduction of this thesis. 
720 See J. Zhu (2012, pp. 403-404). 
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currencies) with foreign exchange to expel the burden of foreign currencies to the side 
of China. 
The Japan’s tricks on manipulating Fabi and foreign currencies caused 
economic discoordination in Occupied China. Besides, by using government coercive 
power, Japan was also trying to destroy the stability of China’s foreign currency reserve 
system by buying the Chinese strategic supplies. Ordinary people in Free China 
suffered from the economic discoordination caused by currency wars. 
5.5.13 The Currency War between the Communists and the National Government 
This section deals with the currency war between the Communists and the 
National Government. Section 5.5.13.1 demonstrates the currency war between the 
Communists and Free China. Section 5.5.13.2 analyzes the price inflation in the 
Communist-occupied area. 
5.5.13.1 The currency war between the Communists and Free China. The 
Communists were also making some efforts trying to destroy Fabi. In the Communist-
occupied area (COA), which was around one third of the Chinese territories at that time, 
Fabi was allowed to be circulated in the beginning of the war. Later for controlling 
COA, the CCP authority established its own banking system and currencies, gradually 
forbidding the use of Japanese puppet currencies and limiting the use of Fabi.  
At the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, in 1937, Fabi could still be 
circulated in COA. In June 1938, the CCP established its subsidiary currency, 
Guanghua Bi.721  The initial exchange rate was 1:1 with Fabi. During this period, the 
increase of price in COA was consistent with the price inflation in Free China. At first, 
Fabi, CCP currency, and other local currencies all circulated at the same time in COA. 
There were no less than hundreds of currencies in COA. Some local currencies could 
721 Guanghua Bi in Chinese is “ݹ㨟ᒓ.” 
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not even circulate to other COA district due to the monopoly of local authorities in 
COA, while COA only had 800,000 square meters, along with its population of 2 
million in maximum before the end of the War of Resistance. The chaotic currency 
situation showed CCP’s incompetence of currency management. At the end of 1940, the 
CCP currency accounted for 80% of the COA currency circulation while Fabi was for 
20%.  Since the winter of 1940, due to the CCP’s continuous attack on government 
forces in order to expand the scope of its rule, the conflict between government force 
and Communist force expanded. Before 1941, the circulation of CCP currencies were 
very small and it was using Fabi as its alternative domestic currency, prohibiting the 
circulation of Japanese puppet currencies. On January 30, 1941, the CCP banned the use 
of Fabi in the COA. In February 1941, the CCP officially issued its own currency, 
Bianbi.722 Since then, Bianbi became the only legally used currency in the COA. To 
suppress price inflation, the CCP issued Commercial Circulation Coupons from June 
1944 to August 1945.723 Based on the above analysis, we argue that CCP made three 
changes to its monetary system in the short period of 8-year wartime, which is sufficient 
to demonstrate its lack of understanding of currency issues and indicate that the CCP’s 
insecurity and its lack of confidence of its rule given the uncertainty of its economic and 
financial status. This uncertainty cannot even be discussed to the same extent with the 
currency problems in the Japanese-occupation areas and Free China. 
5.5.13.2 Price inflation in the Communist-occupied area. On the other hand, 
the COA also had a serious problem of price inflation. Figure 5.18 below shows the 
price inflation condition in the Communist-occupied area, along with a comparison of 
722 Bianbi in Chinese is written as “䚺ᒓ.” 
723 References of the currency conditions of Communist-occupied area and the currency war between the 
Chinese government and CCP separatist regime that are used in this paragraph, see Gao (1993), Wei 
(1987), J. Li (1987), Fan (2009), and Lu & Q. Fang (1991, pp. 709-716). For the excerpts of archives of 
the financial and fiscal conditions of the wartime Communist-occupied area, See Financial and Economic 
History Compilation Group of the Shan-Gan-Ning Border Region [FEHCGSR] (1981/2016a, 
1981/2016b) and Jia (1988). 
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wartime Free China and Occupied China. Due to the huge difference of different data, 
we use logarithms to evaluate and express the data in this figure. In text, we use the 
original data to demonstrate without logarithms. Due to the data in the COA, we choose 
the price indices of the capital of the COA Yan’an to demonstrate the COA’s price 
inflation condition. In 1937, the price index in the Communist-occupied area was 100. 
The annual price indices were going up every year during the Second-Sino Japanese 
War:  143, 237, 500, 2,200, 9,900, 119,900, and 1,690,712 from 1938 to 1945, 
respectively.724 The statistic results show that the Communist-occupied area was also 
suffering from the wartime price inflation. The statistic result of figure 5.17 below 
shows that the Communist-occupied area had more severe condition of price inflation 
than the case in Free China and Occupied China. In 1940, price inflation increased in 
the COA as CCP issued ore banknotes due to its increased military conflict with the 
government.725 
  
724 See Schran (1976, p. 184). 
725 See J. Li (2007). 
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Figure 5.18 Comparison of price indices among Free China, Communist-occupied area, and Occupied China, 1937-
1945. 
Sources: For price index for Free China (1937=100), see A. Young (1965, p. 356). For price index for Communist-
occupied area from 1937 to 1944 (1937=100), see Schran (1976, p. 184). For price index for Communist-occupied 
area in 1945, see FEHCGSR (1981/2016, p. 135). For price index for Occupied China (1937=100), see A. Young 
(1965, p. 357). 
Notes: Due to the huge difference of different data, we use logarithms to evaluate and express the data in this figure. 
We choose the price indices of the capital of the COA Yan’an to demonstrate the COA’s price inflation condition. 
The price index for Communist-occupied area in 1945 was calculated based on the ratio of the 1944 to 1945 data 
from FECCGSR and the 1944 data from Schran. The data of Occupied China is the wholesale prices in Shanghai 
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What the Communists did on either forbidding the Japanese puppet currencies 
or limiting the use of Fabi was also the institutional aggression on people’s right of 
choosing the currencies that they preferred. The trade between the COA and Free China 
was limited by the Communist coercion on limit using Fabi. Though the Japanese 
puppet currencies and Fabi had their own problems, obviously, it should be the Chinese 
citizens who make the decision of whether these currencies should be adopted, not the 
Communist authority by using coercion. 
5.6 Conclusion 
To understand the inflation issues and the performance of the Central Bank of 
China during the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1947 to 1945, it is essential to review 
and comprehend the special political and economic background of China during the war. 
Section 5.2 reviews the political and economic background during the Second Sino-
Japanese War. The analysis in section 5.2.1 points out that, in terms of politics, the 
disputes between China and Japan had been planted as early as the First Sino-Japanese 
War of 1895, and Japan’s stepwise aggression against China meant that a formal war 
between the two countries was inevitable in future. Similarly, the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) maintained its separatist regime substantially during the Second Sino-
Japanese War. Although the CCP did not actively resist the Japanese invaders 
throughout the war compared to government forces led by the Kuomintang, it launched 
some sporadic offensives against government forces in the late 1940s. The National 
Government of the Republic of China, the Japanese-occupied areas (Wang Jingwei 
regime of Occupied China and Manchukuo), and the CCP’s separatist regime fought 
against each other in a short period of 8 years, which was quite similar to China’s Three 
Kingdoms hegemony in the 3rd century. Hence, it is precisely this chaos and warfare in 
politics and military that trigged the government to over-print banknotes to cover its 
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military expenditures, which led to price inflation and the decline of the quality of life 
of people and the losses in entrepreneurial production and sales activities.  
The analysis in section 5.2.2 points out that, despite the factors of war and 
price inflation during wartime, China’s economy still had some positive aspects. This 
section conducts a detailed quantitative analysis of the relevant content. Our 
quantitative analysis from section 5.2.2.1 to section 5.2.2.3 show that Free China’s 
deposits and credit that supported the economic construction, foreign aids, numbers of 
enterprises and factories, and agricultural production were all increasing during the 
wartime. These are the positive factors of the economic growth in Free China. However, 
due to war, the economy of Free China also encountered some negative factors, such as 
the exhausted foreign exchange reserves, fiscal deficits and the intensifying price 
inflation. From section 5.2.2.4 to section 5.2.2.6 we deal with these topics. Our analysis 
shows that through foreign aid (especially the banknotes and gold acquired from the 
United States and the United Kingdom), Free China gradually acquired more foreign 
exchange reserves. Before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese 
government had about totaled the equivalent of US$378.9 million in foreign exchange. 
At the end of 1945, the Central Bank of China held foreign exchange worth about 
US$140 million, the gold and silver taken from the Japanese and the Japanese-occupied 
areas worth US$60 million, along with the American loans, the repayment of American 
military expenditures, and the Central Bank’s own assets, which totaled about US$900 
million. This is the biggest amount of the foreign reserves that the ROC government 
held before the 1949 Communist Revolution. 
However, the measure of exchange stabilization has not helped Free China 
curb price inflation due to fiscal deficits and escalating price inflation. Section 5.4 deals 
with the process of the wartime inflation. We found that although the currency issuance 
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and price inflation during the wartime both increased, the increase rates showed two 
different trends. In the first stage, that is, from 1937 to 1939, the price increase had a 
relatively moderate trend. The average annual price increase during this period was 
49.4% while the note issue annual growth rate from 1937 to 1940 was 40.9%, 85.7%, 
and 83.5% respectively. We found that among them, increased agricultural production, 
people’s trust in Fabi, the government’s sale of foreign exchange and foreign trade, 
common people’s less cash expenditures caused by the inconvenience of carrying cash 
in the early stage in the war, entrepreneur’s cash holdings due to uncertainty, the use of 
metal currencies were the factors of why price inflation was relatively mild in the first 
three years of the Second-Sino Japanese War. Section 5.4.1 deals with the wartime price 
inflation in the first stage. 
The monetary expansion and price inflation show a different and harsher 
pattern in the second stage of price inflation from 1940 to 1945. Section 5.4.2 generally 
describes the process of price inflation. The annual growth rate of total money supply 
from 1940 to 1945 were 316.8%, 97.27%, 174.6%, and 447.7%, respectively while on 
the side of price index, the wholesale prices index from 1940 to 1945 (1926=100) were 
969.6, 2,449.4, 7,371, 23,702.5, 81,642.3, and 308,372.4 respectively. Statistics shows 
that the price inflation in the second stage is very different from the three-year increase 
in the first stage, which was a price hyperinflation. 
So why is the second stage of price inflation so different from the first stage? 
In section 5.5, combined with historical events and the statistics itself, we have made an 
original systematic quantitative analysis of the various causes of wartime price inflation 
(especially the second stage of price inflation). We point out that the most direct cause 
of price inflation during wartime was the issuance of Fabi. The cost of living and 
consumer goods price indexes were generally higher than other indexes during the war, 
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especially from 1940 to 1943, both of which were higher than the wage indexes of the 
four major occupation categories (including the salary indices of college teachers, 
middle school teachers, primary school teachers, primary school teachers, and 
government officials) in the statistics. It can be seen that because of the rising cost of 
living and the increasing price of consumer goods, both the ordinary people and 
entrepreneurs’ production and living conditions were worsening due to wartime price 
inflation. Moreover, due to the wartime expansionary monetary policy and price 
inflation, people gradually lost their confidence in Fabi. We argue that the reduction of 
people’s psychological confidence on Fabi also caused the increase of prices. Besides, 
through statistic results, we also conclude that the government’s taxation and fiscal 
policy, the expansion of private credits were also the triggers of wartime price inflation. 
While the policies of the increase of interest rate, the increase of bank’s saving, the sales 
of gold and foreign reserves all together were not valid to suppress the wartime price 
inflation. Besides, the statistics result shows that the generally increasing agricultural 
production during the wartime was not related with price inflation. 
Our analysis in section 5.5 not only discusses the impact of the National 
Government’s own policies on price inflation, but also discusses the impact of trade 
wars and currency wars between Free China, the Japanese-occupied areas (Occupied 
China and Manchukuo), and the Communist-occupied area on price inflation in these 
three regions. Although no specific statistics were available, evidence shows that in 
order to purchase export goods, the Chinese government relied on printing currency to 
make up for its fiscal deficit, which also partly caused the increase of price. During the 
wartime, insufficient supply of factory products also led to rising prices in Free China. 
These two were all related to the fact that most of the industries were in Occupied China 
and Manchuria. Besides, the reduction of the circulation area of Fabi caused by the 
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Japanese occupation also partly caused Free China’s price inflation. At the same time, 
the Japanese-occupied areas (Occupied China and Manchukuo) and the Chinese 
Communist Party fought currency wars with Free China to destroy or distort the 
financial order of Free China in this way. 
Japan tried to obtain foreign currency by issuing fake Fabi, while the Chinese 
Communist Party forced Fabi out of the Communist-occupied area through three 
currency reforms. At the same time, our research also points out that there was wartime 
price inflation in both Free China, the Communist-occupied area, and the Japanese-
occupied areas (Occupied China and Manchukuo). Therefore, in any of these three 
regions, their economies were affected by wartime expansionary monetary policy and 
price inflation. On the side of Free China, we conclude that although the issue of 
additional currency during the war did temporarily resolve the issue of military 
expenditures, it had a very serious negative impact on the wartime economy, which 
would inevitably bring many difficulties to the post-war economic reconstruction. The 
empirical result of our research matches as the same of what economic theory teaches 
us on how war could distort the economy causing severe wartime price inflation. From 
another perspective, our analysis also points out that there was controversy as to 
whether the continuous nationalization of banks and the government’s gradual control 
of the local, private, and spontaneously free banks during the wartime were conducive 
to resisting Japanese aggression and stabilizing the financial order of free China. While 
at the same time, China failed its 1935 currency reform plan to establish a central 
reserve banking institution as local, private, and spontaneously free banking institutions 
still existed. Moreover, we also point out that the central banking system in the wartime 
did not complete the central bank’s comprehensive monopoly of currency issuance 
banking system established in 1935. The reform of the entire banking system had not 
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advanced or retreated, which had brought uncertainty to the post-war central banking 
system and even to post-war economic construction throughout China. We also point 
out that it was not the opinions of Chinese and foreign financial and economic experts 
such as T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung, and A. Young that China’s central banking system 
should adopt an aggressive currency issuance policy instead of issuing government 
bonds and tightening (military) expenditures during the war, but the final decision of the 
National Government leader Chiang Kai-shek. Although Chiang Kai-shek led the 
victory of Free China in the military side, his status as an economic layman brought 
vicious wartime price inflation to Free China. In addition, this central planning 
decision-making system also brings hidden dangers to future post-war economic 
reconstruction. In any case, after all, Free China won the war in 1945. However, facing 
the problems of price inflation, economic reconstruction, and reconciliation between the 
National Government and the Chinese Communist Party at the end of the war, the 
stability of the post-war banking system became an unavoidable issue. This topic will 
be discussed in the next chapter of the thesis. 
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Chapter 6  
Hyperinflation, the Collapse of China’s First Modern Central Banking System  
and the Communist Revolution, 1945-1949 
Abstract: This chapter analyzes the conditions and the collapse of China’s first modern 
central banking institutions during the Chinese Civil War. Although China established 
its first modern central bank in 1928, along with its 1933 silver-standard reform and its 
1935 fiat currency reform, due to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the 
banking reform ended. Because China passed its first democratically created 
Constitution in 1946, becoming the world’s largest democratic country at the time, the 
post-WWII China was originally expected to establish a stable banking system. 
However, during the following Chinese Civil War period, not only the central banking 
experiment failed by a huge price inflation and a chaotic economic order, but the 
government of Republic of China was also defeated militarily by the Chinese 
Communist Party. This chapter provides a quantitative, qualitative, and synthetic 
analysis of the collapse of China’s first modern central banking system and its price 
hyperinflation during the Chinese Civil War. Based on the above political background, 
this chapter not only provides a brief description of the Chinese economy during the 
Chinese Civil War, but also an in-depth analysis of the process and the reasons why two 
currency systems, the Fabi and the Gold Yuan Notes, collapsed successively during the 
Civil War. This chapter also synthesizes the economic, political, and social 
consequences of the wartime expansionary monetary policy and its price hyperinflation. 
The massive issuance of currency and its subsequent price hyperinflation in response to 
military expenditures later became the biggest feature of China’s economy during the 
Civil War. We point out that President Chiang Kai-shek and the government of the 
Republic of China must bear the ultimate responsibility for the collapse of the monetary 
system and price hyperinflation as they ignored all the suggestions of the Chinese and 
foreign economists who opposed the payment of military spending through excessive 
monetary expansion policy. An original evaluation of the economic and monetary 
policy debates during the Civil War is provided in this chapter. Besides, we also point 
out that the Marshall Plan for China, which arrived lately in 1948, was useless to 
stabilize the Chinese economy and its monetary system. The chapter concludes by 
pointing out that the Chinese Civil War and the collapse of China’s first central banking 
system has had a profound impact on the contemporary cross-strait relationship among 
the Communist Chinese Mainland and the Republic of China on Taiwan. 
JEL Classifications: B2, B53, E42, N15, N25, N45. 
 
Key words: central banking, Chinese Civil War, hyperinflation, Fabi, Gold Yuan Notes
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a quantitative, qualitative, and synthetical analysis of the 
collapse of China’s first modern central banking system and its price hyperinflation 
during the complicated and chaotic Chinese Civil War. Section 6.2 demonstrates the 
political and economic background of the Chinese Civil War. Section 6.2.1 is regarding 
the 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China and the Chinese Civil War. On 
December 25, 1946, the National Constituent Assembly passed the Constitution of the 
Republic of China, which was the first time in Chinese history that a constitution 
through constitutional and democratic procedures was enacted. From November 1947 to 
January 1948, the first time in the entire history of China, millions of Chinese people 
voted for their own representatives of the first National Assembly and the members of 
the first Legislative Yuan. The Republic of China became the largest democracy in the 
world at the time. The National Assembly elected Chiang Kai-shek as the first 
democratically elected President of the ROC. On May 20, Chiang Kai-shek was sworn 
in office. However, due to military failure and mismanagement of the economy and 
price hyperinflation, the Chinese Communist Party occupied the majority of the Chinese 
Mainland in 1949, and the government of the free Republic of China had to withdraw 
itself to Taiwan in the same year till now.  
Section 6.2.2 provides a brief description of the Chinese economy during the 
Chinese Civil War. Among all the economic features, the massive issuance of currency 
in response to military expenditures later became the biggest feature of China’s 
economy during the Civil War, resulting price hyperinflation. However, the 
responsibility for the failure of the ROC government’s monetary policy must be upon 
their shoulders, because the various measures proposed by Chinese and foreign 
economists during the Civil War to deal with price hyperinflation were never adopted. 
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Our analysis in section 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 provide an original evaluation of the economic 
and monetary policy debates during the periods of Fabi and Gold Yuan Notes 
respectively.  
Section 6.3 systematically reviews the process of Fabi’s price hyperinflation 
from 1945 to 1948. In section 6.3.1, we have pointed out that the previous issued Fabi 
and its price inflation during the Second Sino-Japanese War promoted price inflation 
during the Chinese Civil War. This understanding is very important because it helps us 
realize that the Civil War’s price hyperinflation during was not a static and short-term 
process, but a dynamic economic phenomenon linked to the expansionary monetary 
policy and price inflation in the previous wartime. Section 6.3.2 shows the data of 
Fabi’s monetary expansion and its price hyperinflation during the Civil War. Section 
6.3.3 to 6.3.8 deals with each of the above topics respectively. Here, it needs to be 
emphasized again our conclusion in section 6.3.7 that the failure of international 
cooperation is an important reason for the collapse of Fabi. Since the Marshall Plan for 
China was not approved until 1948, it became an empty check. Section 6.4 provides an 
analysis of the possible consequences of the Civil War’s Fabi price hyperinflation from 
1945 to 1948. Empirical evidence and statistics show Fabi’s price hyperinflation 
distorted entrepreneurial production, ordinary people’s life (especially the purchasing 
power of the banknotes that they held), and social orders.  
Like section 6.3, section 6.5 systematically reviews the process of Gold Yuan 
Notes’ price hyperinflation from 1948 to 1949. In section 6.6, we point out that Gold 
Yuan Notes’ expansionary monetary policy and its price hyperinflation also distorted 
the economic, political and social orders like Fabi. 
Section 6.7 is the conclusion.  
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6.2 Political and Economic Background during the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1949 
This section reviews the political and economic background during the Chinese 
Civil War. Section 6.2.1 demonstrates the 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China 
and the Chinese Civil War. Section 6.2.2 deals with the economic conditions during the 
Civil War. Section 6.2.3 and section 6.2.4 separately review the economic and monetary 
policy debates during the period of Fabi (1945-1948) and the period of Gold Yuan 
Notes (1948-1949).  
6.2.1 The 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China and the Chinese Civil War 
This section reviews the political background during the Chinese Civil War. 
Section 6.2.1.1 demonstrates the 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China as an 
attempt to constitutional democracy. Section 6.2.1.2 briefly reviews the process of the 
Chinese Civil War. 
6.2.1.1 The 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China: an attempt in 
constitutional democracy. Despite the complicated situations in the Second Sino-
Japanese War (1937-1945), China entered another chaotic period after 1945. On August 
15, 1945, Japan surrendered to the Republic of China (ROC). The Chongqing 
Negotiations between the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) reached the “Double Ten Agreement,” a consensus on the nationalization of the 
military and the constitutional democracy, which once brought a glimmer of hope for 
peace to the Chinese people.726 The CCP even participated in the early drafting of the 
formal constitution of the ROC.  
On December 25, 1946, the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) passed the 
Constitution of the Republic of China, 727 which was the first time in Chinese history a 
726 References of the Chongqing Negotiations, see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 423-424) and C. 
Wang (2000, pp. 28-58). 
727 Although the study of the long-term institutional influence of the 1946 Constitution of the ROC on 
Mainland China and Taiwan is not the focus of this thesis, due to the lack of relevant research, we argue 
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constitution through constitutional and democratic procedures was enacted. 728 From 
November 1947 to January 1948, the first time in the entire history of China, millions of 
Chinese people voted for their own representatives of the first National Assembly and 
the members of the first Legislative Yuan. The two direct elections made the Republic 
of China became the largest democracy in the world at the time. The 461 million 
Chinese people directly authorized their legislative representatives (an average of 
600,000 people elected a member of one member of the Legislative Yuan).729 From 
March 29 to May 1, 1948, with the enormous prestige of leading the country for the 
eight-year fight against the Japanese invaders, the National Assembly elected Chiang 
Kai-shek as the first democratically elected President of the ROC. On May 20, Chiang 
Kai-shek was sworn in office. 
6.2.1.2 The Chinese Civil War. On the surface, everything seemed to be 
moving towards a positive and peaceful direction. It seemed that Sun Yat-sen’s 
that the annotation should be marked to attract the attention of later scholars. For the original texts of the 
Constitution of the Republic of China, see National Constituent Assembly (1947). For other references of 
the National Assembly, see F. Li (2009). The work of designating the formal constitution of the Republic 
of China dates back to 1912 when the ROC was just established. References of the history of the 
formulation of the ROC constitution, see C. Chang (1947, 1948), J. Zhang & X. Zeng (1979), Z. Jing 
(1984), D. Zheng (2003a, 2003b), B. Lv (2013), Y. Han (2014), T. Wang (2014), and Fairbank & 
Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 741-742). References of the formulation process of the Constitution of the 
Republic of China, see Secretariat of the National Constituent Assembly (1946), C. Chang (1947, 1948), 
National Constituent Assembly (1947), J. Zhang & Zeng (1979), Z. Jing (1984), D. Zheng (2003a, 
2003b), B. Lv (2013), Y. Han (2014), T. Wang (2014), Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 741-742), D. 
Zheng (2003a, 2003b), and Y. Han (2014). For more about the voting process of the representatives of the 
National Constituent Assembly, see Secretariat of the National Constituent Assembly (1946) and Z. Jing 
(1984). H. Lee (2000) argues that though during the voting process, some cases of voting fraud appeared, 
overall, the election was going smoothly, and the final National Constitutional Convention was held 
successfully. Thanks to Jason Li, Tyler Xiong, Alan Bi, and Chao Pan for inspiring the author in this part 
of the discussion. 
728 The Constitution of the ROC has so far been used in the Taiwan Area of the Republic of China. The 
reason why Taiwan adopted the Constitution of the Republic of China was because Taiwan was already 
the territory of the ROC when the Constitution was enacted. It was not until 1949 that the Nationalists 
failed the Civil War that Taiwan and Mainland China were separated and became two de facto countries. 
For more about the elected Taiwan’s representatives of the NCA and its representatives of the First 
National Assembly to Nanjing, see Secretariat of the National Constituent Assembly (1946, pp.17-18, pp. 
64-65) and S. Li (2016). For the topic of the Taiwanization of the Constitution of the Republic of China, 
see T. Wang (2014). Based on the above references, we can conclude that in view of the fact that the 1946 
Constitution of the Republic of China was produced through the constitutional procedure of the whole 
Chinese people, the Republic of China is still the legitimate China. 
729 For the population of China in 1948, see The Washington Post (1947) and The Canberra Times (1947).  
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Minshengism (Government for the People) was achieved in China.730 However, the 
mutual distrust between the ROC government and the CCP gradually escalated the 
short-term ceasefire between the two sides into a civil war and the CCP withdrew from 
the constitution creation process. Internationally speaking, the US government sent 
General George Marshall’s mission from 1946 to 1947 to regulate the conflicts between 
the Chinese government and the Communist Party but ultimately failed.731 In July 1946, 
the CCP’s army was officially and publicly separated from the government and replaced 
its name by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).732  
As the conflict between the government and the Communist Party intensified, 
in May 1948, the National Assembly enacted the “Temporary Provisions Effective 
During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist 
Rebellion.”733 The pass of this act means that the Chinese Civil War started officially. 
In the beginning of the Civil War, the government initially won some victories on the 
battlefields, but after 1948, mainly due to the government’s wrong military strategy, the 
military situation turned sharply, and the government troops were facing successive 
failures. 734  On October 1, 1949, the CCP Chairman Mao Zedong announced the 
730 See Y. Sun (1924). 
731 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 758), C. Wang (2000, pp. 505-566, pp. 128-136), and X. Han & 
K. Jiang (2011, p. 8225). 
732 For more about the process of the Civil War, see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 723-788), C. 
Wang (2000). Mao (1947/1991, 1948/1991), Z. Zhu & Tao (2000), Chassin (1966), Y. Jiang (2013), Party 
History Research Center and S. Yan (1999). 
733 The full name of the Temporary Provisions in Chinese is “अ଑ᡑҲᱲᵏ㠘ᱲọⅮ.” For more about 
the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the 
Communist Rebellion, see C. Chang (1947, 1948), J. Zhang & X. Zeng (1979), D. Zheng (2003a, 2003b), 
B. Lv (2013), and Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 741-742). 
734 For more about the wrong war strategies of Chiang, see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 774-775, 
pp.778-779, pp. 780-787) and Z. Zhu & Tao (2000, p. 65, pp. 72-79, pp. 81-82, p. 94, p. 95, p. 98, pp. 
100-101, p. 120, p. 122,  pp. 162-192pp. 282-283, pp. 427-455, , pp. 600-619, pp. 709-731). Due to the 
above references, Chiang Kai-shek also liked to intervene in the combat plans without acquainting with 
the frontline military situations, rushing to issue operational orders, and leading to military defeats. F.A. 
Hayek, the Nobel laureate in economics in 1974, argues that central planning is challenging to carry out 
due to the lack of necessary knowledge (Hayek, 1937a, 1945). We consider that the Hayekian view can 
also be applied to military issues. It is difficult for the rear military chiefs who lack first-hand frontline 
military information to make accurate judgments about the war situation. We argue that Chiang Kai-shek 
made a mistake on this issue, who thought that he could fully grasp the frontline war situation when he 
was in the rear office. 
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establishment of the so-called People’s Republic of China in its new capital Beijing, 
formerly known as Beiping.735 At the end of April 1950, the PLA completely controlled 
the whole Mainland China and the ROC along with the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan 
island and other small islands nearby.736 The Communist Revolution succeeded and 
Chiang Kai-shek had to announce his temporary departure from the presidency due to 
his political and military failures on January 21, 1949.737  
In 1950, Chiang Kai-shek announced the reinstatement of the President of the 
Republic of China in Taipei. In 1971, the Republic of China, a founding and permanent 
member of the United Nations, withdrew from the United Nations due to CCP factors. 
In 1972, Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, became Premier of the 
Republic of China, and subsequently carried out the Hayekian market-oriented 
economic reform in Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek died in his presidency in 1975. In 1979, 
Chiang Ching-kuo was elected President of the Republic of China. In 1987, one year 
before his death, he announced the lifting of 38-year martial law due to the rebellion of 
the Chinese Communist Party and the restoration of political democratization. In 1996, 
the Republic of China held direct presidential elections in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, 
and Matsu. Chiang Ching-kuo’s disciple Lee Teng-hui was elected as the first directly 
elected President of the Republic of China. Thus, the complete political democratization 
in Chinese history was achieved in the Free Area of the Republic of China. Sun Yat-
sen’s Three Principle of the People was realized in the Taiwan Area of the Republic of 
China.738 In 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Chen Shui-
bian was elected President of the Republic of China. The Kuomintang’s 72-year control 
735 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 785) and Z. Zhu & Tao (2000, pp. 673-689). 
736 References of the Communists’ final attack on the ROC armies, see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, 
pp. 782-785) and Z. Zhu & Tao (2000, pp. 689-717). 
737 For Chiang Kai-shek’s temporary departure of presidency, see Y. Li & Z. Zhang (1995, p. 375), Z. Zhu 
& Tao (2000, pp. 445-507), Hong (2008, p. 550), and K. Chang (1958, p. 84). For Chiang’s official 
biography, see Qin (1978). For the autobiography of Chiang’s political rival Li Zongren during the Civil 
War period Nationalists, see Z. Li (1979). 
738 For a brief evaluation of Sun Yat-sen’s theory, see section 4.1.1.2 of Chapter 4. 
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of the Republic of China’s central government since 1928 and its 51-year rule of 
Taiwan since the Communist Revolution in 1949 ended. Subsequently, the Kuomintang 
and the Democratic Progressive Party continued to take turns, and Taiwan not only 
achieved economic liberalization, but also achieved a stable two-party system.739  
After 1949, the Republic of China on Taiwan gradually became an 
economically successful market economy country since the 1970s, and after the direct 
presidential election in 1996, it became the first fully constitutional and democratic 
country in Chinese history, ranked among the developed countries in the world. At the 
same time, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, Mainland China has 
experienced major historical events such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962), the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the economic reforms since 1978, and the June 4th 
Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. It is difficult to make a brief and sloppy evaluation of the 
results of the Chinese Communist Party ruling in Mainland China. However, it can be 
said that the result of the Chinese Civil War from 1945 to 1949 was a watershed in a 
very historical development of China, and the achievements made by the Republic of 
China on Taiwan are undoubtedly a positive asset that the Chinese on both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait should be proud of. 
6.2.2 Economic Conditions during the Chinese Civil War 
This section briefly reviews China’s economic conditions doing the Chinese 
Civil War. Section 6.2.2.1 demonstrates the Civil War’s general economic condition. 
Section 6.2.2.2 introduces the short period of economic stability from August to 
December 1945. Section 6.2.2.3 reviews the issues of monetary expansion, military 
739 For the politics of the Republic of China on Taiwan since 1949, see Chao $ Myers (1994), T. S. Wang 
(2014), Jain (1963), T. W. Lee (1996), T. I. Wang & I. C. Liu (2004). About Chiang Ching-kuo’s political 
democratization reform in Taiwan and his resume, see Taylor (2009) and J. Zeng & Liang (2006). 
Regarding the economic theory of Chiang Ching-kuo’s economic advisor, Sho-Chieh Tsiang (a Hayekian 
economist who led the reform of Taiwan’s economic liberalization), see H. Han (2015), T. Liu (2013). For 
the history of Taiwan under Japanese occupation (1895-1945), see Lamley (1997). 
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expenditure, price hyperinflation, and taxation. Section 6.2.2.4 deals with the topic of 
the destruction of agriculture by the Civil War. 
6.2.2.1 The general economic condition: an exhausted economy and the 
difficulties of rehabilitation and reconstruction. The overall situation of China’s 
economy was not satisfactory months before the end of the war. During that period, 
savings and consumer goods were used to maintain Chinese people’s most basic 
survival. The taxation of the government and the army and the problem of deserters 
increasingly troubled Free China. In addition, 50 million demobilized soldiers needed to 
be housed. Millions of acres of farmland could not be produced because of the 
destruction of the war. The transportation lines in the country, especially in south China, 
had been severely damaged, and railways and other facilities needed to be rebuilt. The 
countryside and the urban factories needed people, funds, and equipment for postwar 
reconstruction.740 
Therefore, the government was facing a very difficult postwar reconstruction 
effort. However, as we pointed out in section 6.2.1.1, the escalating military conflict 
between the government and the Chinese Communist Party made the postwar peaceful 
economic reconstruction impossible. At the same time, the government’s reliance on 
printing banknotes to pay military expansion of the Civil War also caused price inflation 
and market discoordination. Coupled with the war factors, China’s economy was driven 
into total failure by war, monetary expansion, and price inflation. We will specifically 
analyze the consequences of these two factors on the Chinese economy and banking 
system from sections 6.3 to section 6.6.  
The Chinese government overestimated the economic stability factors that 
might occur after the end of Second Sino-Japanese War. It was overly optimistic of the 
740 See K. Chang (1958, p. 67). 
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strong productivity of the recovered Manchuria and Taiwan and the foreign exchange 
reserves of US$900 million reserves with 900 tales of gold reserve accumulated at the 
end of the Second Sino-Japanese War.741 After the end of Second Sino-Japanese War, 
the Chinese government adopted China’s traditional laissez-faire economic policy, and 
almost everything about production control, foreign exchange restrictions, and foreign 
trade regulations were eliminated. There were also some opinions which claimed that 
because the Chinese government was backward in technology at the time, it was 
difficult to control the economy even if the government took measures. 742  For the 
opinions of Chinese and Western economists on China’s economic and monetary policy 
during the Civil War period, see the following section 6.2.3 and section 6.2.4. 
Regarding the escalation of military conflicts and price inflation caused by 
indiscriminate currency issuance in response to wars, see sections 6.3 to section 6.6. In 
section 6.2.2.2 to section 6.2.2.5, we will briefly outline some characteristics of the 
Chinese economy during the Civil War. These characteristics were closely related to 
wartime price inflation, so their specific analysis will be presented in section 6.3 to 
section 6.6. 
6.2.2.2 A short period of economic stability from August to December 1945. 
From the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War in August 1945 to the end of 1945, the 
economic situation of the Republic of China showed signs of profitability in the short 
term. Section 6.2.2.2.1 demonstrates the recovering economy and financial system. 
Section 6.2.2.2.2 analyzes the decreasing of prices during that period.  
6.2.2.2.1 The recovering economy and financial system. The end of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War provided China a very precious opportunity to recover its 
economy which was distorted during the wartime. The more economic aids provided by 
741 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 424) and K. Chang (1958, p. 68). 
742 See K. Chang (1958, p. 68). 
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the United States, the more imported products, the recovery of production, and people’s 
longing for a better life in the postwar time all provided sufficient conditions for the 
recovery of the economy. 743 After the war, the United States provided about US$2 
billion in rehabilitation and military supplies to China.744 China's imports in 1945 were 
US$494.2 million, 15% less than the 588.2 million dollars in 1937.745 However, in 1946, 
China's imports were US$895 million, an increase of 81.1% over 1945.746 In 1946, in 
Shanghai, China’s financial and economic center, the registration numbers of new 
opened factories were 1992, reaching the numbers of 9258 in 1947, setting a historical 
record. In 1947, the number of spinning machines recovered to 90% before the war. The 
number of factories and workers in the paper industry had doubled before the war.747 In 
1947, the numbers of spinning machines recovered to 90% before the war.748 In 1947, 
the number of factories and workers in the paper industry doubled before the war, and 
the output increased by more than one third.749 
At the beginning of the end of the war, the National Government was also very 
confident in the recovery of economy.750 However, the wrong war strategy and wrong 
economic policies made the further recovery of economy impossible. Based on our 
discussed in section 6.2, if the Chinese government could solve its problems with the 
Communists either through in a peaceful negotiation or successfully eliminating the 
Communists in a very short time, the recovery of the Chinese economy, or even a freer, 
more capitalist and a more prosperous China would have emerged.  
743 References of the recovering economy and financial system, see C. Wang (2000, pp. 305-306), P. Yang 
(1963, p. 71), J. Zhu (2012, pp. 424-425), and K. Chang (1958, pp. 67-69, pp. 222-239, pp. 384-385). 
744 See P. Yang (1963, p. 71) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 424). 
745 See K. Chang (1958, pp. 384-385). 
746 See K. Chang (1958, pp. 384-385). 
747 See C. Wang (2000, p. 305). 
748 See C. Wang (2000, p. 305). 
749 See C. Wang (2000, p. 306). 
750 References of this paragraph see J. Zhu (2012, p. 424) and K. Chang (1958, p. 68, p. 222). 
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6.2.2.2.2 The decreasing price in short run, along with the performance of 
agricultural industry. The price was also decreasing in late 1945.751 The price started 
falling in the last week of August, which is in the same month when Japan declared its 
surrender on August 15. In Shanghai, the price of gold dropped by 90% and in the 
wartime capital Chongqing by 60%, while Fabi appreciated by 100% against the US 
dollar according to the market rate in Chongqing. The wholesale price index in 
Chungking dropped from 179,500 in August to 122,600 in September 1945 and fell 
again to 118, 417 in October. Meanwhile, the Shanghai index in terms of Fabi fell from 
43,200 in August to 34, 508 in September.752  
There are several reasons why the prices were decreasing in the short run after 
the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War.753 The first was that the agricultural harvest 
was relatively good in 1944 and 1945.754 From 1944 to 1945, the total receipts of rice 
and wheat in China were 2,869 metric tons, an increase of about 6.5% from 2,682 
metric tons from 1941 to 1942.755 The second was that a large amount of hoarded goods 
in the wartime were sold on the market instantly, causing a decrease in price.756 Many 
people had different anticipation of the economy in the immediate run in the postwar 
era, believing that it would benefit them more to sell the products that they had hoarded 
during the Sino-Japanese War.757 The third reason was that ceasefire provided people an 
emotional release, anticipating a better economic condition and anticipating a more 
controlled price.758 
751 References of the decreasing price in the late 1945, see K. Chang (1958, p. 69), Chou (1963/1969, p. 
23), and J. Zhu (2012, p. 425). 
752 See K. Chang (1958, p. 69). 
753 References of this paragraph see A. Young (1965, pp. 24-27), C. Wang, 2000 (pp. 309-316), K. Chang 
(1958, p. 69), and J. Zhu (2012, p. 425). 
754 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 425) and A. Young (1965, p. 25). 
755 See A. Young (1965, p. 25). 
756 See K. Chang (1958, p. 69) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 425). 
757 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 425) and K. Chang (1958, p. 69). 
758 See K. Chang (1958, p. 69) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 425). 
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The decreasing price showed that though the economic rehabilitation and 
reconstruction was arduous, the economy was gradually recovering step-by-step, and 
people’s faith in the future was also growing. This condition was a very precious chance 
for the Chinese government made some pro-recovery policies, as the entrepreneurs were 
starting new businesses and hired more workers, and the common people were 
reorganizing their life in a normal situation. If China caught up this precious 
opportunity to make the improved economic situation better, China could have achieved 
much prosperity and could have avoided the later tragic Civil War between the 
government and the Communists. 
6.2.2.3 Monetary expansion, military expenditure, price hyperinflation, 
and taxation. The biggest feature of China’s economy during the Civil War was the 
massive issuance of currency in response to military expenditures and the resulting 
price hyperinflation. In 1945, the central banking system issued C$1.03 trillion. In 1947, 
one year before the abolishment of Fabi, the amount of the issued Fabi was C$33.19 
trillion, which was 3,216.25% of the amount in 1945. As a result, the price level in 1947 
was 6337.34% of the amount in 1945.759 In 1946, military spending accounted for 60% 
of total expenditure.760 In 1947, military spending was 55% of total expenditure.761 As 
the government already had a severe  condition of the deficit, it had no choice but to 
borrow the money from the Central Bank to pay the military expansion, which caused 
price inflation.762 
In 1948, the collapse of Fabi made the Chinese government decide to issue 
new currency Gold Yuan Notes in response to the increasingly collapsed Fabi system. 
As the government had no other method to pay the expense of the Civil War, the 
759 All the related data of military expenditures can be seen in Figure 6.1 below. 
760 See K. Chang (1958, pp. 71-72). 
761 See K. Chang (1958, pp. 71-72). 
762 The Deficit of the National Government in 1945 was C$1,106,698 million, in 1946 was C$4,697,802 
million, in 1948 was C$29,329,512 million. See K. Chang (1958, p. 374). 
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original quota of GY$2 billion was also cancelled and the government started to printing 
more Gold Yuan Notes to pay the war expense after the Amended Measures for the 
Issuance of Gold Yuan Notes decree was enacted.763 Since then, the amounts of the 
issued Gold Yuan Notes started to increase rapidly. In November 1948, the issued 
amount of it was GY$3.39 billion, and in April 1949 it was GY$679.456 billion.764 
From August 1948 to the Fall of Shanghai in May 1949, the issuance of the Gold Yuan 
Notes has increased by more than 19,9423%.765 After breaking through the initially 
agreed issuance quota, the face value of Gold Yuan Notes was also increasing. In March 
1949, the government issued the banknote’s face value of GY$5,000 and GY$10,000; 
in April, the newly issued banknote’s face value was GY$100,000; in May, the newly 
issued currencies’ face value was GY$500,000 and GY$1 million. 766  Hence, the 
issuance of Gold Yuan Notes led to price hyperinflation. If the price index in Shanghai 
of Gold Yuan Notes in August 1948 was 100, then the price index of it in April 1949 
was 20,957,009.767 
The National Government had a huge debt problem since the victory of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War in 1945. As we have mentioned before, the Chinese 
government had to a considerable expense of its military force to resist and exterminate 
the Communists’ expansion and to restore its military force in the former Japanese-
occupied areas. In 1946, military spending accounted for 60% of total expenditure. In 
1947, it was 55% of total expenditure.768 Until the government of the Republic of China 
moved to Taiwan in 1949, the Chinese government’s military expenditure in response 
to the Civil War was never less than half of its annual financial support. On one hand, 
763 The original name of the degree in Chinese was “؞↓䠁ൃࡨⲬ㹼䗖⌅.” For the references of the 
decree, see ACPBC (1991, p. 610) and Hong (2008, p. 541). 
764 See Hong (2008, p. 543) and D. Liu (1992, pp. 284-285). 
765 The original name of the Fall of Shanghai was “к⎧␚䲧.” 
766 See Hong (2008, p. 542). 
767 See K. Chang (1958, p.373). 
768 See K. Chang (1958, pp. 71-72). 
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the direct tax policy that continued from the ancient Chinese dynasties to the period of 
the Second Sino-Japanese War continued. According to our calculation, from 1945 to 
1947, the proportions of government direct tax revenue to government fiscal revenue 
were 16.7%, 8.9%, and 14.3% respectively.769 Due to war factors, there are no relevant 
statistical data for 1948 and 1949, from which we can speculate that with the deepening 
of the Civil War since 1948, the war had serious negative impact on government 
revenue. On the one hand, the government’s tax revenue was restricted, but on the other 
hand, direct taxes also increase the burden on the taxed Chinese people. Even adding 
the revenue from the sales of government bonds, from 1945 to 1948, government 
revenue accounted for 52.8%, 38.0%, 32/4%, and 34.8% of fiscal expenditure 
respectively.770 Almost all of the government’s fiscal and military expenditures were 
solved by printing new banknotes. Therefore, the severe degree of deterioration of 
China’s economy and price inflation during the Civil War can be imagined. For the 
specific discussion between the relationship between the Civil War’s taxation and price 
inflation, see section 6.3.4. 
6.2.2.4 From the abundant foreign exchange reserves to its depletion. On 
March 4, 1946, the Central Bank of China officially opened the foreign exchange 
market.  In the beginning, when the foreign exchange market was opened, the exchange 
rate of Fabi to the US dollar was C$2020 to US$1. In the same month, on the black-
market, the exchange rate of Fabi to the US dollar was C$2006 to $1.771 Though the 
Chinese government had several foreign reserve crises during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, with the foreign assist, especially the US one, and the foreign reserves that the 
National Government received from the former Japanese-occupied areas, the National 
769 Our statistical results are calculated based on K. Chang’s (1958, p. 158) government direct tax revenue 
and total revenue from 1945 to 1947. 
770 See K. Chang (1958, p. 158). 
771 See Figure 6.10 below. 
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Government accumulated a considerable amount of money. 772  After the war, the 
National Government had US$900 million reserves with 900 tales of gold reserve.773 
However, as the Civil War deepened, the government’s foreign exchange reserves 
gradually dried up. In 1946 alone, the government’s foreign reserve situation 
deteriorated. The consumption of government’s reserve of gold and foreign exchange 
was very high and by November 1946 it had consumed foreign exchange of $450 
million.774  In August 1946, in the black-market, the US dollar was C$2,909 and in 
February 1947 it was C$12,657, rising more than three times. In March 1946, as the 
Secretary of State, George Marshall proposed his “Marshall Plan of China”, expressing 
that United States would give China a loan of US$500 million.775  Although the finally 
arrived to China in 1948, there was still no way to change the Chinese government’s 
defeat in the Civil War, whether militarily or economically. 
6.2.2.5 The destruction of agriculture by war. In section 6.2.2.2.2 above, we 
have pointed out that within a few months after the end of the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, agricultural production resumed. However, as the Civil War progressed, the 
agricultural situation deteriorated. Price hyperinflation also gradually caused the decline 
of the purchasing power of farmers.776 The prices of various industrial products were 
increasing much quicker than the increase in the prices of agricultural products. This 
phenomenon means that the farmers’ actual money income and purchasing power 
money were declining. This situation lasted from the period of the Second Sino-
Japanese War (1937-1945) to the time after the war. Whether it was before and after the 
war, the prices of agricultural products were always lower than the prices of industrial 
772 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 424), and K. Chang (1958, pp. 259-261). 
773 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 424). 
774 See P. Yang (1963, p. 75). 
775 See Hong (2008, p. 507). 
776 Reference of this paragraph see G. Wu (1958, pp. 174-179), Hong (2008, pp. 527-528), P. Yang (1963, 
pp. 140-141), and X. Fang (1948). 
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products. The price difference between agricultural products and industrial products was 
around three times before the war and after.777 As the price hyperinflation reduced the 
purchasing power of urban populations, the output of agricultural products was also 
decreasing (see Figure 6.13 below in this chapter).778 The yield of tea in 1946 was 82% 
lower than the average yield of it from 1933 to 1937.779 The yield of eggs was reduced 
by 6.7% in 1946 compared to 1936.780 The price of tung oil in 1946 was only 50% of its 
price before the Second Sino-Japanese War.781 The ratio of price indices of finished 
products to raw materials that related to agricultural industry were always more than 
one during the Civil War period, which means that although agricultural industry was 
also facing price inflation, compared the degree of price inflation of other industries, the 
Chinese farmers were facing a de facto loss during the Civil War period. In the next 
section 6.2.3, we analyze the economic and monetary policy debates during the period 
of Fabi, 1945-1948. In the next section 6.2.3, we review the economic and monetary 
policy debates during the period of Fabi, 1945-1948. 
6.2.3 Economic and Monetary Policy Debates During the Period of Fabi, 1945-
1948 
This section reviews the economic and monetary policy debates during the 
period of Fabi (1945-1948) in the Chinese Civil War. Though only four years long, as 
the developing economic crisis and Civil War’s price hyperinflation, the Chinese 
economists, policy makers, and the foreign monetary experts all provided their 
suggestions on the stability of Chinese central banking and monetary institutions. 
6.2.3.1 Yang Peixin and his proposals of privatization, anti-inflation, and 
democratization to stabilize the economy and monetary system. As a financial 
777 See G. Wu (1958, pp. 174-179) and P. Yang (1963, p. 140). 
778 See Figure 6.13. 
779 See X. Fang (1948). 
780 See X. Fang (1948). 
781 See X. Fang (1948). 
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journalist, during the Civil War time, Yang wrote two books from his first-hand 
materials and authoritative sources of data, forming a systematic analysis. His first book 
China’s Economic Trends was written in 1946 after the end of the Second World War 
and the Second Sino-Japanese War, focusing on China’s economic and monetary 
conditions of 1945, proposing his warnings and predictions of central banking 
hyperinflation, as well as criticizing the bureaucratic-capitalist system, and finally 
calling for privatization to reduce government size and power to prevent hyperinflation.  
6.2.3.1.1 Being against the Nationalist’s centrally planned economy. In terms 
of economic policy, Yang opposed the National Government’s centrally planned 
economy (which regulates the prices, the sales, and the buying of products) and 
expansionary monetary policy, advocating a postwar economic privatization and 
eliminating state-owned capitals and enterprises. 782  He criticized the government 
planned economy and the nationalization of private enterprises, which led to corruption 
and money wasting and caused state privilege and the state monopoly of the 
economy. 783 He assumed that the planned economy was conducive to the government’s 
printing of banknotes to support the interests of the state- relevant enterprises, resulting 
in issuing more and more banknotes, and leading to inflation. Thus, Yang not only 
advocates the abolition of the planned economy, but also the abolition of the 
inflationary policies, believing that inflation must stop as soon as possible.  
6.2.3.1.2 Anti-inflation proposal. Besides, Yang argued that the decline of 
prices in the short run after the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War was a normal  
economic phenomenon (as the war pressure on the increase of prices disappeared), 
pointing out that the public was opposed to expansionary monetary policy and 
782 The original Chinese texts of centrally planned economy in P. Yang’s description is “㎡ࡦ㏃☏.” 
783 P. Yang deems that the National Government’s planned economy is “the invention of Italy and the 
German fascists” and the reason why the National Government proposed this policy is that it found it was 
“profitable”, which can help the government get more financial support (P. Yang, 1963, p. 12, own 
translation). 
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predicting that if the government could it’s expansionary monetary policy “prices will 
rise again in the next two years.”784 Yang also analyzed the government’s gold and 
foreign exchange policy in 1945 deeming that “gold and foreign exchange policy have 
become the only means for the government to stabilize prices.”785 Thus, he believed that 
the gold and foreign exchange policy could only be effective in the short term. Yang 
advocated that the government should solve its fiscal deficits through the issuance of 
government bonds instead of printing new paper money as he considers that the 
expansionary monetary policy had caused various political and economic problems as 
above.  
Yang demonstrated his understanding of the negative effects of rising prices 
caused by inflation. He points out that expansionary monetary police and price inflation 
caused a disequilibrium in the monetary economy. 
“Inflation deprives the purchasing power of soldiers, civil servants, teachers, 
and employees, making the goods impossible to be sold out. This has created a 
phenomenon: on one hand the market has a lack of materials, while people 
have no money to buy products - this is a Chinese-style overproduction - which 
can be called a wartime financial crisis.” (P. Yang, 1946, p. 51, p. 123, own 
translation)  
Therefore, he believed that inflation could lead to a disequilibrium between the supply 
of products/currency and the demand of products/currency. 
In The Theory of China’s Inflation (1948), regarding price inflation, Yang 
profoundly pointed out that the issuance of Fabi was the basis of price inflation, making 
Fabi become a currency of an indefinite issue (as the Chinese currency before the 
784 See P. Yang (1946, p. 15), own translation. 
785 See P. Yang (1946, p. 8), own translation. 
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issuance of Fabi all could be exchanged for silver).786 He also believed that moderate 
price inflation is conducive to economic prosperity, while price hyperinflation will lead 
to a decline in real wage rates.787 Moreover, Yang criticized the government’s tax and 
inflation policies of indiscriminate currency issuance created a polarization between the 
rich and the poor, depriving the wealth of common people.788 He criticizes that in the 
war of resisting the Japanese, the government’s taxation on 99% of the poor and the 
public rather than on 1% of the bureaucratic capital class was actually exploiting the 
common Chinese people. The expansionary monetary policy made the bureaucratic 
class benefited from cheap credit and financial speculation through the first-hand 
internal information from the government, while “small and medium-sized banks and 
lower-class workers were liquidated by expansionary monetary policy.”789 
6.2.3.1.3 The proposal of political democratization. Furthermore, he 
advocated political democratization, the reduction the size of the government, and the 
elimination of the government economic intervention, thinking that “all economic 
consequences today are caused by political reasons.” 790  This proposal matched the 
intention of the implementation of the 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China. 
However, the Chinese government’s policy failure in terms of economy and military, 
along with the ambitious Communists, making his proposal become impossible after the 
end of Civil War. 
6.2.3.2 Wu Chi-yuen and his just price proposal. In Wu Chi-yuan’s From 
Wartime Economy to Peacetime Economy (1946a), he supported the policy of the 
abolishment of Fabi establishing another new 100% reserve central banking system. In 
786 See P. Yang (1948, p. 1), own translation. 
787 See P. Yang (1948, p. 2), own translation. 
788 See P. Yang (1948, p. 8, p. 11). 
789 See P. Yang (1948, p. 21), own translation. 
790 See P. Yang (1948, p. 7), own translation. 
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addition, he also advocated a stable currency system through price control, free 
exchange, tax increase and reduction of government-owned industries. 
6.2.3.2.1 Being against the traditional gold standard, supporting central 
banking 100% reserve, and the proposal of abolishing Fabi. Wu denied the traditional 
gold standard and supported the paper money standard, believing that Chinese currency 
should be linked to the dollar, not gold as “China’s gold production is limited, and its 
national strength is not sufficient; thus, there is no need for China to adopt a gold 
standard.”791 The second reason why Wu opposed gold standard was that he deemed 
that in the 19th century, the results of the Western countries who implemented the gold 
standard were not ideal, and “for a country [like China] with a deficit in the balance of 
payments, the implementation of the gold standard will lead to the weakening of the 
economy and production.” 792  Besides, Wu advocated that the government should 
authorize the central bank and the designated commercial banks to issue a new currency 
abolishing Fabi.793 He deemed that the new currency issued by the government should 
have two types. The first type is that the government entrusts the banks to issue 
banknotes without any reserve support. The second is the currency of 100% gold and 
foreign exchange reserves. However, he did not say the issuance ratio of the two types 
of currency. In addition, Wu advocated that the government should adopt the principle 
of the transparency of currency issuance by using the to regulate currency issuance.  
6.2.3.2.2 Theory of just price, economic cycle, and the psychological effects 
of price inflation. Wu considered that the government should stabilize prices through 
price controls and the price adjustment between different regions, and through the 
acquisition of export commodities.794 However, Wu did not demonstrate the negative 
791 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 315), own translation. 
792 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 315), own translation. 
793 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, pp. 316-317), own translation. 
794 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 387). 
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effects caused by price control to the economy (the cronyism and government-issued 
privilege, corruption, and the invalidity of price adjustment) as Yang Peixin did. He 
reckoned that the postwar prices should be set at 2000 times of the pre-war prices to 
curb inflation.795 However, Wu did not provide any logical deduction of his argument, 
just arguing that that such prices were reasonable. Subsequently, Wu said that in order 
to maintain the price level at 2000 times of the pre-war prices (as we have seen, 
previously Wu argues that the postwar prices should be set at 2000 times of the pre-war 
prices), the amount of Fabi issued should be increased to about C$2 trillion.796 However, 
Wu still did not give any detailed reasons.797 
Wu also pointed out that the rising prices would lead to economic recession 
and the polarization between rich and poor. Besides, Wu also predicted that the soldiers, 
the public servants, and the teachers might no longer endure the oppression that 
inflation brought on their lives in the postwar era.798 He considered that although the 
increasing prices can stimulate industrial production, but the postwar prices were 
already in a state of malignant rise. “To stimulate production by increasing prices is just 
like quenching a thirst with poison, which will trigger the recession of business and 
industry.”799 Therefore, he reckoned that the postwar price conditions caused an unfair 
distribution of social wealth.800 Thus, the view that Wu holds on how price inflation can 
795 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 307), own translation. 
796 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 337). 
797 For Wu Chi-yuen's other analysis on how the Civil War and central banking monetary inflation caused 
price hyperinflation and the wealth gap between the rich and the poor, see Chi-yuen Wu (1946b). In this 
paper, he pointed out that “the civil war itself is not just a big economic drain, but also... accelerating the 
economic collapse, delaying economic construction, which is an economic destruction and struggle 
caused by endless disasters.” He assessed that the postwar price hyperinflation was caused by the civil 
war is profound. However, he did not explicitly point out how price inflation caused the widen gap 
between the rich and the poor. 
798 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 374). 
799 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 373), own translation. 
800 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 373). 
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cause the economic gap between the rich and the poor is consistent with the analysis of 
the Austrian Business Cycle Theory.801 
Wu emphasized the impact of psychological effects on prices.802 He argued 
that due to of psychological effects “the increase of banknote issuance will not 
necessarily lead to price increases.” 803  Thus, Wu advocated the establishment of a 
special fund of C$1 trillion to regulate the market prices.804 However, where does the 
funding come from? Why does the amount have to be C$1 trillion? Wu here had the 
same problem as before because he still does not provide sufficient demonstration on 
this argument 
6.2.3.2.3 Theory of exchange rate and non-interventionism. Wu proposed the 
exchange rate of the new currency in future with foreign currencies and Fabi. He argued 
that the government should not intervene the market other than the open market 
operation.805 He indicated that “price and exchange rate should find a reasonable and 
natural level by themselves.”806 The government should be “allowing the free trade of 
US dollars.”807 Besides, he considered that opening up the foreign exchange market can 
help stabilize the psychology of the market participants emphasizing the role of 
psychological factors in formulizing price.808 However, again, Wu put forward another 
contradictory claim. He claimed that when the exchange rate stabilizes to a certain level, 
the government can set an official exchange rate according to this level, which is in 
contradiction with the previous Wu’s claim that the government should not intervene in 
801 For more about the Austrian Business Cycle Theory, see Mises (1912/2009), Hayek (1931/1935), 
Huerta de Soto (1998/2010), and Bagus (2010/2012, 2015). Also see An Outline of International Price 
Theories (C. Y. Wu, 1939). 
802 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 407). 
803 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 408), own translation. 
804 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p, 386). 
805 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 306). 
806 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 309), own translation. Also see p. 345 of the same book. 
807 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 335), own translation. 
808 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 348). 
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the exchange rates.809 Subsequently, he advocated that the central bank should expand 
its control over foreign exchanges. 810  It should become the “real controller of the 
foreign exchange market [after the foreign exchange reform in February 1946].”811 For 
Wu, the government should impose its controls on foreign exchange that the designated 
banks should monopolize foreign exchange trading.812 Therefore, Wu Chi-yuen’s claim 
is completely distinct from that of Yang Peixin. 
6.2.3.2.4 Theory of using fiscal balance and taxation to suppress inflation. 
Wu advocated fiscal balance to suppress price inflation.813 Wu argued that wartime 
fiscal deficits were the primary cause of price inflation, claiming that it was a consensus 
for the Chinese people at that time.814 Thus, Wu proposed to achieve the fiscal balance 
by taxing rich people, as he deemed that the cost of war is the burden of the people of 
middle and lower classes, but not the rich people.815 Therefore, he argued that it is 
required to impose progressive property taxes, comprehensive income taxes, excessive 
profits taxes, luxury taxes, and financial transaction taxes on the rich.816 However, what 
Wu Chi-yuen ignored was that the rich can use their income to invest and hire labors, 
enhancing the economy.  Due to Wu’s proposal, the rich people’s money should be 
forcibly requisitioned by the government, ignoring the unknown consequences of 
taxation, and he could not argue whether taxation is an effective way or not to solve the 
postwar fiscal deficits and inflation problems. Hence, he himself admitted that 
implementation of taxation “has a great difficulty.” 817  This shows that he also 
809 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 349). 
810 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 397). 
811 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 351), own translation. 
812 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 309, p. 349), 
813 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, pp. 322-324, pp. 380-385). 
814 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 367). 
815 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 324, p. 381). 
816 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, pp. 382-383). 
817 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 383), own translation. 
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recognizes that as a central planning measure of the government, it is difficult to 
calculate in which degree should the government collect taxations.818  
6.2.3.2.5 Theory of Privatization and the Abolishment of zombie enterprises. 
We advocated that the government should balance its expenditure and income by selling 
government materials and properties, including state-owned enterprises and 
industries. 819 Besides, Wu advised that the dead-alive factories and the bankrupting 
factories which were benefited from the previous speculation should be closed and if 
they were still open, they would become a burden of China.820 
6.2.3.3 Professors of Economics at Nankai University’s argumentations on 
post Sino-Japanese War’s economic construction and the methods to prevent price 
inflation. Fang Xianting (1903-1985), Professor of Economics at Nankai University 
stressed the importance of saving and capital accumulation in the process of economic 
development.821 He was against the centrally planned economy, arguing that this type of 
publicity will make foreigners reluctant to invest in China.822 However, Fang did not go 
profoundly to analyze that apart from the publicity, if it is necessary to have a centrally 
planned economic system to enhance economic growth. Fang also believed China 
should be cautious to borrow foreign debts as the repayment ability should also be 
considered. Hence, Fang could be treated as a fiscal conservative.823 Li Zhuomin (1912-
1991) argued that industrialization was an important part of the postwar Chinese 
economy proposed his theories of industrialization and stable currency. He advocated 
that China should borrow capital from foreign countries on the one hand and reduce 
818  For more about the theory of impossibility of central planning economic calculation, see Mises 
(1949/1998), Hayek (1945), and Huerta de Soto (1992/2010). 
819 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, pp. 387-388, pp. 393-394). However, Wu also argued that the government 
should increase income by operating state-owned enterprises (p. 334), which is completely contrary to his 
own analysis as we have demonstrated in this paragraph. 
820 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p.303, p.336). 
821 See S. Fang (1945/1947, pp.1-14). 
822 See S. Fang (1945/1947, p. 25). 
823 See S. Fang (1945/1947, p. 25). 
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domestic debt on the other, which is similar to Fang Xianting’s proposal.824 Besides, Li 
Zhuo-min advocated that China should develop its economy through the elimination of 
tariff barriers and through free trade. 825  Like Fang, Li Zhuomin also opposed the 
centrally planned economy. About foreign exchange and banking policy, he proposed to 
establish stable institutions of foreign exchange, foreign trade and economic order 
through a strong central banking system.826 However, Li did not specifically explain in 
detail what central banking system he preferred. Chen Zhenhan (1912-2008) argued 
both government economic intervention and the market playing the role of enhancing 
China’s postwar economic development. Chen provided his insights between prices and 
consumption though he did not provide his theory of central banking. He argued that if 
the prices continue to increase, the government should regulate the prices to suppress 
price inflation.827 Yang Shujin and Wu Daye argued that if a silver standard and an 
international gold standard based on a determined gold content were not possible, the 
alternative was issuing a new Fabi based on a Dollar Standard System with which the 
exchange rate of the new Fabi should be fixed. They advocated relatively stable rising 
prices and opposed deflationary monetary policy and price deflation, while they also 
criticized some negative economic consequences of hyperinflation policy though it was 
not an institutional analysis. On economic policy, they emphasized the role of capital 
and investment that can promote economic development; however, they did not mention 
the role of entrepreneurial discovery, creativity, and coordination in discovering 
potential investment opportunity. 828  Song Zexing (1917-2003) proposed a mixed 
economy between the protection of infant industry and the market that can enhance the 
postwar China’s economic development, but an analysis of the role of entrepreneurs is 
824 See S. Fang (1945/1947, p. 15). 
825 See S. Fang (1945/1947, p. 16). 
826 See S. Fang (1945/1947, p. 22). 
827 See S. Fang (1945/1947, pp. 59-60). 
828 For the details of Yang Shujin and Wu Daye’s theories, see S. Fang (1945/1947, pp. 159-203). 
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absent in his proposal. Besides, he advocated the resolution of the trade deficit through 
the central bank’s currency depreciation policy. However, he did not review China’s 
free banking tradition and the possible negative institutional effects of the central bank’s 
expansionary monetary policy.829 
6.2.3.4 The debate between Minster of Finance Yu Hung-chun and his 
economic advisor Zhu Xie on the limitation of the issuance of Fabi. Minister of 
Finance Yu Hung-chun (from November 20, 1944 to May 31, 1948) advocated 
maintaining government spending through monetary expansion, while his economic 
advisor Zhu Xie argued that a new currency should be issued to suppress price inflation 
in the conditions of restricted monetary issuance and the holding of the assets of gold 
reserves, the reserves of US dollars, and the materials left by the Japanese.830 
6.2.3.5 Soong Tse-ven, Arthur N. Young and the Shanghai Panic Buying of 
Gold in February 1947. Arthur N. Young’s suggestion on free trade of gold to stabilize 
the prices was accepted by Premier Soong Tse-ven. However, economists at that time 
argued that it as the expansionary monetary policy caused the price hyperinflation, 
making the policy of free trade of gold resulted in the panic buying of gold in 1947.831 
However, as we have demonstrated in chapter 3, the prerequisite of A. N. Young’s 
theory of the free trade of gold was based on a monetarist perspective of a restricted 
monetary supply. In Young’s argumentation, once the government starts to over-issue 
the banknotes, it was not possible for the policy of free trade of gold to stabilize 
prices.832  
829 For the details of Song Zexing’s theories, see S. Fang (1945/1947, pp. 27-35, pp. 204-257). The 
Chinese names of the economists mentioned above that are not included in the reference chapter of this 
thesis are as follows: Li Zhuomin (ᵾঃ᭿), Chen Zhenhan (䲣ᥟ╒), Yang Shujin (ὺ਄䙢) and Song 
Zexing (ᆻࡷ㹼). 
830 For the details of the debate between Yu Hung-chun and Zhu Xie, see X. Zhu (1985). 
831 See H. He (1985), L. Li (1985), R. Shen (1985), and Y. Zi (1985). 
832 For our detailed analysis of Soong’s economic and monetary theories, see section 4.2.3.2 of Chapter 4. 
For Young’s monetary and economic theories for the National government, see Chapter 3. 
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6.2.3.6 Fang Xianting and his understanding of people’s expectation on 
price inflation. Two years of the first publication in January 1948, Fang Xianting 
acknowledged the importance of suppressing price inflation, considering that the growth 
of the amounts of materials and products increase synchronously in tandem with the 
currency issuance can prevent the further price inflation. Besides, he also understood 
that people’s psychological expectation of price inflation per se can also make the 
prices higher. However, like the other Chinese economists, Fang also did not 
demonstrate whether the central banking system itself could cause monetary and price 
inflation as the Austrian School economists argue.833 
6.2.3.7 A primarily institutional analysis of the monetary price inflation 
issues of a group of 12 Chinese economists. Two months before the issuance of the 
Gold Yuan Notes, there was a group of 12 Chinese economists who provided a 
summary of the Chinese economy in the first half of 1948.834 Their analysis included 
the economic issues of deficits, monetary expansion, the rising prices, the conditions of 
rural areas, industrial and commercial conditions, financial turmoil, and the 
deterioration of foreign trade, which is a combination of laissez-faire economics and 
interventionism, especially mercantilism. Their thought and analysis path have some 
ways of thinking of institutional economics and they provided the detailed analyses for 
some specific economic issues; however, they have not launched their arguments about 
the price hyperinflation systematically and analytically.  
6.2.3.8 Kuang Ri’an and his argumentation of how Fabi’s price inflation 
reduced the living standard of people. On the eve of the Gold Yuan Note’s reform, on 
August 1948, economist Kuang Ri’an compared the large gap between the indices of 
workers’ living expenses and the indices of wholesale price in Shanghai in 1947, 
833 See X. Fang (1948). For the position of the Austrian School, see Mises (1912/2009, 1949/1998, 
1978/2002, 1979/2006) and Salerno (2010, pp. 199-236). 
834 See C. X. Wu et al. (1948). 
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pointing out that expansionary monetary policy and price inflation seriously reduced the 
living standards of the working class in Shanghai area.835 Kuang endorsed the policies 
such as reducing taxes, expanding loans to businesses, and abolishing government 
economic regulations. However, he did not specifically analyze his own proposals.  
6.2.3.9 Yu Hong-jun and the Rejected Gold Yuan Plan. On May 19th, 1948, 
after Yu Hong-jun took over as the governor of the Central Bank, he summoned four 
economists including Li Lixia, Wu Daye, Lin Chongyong and Fang Shangui to 
formulate a plan of the new currency reform.836 Li Lixia was the Director of the Audit 
Office of the Central Bank.837 Wu Daye was a professor of economics at the Nankai 
University, who was also a consultant to the Central Bank of Chiang when Chang Kia-
ngau was its governor. Lin Chongyong and Fang Shangui were deputy directors of the 
Economic Research Division of the Central Bank.838 Their plan had these four features. 
Firstly, they advocated the retention of Fabi. They deemed that under the Civil War, the 
monetary system was not suitable for fundamental reforms. They considered that 
although Fabi was in a vicious state, it still can survive for a period as long as 
supplementary measures were taken to save it. Secondly, they believed that the essential 
problem at that time was the disparity in fiscal revenue and expenditure. Therefore, they 
suggested adopting a new currency system called Gold Yuan which was like the 
previous Custom Gold Unit (that was issued during the Second World War) to stabilize 
taxes and sort out finances.839 The specific plan of the Gold Yuan had three points. The 
fixed exchange rate of the Gold Yuan should be US$25 million per 25 Gold Yuan. 
People who held Gold Yuan can buy and sell foreign exchange without limit. The 
835  See Kuang (1948). The original Chinese name of worker’s living expenses and the indices of 
wholesale price are “ᐕӪ⭏⍫䋫ᤷᮨ” and “ᢩⲬ⢙ܩᤷᮨ” respectively. 
836  The original Chinese name of Lin Chongyong and Fang Shangui are “᷇ጷᓨ” and “ᯩழṲ” 
respectively. For the reference, see L. Li (1985a). 
837 The original name of the Audit Office in Chinese is “ねṨ㲅.” 
838 The original name of the Economic Research Division in Chinese is “㏃☏⹄ウ㲅.” 
839 The original name of the Gold Yuan in Chinese is “䠁ൃ.” 
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exchange rate between Gold Yuan and Fabi should be set by the Central Bank at any 
time. The tax paid to the central government and the import and export trades should all 
use Gold Yuan. In sum, as Li Lixia himself said, the Gold Yuan plan only expands the 
method of the previous Custom Gold Unit to pay taxes and import and export trades. 
Thus, the Gold Yuan plan does not have any other new measures than the Custom Gold 
Unit. The governor of the Central Bank Yu Hong-jun was very satisfied with this plan 
thinking it was the only possibility. However, President Chiang Kai-shek disagreed and 
rejected it. 
6.2.4 Economic and Monetary Policy Debates During the Period of Gold Yuan 
Notes, 1948-1949 
In the previous section 6.2.3, we have reviewed the academic debates of 
economic and central banking theories of the Chinese economists during the Fabi period 
of the Civil War, 1945-1948. In this section, we review the economic and monetary 
policy debates during the period of Gold Yuan Notes, 1948-1949.  
6.2.4.1 President Chiang Kai-shek's support for the implementation of 
Gold Yuan Notes. President Chiang was strongly in favor of the implementation of 
Gold Yuan Notes. He denied the plan of retaining legal currency while issuing Gold 
Yuan Notes to pay taxes, foreign trades, and foreign exchanges.840 Chiang Kai-shek 
proposed the plan of Gold Yuan Notes at a meeting of the Kuomintang Central Standing 
Committee.841 This indicated that it was Chiang who was manipulating the issuance of 
Gold Yuan Notes. Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek must bear the final responsibility for the 
policy failure of Gold Yuan Notes. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek was also supporting his 
son Chiang Ching-kuo’s action of “hitting the tigers”: hitting the speculators during the 
840 See L. Li (1985a). 
841 See Y. Huang (1985). 
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Gold Yuan Notes’ price hyperinflation.842 However, if the government took measures to 
suppress price hyperinflation, why would there be such a large degree of market 
speculation? Besides, it is understandable that President Chiang Kai-shek was 
deliberately in favor of issuing the new issued Gold Yuan Notes instead of Fabi due to 
the chaotic financial situation and the price hyperinflation of Fabi at that time. However, 
by using force to order the Shanghai entrepreneurs to submit their gold silver and 
foreign currencies to support the Civil War was also a violation of private property 
rights. Chiang Kai-shek ignored the policy suggestions from most of the economists 
that a further war-oriented expansionary monetary policy would trigger a more severe 
price inflation, no matter whether there would be a new monetary system being 
implemented or not. 
6.2.4.2 Minister of Finance Wang Yun-wu and his support on Gold Yuan 
Notes. Yu Hong-jun’s successor, the new Minister of Finance Wang Yun-wu (May 31st, 
1948 to November 11th, 1948) strongly supported the issuance of the Gold Yuan 
Notes.843 Wang Yun-wu used to be the editor-in-chief at the famous Commercial Press, 
had no connection with the financial and economic circles. Perhaps because of Chiang 
Kai-shek’s trust in him, Wang was nominated as the new Minister of Finance to 
substitute for Yu Hong-jun.844 Wang advocated to implement a new currency system.845 
He proposed two ways to reverse the situation. First, issue Gold Yuan Notes, whose 
value should be guaranteed by the gold, silver, and foreign reserves held by the central 
bank. Second, use political power to levy mandatorily the gold, silver, and foreign 
exchanges held by the people, implementing economic control. In sum, Minister of 
Finance Wang Yun-wu was one of the few people who strongly supported the issuance 
842 See L. Dai (1985), L. Li (1985a) and C. Shou (1985a). 
843 See S. D. Cheng (1948). 
844 See C. Shou (1985b) and X. Zhu (1985). 
845 For more of Wang Yun-wu’s arguments in details, see C. Shou (1985, b). 
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of Gold Yuan Notes as President Chiang Kai-shek did. Perhaps due to Wang being a 
press editor who had little economic knowledge, he was also in favor of expansionary 
monetary policy instead of other methods to solve the war expense issues, all without 
considering the negative consequences of price inflation caused by monetary expansion. 
Besides, he was also among the few people who supported using political power to levy 
mandatorily the gold, silver, and foreign exchanges held by the people, implementing 
economic control and making prices stable. 
6.2.4.3 Dai Li’an and his proposal against issuing more banknotes. Former 
Director of the Department of Currency and Shanghai banker Dai Li’an was strongly 
against the issuance of Gold Yuan Notes when he was in an Executive Yuan meeting 
about how to implement Gold Yuan Notes.846 847 In his memory, Dai claimed that he 
was the only person who was against the plan of implementing Gold Yuan Notes. He 
argued that there were two contradicted points in the planed measures of implementing 
the new currency. Firstly, he illustrated that the price regulation measure is self-
contradictory. Dai thought that the measure stipulates that the prices of various products 
should not exceed their prices of August 19, 1948 (one day before the planned 
implementation day of the Gold Yuan Notes) while the measures rule that the prices of 
the public transportation industry could be adjusted. However, the prices of electricity 
and transportation were related to the price of the goods. Thus, Dai argued that if the 
prices of the public transportation industry could be adjusted and increased artificially, 
then “how to limit and not to increase the price of other products without increasing the 
price?” Secondly, he considered that the acquisition plan of gold, silver, and foreign 
currencies may not guarantee the market stability. Dai assumed that though the idea of 
redeeming gold, silver, and foreign currency within a time limit was good; however, 
846 The Chinese name of the position, Director of the Department of Currency is “䋑᭯䜘䥒ᒓਨਨ䮧.” 
847 See L. Dai (1985). 
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given that large amounts of new Gold Yuan Notes were being released, the purchasing 
power of banknotes would increase resulting big pressure on the market (to increase 
prices). However, Dai’s opinions were not considered by Soong Tse-ven’s cabinet. 
Altogether, Dai Li’an was very conscious of that if the government still issued new 
banknotes without any reserve of gold, silver and foreign currencies, prices will 
continue to rise. Besides, he also understood that price regulation policy is self-
contradictory as the regulated prices would make products more scare causing rising 
prices again. 
6.2.4.4 Cheng Shaode and his proposal of adopting a new currency system. 
Financial specialist Cheng Shaode is one of the few scholars who support the 
implementation of the Gold Yuan Notes to replace Fabi. 848 Firstly, he believed that due 
to the price inflation issues and the failure of Fabi, a new monetary system should be 
adopted to stabilize people’s confidence, although he also admits that most scholars at 
that time were cautious about the reform of adopting a new currency system. Secondly, 
Cheng argued that Gold Yuan Notes reform was caused by the fluctuation of the prices 
of gold and silver and price inflation. He provided Shanghai’s commodity wholesale 
prices indices from 1947 to 1948 to demonstrate the severity of the price inflation issues, 
and pointed out the phenomenon that brought about by the price hyperinflation, such as 
panic buying, the speculations of goods,  the lack of circulating currencies to due 
hoarding (caused by the rising prices), and the increase of interest rates. However, he 
did not conduct an in-depth analysis of these issues. Thirdly, Cheng argued that the two 
prerequisites for making the monetary reform successful are the government’s absolute 
control of the budget and the restraining of the government balance of payments. 
848 For Cheng’s monetary theory, see S. D. Cheng (1948). Cheng Shaode (1900-1954) received his Ph.D. 
of economics at the University of Paris in 1932. His doctoral dissertation title is “Étude sur le marché 
monétaire de Changhaï (au début du XXe siècle)” (“Research on Shanghai Financial Market in the Early 
20th Century”, own translation). For more about Cheng’s thesis, see: https://data.bnf.fr/fr/15030962/shao-
teh_chen. For Cheng’s simple biography, See J. Zou (2016, p. 114). 
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Finally, he presented a specific policy details about how to implement the currency 
reform, which is a combination of government intervention and laissez-faire policies: 
the regulation of prices, the control of government budget, various financial policies 
should be reasonably matched together, and the control of international trade and the 
execution of trade balance. In sum, Cheng also proposed a self-contradicted policy plan. 
He argued it was necessary to adopt a new currency system instead of the collapsing 
Fabi. He correctly perceived that the fluctuation and price inflation of gold and silver 
made the survive of Fabi difficult. He also correctly observed that the control of 
government budget was one of the essentials that the government should do to prevent 
price inflation. However, he also wrongly considered that price and trade regulation 
policies would help the government stabilize the currency system. 
6.2.4.5 Song Tongfu and his proposal to restricting government spending 
to stabilize the currency system. After the issuance of Gold Yuan Notes in August 
1948, in September, financial expert commented on the government’s decrees on the 
implementation of Gold Yuan Notes. Subsequently, he pointed out that to make the 
government’s currency reform successful, there were three things that the government 
should do.849 First of all, he argued that the government should take two measures to 
stabilize the exchange rate. One, the government should execute the planned 40% 
reserves of Gold Yuan Notes and make its issuance policy transparent to avoid the over-
issuance of it, given the government’s bad record of over-issuing currencies during the 
Second Sino-Japanese War. Two, regulate the trade of currencies (gold, silver, and 
foreign currency) and products. Secondly, Song argued that the government should 
balance its fiscal revenue and expenditures since the government had a record of using 
printing paper money to cover its deficits during the Second Sino-Japanese War. There 
849 See T. Song (1948). 
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are three points of this argument. one, cut the government spending. Two, increase the 
government’s revenue by taxation. Song provided his calculations of the previous 
taxation revenue to support his point. Three, issue public debt and use profits of the 
sales US aid materials to China to offset the fiscal deficit. He argued that if the 
government “can seriously do [these] three things, then the new currency system will 
succeed.” Thirdly, Song suggested that the government should take four measurements 
to stabilize the prices to avoid the happening of the further price hyperinflation. One, he 
advocated the increase of people’s savings. He argued that price inflation undermines 
the habits of people’s savings. This analysis concurs with other scholars’ demonstration 
that the Chinese people do have an economic tradition of saving.850 Two, use hot money 
for production. Three, reduce consumption. Four, advocate a strict implementation of 
the price regulation. Fourthly, Song argued that the government’s decrees of 
implementing Gold Yuan Notes were “perfect” in the perspective of policy planning. 
Thus, he indirectly criticized some pro-Communist views that advocated the currency 
reform of the Soviet Union style in the 1920s to confiscate private properties and 
currencies that people held stabilize the economy. In sum, Song argued that once the 
currency reform fails, “China's future is negatively unimaginable” as China was in the 
“period of mobilization for the suppression of Communist rebellion”. The irony is that 
his prediction became a reality, as the pro-capitalist and pro-constitutionalist ROC 
government lost Mainland China, and mainland China has entered the tyrannical era 
with the CPC ruling since 1949. 
6.2.4.6 Huang Yuanbin’s criticism on Kemmerer Plan and his suggestion 
of using the tools of financial markets to stabilize the currency system. The 
Legislative Representative and the Convener of the Currency Group of Legislative 
850 See J. Zhu (2012) and X. Fang (1945/1947). 
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Yuan Huang Yuanbin, who was previously the adviser to the Minister of Finance, held 
three related opinions of the currency reforms. 851  First of all, he criticized that E. 
Kemmerer’s theory of the gold standard did not apply to China because it had never 
implemented that system in history. He also criticized the rush issuance of Fabi in 
China, distorting the previous financial order.852 However, he did not further argue in 
detail whether Fabi as a currency system, based on a modern central banking system, 
was suitable for China. Secondly, Huang claimed that he was holding the same opinion 
as Chang Kia-ngau, advocating the use of financial markets rather than government 
intervention to control and stabilize the economy. He argued that if people are forced to 
change their currencies according to political pressure, their distrust will also prompt 
them to resist the monetary reform and use goods instead of currencies as the medium 
of exchange. Huang’s views were also submitted to President Chiang Kai-shek. Thirdly, 
by proving the first hand inside sources, Huang’s article also demonstrated how the 
political struggles inside the ROC government caused the chaotic situations of the 
monetary policies. In sum, Huang Yuan-bin considered that there was no applicability 
of a gold standard in China, refuting Edwin Kemmerer’s gold-reserve central banking 
proposal; while he also argued that the quick switch into Fabi and fiat money system 
also created a chaotic situation of the banking system. Like Chang Kia-ngau, Huang 
was also in favor of using the tools of financial markets rather than government 
intervention to control and stabilize the economy being against the proposal of using 
government coercion to confiscate people’s gold, silver, and foreign reserves. He 
argued that this mandatory policy will cause people’s distrust of the financial orders 
making the banking situation more complicated negatively.  
851 The original Chinese name of the Legislative Representative and the Convener of the Currency Group 
of Legislative Yuan is “・⌅䲒䋘ᒓሿ㍴ਜ䳶Ӫ.” Reference of this section see Y. Huang (1985). 
852 For the issues of Kemmerer’s China project and the issuance of Fabi, see Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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6.2.4.7 Premier Weng Wenhao’s Memory of his service during Gold Yuan 
Notes period. Chiang Kai-shek’s Premier Weng Wenhao (from 24 May to 26 
November,1948) provided his memories of the chaos of the political situation at that 
time, pointing that Minister of Finance Wang Yun-wu, who strongly supported the 
abolishment of Fabi and the implementation of the Gold Yuan Notes, was isolated by 
the rest of politicians and was neither supported by H. H. Kung nor the Shanghai 
bankers.853 Besides, we find that the reasons why Weng were appointed as the Premier 
was that he had connection and reputation among the Americans, and he supported the 
U.S. aids to ROC.854 
6.2.4.8 George Marshall and his proposal to support Free China and the 
ROC central banking system. The Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program) 
played an important role of the reconstruction of Western Europe historically in some 
degrees, while the similar proposal was also suggested to help the habitation of the 
postwar Republic of China. In the review of the relevant literature, we find the U.S. 
diplomat George Marshall also provided his suggestions on constructing China’s 
banking policies during the Civil War.  
Marshall’s activities in China are consistent of three parts. Firstly, as we have 
demonstrated in the introduction part of this chapter, the US government sent General 
George Marshall’s mission from 1946 to 1947 to regulate the conflicts between the 
Chinese government and the Communist Party but ultimately failed.855 During his two-
year staying in China, Marshall acknowledged the economic and political conditions of 
the ROC better than before. He made a prediction that if China engages in a large-scale 
853 See Weng (1960) and C. Shou (1985b). 
854 See C. X Wu et al. (1947). 
855 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 758), C. Wang (2000, pp. 505-566, pp. 128-136), and X. Han & 
K. Jiang (2011, p. 8225). 
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civil war, the economy will collapse.856 Marshall’s conclusion became a reality when 
the Communists won the Civil War in 1949.  
After his visit on China, later Marshall even proposed his land policy for China, 
arguing China should carry out land reform and hand over land from landlords to 
farmers.857 However, the reform later failed as the government’s land reform only let 
farmers to pay a lot of money to obtain land from their landlords, increasing the burden 
on Chinese farmers (see section 6.4.2.4 of this chapter).  
In March 1946, as the Secretary of State, George Marshall proposed his 
“Marshall Plan of China”, expressing that United States would give China a loan of 
US$500 million.858  However, the loan was delayed until 1948, and the amount of the 
final physical assistance only accounted for US$463 million, making it a useless plan on 
supporting the Free China to resist the Communists as the ROC government was 
severely failing in the Civil War in late 1948 militarily and suffering from price 
hyperinflation economically (see section 6.3.7 of this chapter). 
6.3 Process of Fabi’s Price Hyperinflation, 1945-1948 
In this section, we investigate the reasons why Fabi’s price hyperinflation 
happened and how Fabi collapsed from 1945 to 1948. Section 6.3.1 reviews the 
background: the over-issued Fabi and its price inflation during the Second Sino-
Japanese War. Section 6.3.2 specifically analyzes Fabi’s expansionary monetary policy 
in the Civil War era. Section 6.3.3 demonstrates the Chinese government’s 
mismanagement on the Japanese puppet currencies. Section 6.3.4 illustrates the 
relationship among taxation, public debt policies and the Civil War’s price 
hyperinflation. Section 6.3.5 demonstrates the circulation of uncontrolled foreign 
currency. Section 6.3.6 examines the foreign reserve policy and gold policy. Section 
856 See C. Y. Wu (1946a, p. 417). 
857 See C. X. Wu et al. (1948). 
858 See Hong (2008, p. 507). 
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6.3.7 discusses the lack of foreign aids and Marshall Plan on China. Section 6.3.8 
analyzes the economic regulation policies. 
6.3.1 Background: The Over-issued Fabi and its Price Inflation during the 2nd 
Sino-Japanese War  
As we have discussed in Chapter 5, for paying the war expense, the Chinese 
government already issued a massive amount of Fabi during the Second Sino-Japanese 
war. In 1937, the central banking system of the government issued C$1.64 billion, in 
1945, the amount of the issued Fabi was C$1.0319 trillion, which was 62921% of the 
amount in 1937. As a result, the price level was 144773.74% of the amount in 1937.859  
The previous over-issuance of Fabi was disguised trouble of the later 
hyperinflation after the end Second-Sino Japanese War. The National Government 
already made a mistake of issuing a lot of banknotes in the previous war time to pay the 
wartime expense. However, after 1945, the government continued its expansionary 
monetary policy, which was another main reason why the financial system collapsed 
during the Civil War time.  
6.3.2 Fabi’s Monetary Expansion Policy in the Civil War Era 
In this section, we thoroughly exam the expansionary monetary policy of Fabi 
during the postwar era.860 Figure 6.1 below shows the monetary supply and price level 
from 1945 to 1948. Price indices have been evaluated by logarithms in Figure 6.1. In 
the text demonstration, we use the original data to demonstrate. In 1945, the central 
banking system issued C$1.0319 trillion, in 1947 (one year before the abolishment of 
859 All the statistic results in this paragraph is our own calculation based on the price indices data from K. 
Chang (1958, p. 376, p. 371). 
860 For the economic situation and hyperinflation during this period, see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, 
pp. 741-746), J. Zhu (2012, pp. 423-432), K. Chang (1956, pp. 67-85, p. 151-169, pp. 259-274, pp. 303-
321, pp. 350-360), G. Wu (1958, pp. 92-97; pp. 140-245), Hong (2008, pp. 471-552), and P. Yang (1963, 
pp. 60-83). In order to more accurately analyze China's economic situation after 1945, we will analyze the 
issues related to the Gold Yuan Notes (1948-1949) in the next section of this chapter. In this section, we 
will focus on the analysis of the situation of Fabi from 1945 to 1948 before the Gold Yuan Notes reform. 
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Fabi), the amount of the issued Fabi was C$33.1885 trillion, which was 3,216.25% of 
the amount in 1945. As a result, the price level in 1947 was 6337.34% of the amount in 
1945. Figure 6.1 also shows that the price in December 1945 was five times that of 
September. If the price index in 1926 was 100, the price indices from 1945 to 1948 
were 1.5 trillion, 9.2 trillion, 61 trillion, and 399 trillion. Obviously, China experienced 
vicious price inflation during the Civil War. In the subsections of section 6.3.2, we will 




Figure 6.1 Monetary supply and price indices, 1926-1948.  
Sources: Data on currency issues, currency deposits, and total money supply is from K. Chang (1958, p. 376); also 
see G. Wu (1958, pp. 92-96), P. Yang (1963, pp. 61-62) and Hong (2008, pp. 519-520). Data on price indices of 1930 
to July 1948 is from K. Chang (1958, pp. 371-373). Data on price indices in August 1948 is from G. Wu (1958, p. 
162). Price indices from 1930 to 1936 is the Shanghai price index. Price index from 1937 to July 1948 is the whole 
Free China index. The price index of August 1948 is the Shanghai price index.  
Notes: Price index has been evaluated by logarithms in the figure. The price indices of 1946 to 1948 were obtained 
from the average of the monthly price indices for these years. In order to enable price indices from different sources 
to be displayed on the same statistical chart, we have processed the data from different sources according to the 






























































6.3.2.1 Monetary expansion as the payment of the military spending in the 
Civil War. The governments’ military spending in the Civil War was the leading cause 
of Fabi’s price hyperinflation during the Civil War era.861 The government had to print 
a lot of banknotes to maintain its military force to resist and exterminate the Communist 
rebellion, and to restore its military force in the former Japanese Occupied Areas. 
Figure 6.2 below shows the military expenditure from 1945 to 1948. All data have been 
evaluated by logarithms in Figure 6.2. In the text demonstration, we use the original 
data to demonstrate. In 1946, military spending accounted for 60% of total 
expenditure. 862 In 1947, military spending was 55% of total expenditure. 863  As the 
government already had a severe  condition of the deficit,864 it had no choice but to 
borrow the money from the Central Bank to pay the military expansion, which caused 
price inflation. The conclusion from Figure 2 is due to the proportion of the military 
spending in the total government expenditure, the military expansion is the main cause 
of the price hyperinflation from 1945 to 1948. 
  
861 See K. Chang (1958, pp. 71-72), P. Yang (1963, pp. 63-66), and G. Wu (1958, pp. 98-990). Some 
research (Hong, 2008, pp. 496-529) detailed the process of Fabi’s inflation but did not elaborate on the 
relationship between the hyperinflation and the Communist Revolution. 
862 See K. Chang (1958, pp. 71-72). 
863 See K. Chang (1958, pp. 71-72). 
864 The deficit of the National Government in 1945 was C$1,106,698 million, in 1946 was C$4,697,802 
million, and in 1948 was C$29,329,512 million. See K. Chang (1958, p. 374). 
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Figure 6.2 Military expenditure, 1937-1948. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese dollars (C$). 
Sources: Data on central government expenditure (1937-1945) is from A. Young (1965, p. 16). Data on central 
government expenditure (1945-1948) is from K. Chang (1958, p. 154). Data on military expenditure from 1946 to 
1948 (K. Chang, 1958, pp. 154-155) is based on the estimated defense expenditure composition and central 
government expenditure. Data on military expenditure (1937-1945) is from A. Young (1965 p. 16). Data on total 
money supply (1937-1948) is from K. Chang (1958, p. 376). The total money supply includes currency issues and 
currency deposits. Data on total money supply also see G. Wu (1958, pp. 92-96), P. Yang (1963, pp. 61-62) and 
Hong (2008, pp. 519-520). Data on price indices (1937-1948) is from Chang (1958, p. 371-373). The price index 
from 1937 to July 1948 is the index of Free China. Price index of January to August 1948 is the index of Shanghai. 
Data on price index, also see G. Wu (1958, pp. 154-163), and P. Yang (1963, pp. 61-62).  
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Inside the National Government, some oppositions were against the monetary 
expansion in military affairs.865 For dealing with the failure of the economic policy, the 
Chinese government appointed Pei Tsu-yee  as the new governor of the Central bank 
substituting Yu Hung-chun, trying to control the price inflation in 1946.866 However, 
these personnel changes in the government did not change the situation of price 
hyperinflation. Reducing price inflation requires a reduction in military spending. 
However, the government and the Minister of Finance at the time refused to reduce 
military spending, which meant that Pei’s deflationary monetary policy could not be 
implemented.867 
6.3.2.2 Monetary expansion as the administration management spending 
necessity in the formulation of the price hyperinflation. Monetary expansion also 
played a role as the administration management spending necessity in the formulation 
of the price hyperinflation.868 The expense of administration management was also a 
considerable burden. The National Government also had to spend a lot to pay the 
salaries and daily management of the large government institutions in the recovered 
territories which were formally occupied by the Japanese. Figure 6.3 below shows the 
administration expenditure and monetary supply from 1945 to 1948. All data has been 
evaluated by logarithms in Figure 6.3. In the text demonstration, we use the original 
data to demonstrate. For paying the salaries and expense of government management, 
the government borrowed the newly printed money from the Central Bank. In Figure 
6.3, we can see that administrative expenditure and the total government, as well as the 
865 See K. Chang (1958, p. 73). 
866 More about Pei, see Prial (1982). Pei Tsu-yee is the father of the famous Chinese architect IM Pei (䋍
㚯䣈, 26 April 1917 – 16 May 2019). IM Pei always held the nationality of the Republic of China before 
his death. For how Yu Hung-chun was trying to control the price inflation, see K. Chang (1958, p. 73). 
867 See K. Chang (1958, p. 73). 
868 References of this paragraph see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 741-742), J. Zhu (2012, p. 426), 
and K. Chang (1956, pp. 71-72). Regarding the various economic policy difficulties encountered by the 
ROC government in postwar reconstruction, see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 741-743). 
456 
                                                 
total money supply, were all increasing from 1945 to 1948. In 1945, the administrative 
expenditure was C$122,115 million, which was only 9% of the central government 
expenditure in that year. However just one year later, the administrative expenditure is 
28.5% of the total central government expenditure. In 1948, the administrative 




Figure 6.3 Administration expenditure, 1937-1948 Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese dollars (C$). 
Sources: Data on central government expenditure (1937-1945) is from A. Young (1965, p. 16). Data on central 
government expenditure (1945-1948) is from K. Chang (1958, p. 154). Data on administration expenditure from 1946 
to 1948 (K. Chang, 1958, pp. 154-155) is based on the estimated defense expenditure composition and central 
government expenditure. Data on administration expenditure (1937-1945) is from A. Young (1965 p. 16). Data on 
total money supply (1937-1948) is from K. Chang (1958, p. 376). The total money supply includes currency issues 
and currency deposits. Data on total money supply also see G. Wu (1958, pp. 92-96), P. Yang (1963, pp. 61-62) and 
Hong (2008, pp. 519-520). Data on price indices (1937-1948) is from K. Chang (1958, p. 371-373). Price index from 
1937 to July 1948 is the index of Free China. The price index of January to August 1948 is the index of Shanghai. 
Data on price index, also see G. Wu (1958, pp. 154-163), and P. Yang (1963, pp. 61-62).  
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It is quite understandable that the National Government needed to borrow 
money from the Central Bank to pay the salaries of its employees. However, the 
National Government did not have a specific main plan to balance its other plans, 
making the borrowed money an employee’s salaries contradicted from its other different 
goals.  
6.3.2.3 The Stimulation of the economy and the low official interest rate. 
The third question of the main hypothesis in section 3.3 was that if the government’s 
stimulation policy of the economy and the low official interest rate also partly cause the 
hyperinflation.869 Our research finds that after the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, 
the government kept a low official interest to stimulate the economy, while the strong 
consumer demand also drove the price inflation. 870 In Figure 6.4 below, we find that the 
official interest rate from 1946 to 1948 was 10.7%, 15.14%, and 23.17% respectively. 
The black-market interest rate was higher than the official rate. The black-market 
interest rate from 1946 to 1948 was 15.08%, 18.25%, and 26.55% respectively. The 
price index in 1948 increased by 44,650.9% over 1946. The wholesale prices (Shanghai) 
in 1948 increased by 14,478.4% over 1946. However, due to the government's official 
interest rate maintained at a low price, the supply of loans increased, resulting in a 
significant increase in bank credits and private loans.871 In 1946, the issuance of private 
loan was C$1,073,483 million. In 1948, the amount of private loan was C$156,496,326 
million, which was increased by 14,478.4% over 1945. In addition, the government also 
869 References of this paragraph see Hong (2008, pp. 492-496), J. Zhu (2012, pp. 427-428), and K. Chang 
(1958, pp. 74-78). 
870 For the references of low interest rates, see Hong (2008, pp. 492-496) and K. Chang (1958, p. 427-
428). For the references of consumer demand, see Hong (2008, pp. 493-495, pp. 510-517) and J. Zhu 
(2012, p. 428). 
871 See J. Zhu (2012, p. 428). 
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ignored the velocity of money.872 In 1945, the velocity of money was 2.57%. In 1948, it 
raised to 10.82%.  
872 See He (1999) and J. Zhu, (2012, p. 428). The Austrian School of economics is skeptical about the 
concept of the velocity of money. For related references, see Shostak (2017, 2018). 
460 
                                                 
 
Figure 6.4 Black market interest rate and production, 1946-1948. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese 
dollars (C$). 
Sources: Data on note issues is from K. Chang (1958, p. 374); also see G. Wu (1958, pp. 92-96), P. Yang (1963, p. 
61-62) and Hong (2008, pp. 519-52). Data on the velocity of circulation of notes is from K. Chang (1958, p. 270). 
Since there is no annual data, we have selected the data for each December from 1946 to 1948 as the samples. Data 
on bank credit (in CNC$ millions) is from K. Chang (1958, p. 375). Bank credit data in 1946 is from June to July. 
Data on official market interest rate is from K. Chang (1958, p. 375). Data on the price index of 1945 (Free China), 
see K. Chang (1958, p. 371). Data on the price index of 1946 to 1948 of the whole China, see K. Chang (1958, pp. 
372-373). Data on the price index of 1946 to 1948 is the annual data calculated from the monthly date of these years 
(K. Chang, 1958, pp. 372-373). Data on wholesale price index (Shanghai) is from K. Chang (1958, p. 79). The price 
indices of 1946 to 1948 were obtained from the average of the monthly price indices for these years. Since there is no 
complete monthly data, we have selected the wholesale price index of August 1948 as the sample. For data on price 
index, also see G. Wu (1958, pp. 154-163), and P. Yang (1963, pp. 61-62). Data on private loans see K. Chang (1958, 
p. 77).  
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6.3.2.4 National Government’s underestimation of public’s psychological 
rebound of prince inflation. Whether the National Government underestimated the 
public’s psychological rebound that partly caused the increase of prices is another 
question that needs examining.873 The Chinese people had already been very susceptible 
to price inflation during the Second Sino-Japanese War and the new issuances of 
currency increased people’s sensitivity. Thus, when the prices raised, the National 
Government tried to control them. However, the price control reform in February 1947 
made people rush to buy the products in the market, which made the Nationalist 
Government cancel the price control. Thus, the price increased rapidly again, which 
made people furious. Although the content of the psychological changes of the people 
may not be fully quantified, it can be inferred from the increase in production volume in 
Figure 6.4 that since the total demand is equal to the total supply, the demand of the 
people at that time was also high. 
We argue that the government did not systematically evaluate the public’s 
psychological rebound when the prices were increasing and when it was executing the 
price control measurements. If the National Government could make better propaganda 
on this policy and make the balances among different policies, the prices might be 
stabilized to a certain degree. 
6.3.3 Mismanagement with Japanese Puppet Currencies  
This section analyze whether the mismanagement on the Japanese puppet 
currencies was also one of the reasons of Fabi’s price hyperinflation. 874 In section 
5.5.12.4 of Chapter 5, we analyzed the monetary expansion and price inflation issues of 
the Japanese puppet currencies during the Second Sino-Japanese War to understand the 
873 References of this paragraph see J. Zhu (2012, p. 431), and Hong (2008, pp. 510-514). 
874 References of this section see P. Yang (1963, pp. 55-56), G. Wu (1958, pp.41-50), Hong (2008, pp. 
477- 482), ACPBC (1991, pp. 311-320), J. Zhu (2012, pp. 426-427), and Research Group of the Northeast 
Materials Regulatory Commission [RGNMRC] (1948). 
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postwar price inflation in the former Japanese occupied areas of Wang Jingwei Regime 
and Manchukuo, it is important to review whether the Chinese government mismanaged 
the Japanese puppet currencies causing a postwar price inflation in the former occupied 
areas or not. Our research finds that before the victory of the Second Sino-Japanese War, 
the Manchukuo Regime (Manchuria) and Wang Jingwei Regime, who separately ruled 
the Japanese-occupied areas, had already paid for war and government expenditure 
through their own expansionary monetary policy.875 Figure 6.5, Figure 6.6 and Figure 
6.7 below show the monetary expansion and price inflation situation in the Japanese-
occupied areas during the Second Sino-Japanese War: the currency conditions in 
Manchuria  from 1936 to 1944, and the currency issues of Federal Reserve Bank 
Dollars from 1938 to 1945 in Wang Jingwei Regime. 876 In Manchuria, during that 
period, both the wholesale price indices and the currency issues were increasing. In 
1944, the wholesale price index was 358.3, which has increased 258.3 over 1936. The 
currency issues of Manchukuo Yuan were 7,709,251 million in 1944, which increased 
2,706.5% over 1936.877 In Wang Jingwei Regime, in 1943, the wholesale price index in 
North China was 1,176.67, which increased 1,076.67 over 1936. The currency issues of 
Federal Reserve Bank Dollars of the Wang Jingwei Regime were FRB$142,399 million 
in 1945, which increased by 687423% over 1936. To sum, the Japanese Puppet 
Regimes were also implementing monetary expansion policies during the Second Sino-
Japanese War. 
875 See P. Yang (1963, pp. 55-56), and G. Wu (1958, pp.41-50). In addition to the above two Japanese 
Occupied Areas, the Japanese authority on Taiwan was also implementing inflationary policy. Since the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki (俜䰌ọ㌴) in 1895, Taiwan became a Japanese colony until 1945. Although 
Taiwan did not directly participate in the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese authority on Taiwan 
still implemented an inflationary policy there. In 1937, the issuance of Taiwanese Silver Dollar Notes (ਠ
⚓䢰ࡨݳ) was 75 million yuan, reaching 2.9 billion yuan in December 1947. From 1937 to 1945, prices 
in Taipei has risen by 23 times. The above data on Taiwan’s inflation is from G. Wu (1958, p.56). For 
more about the above inflation situation in Taiwan at that time, see Y. Wu (1947). For more about the 
history of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, see Fairbank & K. Liu (1980, pp. 107-109). For more about the 
history of Taiwan under Japanese rule see Lamley (1999). 
876 The original name of Federal Reserve Bank Dollars in Chinese is “ѝཞۉݢ䢰㹼ࡨ.” 
877 The original name of Manchukuo Yuan in Chinese is “┯⍢഻ൃ.” 
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Figure 6.5 Currency conditions in Manchuria, 1936-1944. Figure’s currency unit is one million Manchukuo Yuan. 
Sources: Data on currency issues of Manchukuo Yuan and the wholesale price indices of Changchun from 1936 to 
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Figure 6.6 Currency issues of Federal Reserve Bank Dollars, 1938-1945. 
Sources: Data on currency issues of Federal Reserve Bank Dollars and the wholesale price indices of north China 
from 1938 to 1945, see P. Yang (1963, p. 56); also see G. Wu (1958, pp. 45-47).  
Notes: Data on 1933 is the monthly data on March 1933 when the issuance of Federal Reserve Bank Dollars initialed; 
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Subsequently, after the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the National 
Government was facing a problem of how to deal with the Japanese puppet currencies 
under the former Wang Jinwei Regime. The Chinese government decided that people 
had to exchange the Japanese puppet currencies for Fabi mandatorily.878 As the official 
exchange rate was lower than the public’s expectation, people who had the Japanese 
puppet currencies went to the market in a rush to buy different products, making the 
prices higher than before.879  Figure 6.7 below shows the currency issues of Federal 
Reserve Bank Dollars in 1945 (from January to October). The currency issuance was 
FRB$142,399 million in October 1945, which has increased by 618.4% over January 
1945. 
  
878 See J. Zhu (2012, pp. 426-427), Hong (2008, p. 482), ACPBC (1991, pp. 312-320), and P. Yang (1963, 
pp. 57-58). 
879 See J. Zhu (2012, pp. 426-427), P. Yang (1963, pp. 57-58), and Hong (2008, pp. 481-482). 
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Figure 6.7 Currency issues of Federal Reserve Bank Dollars in 1945. 
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We argue that abolishing the circulation of the Japanese puppet currencies was 
indeed a very nationalist action of the Chinese government. However, it seems that the 
National Government did not consider the public’s reaction and did not consider the 
price inflation caused by the sudden abolishment of the Japanese puppet currencies. It 
was understandable that some Chinese people were angry about the Japanese 
occupation and the Japanese puppet Currencies. However, there had also another group 
of Chinese people who still wanted to use the Japanese puppet currencies in the short 
run, considering the convenience of their life. Thus, the ideal policy dealing with the 
Japanese puppet currencies might be announcing that the Japanese puppet currencies 
would be abolished eventually, but it would still be allowed in circulation with the 
market exchange rate in the short run.  
This policy has the following benefits. In the first place, as the Japanese puppet 
currencies could be circulated in the short run, people could keep their confidence in the 
ROC government and the financial system. Second, the circulation of the Japanese 
puppet currencies in short run could also stabilize the prices as people did not need to 
buy products rashly and as the ROC government did not need to issue more Fabi when 
the Japanese puppet currencies was still in circulation. Third, the allowance of using the 
Japanese puppet currencies could also provide the former Japanese-occupied areas a 
smooth period of making the economic transition. In the fourth place, the smooth 
transition of currency would also steadily advance the changes in the spontaneous social 
order, and people would not be overwhelmed by the sudden changes in the financial 
system. However, the ROC government did not take smooth measures to gradually and 
excessively deal with the issues of the Japanese puppet currencies, and ultimately the 
wrong economic policy promoted monetary expansion and price inflation. 
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6.3.4 Taxation and Public Debt Policies 
This section examines if the mismanagement of the taxation and public debt 
policies also partly caused the price hyperinflation.880 As the Chinese government did 
not have enough taxes to pay its deficit, it issued a series of public debt to cover its vast 
wartime deficit. However, the unstable economic situation made it hard to repay the 
loan to the public, causing people to lose confidence in the government further. 
One view argued that as the Chinese government did not have sufficient taxes, 
it was impossible to reduce government debt through taxation.881 We argue that this 
view is reasonable in some sense. The government had inherited China’s traditional 
concept of keeping taxes low and was willing to levy taxes.882 This view argues that the 
Chinese government naively believed that with the support of people, it could overcome 
economic difficulties. Thus, it did not establish any modern tax system. Moreover, this 
standpoint argued that the reality was that the Chinese people did not support the 
government's tax policy during the war because they were busy with dealing with their 
own difficulties. Judging from the taxation situation already collected by the Chinese 
government, the tax was based on profit, and the profit was difficult to determine and 
calculate during the wartime. On the other hand, the view argued that because of the 
wartime expansionary monetary policy and price inflation, it was difficult to calculate 
the value of the profit that the government collected. Therefore, this argument claims 
that the Chinese government had almost no way to compensate for the fiscal deficit 
through taxation policies during the war. 
880 References of the issue of the government’s taxation and deficit see K. Chang (1958, pp. 151-169), 
Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 741-743), J. Zhu (2012, p. 426), and P. Yang (1963, pp. 120-122). 
881 For more details of the view and reference in this paragraph, see J. Zhu (2012, p. 426) and K. Chang 
(1963, p. 68). 
882 The traditional Chinese traditional concept of keeping taxes low and not levying taxation is written as 
a famous saying “䕅ᗝ㮴䌖” in Chinese. 
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We have doubts about whether the establishment of a modern tax system can 
solve the debt problem of the National Government. First, the establishment of a 
taxation system required the support of the majority of people. However, the politicians 
and specialists of the government did not have the energy to design and publicize the 
reform of the taxation system during the wartime, as they already had much work to 
do. 883 Thus, the mobilization of the people to support a new taxation system could not 
be possible. Compared with the tax system, the mobilization of the ROC government in 
establishing the central bank system was extensive and robust enough. When the 
government was establishing the central banking system in the late 1920s, it had 
sufficient discussion of the central banking issues. It also the foreign monetary experts 
(i.e., E. Kemmerer and A. Young) to investigate and research the carefully banking 
issues. Besides, the government also successfully convinced the public and chief 
bankers to support the new central banking system. To sum, the Chinese government 
did enough preparation, and promotion of the entire policies of the new central banking 
system, making the central banking reform happened gradually and steadily. On the 
contrary, the government did not have specific plans and steps on the reform of the 
taxation system. Therefore, it is not surprising that the reform of the taxation system 
was difficult to achieve. Second, the Second Sino-Japanese War and the subsequent 
Civil War involved most of the energy of the Chinese government. The Chinese 
government had to couple with the reception and management of the former Japanese-
occupied areas and prepare all the work for the implementation of the 1946 Constitution, 
making the politicians and specialists of the government very difficult to have the time 
thinking about the reform of taxation system. Therefore, we argue that it was almost 
impossible for the ROC government to establish a modern taxation system during the 
883 See K. Chang (1958, pp. 151-169), Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 741-743), J. Zhu (2012, p. 
426), and P. Yang (1963, pp. 120-122). 
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wartime. Balancing the deficit through the tax collection was difficult. As the 
government encountered difficulties in collecting taxes, it had to seek to issue public 
debt to solve the deficit problem. However, due to monetary expansion and price 
inflation, the repayment of public debts through Fabi was worthless, which indirectly 
leads to the public losing their confidence in the government. Thus, we argue that the 
failed taxation and public debt policies were also one of the reasons why the National 
Government could not prevent price inflation from happening. 
The National Government had a huge debt problem since the victory of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War in 1945. 884  As we have mentioned before, the Chinese 
government had to a considerable expense of its military force to resist and exterminate 
the Communists’ expansion and to restore its military force in the former Japanese-
occupied areas. In 1946, military spending accounted for 60% of total expenditure. In 
1947, it was 55% of total expenditure. Besides the military expansion, the government 
also spent a lot on its administrative management. As there were so many lost territories 
were recovered from the Japanese occupation, the government also had to spend a lot to 
pay the salaries and daily management of the huge government institutions. Figure 6.8 
below shows the government deficit conditions from 1946 to the middle of 1948. We 
have found that the indicators of note issuance, government expenditure, government 
revenue, and government deficit, were all growing during the Civil War, which also 
means that the Chinese people and entrepreneurs must bear the negative consequences 
of monetary expansion and price inflation.   
884 Reference of the data in this paragraph see K. Chang (1958, pp. 71-72). 
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Figure 6.8 Government deficit, 1946-1948. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese dollars (C$).  
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The expenditure of the daily management of all the government institutions 
could be treated as normal spending. For the rehabilitation and reconstruction, the 
Chinese government had to expense to restore all the necessary institutions. Though 
corruption was a problem for the government, there was almost nothing can blame the 
government using the money in the restoration of the necessary government institutions. 
However, as we have analyzed before in section 6.2.1, the war between the government 
and the Communists could be avoided. In this sense, a considerable burden of deficit 
could be released, and the government could have devoted all its energy in the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Republic of China meanwhile maintaining the 
peace with the Communists. 
6.3.5 Circulation of Uncontrolled Foreign Currency  
This section inspects if the circulation of uncontrolled foreign currency had 
influence on the price hyperinflation.885 Before the Second Sino-Japanese War, the US 
dollar had already circulated in Free China. In 1946, the Chinese government opened 
the foreign exchange market, increasing the dollar’s inflow. In addition to the foreign 
exchange market opening, the price inflation caused by the dollar was mainly due to the 
following reasons. First, China’s industrial development after the Second Sino-Japanese 
War promoted the influx of dollars and its price inflation. In the postwar era, many 
products, such as cotton, tobacco, and fuel, had to be imported from the United States. 
As these products needed to use dollars to calculate prices, accounting profits, and 
monetary costs, people in China needed to buy US dollars to purchase these products. 
Second, the Chinese government allowed the United States to station troops in China. 
Thus, the US military directly used the US dollar making the dollars flow into the 
market. Third, because the United States implemented expansionary monetary policy 
885 References of this paragraph see P. Yang (1963, p.116), J. Zhu (2012, p. 427), and S. Zhu et al. (1947). 
473 
                                                 
during the Second World War and in the postwar era, the US dollar in 1948 was only 
equivalent to 55 cents in Chinese dollars in 1937. One dollar lost its purchasing power 
of 45 cents in the past decade, which also promoted the price inflation of the dollar. 
Fourth, due to the failure of Fabi and its subsequent replacement of the Gold Yuan 
Notes, the circulated US dollars were at least three times the amount in Free China than 
during the Second Sino-Japanese War. For example, in Shanghai (China’s financial 
center), with the exception of people using gold for renting houses and shops, the 
transactions of large-scale goods and the transactions between old trade partners all 
used US dollars.886 The circulation of the US dollar in Free China after the Second 
Sino-Japanese War was more than US$30 million in Guangdong Province and Fujian 
Province. The national circulation of the US dollar was estimated to be around US$150 
million, which were mainly in ports and major cities such as Shanghai and Guangzhou. 
Thus, our research concludes that the massive circulation of the US dollar also boosted 
price inflation indirectly causing the collapse of Fabi. 
Figure 6.9 below shows Chinese official US dollar exchange rate in 1947. At 
the beginning of 1947, one dollar was equivalent to C$3,395. In December 1947, one 
dollar was equivalent to C$83,000. Of course, the US dollar’s higher price was not only 
caused by the large circulation of in Mainland China, but also caused by the 
depreciation and price hyperinflation of Fabi. However, the above data also tells us after 
the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1945, the Chinese currency and foreign 
currency markets were facing a situation of extreme instability and deteriorating price 
inflation. 
  
886 More about how people traded goods and dollars, see S. Zhu et al. (1947). 
474 
                                                 
 
Figure 6.9 Chinese official dollar exchange rate in 1947. Figure’s currency unit is one Chinese dollars (C$).  
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Besides, other foreign currencies were also circulating in Free China.887 There 
are still 3 million Philippine pesos in circulation in South China after the Second Sino-
Japanese War. Likewise, due to the failure of Fabi and the subsequent Gold Yuan Notes, 
and due to Guangdong Province is adjacent to Hong Kong geographically, the Hong 
Kong dollar was particularly popular in Guangdong and other provinces in South China 
after the Second-Sino Japanese War. The issuance of the Hong Kong dollar was 
HK$280 million in 1945, and it was HK$880 million in April 1949. Before the 1949 
Communist Revolution, HK$600 million were circulating in mainland China; Hong 
Kong dollar accounted for 88% of the circulated currency in South China. 
The circulation of foreign currency in China indeed boosted price inflation to 
some degree. However, we must also note that the widespread use of foreign currency 
by ordinary people is mostly due to their distrust of Fabi and the price inflation it 
brought. Therefore, it was the inability of Fabi that led people to use foreign currency to 
protect their daily lives rather than the circulation of foreign currency caused price 
inflation and the collapse of Fabi. Moreover, the collapse of Fabi was a result of the 
ROC government’s series of wrong political, economic and military policies. 
6.3.6 Foreign Reserve Policy and Gold Policy  
This section examines if the foreign reserve policy and the gold policy had the 
influence on the price hyperinflation of Fabi. Our research finds that the wrong 
exchange rate policy also harmed the instability of the central banking system, and price 
inflation caused by the wrong exchange rate policy also had a negative contribution to 
the foreign exchange rate. T. V. Soong, the Premier of the Republic of China (25 Sep. 
1930 – 4 Dec. 1930), led the reform of free exchange of foreign currency and gold at 
887 Reference of this paragraph see P. Yang (1963, pp. 116-119), 
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that time.888 Soong’s initial idea was to alleviate price inflation through opening up the 
foreign exchange and gold markets. Once the markets of foreign exchange and gold 
were open, people could use their foreign exchanges and gold to buy Fabi to reduce the 
pressure of price inflation. Besides, Soong also thought that the opening of the markets 
could be a way of attracting US investment in China. However, a prerequisite for this 
policy is that the value of the currency remains relatively stable. In this way, Chinese 
and foreign investors may form a more optimistic expectation of Fabi, choosing to 
purchase it through foreign currency and gold. However, if Fabi is in a status of 
continuous printing, it means that the Fabi is in rapid price inflation, making the value 
of it depreciated. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that people were 
reluctant to buy Fabi through foreign currency and gold. Unfortunately, this is precisely 
what was happening at the time. Soong’s policy was too idealistic. He did not consider 
the continuing depreciation of Fabi at that time, would not only make the free exchange 
policy not only helpless to ensure the price deflation of Fabi, but also caused a series of 
economic and political problems. 
On March 4, 1946, the Central Bank officially opened the foreign exchange 
market.  In the beginning, when the foreign exchange market was opened, the exchange 
rate of Fabi to the US dollar was C$2020 to US$1. Figure 6.10 below shows the prices 
of US dollar and gold in Chinese dollar Fabi from 1945 to 1948. In the same month, on 
the black-market, the exchange rate of Fabi to the US dollar was C$2006 to $1. We can 
find that in the beginning, the exchange rate difference between the official exchange 
rate and the black-market exchange rate was not monumental. Several factors led to the 
relatively stable foreign exchange prices at the time. 889  First, the government was 
negotiating with the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, people were hoping for peace at 
888 References of this paragraph see P. Yang (1963, p. 72), and J. Zhu (2012, pp. 428-429). 
889 See Wen (2011). 
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that time, which stabilized their confidence in the foreign exchange market and their 
subjective expectations of prices. Second, because the Civil War did not yet begin 
during that period, the government’s foreign exchange has not been consumed because 
of war, making foreign exchange abundant, which also stabilized the price of foreign 
exchange. Third, due to the combination of the foreign exchange market and the trading 





Figure 6.10 Currency issuance of Fabi, Prices of US dollar and gold in Fabi, 1945-1948, 1945-1948. 
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However, gradually the prices of the exchange market and the gold market 
started to rise.890 As just stated previously, at the beginning of the reform, the price in 
the foreign exchange market and the gold market was rising gradually. From March to 
July 1946, the black-market price of the US dollar rose from C$2,022 to C$2,519, an 
increase of about 25%.891 The price of the gold market rose from C$1.59 million to 
C$1.93, an increase of about 21%.892 As we have analyzed in section 6.3.2.1, in order to 
pay for the Civil War, the Chinese government issued a large amount of Fabi, and the 
result was a rapid rise in prices. One of the results of the government’s attempt to use 
the sale of foreign exchange to stabilize prices is the massive consumption of 
government foreign exchange. However, the government quickly discovered that 
foreign exchange was being consumed very quickly. The consumption of government’s 
reserve of gold and foreign exchange was very high, and by November 1946 it had 
consumed foreign exchange of $450 million.893 The depreciation of Fabi corresponded 
to the relative scarcity of gold and foreign exchange. Therefore, the prices of gold and 
foreign exchange markets had also risen. In 1947, gold prices rose dramatically. In 
February 1947, the average selling price of gold in Shanghai was four times higher than 
the average price in March 1946. 894 At this time, the government no longer dared to let 
go of selling gold and foreign exchange, while the rising price of gold and foreign 
exchange in the black-market began to accelerate. In August 1946, in the black-market, 
the US dollar was C$2,909, and in February 1947 it was C$12,657, an increase of more 
than three times. In February 1946, the gold rose from C$2.03 million to C$6.11 million 
in the same period; the price had risen at least two times.895 From March 1946 to 
890 See G. Wu (1958, pp. 140-152) and P. Yang (1963, pp. 75-76). 
891 See P. Yang (1963, p. 75). 
892 See P. Yang (1963, p. 75). 
893 See P. Yang (1963, p. 75). 
894 See R. Shen (1985). 
895 See P. Yang (1963, pp. 75-76). 
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February 1947, the consumption of foreign exchange, gold, and others accounted for 
58.41% of the reserve at the end of February 1946, and the consumption of gold at that 
time accounted for 60% of the original foreign exchange deposit in March 1946, being 
sold for 3.53 tales.896 For this reason, the President of the National Government Chiang 
Kai-shek was angry, and T. V. Soong had to resign, leading Soong to fade out of the 
political circle of the Republic of China.897 The panic buying happened In February 
1947 in the whole country, especially in Shanghai was called “the panic buying of gold 
in 1947”. 
Initially, Soong wanted to use the free exchange of gold and foreign exchange 
to ease price inflation. However, the problem is that the amount of Fabi issued by the 
Chinese government had been unable to hedge against the sale of gold and foreign 
exchange. Similarly, due to the loss of foreign exchange and gold, people lost 
confidence in Fabi and further sold the amounts of it that they held. Soong’s policy was 
full of contradictions. On one hand, he wanted to be laissez-faire in the gold and foreign 
exchange markets. On the other hand, he could not control the currency issuance. The 
result was the failure of his policy of gold and foreign exchange. 
6.3.7 Insufficiency of Foreign Aids and Marshall Plan on China 
This section analyzes whether the lack of foreign aids was also one of the 
causes of Fabi’s price hyperinflation. During the wartime, if the Chinese government 
had no way to stabilize the value of through its own gold and foreign exchange policies, 
then gold and foreign exchange aid from Western countries should also be a way to help 
China stabilize the price value of Fabi. However, unfortunately, because the foreign aid 
896 See R. Shen (1985). 
897 See R. Shen (1985). 
481 
                                                 
of Western countries was not in place in time, the Chinese government did not have the 
opportunity to use this method to stabilize the value of the Fabi.898 
In fact, the Chinese government had already obtained a certain degree of US 
aid during the Second Sino-Japanese War.899 In 1942, the Chinese government won a 
US$500 million loan to resist against Japan, including using part of the loan to purchase 
a US$200 million gold from the US. At the same time, the US army garrison also 
brought US$321 million to China. Also, after 1947, the United States gave China 
another US$2 billion to stabilize China's economic situation. At that time, the US's 
currency assistance to China accounted for more than 50% of the Chinese government's 
monetary expenditure. The money was finally used by the Chinese government to quell 
the rebellion of the Communist Party of China. 
However, as we have analyzed before, due to the consumption of the Civil War, 
prices had skyrocketed, and foreign exchange reserves were completely consumed. 
Thus, the Chinese government was very eager to request economic assistance from the 
United States.900 On February 10, 1947, Primer T. V. Soong eagerly stated to the US 
officials that without further foreign aid, the Chinese economy was likely to collapse 
within a few months.901 In 1948, the Chinese government again proposed to the United 
States a three-year US$1.5 billion loan assistance program.902 However, in the face of 
the pressure of the continuous collapse of the government of Republic of China, the US 
government finally promised the assistance only in the form of physical goods rather 
than loans as the primary means of assistance.903 In March,1946 the US Secretary of 
State George Marshall once expressed that the United States would give China a loan of 
898 See P. Yang (1963, p. 71, pp. 80-82) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 432). 
899 Data of this paragraph see P. Yang (1963, p. 71). 
900 See Hong (2008), World Affairs Press (1957), and P. Yang (1958). 
901 See World Affairs Press (1957, pp. 401-402). 
902 See P. Yang (1958, pp. 81-82). 
903 See P. Yang (1958, pp. 81-82). 
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US$500 million.904 However, the loan was delayed until 1948, and the amount of the 
final physical assistance only accounted for US$463 million.905 
The US economic assistance did not meet the requirements of the Chinese 
government; in fact, according to the US statement, after Japan surrendered, they had 
provided China with US$1.437 billion loans in economic assistance.906 So, perhaps we 
need to look at the problem differently: the US might not have met all the Chinese 
government's request for financial assistance, but in absolute terms, the loans of 
US$1.437 billion was not insignificant. What we need to doubt is Chiang Kai-shek’s 
ability to manage finance and military talent as the President of the National 
Government. 
The lack of foreign aids was one of the reasons why price inflation could not 
be controlled at the time. However, if we consider from the perspectives of the United 
States and other Western countries, it is understandable that they were less willing to 
assist the Republic of China. The government led by the Chinese Nationalist Party had 
not had an excellent fiscal and monetary policy disciplines since the Second Sino-
Japanese War, which makes the Western countries reluctant to provide more aids to 
China. Therefore, if the Chiang Kai-shek administration had been able to have stricter 
discipline over fiscal and monetary policies and formulate a more effective military 
strategy to calm the Communist rebellion, it would have been reasonable for Western 
countries to increase their aids. Under such a circumstance, the Chinese government 
might not even need more foreign aids to settle the Communist rebellion. 
6.3.8 Economic Regulation Policies 
In the previous sections, we have discussed the monetary and fiscal policies 
issues that led to the price hyperinflation of Fabi. We conclude that the Chinese 
904 See Hong (2008, p. 507). 
905 See Hong (2008, p. 507). 
906 See Hong (2008, p. 507). 
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Nationalist Government’s misguided monetary policies are the most important causes of 
the price hyperinflation. In this section, we examine the hypothesis if the government’s 
economic regulation policies had the role in the shape of the price hyperinflation. 
6.3.8.1 The stock market policy and its relationship with the price 
hyperinflation. The stock market policy and whether it had the relationship with the 
price hyperinflation is should also be discussed.907 During the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, the government did not ban stock trading. However, in the early days after the 
victory of the resistance against the Japanese, in order to strengthen control over the 
economy, the Chinese government prohibited stock trading (although in May 1946 and 
August 1948, the stock exchanges in Shanghai and Tianjin opened separately and the 
transactions were very active). The initial share capital of the Tianjin Stock Exchange 
was C$1 billion. 908  However, in August 1948, the government ordered the stock 
exchanges to close on the grounds of currency reform. Thus, the stock market could no 
longer play the role of absorbing capital, and all the funds that flowed into the market, 
foreign exchange market, overseas market, etc., indirectly promoted price inflation. 
6.3.8.2 Price control policy and price hyperinflation. Another question that 
needed to answer was what were the conditions of the price control were and whether it 
partly caused the price hyperinflation. 909  The price inflation in 1946 caused the 
government to issue a price control in February 1947.910 Our research finds that some 
opinions argued that there were two reasons for the failure of price control. One is that 
the government had a limited ability of the price control of goods. The other is that the 
government’s preemptive measures were only effective in places like Shanghai and 
907 References of this paragraph see J. Zhu (2012, p. 429) and Hong (2008, pp. 523-524). 
908 The original name of Tianjin Stock Exchange in Chinese is “ཙ⍕䅹ࡨӔ᱃ᡰ.” 
909 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 743-744) and K. Chang (1956, pp. 350-352). 
910 See K. Chang (1956, p. 350). 
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Nanjing where it had a strong influence. 911  We reckon that when formulating the 
issuance policy of Fabi, the government should consider that once price inflation 
accelerates, there is no way to control prices. This is because the government’s price 
control was simply not enough to cover in all areas of the Republic of China, but the 
currency was easily distributed throughout the while government-controlled areas. 
6.3.8.3 Capital outflow as a role of the formulation of price hyperinflation. 
The third question that needed to be answered is what the role of capital outflow was in 
the formulation of price hyperinflation. Our research finds that due to price inflation and 
the deterioration of the economic situation, capital outflow such as foreign exchange 
and gold appeared in large numbers. According to statistics, during the Civil War, the 
wealth of wealthy Chinese families and government officials in the United States 
reached US$1 billion to US$2 billion, of which the T. V. Soong family had US$100 
million in deposits in the United States and Switzerland. We argue that the Civil War 
led to a severe capital flight from the stock market, which could have played a role in 
hedging the price inflation of Fabi if it was still open during the Civil War. 
6.3.8.4 The expansion of demand as an influence on price hyperinflation. 
Our research finds that after the Second Sino-Japanese War, people had a great desire to 
return to normal economic life. However, due to the scarcity of products, people’s 
demand was reflected in the rapid rise in prices.912 As we have analyzed in the previous 
sections, the leading cause of price inflation was the government’s over-issuance of 
Fabi. Therefore, the expansion of demand, even if it promoted the rise of prices, was not 
the main cause of the rising prices. 
911 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 744). 
912 See J. Zhu (2012, pp. 430-431) and Hong (2008, pp. 492-496). 
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6.4 A Discussion of the Possible Consequences of Fabi’s Price Hyperinflation, 
1945-1948 
After analyzing the causes of Fabi’s price hyperinflation, in this section, we 
synthesize the economic, political and social consequences of Fabi’s price 
hyperinflation from 1945 to 1948. From section 6.4.1 to section 6.4.3, we propose three 
consequences of what the institutional consequences of the collapse of the Fabi were 
from 1945 to 1948. These sections respectively discuss how the Fabi’s price 
hyperinflation caused the destruction of entrepreneurial production, people’s lives, and 
social orders. 
6.4.1 Destruction of Entrepreneurial Production 
This section analyses how Fabi’s monetary expansion and price hyperinflation 
destroyed entrepreneurial production. Section 6.4.1.1 discusses the cost of the wages 
increases paid to the workers. Section 6.4.1.2 demonstrates the taxation on 
entrepreneurs. Section 6.4.1.3 is on cronyism, destructive entrepreneurship, and unfair 
high interest rates credits for the entrepreneurs without the official relationships. Section 
6.4.1.4 illustrates the relationship between overproduction and entrepreneurial loss that 
cost by Fabi’s monetary expansion and price hyperinflation. 
6.4.1.1 The increase of the cost of the wages paid to the workers. Our 
analysis finds that the price hyperinflation caused an increase in workers’ wages which 
increased the cost of entrepreneurs. 913  Before the Second Sino-Japanese War, the 
government had various means to destroy the strikes. However, after the war, as the 
government's control was weakened, it had no ability to destroy the strikes. Therefore, 
in the postwar era, the government had to allow workers to adjust and raise their wages 
automatically. In April 1946, the government announced this policy. Subsequently, the 
913 References of this paragraph see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 742). 
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rise in wages of workers led to an increase in the cost of entrepreneurs, which harmed 
the interests of entrepreneurs and caused the dissatisfaction among them. 914  One 
example was the decline in the purchasing power of Shanghai workers’ salaries in 1948. 
If we treat the first year of statistics of the price index is 1936, the price index of 
Shanghai in July 1948 rose 4.06 million times, while the living expenses index of the 
labors of Shanghai only rose 1.62 million times, having a difference of 150.2%.915 The 
price of rice was about C$40 million in the first half of August 1948; however, the price 
of rice rose to more than C$60 million in the second half of August 1948.916 The rising 
cost of living for ordinary people was partly passed on to the entrepreneurs who hired 
them. 
6.4.1.2 The taxation on entrepreneurs. In section 6.3.4, we have analyzed 
that the price hyperinflation led the government to increase spending by increasing 
taxes to entrepreneurs, which has also distorted entrepreneurship.917 The government’s 
tax policy did not treat entrepreneurs equally. It increased taxes for some entrepreneurs 
and did not increase taxes for some speculators, which led to the taxed entrepreneurs 
having less incentives to produce.918 Besides, what we need to point out here is that if it 
were not the government's chaotic economic policy and expansionary monetary policy, 
speculators would not have the opportunity. Therefore, instead of condemning 
speculators, it is better to condemn the fact that the government’s expansionary 
monetary policy caused speculation. Because as long as there is bad economic policy 
from the government, speculators will always exist. 
914 References of this paragraph see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 742-743), P. Yang (1963, pp. 
137-140), D. Wu (1958, pp. 33-36), Kuang (1948), and Hong (2008, pp. 521-522, pp. 526-627). 
915 See Kuang (1948). 
916 See Kuang (1948). 
917 References of this paragraph see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 742), C. X. Wu et al. (1948, p.12), 
and P. Yang (1963, p. 153). 
918 For more about the relationship between taxation and speculation, see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, 
p. 743). For more about the speculation issues, see Hong (2008, pp. 511-514). 
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6.4.1.3 Cronyism, destructive entrepreneurship, and unfair and high 
interest rates credits for the entrepreneurs without the official relationships. The 
price hyperinflation led to the emergence of cronyism, leading to the emergence of 
destructive entrepreneurship and the unfair credits for the entrepreneurs without official 
relationships.919 Government officials and their entrepreneurial partners colluded to get 
foreign exchange, import goods, and get the other benefits that ordinary people in 
business could not get. One case of how politicians get benefit from the collusion was 
shown in section 6.3.8.3. 
In the management of foreign exchange, after the victory of the Second Sino-
Japanese War, enterprises that traded on the black-market were hit by the 
government.920 The government provided relatively sufficient foreign exchanges for the 
state-owned enterprises and the private entrepreneurs with whom the government had 
close ties and calculated foreign exchange at official rates, while private entrepreneurs 
who were not closely related to the government were refused to fully satisfy their 
foreign exchange.921 
In the issue of the discriminated credit policy, one example was the nepotism 
between the government and the rice merchants who were closely related to it.922 In 
1946, the government loaned to rice merchants, who engaged in speculative activities 
919 Due to K. Foss and N. Foss (2002), “entrepreneurship may be socially harmful if it takes the form of 
rent-seeking, attempts to influence governments (or management) to redistribute income in a way that 
consumes resources and brings about a social loss”, which can be referred to the destructive 
entrepreneurship. We argue that during the Civil War, the behaviors of the entrepreneurs who colluded 
with the government can be called destructive entrepreneurship. Some viewpoints (Huerta de Soto, 2006, 
pp. 421-423) argue that the credit expansion of the central bank will cause entrepreneurs to misjudge 
market price signals, thereby distorting entrepreneurship. Also, in one study, W. H. Wang and Caramés 
(2019) point out how the traditional philosophy of Laozi can help entrepreneurs avoid destructive 
entrepreneurship. However, clearly during that time, when some of the Chinese entrepreneurs and 
politicians colluded, the traditional business ethics were lost. 
920 References of this paragraph see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 743), P. Yang (1963, pp. 145-157; 
1948, p.154), and Hong (2008, pp. 496-500). 
921 See P. Yang (1948, p.154). 
922 References of the discriminatory credit policy see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 742), Hong 
(2008, pp. 511-514), P. Yang (1946, pp. 66-70; 1948, pp. 88-102; 1963, pp. 68-70, p. 146). 
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leading to the increase of price. 923 In addition, the interest rate manipulated by the 
government on private enterprises loans was also not fair. As early as during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War, the ROC government implemented an unfair credit policy for the 
ordinary entrepreneurs and implemented preferential policies for the state-owned 
economy on the number of loans and interest rates, which discriminated against private 
entrepreneurs on credit policies.924 According to data from March 1941, the Central 
Bank, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, and the Farmers Bank provided C$186 
million loans to state-owned enterprises, while the loans to the private economy 
amounted to only C$67 million.925 The annual interest rate was about 10% and in terms 
of price, had increased dozens of times. Through this, the ROC government was 
actually subsidizing the state-owned enterprises by providing low-interest loans, making 
the state-owned enterprises having the absolute advantage against the private 
economy. 926  During the Civil War since 1945, the government continued this 
discriminatory policy. The loan interest rate obtained by the private sectors was 
calculated according to the market and the black-market price was much higher than the 
official interest rate provided by the government to the state-owned economy.927  
6.4.1.4 Overproduction and entrepreneurial loss. The price hyperinflation 
also led to excessive production and the loss of entrepreneurs.928 In the early days of 
Fabi’s price inflation, some enterprises were even experiencing profit.929 However, with 
the progress of monetary expansion and price inflation, especially during the Civil War, 
923 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 742). 
924 See Zong (1943, p. 263), P. Yang (1946, p. 69; 1948, p. 92; 1963, pp. 148-149). 
925 See Zong (1943, p. 263) and P. Yang, (1963, pp. 148-149). 
926 See Zong (1943, p. 263) and P. Yang, (1963, pp. 148-149). 
927 See P. Yang (1948, p. 92; 1963, p. 150). For data on the difference between the official interest rate and 
the black-market interest, see K. Chang (1958, p. 375). 
928 References of this paragraph see P. Yang (1946, pp.81-83; 1963, p. 146) and Z. Zou (1943). About the 
theory of entrepreneurial loss and entrepreneurship, see Kirzner (1997) and Harper (2003). 
929 See P. Yang (1963, p. 146). 
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enterprises experienced excessive production and losses.930 Despite the lack of specific 
and comprehensive statistics, evidence shows that the price inflation after 1944 led to a 
decline in the purchasing power of all the classes of society, followed by a decline in 
prices and a decline in the production of the consumption goods. 931 Moreover, the 
previous price inflation led to overproduction of factories and enterprises. As the 
purchasing power of people declined, the goods at this time also became unsalable, the 
production of machine manufacturing was also reduced.932 
6.4.2 Destruction of Ordinary People’s Life 
The monetary expansion and price hyperinflation of Fabi resulted in a decline 
in the value of government bonds that people held, a decline in the value of savings, and 
a malignant decline in the purchasing power of money and the decline of the quality of 
people’s life. Each sub-section of section 6.4.2 deals with one of the above topics 
respectively.  
6.4.2.1 A decline in the value of government bonds the people held. We find 
that the government’s expansionary monetary policy and price hyperinflation also led to 
a decline in the value of government bonds purchased by the public, which caused 
public dissatisfaction.933 As of 1946, the government issued public debt of C$9.558 
billion (excluding the British pounds, US dollars, and customs bonds). 934 After the 
victory of the Second Sino-Japanese War, due to price hyperinflation caused by 
expansionary monetary policy, people asked the Chinese government to repay 1,000 
930 See P. Yang (1963, p. 146). 
931 See P. Yang (1963, p. 146). 
932 See P. Yang (1963, p. 146). The Austrian Economics school argues that the loss of entrepreneurs is 
caused by the central banking system-generated business cycle (Garrison, 2000). For an analysis of the 
Austrian School perspective on the business cycle problems caused by Mainland China’s central banking 
system in recent years, refer to W. Wang and Vegas (2017). 
933 References of this paragraph see P. Yang (1963, pp.122-126, p. 145), Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, 
p. 743), and Qian (1984, pp. 338-365). 
934 See P. Yang (1963, p. 145). 
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times the amount of the original public debt.935 However, in July 1946, the government 
decided to pay the public debt according to the ratio of one to one.936 This policy caused 
a massive loss for the people who had bought the public debt, causing their distrust and 
dissatisfaction with the government.937 
6.4.2.2 A decline in the value of savings. The Chinese government’s 
expansionary monetary policy also led to a decline in the value of savings.938 After the 
beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Chinese government restricted 
the withdrawal of deposits. 939 Therefore, during the war of resistance, hundreds of 
millions of depositors could not withdrawal their more than one million value 
deposits. 940  In 1947, the price of the government’s ruling area rose by more than 
100,000 times, and the government only allowed the amount of savings to be repaid 700 
to 1700 times the original value of the savings. 941  Ironically, after controlling the 
Mainland China in 1949, in 1953, the Communist regime compensated the people for 
their deposits losses to some degree.942 
6.4.2.3 Malignant decline in the purchasing power of money and the 
decline of the quality of people’s life. Due to our research, we find that the price 
hyperinflation also caused the malignant decline in the purchasing power of money and 
the decline of quality of people’s life. Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.12 below show how the 
living standard of the labor class also significantly declined due to price 
hyperinflation.943 One example was the decline in the purchasing power of Shanghai 
935 See P. Yang (1963, p. 145). 
936 See P. Yang (1963, p. 145). 
937 See P. Yang (1963, p. 145). 
938 References of this paragraph see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 742-743), P. Yang (1963, pp. 
145-146), China Finance (1953), and Hong (2008, p. 491). 
939 See P. Yang (1963, p. 145). 
940 See P. Yang (1963, p. 145). 
941 See P. Yang (1963, p. 145). 
942 See China Finance (1953) and P. Yang (1963, p. 145). 
943 References of this paragraph see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 742-743), P. Yang (1963, pp. 
137-140), D. Wu (1958, pp. 33-36), Kuang (1948), and Hong (2008, pp. 521-522, pp. 526-627). 
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workers’ salaries in 1948. If we treat the first year of statistics of the price index is 1936, 
the price index of Shanghai in July 1948 rose to 4.06 million times, while the living 
expenses index of Shanghai’s workers only rose to 1.62 million times, having a 
difference of 150.2%.944 The price of rice was about C$40 million in the first half of 
August 1948; however, the price of rice rose to more than C$60 million in the second 
half of August 1948, making the actual purchasing power of workers' wages drop by a 
third.945 And all this occurred in just half a month!946  
Thus, workers were living in a miserable situation. First, they lacked nepotism 
in the government; hence there was no way for them to gain privileges. Therefore, it 
was not possible for them to get any help from the government to avoid the loss from 
the price hyperinflation. Second, due to the low social status of the workers, it was also 
difficult for them to adopt various resources and took measures to preserve their wealth 
during the period of the price hyperinflation. Third, and perhaps the most important, is 
that Chinese workers at the time did not understand price inflation from the perspective 
of economic theory, which made it difficult for them to use scientific theory to guide 
themselves to find ways to circumvent price hyperinflation. 
  
944 See Kuang (1948). 
945 See Kuang (1948). 
946 See Kuang (1948). 
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Figure 6.11 Kingming price indices, 1947-1948. 
Sources: G. Wu (1958, pp.186-188) and Central Bank Economic Research Division (1949).  
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Figure 6.12 Shanghai price in 1947. 
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The decreased purchasing power of money then caused the decline of the 
living standard of the public servants, the personnel of the public universities, and the 
students who were dependent on their family members working in the public sectors.947 
Although these people work for the government, they could not benefit from the 
corrupted cronyism system. 948  The following are examples of the difficult life of 
intellectuals during this period.949 At that time, Wen Yiduo, a well-known professor at 
Kunming University in China, had to make a fake official stamp to make fake 
certificates obtaining subsidy income.950 Du Su, a senior professor of economics at the 
University of Guilin, who had been teaching for many years, committed suicide in 1948, 
leaving behind his wife and three daughters.951 The experience of these public servants 
and the intellectuals of public universities is equally worthy of sympathy. Just like the 
public servants of other countries, these Chinese public servants perhaps just wanted to 
have a stable income. Thus, they might have never dreamed that the policies of the 
government led by the Nationalist Party, which promised to bring them a good 
livelihood, actually not only did not bring them a stable life but also destroyed their 
livelihood through expansionary monetary policy. However, human actions are full of 
uncertainty. If these public servants realized that their jobs in the government jobs were 
also uncertain, especially during the wartime, they might have prepared more 
sufficiently to deal with such situations. 
6.4.2.4 A decline of the purchasing power of farmers. The extreme monetary 
expansion and price hyperinflation also caused the decline of the purchasing power of 
947 Reference of this paragraph see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 742-743) and P. Yang (1963, p. 
145).  
948 See P. Yang (1963, p. 145). 
949 See P. Yang (1963, p. 144). 
950 For more about Wen Yiduo and his intellectual activities with other scholars in the 1940s, see Mazur 
(1993). 
951 The original name of Du Su in Chinese is “ᶌ㚵.” 
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farmers.952 The prices of various industrial products were increasing much quicker than 
the increase in the prices of agricultural products. This phenomenon means that the 
farmers’ actual money income and purchasing power money were declining. This 
situation lasted from the period of the Second Sino-Japanese War to the time after the 
war. Whether it was before and after the war, the prices of agricultural products were 
always lower than the prices of industrial products. The price difference between 
agricultural products and industrial products was around three times before the war and 
after.953 As the price hyperinflation reduced the purchasing power of urban populations, 
the output of agricultural products was also decreasing (see Figure 13 in the appendix of 
this chapter). The yield of tea in 1946 was 82% lower than the average yield of it from 
1933 to 1937.954 The yield of eggs was reduced by 6.7% in 1946 compared to 1936.955 
The price of tung oil in 1946 was only 50% of it before the Second Sino-Japanese 
War.956 We argue that because of the inconvenient transportation and communication 
conditions in rural China at the time, farmers lacked information and knowledge to 
avoid price inflation. Therefore, the situation of the peasants was also very tragic. 
Moreover, because of the decline in farmers' purchasing power, it was difficult for them 
to purchase industrial products for consumption. Therefore, the price hyperinflation not 
only caused the fall of peasants' monetary income but caused that the industrial 
producers lost the purchase of the farmers worsening the general economic situation.   
952 Reference of this paragraph see G. Wu (1958, pp. 174-179), Hong (2008, pp. 527-528), P. Yang (1963, 
pp. 140-141), and X. Fang (1948). 
953 See G. Wu (1958, pp. 174-179) and P. Yang (1963, p. 140). 
954 See X. Fang (1948). 
955 See X. Fang (1948). 
956 See X. Fang (1948). 
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Figure 6.13 Agricultural price indices, 1937-1949.  
Sources: P. Yang (1963, p. 141) and D. Wu (1945, pp. 34-35).  
Notes: All data has been evaluated by logarithms in the figure. The currency standard of 1948 was changed from Fabi 
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6.4.3 Destruction of Social Orders 
The monetary expansion and price hyperinflation of Fabi resulted in the 
destruction of social orders. Each sub-section of section 6.4.3 deals with one of the 
above topics, respectively.  
6.4.3.1 The strikes of workers. Our research find that the price hyperinflation 
led to a decline in the living standards of workers, which in turn caused strikes. The 
strikes of workers then interrupted the regular production of enterprises and factories, 
negatively interrupting entrepreneurship and production orders. Thus, the supply of 
products was reduced by the strikes. Compared to the situations before the Civil War, 
the situation of strikes after 1945 was more severe.957 In 1936, before the Japanese 
invasion, the total number of strikes recorded nationwide was 278. 958 In 1946, the 
number of incidents involving strikes and labor disputes in Shanghai reached 1,716.959 
By 1947, the number reached 2,538. 960  Evidence supported the government’s 
accusation that the Communist infiltrated the workers’ strike. 961   However, if the 
government did not implement such an expansionary monetary policy, it would not 
have such a significant negative impact on the normal life of workers and the 
production of enterprises and factories. 
6.4.3.2 The protests of students and intellectuals. We also find that due to 
the deterioration of the economic situation caused by the price hyperinflation, students 
and professors broke out in large-scale demonstrations, in particular, the demonstrations 
of anti-hunger and anti-warfare, the requiring of military spending cuts and increasing 
government education budgets in the spring of 1947.  The deterioration of the economic 
957 Reference of the strikes of the labors during the Civil War, see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 742), 
and C. Liu (1951). 
958 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 742). 
959 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 742). 
960 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 742). 
961 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 742) and C. Liu (1951). 
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situation made it impossible to carry out activities related to education, which led to 
these demonstrations by students and professors, disrupting negatively the social order 
of education. After we finish the analysis of the process and the consequences of Fabi’s 
extreme monetary expansion and price hyperinflation, in the next section (section 6.5), 
we demonstrate the process of Gold Yuan Notes’ price hyperinflation. 
6.5 Process of Gold Yuan Notes’ Price Hyperinflation, 1948-1949 
This section demonstrates the process of Gold Yuan Note’s price 
hyperinflation from 1948 to 1949. Section 6.5.1 is about the background of the issuance 
of Gold Yuan Notes. Section 6.5.2 to section 6.5.6 analyze the process and reasons of 
Gold Yuan Notes’ price hyperinflation in details. 
6.5.1 Background of the Issuance of Gold Yuan Notes 
Our research has found that there are three essential factors of the background 
of the issuance of the Gold Yuan Notes. The first is the price control reform in February 
1947. The second is the panic buying of gold in 1947. The third is the currency reform 
decision of the President of the Republic of China Qiang Kai-shek. Each sub-section in 
section 6.5.1 deals with one of the above topics, respectively. 
6.5.1.1 The price control reform in February 1947. In section 6.2.2.3, 
section 6.3.2.4, and section 6.3.8.2, we already demonstrated the process and 
institutional consequences of price control. We have pointed out that the failure of price 
control was one of the original intentions of the soaring prices. What we need to 
emphasize in this section is that price control reform was the most significant economic 
reform of the government before the 1948 Golden Yuan Notes reform.962  However, 
considering the background of the government’s gradual failure in the Civil War and the 
failed price control reform, little space remained for the government to curb the errors 
962 For more about the price control, see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 743-744), K. Chang (1958, 
pp. 72-730), J. Li & F. Xu, and J. Zhu (2012, p. 431). 
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of any further economic and monetary reform. Therefore, every step of the 
government's next reform must be cautious, and a slight carelessness in the new reform 
will lead to a total loss. 
6.5.1.2 The panic buying of gold in 1947. In section 6.3.6, we have 
demonstrated the process and the institutional consequence of the panic buying of gold 
in 1947. We have demonstrated that the wrong gold policy and the panic buying of gold 
were the reasons of Fabi’s price hyperinflation, making people distrust the Nationalist 
Government more. Therefore, in light of the shaken public support, any subsequent 
monetary reform would become a critical factor in the success of the government and 
Free China. 
6.5.1.3 The reform decision of President Qiang Kai-shek and the Chinese 
government. As the previous analysis of this chapter has revealed, China’s economic 
situation in 1948 was in a chaotic situation: price hyperinflation could not be restrained, 
and misguided economic policies accelerated the occurrence of price hyperinflation. In 
order to solve the price inflation problem, the Chinese government proposed a reform 
plan to solve it.963 This plan is divided into three parts. In the first part, the plan argued 
that in the case of the continuation of the Civil War, to stabilize the economic, political, 
and military situations, the monetary system should not be radically reformed. Thus, 
Fabi should be retained. In the second part, the plan believed that although Fabi was in a 
state of price hyperinflation, as long as supplementary measures were taken, the current 
economic situation could be maintained, and the situation would not be deteriorated 
further. In the third part, given the disparity in government revenues and expenditures, 
the project planned that on the basis of not changing Fabi’s status quo as the legal 
currency standard, the government could issue a particular currency being used for 
963 References of this reform plan in this paragraph, see Y. Huang (1985), Weng (1960), and J. Zhu (2012, 
pp. 432-433). 
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trading foreign exchange and paying taxes. Further, the plan argued that the special 
currency should not circulate in the market like the function of Customs Gold Unit 
issued before the Second Sino-Japanese War.964  
This approach was a very smooth and gradual monetary reform program. 
However, this program did not seem to have received the support of senior government 
officials. Senior government officials, especially President Qiang Kai-shek, were more 
inclined to more radical monetary reforms.965 With the support of the Premier (May 24, 
1948 - November 26, 1948) Weng Wenhao and the Minister of Finance (June 1, 1948 - 
November 15, 1948) Wang Yun-wu, this program was denied. In May and June of 1948, 
just after the sworn of President Chiang Kai-shek, the first democratically elected 
President of the Republic of China (through the National Assembly which was elected 
directly by all the Chinese voters), who was also the first and only President elected 
democratically in the whole China in history, vetoed this plan and decided to abolish 
Fabi issuing a new currency, which is called the Gold Yuan Notes. 
For the Chinese government and President Chiang Kai-shek, there were three 
reasons to cancel Fabi and issue the Gold Yuan Notes.966 The first reason was that the 
government's financial pressure was immense. Thus, it was a possible option to ease the 
government’s fiscal pressure by issuing a new currency standard. The second reason 
was that the government needed to reclaim the gold of the private sectors (that scattered 
among ordinary people in 1947) to increase control over the financial system. The third 
reason was to rebuild the government credit through gold and the convertible new 
currency standard. These reasons seemed to have some cogency. However, some 
964 The original name of Customs Gold Unit in Chinese is “䰌䠁ࡨ.” For more about the Customs Gold 
Unit, see section 4.4.1.1 of Chapter 4. 
965 Reference of this plan and of this paragraph, see Y. Huang (1965), J. Zhu (2012, pp. 432-433), and K. 
Chang (1958, p. 79). 
966 Reference of the reasons why the Chinese government abolished Fabi and issued the Gold Yuan in this 
paragraph, see Y. Huang (1985), and Weng (1960), S. D. Cheng (1948), J. Zhu (2012, p. 433), and Hong 
(2008, pp. 529-532). 
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officials such as Chang Kia-Ngau and Huang Yuanbin warned that the newly issued 
Gold Yuan standard would inevitably lead to an uncontrollable situation of price 
inflation.967 In addition, we argue that taking into account the government's inconsistent 
economic and monetary policies and lack of execution of its own policies, it is not a 
strange thing if the new monetary standard could not be fully implemented or even fail. 
On August 19, 1948, the Presidential Decree Financial and Economic 
Emergency Policy and Order announced the new monetary standard reform. 968 The 
Decree declared the implementation of the Gold Yuan standard and promulgated a 
series of rules to support the new currency standard of supporting laws and 
regulations. 969  On the same day, the Chinese government issued Measures for the 
Issuance of Gold Yuan Notes, which stipulated specific rules for the Gold Yuan 
standard.970 The main contents of the decree were recorded as follows: 
The unit of value was defined as 0.2217 centigram of pure gold, to be 
represented by a note known as the Gold Yuan. The new notes exchanged at 
the rate of GY 1 to CNC $3,000,000. A 40 per cent reserve of gold, silver, and 
foreign exchange was to be maintained against the note issue, which was 
limited by law to 200,000,000 Gold Yuan equivalents of the levels obtaining 
on August 19 and could not be altered without the approval of the government 
authorities. The possession of gold, silver, or foreign exchange was prohibited, 
and all private holdings were to be surrendered in return for Gold Yuan notes. 
(Chang, 1958, pp. 79-80). 
967 See Hong (2008, p. 532), Y. Huang (1985), and K. Chang (1958, p.79). 
968 The original name of the decree in Chinese is “䋑᭯㏃☏㏺ᙕ㲅࠶Ԕ.” 
969The original name of the Measures in Chinese is “䠁ൃࡨⲬ㹼䗖⌅.” For more about this Presidential 
Decree, see T. Song (1948), S. D. Cheng (1948), ACPBC (1991, p. 574), and Hong (2008, p.532). 
970 For more about the Measures, see S. D. Cheng (1948), ACPBC (1991, pp. 574-576), K. Chang (1958, 
pp. 79-80), Hong (2005, pp. 1279-1281), and Hong (2008, p. 532-533). 
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According to the above series of regulations, the government began to issue new Gold 
Yuan Notes to replace Fabi. However, history tells us that the new monetary policy 
ultimately failed for various reasons. In the following sections, we will analyze the 
reasons and process of the Gold Yuan’s price hyperinflation and failure. 
6.5.2 Unconstrained Currency Circulation 
Another issues which should be inspected is the relationship between the 
unconstrained currency circulation of Gold Yuan Notes and its price hyperinflation. In 
response to paying the expense of the Civil War, the issued amounts of Gold Yuan 
Notes had exceeded the promised initially amounts GY$2 billion, which is one of the 
reasons for the continued acceleration of the monetary expansion and price 
hyperinflation and the failure of this new currency.971 Figure 6.14 below shows the 
issuance of Gold Yuan Notes and Shanghai price index from August 1948 to May 1949. 
As the government had no other method to pay the expense of the Civil War, the 
original quota of GY$2 billion was also cancelled and the government started to printing 
more Gold Yuan Notes to pay the war expense after the enactment of the decree of the 
Amended Measures for the Issuance of Gold Yuan Notes.972 Since then, the amounts of 
the issued Gold Yuan Notes started to increase rapidly. In November 1948, the issued 
amount of it was GY$3.39 billion, and in April 1949 it was GY$679.456 billion.973 
From August 1948 to the Fall of Shanghai in May 1949, the issuance of the Gold Yuan 
Notes has increased by more than 19,9423%. After breaking through the initially agreed 
issuance quota, the face value of the Gold Yuan Notes was also increasing. In March 
1949, the government issued the banknote’s face value of GY$5,000 and GY$10,000; 
in April, the newly issued banknote’s face value was GY$100,000; in May, the newly 
971 References of this paragraph see K. Chang (1958, p. 373), Hong (2008, pp. 541-543), ACPBC (1991, 
p. 610), and D. Liu (1992, pp. 284-285). 
972 The original name of the decree in Chinese is “؞↓䠁ൃࡨⲬ㹼䗖⌅.” See ACPBC (1991, p. 610) 
and Hong (2008, p. 541). 
973 See Hong (2008, p. 543) and D. Liu (1992, pp. 284-285). 
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issued currencies’ face value was GY$500,000 and GY$1 million. 974  Hence, the 
issuance of the Gold Yuan Notes led to price  hyperinflation. If the price indices in 
Shanghai of the Gold Yuan Notes in August 1948 was 100, then the price indices of it 
in April 1949 was 20,957,009.975 Figure 14 shows the banknote issuances and the price 
hyperinflation of prices indices of the Gold Yuan Notes from August 1948 to May 1949. 
  
974 See Hong (2008, p. 542). 
975 See K. Chang (1958, p.373). 
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Figure 6.14 The issuance of Gold Yuan Notes and Shanghai price index, August 1948 to May 1949. Unit of currency: 
one million Gold Yuan Notes. 



















8/1/48 9/1/48 10/1/48 11/1/48 12/1/48 1/1/49 2/1/49 3/1/49 4/1/49 5/1/49
The Issuance of Gold Yuan Notes and Shanghai Price Index, 
August 1948 to May 1949  
Currence Issues (unit: 100 million)
Growth Index of Currence Issues (August 31 =1)
Shanghai Price Index
505 
From the above discussion and Figure 6.14, we conclude that the excessive 
issuance of the Gold Yuan Notes was the main reason that led to the tragedy of price 
hyperinflation. However, we argue that if other measures were taken, the excessive 
issuance of this currency standard and price hyperinflation was likely to be avoided. On 
one hand, the government should make reasonable war decisions reducing military 
expenditure, which was the most crucial excuse of the government for the over-issuance 
of Gold Yuan Notes. On the other hand, if the government adopted different decisions 
on other policies, such as what we have abovementioned in this chapter (do not abuse 
power to over-issue currency, retain the circulation of Fabi, and actively seek foreign 
aid), then the over-issuance and price hyperinflation of Gold Yuan Notes could have 
been avoided. Unfortunately, all these alternatives had not been endorsed by President 
Chiang Kai-shek, which caused the tragedy of the Gold Yuan Notes happening 
irreversibly. 
6.5.3 Insufficient Metal and Foreign Exchange Reserves to Support the Value of 
Gold Yuan Notes 
This section exams whether the lack of sufficient metal and foreign exchange 
reserves to support Gold Yuan Notes value also caused its price hyperinflation. 976 
Although the government promised to use its US$200 million foreign reserve to support 
the value of Gold Yuan Notes in August 1948, it was estimated that the foreign 
exchange supporting Gold Yuan Notes was still not enough; the foreign reserve of 
which was possibly from the maximum US$130 million in June 1948 to the minimum 
US$36.6 million.977 In late October 1948, the government only had 2,000,000 ounces of 
976 Reference of this paragraph see J. Zhu (2012, pp. 433-434), Chou (1963/1969, pp. 25-27, pp. 168-
172), K. Chang (1958, pp. 79-80, p. 82), and ACPBC (1991, pp. 574-576). 
977 References of the US$200 million foreign reserve see K. Chang (1958, p. 80) and ACPBC (1991, p. 
575). References of the maximum US$130 million in June 1948, see K. Chang (1958, p. 81) and J. Zhu 
(2012, p. 432). References of the minimum US$36.6 million, see Chou (1963/1969, p. 171) and J. Zhu 
(2012, p. 4323). 
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gold, 25,000,000 ounces of silver, and foreign exchange of US$76,000,000 to be used 
to fight against the price hyperinflation.978 Therefore, one  view argues that if China had 
sufficient gold reserves in 1948 and if China did not abandon Fabi, the gold content of 
the Gold Yuan Notes might maintain being stable and its circulation might not be out of 
control. 979 We argue that such a view is reasonable to some degree. However, the 
premise of the view is that President Qiang Kai-shek had a certain degree of economic 
knowledge and listened to the advice of his financial experts making correct decisions 
such as not abolishing Fabi rashly. However, Qiang’s ignorance of economics and his 
recklessness and short-sighted arbitrariness made this policy difficult to achieve. 
6.5.4 Rash Implementation of Gold Yuan Notes Hit People’s Psychological 
Expectation of the Currency System  
The rash implementation of Gold Yuan Notes hit people’s psychological 
expectation of the currency system causing the price hyperinflation. 980  The sudden 
change in the monetary system did not get people’s support. On the contrary, because 
the government imposed people to submit the gold and silver in their hands, and 
because people did not trust the new monetary standard, they went to the mall to buy 
goods to get rid of the newly issued Gold Yuan Notes.981 The panic buying happened 
since the end of September 1948 in many Chinese cities such as Shanghai, Guiyang, 
Zhenjiang, Hangzhou, Beiping (Beijing), Guangzhou, Taipei, Chongqing, Fuzhou, 
Wuxi, Tianjin, Suzhou, Yangzhou, and Chengdu.982 On September 30, the products on 
the Shanghai market were sold out; on October 7, the products on the Beijing market 
978 See K. Chang (1958, p. 82) 
979 See J. Zhu (2012, p.433) and Y. Huang (1985). 
980 Reference of this paragraph see K. Chang (1958, p. 80), and J. Zhu (2012, pp. 434-435). 
981 See K. Chang (1958, pp. 80-81) and Hong (2008, pp. 538-540) 
982 Weekly Report of Banks [WRB] (1948) and Hong (2008, p. 539). 
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were also sold out; on the same day, the rice, noodles, and meat on Taipei market were 
extinct.983 
On the question of whether it was needed to abolish Fabi or not, the 
government’s financial experts had already made recommendations to President Chiang 
Kai-shek on people’s psychological expectations of monetary policy, hoping that the 
government would not quickly abolish Fabi. We also have argued previously in section 
6.5.3 that if Chiang Kai-shek listened to the advice of his financial experts of not 
abolishing Fabi, if Chiang tutored the economic knowledge that he lacked, and if he had 
learned from the lessons of the failure of his previous currency reforms, then the release 
of Gold Yuan Notes might not result in people’s general negative psychological 
expectations. On the issue of the nationalization of gold, silver, and foreign exchanges, 
we also agree with some scholars that if the government did not use force to nationalize 
them, people’s psychological expectations of monetary policy could be stabilized.984 It 
is precisely because of the government’s compulsory exchange policy that led to the 
loss of people's support, causing continuous price inflation and accelerating the ultimate 
failure of currency reform. 
6.5.5 Rapid Currency Depreciation 
The government’s rapid currency depreciation also partly formulated the price 
hyperinflation. Our analysis finds that the loss of control over the issuance of Gold 
Yuan Notes led to the continued depreciation of the currency.985 After the issuance of 
Gold Yuan Notes for only four months, the government announced that the unit of 
value of the Gold Yuan was changed from as 0.2217 centigrams of pure gold to as 
983 See WRB (1948) and Hong (2008, pp. 539-540). 
984 See K. Chang (1958, p. 81) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 434). 
985 References of this paragraph see ACPBC (1991, pp. 609-610), J. Zhu (2012, p. 435), K. Chang (1958, 
p. 83), and Hong (2008, p. 541). 
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0.04434 centigrams of pure gold.986 At the same time, due to the lack of other payment 
for the Civil War, the original quota of GY$2 billion was also canceled.987 In November 
1948, the circulation of the Gold Yuan was 10 times that of August of that year.988 We 
argue that this behavior fully demonstrates that the government at that time did not have 
integrity at all. In order to win the Civil War, the government disregarded people’s lives 
and livelihoods printing banknotes and distorting the spontaneous market order without 
any policy constraint and credit. Of course, the frustration that the government 
encountered in the Civil War made the situation faced by its monetary policy more 
complicated. Because of the defeat of the Civil War, apart from printing money, the 
government could find no other way to solve the issue of war expense. The lack of 
government’s credit accelerated the loss of public trust and support on both the 
government its monetary system. 
6.5.6 A Wrong Time of Implementing a New Currency System 
The time of implementing another currency system was wrong which therefore 
caused price hyperinflation. Some previous research argues that the timing of the 1948 
reform was poor, which was also one of the causes of the failure of the Gold Yuan 
reform.989 Our analysis provides three answers to this hypothesis. First, as we have 
analyzed in section 6.3, due to a series of previous policy mistakes with currency, 
taxation, finance, and the military, in general, Chinese people did not support the new 
currency reform. Secondly, during the reform, the Communist Party had occupied most 
of China’s territory in North China, separating the Chinese economic systems by the 
Civil War. Thus, it was tough to implement a new monetary system. Thirdly, the 
international community had just experienced the painful Second World War and the 
986 See ACPBC (1991, p. 609) and J. Zhu (2012, p. 435). 
987 See ACPBC (1991, p. 610) and Hong (2008, p. 541). 
988 See K. Chang (1958, p. 83). 
989 The three points of this view of the improper time of implementing a new currency reform in this 
paragraph are mainly from J. Zhu’s opinions (2012, p. 435). 
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Western powers did not have enough to support China’s new currency reform 
financially. Hence, we argue that the government’s reform did not adequately take into 
account the timing but rather used coercion to implement the reform by the stubborn 
opinions of President Chiang Kai-shek, which ultimately led to the failure of the Gold 
Yuan Notes. 
6.6 A Discussion of the Possible Consequences of Gold Yuan Notes’ Price 
Hyperinflation, 1948-1949 
Section 6.6 deals with the consequences of Gold Yuan Notes’ price 
hyperinflation from 1948 to 1949. Section 6.6.1 to section 6.6.2 separately analyze the 
economic, political, and social consequences of Gold Yuan Notes’ price hyperinflation. 
6.6.1 Economic Consequences 
Gold Yuan Notes’ expansionary monetary policy and its price hyperinflation 
caused people’s buying to be inconvenienced, entrepreneurs to hoard resources, and the 
financial market’s distortion. Section 6.6.1.1 to section 6.6.1.3 separately delve into 
these issues. 
6.6.1.1 Inconvenience of people’s buying. The over-issuance of Gold Yuan 
Notes led to severe economic consequences. In section 6.5.1.2, we have demonstrated 
the panic buying caused by Gold Yuan’s price hyperinflation. In addition to this issue, 
because of the price hyperinflation caused by the over-issuance of banknotes, the 
purchasing power of currency declined dramatically, and the normal economic life of 
urban residents was markedly shattered.990 Due to the decline in purchasing power and 
the increasing price hyperinflation, urban residents had to carry a bundle of the Gold 
Yuan Notes for shopping.991 Sometimes people had to put a bundle of the Gold Yuan 
990 For references of how the purchasing power of currency declined dramatically and how the normal 
economic life of urban residents has been severely damaged due to the hyperinflation, see Hong (2008 pp. 
542-543) and D. Liu (1992, pp. 289-290). 
991 For references of this event, see Hong (2008 pp. 542-543). 
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Notes on their bicycle for shopping due to the rapidly increased price hyperinflation, 
which was exceedingly inconvenient. In May 1949, the situation of Gold Yuan Notes 
was worsened.992 As the price rose several times a day, people were either unwilling to 
store Gold Yuan Notes or were unwilling to change Gold Yuan Notes because the 
depreciation of it was so rapid. The market, the prices of water, electricity, and gas were 
therefore priced in US dollars. Many products were also priced in gold and silver. On 
May 21, 1949, Shanghai’s rice price was GY$440 million per 50kg. In rural areas, there 
even had a situation of barter exchange.  
6.6.1.2 Hoarding of entrepreneurs and distortion of the financial market. 
In addition, due to the deterioration of the economic and military situations, financial 
markets were turbulent, and entrepreneurs began to hoard goods. Normal securities 
trading activities were difficult to unfold due to the government's changing policies. The 
Shanghai Stock Exchange also opened, closed, and even several times stopped.993 The 
Shanghai Stock Exchange was closed in August 1948 after the issuance of Gold Yuan 
Notes. It was resumed on February 21 and was closed again on June 10, 1949 when 
Shanghai fell into the hands of the Communists. From August 23rd to November 6th, 
1948, President Chiang Kai-shek sent his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who had no economic 
work experience, 994  to Shanghai to crack down on the merchants’ activities of 
stockpiling. 995  This action was known as “hitting the tigers”. 996  Although Chiang 
Ching-kuo hoped that by killing some speculators, the businessmen who stored the 
stockpiled goods would sell them to save their lives, his policy was still greatly resisted 
992 For references of this event, see Hong (2008 p. 543) and K. Chang (1958, p.85). 
993 See Hong (2008, p. 523), J. Zhu (2012, p.430). 
994 For references of this event, see J. Zeng & Liang (2007, pp. 137-138), Hong (2008, p. 537), Q. Fang 
(1985), and Shou (1985a). 
995 See Qin (1978, p. 3480, p. 3517), Z. Zhu & Tao (2000, p. 378), S. Wang (2006, pp. 238-239), and 
Hong (2008, pp. 536-538). 
996 The original name of “hitting the tigers” in Chinese is “ᢃ㘱㱾.” 
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by the Shanghai business community, even though they were in the danger of being 
persecuted by Chiang. Thus, the plan of Chiang ultimately failed.  
6.6.2 Political Consequences 
The collapse of the Gold Yuan Notes caused a breakdown within the 
government. On November 11, 1948, the second day of the enactment of the decree of 
the Amended Measures for the Issuance of Gold Yuan Notes, President Qiang Kai-
shek’s senior advisor Chen Bulei committed suicide as he was too disappointed with the 
situation. 997  On January 21, 1949, under pressure, President Chiang Kai-shek 
announced his temporal stepping down.998 Acting President Li Zongren, who was also 
the Vice President at that time, failed not only in the peace talks with the Communist 
Party in early 1949, but also failed to reverse the deteriorating economic and military 
situation because of his lack of prestige and connections. Finally, he had to return to his 
hometown Guangxi to recuperate.999 
With the deterioration of the economic and military situation, the essential 
financial practitioners who were close to the government had also fled overseas. The 
heads of the Central Bank, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, Farmers Bank, 
997 The original name of the decree in Chinese is “؞↓䠁ൃࡨⲬ㹼䗖⌅.” For the references of the 
decree, see ACPBC (1991, p. 610), Y. Huang (1985), and Hong (2008, p. 541). For the suicide of Chen 
Bulei, see Y. Li & Zhang (1995, p. 362) and Hong (2008, p. 550). 
998 See Y. Li & Z. Zhang (1995, p. 375), Z. Zhu & Tao (2000, pp. 445-507), Hong (2008, p. 550), and K. 
Chang (1958, p. 84). 
999 For the issue of Li Zongren, see Li’s autobiography in the English version (Li, 1979), K. Chang (1958, 
p. 84-85), and Hong (2008, pp. 550-551). Li Zongren and Chiang Kai-shek were far from each other 
because of their differences in personality and value. Chiang advocated the use of military and power to 
solve the problems of the Communist Party, while although Li was once a warlord in Guangxi, he hoped 
to resolve the conflict between the government and the Communist Party through peaceful and 
coordinated means. This situation was one of the reasons why Li initiated the negotiations between the 
government and the Communist Party in early 1949. In 1965, after surrendering to the Communist Party, 
Li Zongren returned to Mainland China occupied by the Communists. However, a year later, Li faced the 
Cultural Revolution initiated by the Communist Party trying to eliminate the entire Chinese traditional 
culture by systemic coercion. Two years later, in 1969, Li died. One wonder was Li regretting and 
ashamed of his surrender to the totalitarian Communist Party? For more about peace talks between the 
government and the Communist Party in early 1949 and the last military defeat of the government the 
Republic of China on Mainland China, see Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, pp. 782-788) and Z. Zhu & 
Tao (2000, pp. 441-445). For more about the Cultural Revolution, see MacFarquhar & Fairbank (1991, 
pp. 107-401) and Clark (2008). For the nature of Communism, See Hayek (1944/2001). 
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and other important financial institutions fled overseas because of the deterioration of 
the economic and military situation, which accelerated the collapse of the cronyism 
economic and financial forces supporting the central government of the Republic of 
China.1000 
President Chiang Kai-shek might not have thought about the government’s 
overall failure on Mainland China due to his poor monetary policy. However, it is 
precisely because of the failure of President Chiang Kai-shek and the Republic of China 
on the Mainland that caused the government of the Republic of China, after moving to 
Taiwan, made painstaking efforts and carried out economic reforms, which avoided the 
monetary disaster in the Mainland reappear again.1001 This status was one of the key 
1000 See Hong (2005, pp. 1388-1389; 2008, pp. 551-552). 
1001 For references of the event of the Republic of China government transporting gold to Taiwan, see J. 
Zhu (2012, pp. 436-437), Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 784), and K. Chang (1958, p. 84-85). It is 
worth noting that during Chiang Ching-kuo’s administration on Taiwan (1972-1987), Taiwan’s economy 
maintained rapid growth and entrepreneurs started their own businesses. This situation is in stark contrast 
to the series of disasters that have taken place on Mainland China occupied by the Communist Party. The 
aides to President Chiang Ching-kuo were a group of classical liberals. One representative of the group of 
advisors was Sho-Chieh Tsiang (㭓⻙ہ), a student of the Austrian school economist and the 1974 Nobel 
Prize winner in Economics Fredrich A. Hayek. The laissez-faire economic thoughts of Sho-Chieh Tsiang 
and other classical liberals led the economic policies of the government of the Republic of China in 
Taiwan from the 1960s to the 1980s. In 1972, Chiang Ching-kuo started serving as the Premier of the 
ROC. In 1975, after his father Jiang Zhongzheng died, Chiang Ching-kuo became the chairman of the 
Nationalist Party of China. In 1978, Chiang Ching-kuo was elected president of the ROC at the National 
Assembly. In 1987, one year before the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, he announced that the Taiwan region 
had lifted a 38-year martial law order to lift the party ban and ban. In 1987, one year before the death of 
Chiang Ching-kuo, he announced that the Taiwan Area of the Republic of China (ѝ㨟≁഻ਠ⚓ൠ॰) 
lifted a 38-year martial law order, party ban (唘⾱) and media ban (๡⾱) since the ROC entered the 
period of mobilization for the suppression of Communist rebellion (अ଑ᡑҲ) in 1947. At that time, one 
top politician of the Nationalist Party was opposed to the lifting of the martial law; Chiang Ching-kuo 
only responded calmly that there was no eternal ruling party in the world (Taylor, 2009). In the 1990s, the 
democratized Taiwan Area of the ROC continued to achieve steady growth on the basis of the Chiang 
Ching-kuo period. In 1996, the Free Area (Taiwan Area) of the ROC achieved direct presidential election. 
This was the first time in Chinese history that direct elections have been used to elect the head of state 
(the election of the first president of the Republic of China in 1948 was an indirect election of the 
National Assembly). In 2000, the Free Area of the Republic of China (ѝ㨟≁഻㠚⭡ൠ॰) achieved 
peaceful rotation of political parties, and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power. 
Taiwan’s economic liberalization and political democratization was inseparable from the work of 
President Chiang Ching-kuo and his staff. It should be said that the achievements of the Republic of 
China on Taiwan are worthy of the pride of the whole Chinese community. Regarding the life of Chiang 
Ching-kuo, see Taylor (2009). Regarding the economic liberalization and market-oriented reforms during 
the Chiang Ching-kuo period, and the contribution of Chiang Ching-kuo and others to Taiwan's free-
market reform, see (T. Liu, 2013; H. Han, 2015; Chiu, 2011). For more about the democratization of the 
Republic of China on Taiwan (1986-1994), see Chao & Myers (1994). For the market-oriented reforms 
that the Chinese Communist Party regime has tried from 2012 to 2017, see W. H. Wang (2018). 
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reasons for achieving economic success of the Republic of China on Taiwan. In 
addition, in early 1949, due to the expected failure of the Republic of China on the 
Mainland, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the shipment of $US300 million of gold, silver and 
foreign exchange to Taiwan. These funds also played a vital role in the future economic 
development of the Republic of China on Taiwan.1002 
6.6.3 Social Consequences 
Since the issuance of the Gold Yuan Notes Golden Coin did not alleviate the 
consequences of Fabi’s price hyperinflation, leading to a continuous decline in the 
purchasing power of the working class, the middle class, the young students and the 
teachers in public educational institutions, which in turn led them to continue the 
previous strikes.1003 The anti-hunger strikes that began in the spring of 1948 continued 
in the era of the Gold Yuan Notes. The strikes were in major cities such as Shanghai, 
Beiping (Beijing), Nanjing, Tianjin, and Guangzhou. The industries involved included 
textiles, fashion, department stores, chemistry, Western medicine, cigarettes, finance, 
hydropower, transportation, shipping industries, and so on. As we have analyzed in 
section 6.6.1, the price hyperinflation resulted in a large depreciation of the purchasing 
power of ordinary people, creating the lack of food which led to the strikes. The 
production of industries and social were falling into complete chaos due to the worse 
era of price hyperinflation. 
6.6.3.1 Chaotic bank run caused by the limited redemption of currencies. 
At the end of 1948, the Ministry of Finance’s policy on the limited redemption of the 
Gold Yuan Notes to bullion also distorted the social order.1004 In early December 1948, 
when the exchange policy was just started executing, 60,000 people were competing in 
1002 See Fairbank & Feuerwerker (1986, p. 784). 
1003 For references of the strikes in this section, see P. Yang (1963, p. 140), Fairbank & Feuerwerker 
(1986, p. 742), and C. Liu (1951). 
1004 For reference of this paragraph, see K. Chang (1958, p. 83). 
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the areas of the government banks in Shanghai, trying to get a chance to exchange the 
hard currencies. In the chaotic situation, dozens of people were killed and injured. 
6.6.3.2 Destruction of the traditional relationship of family. Like Fabi’s 
price hyperinflation, Golden Yuan Notes’ price hyperinflation not only caused the 
above problems in currency order, but also negatively affected family ethics and 
relationships. Here is a tragic case of how the rise in the price of has caused the suicide 
of a couple in Shanghai.1005 In a day of late April 1949, Shanghai's rice price was 
GY$15 million per 50kg, and the price silver dollar was GY$3 million yuan per silver 
dollar. A low-level public servant sold the only ten existing silver dollars that he had 
been ready to use to purchase rice. Because the rice shop had closed, he went back 
wanting to redeem the ten silver dollars that he sold. However, at this time the price of 
the silver dollar has risen to GY$3.8 million per silver dollar, making them have not 
enough money to redeem these ten silver dollars. The husband and his wife were very 
upset and subsequently they both committed suicide. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a quantitative, qualitative, and synthetic analysis of the 
collapse of China’s first modern central banking system and its price hyperinflation 
during the Chinese Civil War. After the end of the Second Sino-Japanese, the National 
Government and the Chinese Communist Party quickly made the Chongqing 
Negotiation in the autumn of 1945. On December 25, 1946, the National Constituent 
Assembly passed the Constitution of the Republic of China, which was the first time in 
Chinese history to enact a constitution through constitutional and democratic procedures. 
From November 1947 to January 1948, the first time in the entire history of China, 
millions of Chinese people voted for their own representatives of the first National 
1005 For reference of this paragraph, see P. Yang (1963, pp.157-158). 
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Assembly and the members of the first Legislative Yuan. The two direct elections made 
the Republic of China become the largest democracy in the world at the time. The 461 
million Chinese people directly authorized their legislative representatives. From March 
29th to May 1st, 1948, with the enormous prestige of leading the country for the eight-
year fight against the Japanese invaders, the National Assembly elected Chiang Kai-
shek as the first democratically elected President of the ROC. On May 20th, Chiang Kai-
shek was sworn in office. 
It seemed that China entered a new peaceful time of postwar economic 
rehabilitation and reconstruction after the laborious 8-year war against the Japanese 
aggressors along with a wartime price inflation. However, reality was on a completely 
different path. Due to military failure and mismanagement of the economy and price 
hyperinflation, the Communists occupied the majority of the Chinese Mainland in 1949 
and the government of the free Republic of China had to withdraw itself to Taiwan in 
the same year (leading up to the present). The Chinese Civil War deeply influences the 
drawing of different political and economic patterns of the Chinese Mainland and 
Taiwan in the modern history of China.  
On the side of the research of the Chinese Civil War, some previous studies 
have demonstrated sufficiently on how the ROC government failed in the Civil War in 
the military perspective, while the other studies investigated different issues that were 
related with the Civil War period’s Chinese economy and central banking system. 
Based on the academic heritage of these studies, this chapter originally goes into an in-
depth and synthetic analysis of how China’s first modern central banking system 
collapsed and how its price hyperinflation unfolded during the Chinese Civil War. 
Section 6.2 demonstrates the political and economic background during the Civil War. 
The formulation of the 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China and the failure of the 
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Chinese are the two important political factors during this Civil War period. The 
Chinese Communist Party disagreed with the democratically made constitution, yet they 
themselves participated in its early drafts. To be against the new constitutional order, a 
war between the Chinese Communist Party and the government of the Republic of 
China gradually became inevitable. Section 6.2.1 deals with the topic of the 1946 
Constitution and the process of the Civil War.  
The failed military strategy was not the only mistake that the Chiang Kai-shek 
administration made, but also the economic policy, especially its central banking policy. 
And a systematic analysis of how the postwar government of the Republic of China 
failed its economic and banking policies should be examined thoroughly. Before this 
examination, it is essential to perceive that an exhausted economy and the difficulties of 
rehabilitation and reconstruction was the general feature of the economic condition 
during the Civil War period. During the short period from August to December 1945, 
the Chinese economy was facing a relative stability. The economy and financial system 
was recovering. Prices were falling during that period, while the performance of the 
agricultural industry was also improving. Section 6.2.2.2 demonstrates the above 
features of the Chinese economy during the period from August to December 1945.  
However, what followed was a deteriorating economic and monetary situation. 
The massive issuance of currency in response to military expenditures later became the 
biggest feature of China’s economy during the Civil War and resulted with price 
hyperinflation. In 1945, the central banking system issued C$1.03 trillion. In 1947, one 
year before the abolishment of Fabi, the amount of the issued Fabi was C$33.19 trillion, 
which was 3,216.25% of the amount in 1945. As a result, the price level in 1947 was 
6337.34% of the amount in 1945. In 1946, military spending accounted for 60% of total 
expenditure. In 1947, military spending was 55% of total expenditure. As the 
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government already had a severe condition of the deficit, it had no choice but to borrow 
the money from the Central Bank to pay the military expansion, which caused price 
inflation. In 1948, the collapse of Fabi made the Chinese government decide to issue 
Gold Yuan Notes as new currency in response to the increasingly collapsing Fabi 
system. As the government had no other method to pay the expense of the Civil War, 
the original quota of GY$2 billion was also cancelled and the government started to 
printing more Gold Yuan Notes to pay the war expense after The Amended Measures 
for the Issuance of Gold Yuan Notes decree was enacted. Since then, the amounts of the 
issued Gold Yuan Notes started to increase rapidly. In November 1948, the issued 
amount of it was GY$3.39 billion and in April 1949 it was GY$679.456 billion. From 
August 1948 to the Fall of Shanghai in May 1949, the issuance of the Gold Yuan Notes 
has increased by more than 19,9423%. After breaking through the initially agreed 
issuance quota, the face value of Gold Yuan Notes was also increasing. In March 1949, 
the government issued the banknote’s face value of GY$5,000 and GY$10,000; in April, 
the newly issued banknote’s face value was GY$100,000; in May, the newly issued 
currencies’ face value was GY$500,000 and GY$1 million. Hence, the issuance of Gold 
Yuan Notes led to price hyperinflation. If the price index in Shanghai of Gold Yuan 
Notes in August 1948 was 100, then the price index of it in April 1949 was 20,957,009. 
Later, as the Communists established its regime in the Chinese mainland in October 
1949, all the banking institutions of the Republic of China gradually disappeared in the 
Chinese Mainland. Section 6.2.2.3 briefly reviews the relationship among monetary 
expansion, military expenditure, taxation, and price hyperinflation.  
The question here is, did the government of the Republic of China fail in its 
monetary policy without receiving any policy suggestions which could help correct its 
errors? Our analysis in section 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 provide an original evaluation of the 
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economic and monetary policy debates during the periods of Fabi and Gold Yuan Notes, 
respectively. This chapter discovers that during the Civil War, economic scientists and 
intellectuals provided sufficient and diverse opinions of how to construct China’s 
economic and monetary system. Among them, Soong Tse-ven and Arthur N. Young 
were the representatives of the economists who were in the level of policy making that 
can directly influence the decision-making of President Chiang Kai-shek; they were in 
favor of a relatively free trade and free exchange policy that they believed was positive 
for the Chinese economy and they were strongly against the expansionary monetary 
policy along with its consequence of price (hyper)inflation. They suggested the postwar 
ROC government should adopt a more self-disciplined monetary policy, arguing that 
this policy would be good of the postwar economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
They strongly opposed uncontrolled military spending and advocated stabilizing the 
economic and financial order through fiscal austerity and other methods. From the 
previous chapters of the thesis, we have already known that Soong Tse-ven and Arthur 
N. Young had a consistent view of supporting a fiscal and monetary tightening policies, 
even after the late 1920s. They did not contradict themselves. Section 6.2.3.5 deals with 
their policy views during the Civil War. Apart from them, economist Yang Peixin was 
in favor of a more laissez-faire and a more profound perspective, who not only 
supported the above policy views that Soong Tse-ven and Arthur N. Young held, but 
even proposed that the complete abolition of state-owned enterprises and any other kind 
of government.  He did this by demonstrating the danger of government economic 
intervention and regulation through his down-to-earth empirical observation of the real 
situation of the Chinese economy and the economic life of the Chinese people with 
sound and systematic argumentation. Besides, Yang Peixin also perceived that a good 
economic policy alone was not enough to China’s postwar rehabilitation and 
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reconstruction. For him, the constitution democracy was also essential to establish a 
heathy and positive postwar economy. Therefore, his perspective was not just from the 
limited version of policy making, but also considers the deeper question of building a 
good institution in a macro and long-term perspective.1006 Section 6.2.3 reviews his 
economic and monetary theories. In addition, in section 6.2.3 and section 6.2.4 we also 
reviewed the views of other scholars, such as Wu Chi-yuen, who advocated market 
economy with a certain degree of government economic intervention on China’s 
economy and monetary system (i.e. just prices and a certain degree of governmental 
industrial and international trade regulations). None of them agree that the government 
can deal with the Civil War’s military expenditures by means of indiscriminate 
monetary expansion. Besides, they were also very critical of the danger of price 
inflation and its harm caused by the extreme expansionary monetary policy. 
Unfortunately, none of the above views were adopted by President Chiang Kai-shek, 
who was the final political decision maker and who had little knowledge of economic 
theories. Therefore, it was no wonder why George Marshall, who had come to China 
from 1946 to 1947 to regulate the conflicts between the Chinese government and the 
Communist Party but ultimately failed later, became pessimistic about the future of the 
Republic of China during the ongoing Chinse Civil War. Section 6.2.4.8 reviews 
George Marshall and his proposal on supporting Free China and the ROC central 
banking system. Although these scholars did not propose a free banking theory similar 
to the Austrian School of economics, if their proposals against inflation were adopted, 
1006 We argue that the theory of dynamic efficiency proposed by the Austrian economist Jesús Huerta de 
Soto cooperates with Yang Peixin’s view. Huerta de Soto argues that private property ethics are a 
necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic efficiency. The ethics of private property is a necessary 
condition because if the ownership of the fruits of each action is not respected, the most important 
incentive to create and discover profit opportunities is removed. Furthermore, an environment of freedom, 
in which entrepreneurs are not coerced and respect their private property, is sufficient condition, for it 
unwraps the creative entrepreneurial process and the coordination that characterizes dynamic efficiency. 
For more about the theory of dynamic efficiency, see Huerta de Soto (2009/2010c, pp. 1-30). 
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they might have been enough to stop the collapse of the Republic of China’s financial 
system before 1949. 
Section 6.3 systematically reviews the process of Fabi’s price hyperinflation 
from 1945 to 1948. In section 6.3.1, we have pointed out that the previous issued Fabi 
and its price inflation during the Second Sino-Japanese War promoted price inflation 
during the Chinese Civil War. This understanding is very important because it helps us 
realize that the Civil War’s price hyperinflation during was not a static and short-term 
process, but a dynamic economic phenomenon linked to the expansionary monetary 
policy and price inflation in the previous wartime. Section 6.3.2 shows the data of 
Fabi’s monetary expansion and its price hyperinflation during the Civil War. According 
to our collation of existing statistics, we find that in 1945, the central banking system 
issued C$1.0319 trillion, in 1947, the year before the abolishment of Fabi, the amount 
of the issued Fabi was C$33.1885 trillion, which was 3,216.25% of the amount in 1945. 
As a result, the price level in 1947 was 6337.34% of the amount in 1945. Figure 6.1 
also shows that the price in December 1945 was five times that of September. If price 
index in 1926 was 100, the price indices from 1945 to 1948 were 1.5 trillion, 9.2 trillion, 
61 trillion, and 399 trillion, respectively. China’s Fabi experienced vicious price 
inflation during the Civil War. Besides, based on previous research and evidence, we 
find that the mismanagement on Japanese puppet currencies, the heavy taxation and 
public debt that people had to bear, the circulation of foreign currency, the exhausted 
foreign currency and gold reserves, insufficiency of foreign aids, and heavy economic 
regulations were all counted for the Civil War’s price hyperinflation. Section 6.3.3 to 
6.3.8 deals with each of the above topics, respectively.  
Here, it needs to be emphasized again our conclusion in section 6.3.7 that the 
failure of international cooperation is an important reason for the collapse of Fabi. As 
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early as March,1946 the US Secretary of State George Marshall once expressed that the 
United States would give China a loan of US$500 million. However, in the face of the 
pressure of the continuous collapse of the government of Republic of China, the US 
government finally promised the assistance only in the form of physical goods rather 
than loans as the primary means of assistance.  However, the loan was delayed until 
1948, and the amount of the final physical assistance only accounted for US$463 
million. Finally, the Marshall Plan for China became an empty check. 
Section 6.4 provides an analysis of the possible consequences of the Civil 
War’s Fabi price hyperinflation from 1945 to 1948. Empirical evidence and statistics 
show Fabi’s price hyperinflation distorted entrepreneurial production, ordinary people’s 
life (especially the purchasing power of the banknotes that they held), and social orders.  
Section 6.5 systematically reviews the process of Gold Yuan Notes’ price 
hyperinflation from 1948 to 1949 and Shanghai’s price index from August 1948 to May 
1949. To suppress the chaotic price hyperinflation and financial disorder, the 
government abolished Fabi and issued Gold Yuan Notes’ instead in August 1948. 
However, the government had no other method to pay the expense of the Civil War 
original quota of GY$2 billion, so it was cancelled, and the government started to print 
more Gold Yuan Notes to pay the war expense in November 1948. Since then, the 
amounts of the issued Gold Yuan Notes started to increase rapidly. In November 1948, 
the issued amount of it was GY$3.39 billion and in April 1949 it was GY$679.456 
billion.  From August 1948 to the Fall of Shanghai in May 1949, the issuance of the 
Gold Yuan Notes had increased by more than 19,9423%. After breaking through the 
initially agreed issuance quota, the face value of the Gold Yuan Notes was also 
increasing. In March 1949, the government issued the banknote’s face value of 
GY$5,000 and GY$10,000; in April, the newly issued banknote’s face value was 
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GY$100,000; in May, the newly issued currencies’ face value was GY$500,000 and 
GY$1 million.  Hence, the issuance of the Gold Yuan Notes led to price hyperinflation. 
If the price indices in Shanghai of the Gold Yuan Notes in August 1948 was 100, then 
the price indices of it in April 1949 was 20,957,009. As Shanghai, the economic center 
of the Republic of China, fell into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party in May 
1949, Gold Yuan Notes gradually withdrew from the stage of history. Apart from Gold 
Yuan Note’s expansionary monetary policy that we have analyzed in section 6.5.2, from 
section 6.5.2 to 6.5.3, we conclude that the insufficient metal and foreign exchange 
reserves to support the value of Gold Yuan Notes, the rash implementation of Gold 
Yuan Notes that hit people’s psychological expectation of the currency system, the 
rapid currency depreciation, and the wrong time of implementing a new currency 
system were also the other main reasons of Gold Yuan Notes’ price hyperinflation. In 
section 6.6, we point out that Gold Yuan Notes’ expansionary monetary policy and its 
price hyperinflation also distorted the economic, political, and social orders like Fabi. 
After the Chinese Communist Party officially announced the establishment of 
the regime in Beijing in October 1949, the Central Bank of the Republic of China and 
its currency system completely withdrew from the historical stage of Mainland China. 
So far, it has only been implemented in Taiwan Area (officially the Free Area) of the 
Republic of China. It can be said that the first modern central bank experiment in 
Chinese history failed in 1949. Obviously, President Chiang Kai-shek and the 
government of the Republic of China ignored the recommendations of Chinese and 
foreign economists during the Civil War. The currency issue abuse in response to 
military spending was the core reason for price hyperinflation during the Civil War. The 
indecision of the US government led by Harry Truman and the Democratic Party that 
whether it should provide military and financial aid to the democratically elected 
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government of the government of the Republic of China was also an important reason 
for the collapse of the ROC central banking system. The Chinese Civil War and the 
collapse of China’s first central banking system has had a profound impact on the 
contemporary cross-strait relationship among the Communist Chinese Mainland the 
Republic of China on Taiwan. 
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Conclusion 
The central banking system has been a worldwide-adopted banking system 
since the 20th century, which influences political and economic structures profoundly in 
different countries to this day. Chinese Mainland is the second biggest economic entity, 
whose economic growth in the last 30 years gets the attention of the world. One hot 
topic is the function of China’s central banking system. But the works for studying the 
establishment of China’s central bank and the monetary thought debate behind the event 
still require further analysis. This thesis explains the establishment of China’s central 
banking system by following the monetary thought debate among Chinese economists, 
politicians, and foreign financial specialists. They provided advice for monetary policy 
from 1927 to 1949.  
The literature on China’s central banking studies is focused on four relevant 
fields. The first field is the general study of the Chinese monetary and banking system. 
Due to their studies, before the establishment of the Chinese National Government in 
1927, both the private sector and the government shared legal rights to do mintage. 
Meanwhile, China had less governmental regulation in monetary issues. Silver, as a rare 
metal, was recognized as the primary currency standard in China. The second field is 
the studies of economic and monetary thoughts of Chinese economists during the period 
from 1927-1949 of the Republic of China. The Chinese economists during the period of 
Nationalist China on the Chinese Mainland (1927-1949) were deeply involved in a huge 
debate on how to build an efficient central banking institution to make China stronger. 
The third field is Edwin W. Kemmerer and Arthur N. Young’s theories and their works 
on the Chinese central banking system. To build China’s first modern central banking, 
some western monetary specialists like Edwin W. Kemmerer and Arthur N. Young 
were invited to China during the late 1920s, providing direct policy advice on China’s 
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banking system. The fourth field is the Austrian school economists’ studies on Edwin 
Kemmerer and the related monetary theories. As a supporter of the gold standard and 
free banking institutions, The Austrian school economists not only provided their own 
views on Edwin Kemmerer’s 100% central banking theory, but also their Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory on how central banking credit expansion and monetary inflation 
cause price inflation and distort the economy and entrepreneurship, and the relationship 
between central banking and wars. In addition, the Austrian school economist and 
Nobel Prize Winner F. A. Hayek also provided his study of the background of monetary 
nationalism in the 1930s. 
However, we find that the literature above did not link the respective research 
fields to comprehensively analyze the subject of the establishment of China’s first 
modern central banking institution, along with its evolution. What were the roles of 
Edwin Kemmerer, Arthur Young, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung, Chiang Kai-shek, and the 
other Chinese financial specialists in the establishment of China’s first modern central 
banking institution? Did the foreign factors, like the 1934 American Silver Purchase Act 
and the 1948 Marshall Plan for China, influence the performance of the Central Bank of 
China and the stability of Chinese politics and economy? Is it arguable to apply the 
insights of Austrian school economics along with the orthodox anti-price inflation 
insights to evaluate the performance of the Central Bank of China, especially its 
expansionary monetary policy and price hyper(inflation) during the Second Sino-
Japanese War (1937-1945) and the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949)?  
Based on these questions, this thesis proposes an Austrian-school based 
perspective to examine the establishment and performance of China’s first modern 
central banking institution, the Central Bank of China, from the period of 1927-1949. 
This thesis has the following three main objectives: Revise the monetary thought debate 
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from 1927 to 1949 among Chinese economists, politicians, and Western monetary 
specialists on how to improve the Chinese monetary system and how to build an 
effective central banking system during wartime. Demonstrate how the establishment of 
central banking was supported by the monetary theories provided in the monetary 
thoughts debate. Identify which parts of the above monetary thoughts caused the 
growing and enormous price inflation during wartime; and discuss whether other 
thoughts in the discussion or related financial thoughts, if they were adopted as 
monetary policies, could avoid the economic collapse and Communist occupation in 
1949.  
This thesis uses the two following methodologies to analyze the research 
objects. The first is economic history. This thesis uses the methods of economic history 
(a combination of orthodox economic theory, the Austrian school’s view on central 
banking and price inflation, and quantitative methods, paying particular attention to 
institutional factors and the long run) to view the establishment of China’s central bank 
and the monetary debate behind it. The second is the extensive use of primary sources 
located in archives. This thesis uses archives to demonstrate the above topics. The main 
files used in this thesis are found in the following location: the library of Bank of Spain 
in Madrid, Spain; the library of Fudan University in Shanghai, China; the library of 
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics in Shanghai, China; E. W. Kemmerer’s 
papers at the library of Princeton University in New Jersey, United States; A. N. 
Young’s papers at the library of Stanford University in Stanford (archives are originally 
from Hoover Institution), United States; Cato Institute in Washington DC, United States; 
personal collections from Prof. Dr. Jiaming Zhu.  
The thesis is structured in three parts. The first part is about China’s general 
economic and banking situation (1912-1927) (Chapter 1). The second part demonstrates 
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the monetary thought debate and silver standard currency reform from 1927 to 1937 
(Chapter 2 to Chapter 4). The third part focuses on central banking and wartime (1937-
1949) (Chapter 5 to Chapter 6). The contents of each chapter of the thesis can be briefly 
summarized as follows. 
Chapter 1 reviews China’s general economic and political situation from the 
19th century to 1927. First, we discuss the comprehensive history of China from the 
Qing Empire—the last Chinese dynasty—to the 1911 Republican Xinhai Revolution. 
The reform of the late Qing Dynasty had contributed mainly to China’s progress, 
especially the modernization of the Chinese economy and opening the Chinese market 
to the entire world. Still, stagnant political reform disappointed the social elite and 
caused the Xinhai Revolution. Since then, China was either in wartime or in Communist 
despotism, except the Nanjing Golden Decade (1927-1937). We argue that if the Qing 
Dynasty successfully implemented all necessary reforms, including banking reform, 
faster before people became angry, China could have been a developed, prosperous, and 
liberal society without authoritarian rule. Furthermore, we also introduce the Austrian 
school’s economic study of free banking institutions in the late 1890s in the Chinese 
southeastern coastal city of Fuzhou. Along with other studies, they revealed that China 
had a long-time history of free banking institutions before the 1920s, which is different 
from the later central banking patterns in China.  
This chapter also points out that unlike the Chinese Communist Party’s official 
negative opinions on the epoch of the Beiyang Government, independent researchers 
have found some positive elements that happened during the Beiyang era. Although 
some regional wars happened among the warlords, due to a pro-laissez-faire economic 
policy, the domestic economy was still growing, especially the industries that were not 
related to the war. Because of World War I, the energy of Western countries was placed 
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on the European battlefield. Hence, there was no Western power to intervene in China’s 
domestic political and economic affairs, which on one side, avoided the wars that had 
happened in the late Qing Dynasty due to poor Sino-foreign relations. In addition, we 
also argue that the improving economic situation and monetary ideas laid the foundation 
of the monetary policy debate and led to the establishment of China’s first modern 
central bank since the late 1920s, especially during the Nanjing Golden Decade (1927-
1937). 
Chapter 2 is an original synthesis that reviews the biography, monetary 
theories, and reports for China’s central banking institutions of Edwin Kemmerer. Most 
importantly, this chapter also includes our original review of Kemmerer’s 1929 reports 
for the construction of China’s first modern central banking experiment. These crucial 
reports sought to build an effective Chinese central banking system based on Edwin 
Kemmerer’s main theories, such as a central banking system with a 100% gold reserve. 
Kemmerer was an economics professor at Princeton University and the world-famous 
“Money Doctor” who helped build central banks in various countries in Latin America, 
Europe, and Asia.  
One originality of the research in this chapter is that we visited the original 
archives of Kemmerer’s research on China’s economic issues kept by the Hoover 
Institution at Stanford University. To start, we demonstrate the biography of “Money 
Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer and his monetary and gold theories. We not only review his 
general theory on central banking and gold reserves but also provide some commentary 
from a few Austrian economists on Kemmerer’s theory, as they both emphasize the 
function of a gold standard in banking systems. Secondly, we present Kemmerer’s 
reports from 1929 and our commentary on whether his project for China was well 
planned and practicable. We provide a detailed description of Kemmerer’s reports and 
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present the critical reports on China’s banking system. Finally, we illustrate our 
commentary on the reports. In addition, the general political and economic background 
in China from 1927 to 1937, which were related to Kemmerer’s reports, is presented in 
this chapter. 
Chapter 3 reviews Arthur N. Young’s banking thoughts on China’s central 
banking reform from 1927 to 1937. As a member of Kemmerer’s western monetary 
specialists’ group for China, who also influenced the decision-making of the Chinese 
National Government and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to adopt Western-style 
central banking institutions, Young’s reports on his banking thoughts will be mainly 
checked in this chapter.  
One originality of the research in this chapter is that we visited the original 
archive of Young’s research on China’s economic issues kept by the Hoover Institution 
at Stanford University. This chapter also reviews Arthur Young’s biography. As a 
senior student graduating with a Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University, Young 
worked with “Money Doctor” Edwin Kemmerer and came to China as an essential 
member of the 1929 Kemmerer Commission for China to analyze and study China’s 
currency and economic issues, making policy recommendations to the Chinese National 
Government. Kemmerer was his “teacher and colleague” who influenced Young’s 
economic thoughts. Also, we find that Young not only came to China as an international 
student proficient in Spanish but also visited Latin American countries and Spain to 
conduct research on the economic affairs of these countries. Furthermore, he also 
visited some European and Asian countries such as Poland and Vietnam to help them 
carry out economic and monetary policies. In the later sections, we have reviewed 
Young’s general comments on the modernization of Nationalist China and his central 
banking thoughts from 1927 to 1937. 
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Chapter 4 studies how China established its first modern central banking 
system from 1927 to 1937, filling a gap in the previous international research on the 
entire process of building China’s first modern central bank. In Chapter 1, we discussed 
that China had more than two thousand years of free banking, and silver tael was used 
as a primary currency standard since the 15th century. However, the three central 
banking reforms that happened in the 1920s and 1930s fundamentally changed the 
status of China’s banking system. China, a country of using traditional and diverse 
metal standards, eventually established its first modern central bank in 1928. In 1933, 
the country abolished the traditional silver tael standard, setting its Silver Dollar 
standard, which was designed by the Sino and Western financial specialists of the 
National Government based one a decade discussion.  
Initially, due to the 1929 gold standard plan proposed by the U.S. financial 
specialist E. W. Kemmerer, the Silver Dollar standard would become a transition 
between the old silver tael standard and the future gold standard. However, due to the 
fragile internal financial condition and the 1934 US Silver Purchase Act, it became 
impossible for China to have sufficient silver to establish its Silver Dollar Standard, not 
mention the gold standard given that China was not a country that produced this scarce 
metal. Instead, from 1934 to 1935, after three rounds of Sino-Western negotiations, 
China was going to implement a fiat money system, Fabi, whose currency value was 
based on its exchange rates of the US dollar and the British pound. The reform was 
taken in November 1935, which ended China’s two-thousand-year history of using 
metals as currency standards. The relatively stable political and economic conditions, 
along with the global trend of establishing a central banking system to strengthen the 
state power and the national financial system, made the birth of China’s first modern 
central banking system inevitable. Based on first-hand references, the monographs of 
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the authoritative scholars, and the empirical data, this chapter focuses on the study of 
the history of the establishment of China’s first modern central banking institutions, 
providing an original, in-depth synthesis and analysis of China’s first modern central 
banking establishment process.  
As the political and economic situation was relatively stable during those 10 
years, that era is called the “Nanjing Golden Decade” by many scholars. Essential 
historical events and data are provided in this chapter to demonstrate how and why that 
10-year history became a Golden Decade. Furthermore, we will also show in this 
chapter that the relatively peaceful environment provided Chinese politicians and 
economists a sufficient condition to discuss what kind of monetary system China should 
adopt. Among them, Yao Qingsan was probably the first Chinese economist during the 
Mainland period of the Republic of China who systematically introduced the Austrian 
School of Economics’ monetary theories into China. In Trends in Modern Currency 
Thoughts and World Currency Systems, Yao introduced F. V. Weisser, J. G. K. 
Wicksell, F. A. Hayek, and L. von Mises’ business cycle theories. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the conditions of China’s first modern central banking 
institutions during the Second Sino-Japanese War. China established its first modern 
central banking in 1928, along with its 1933 silver-standard reform and its 1935 fiat-
currency reform. Due to the 1935 banking reform plan, the Chinese National 
Government would establish a modern central reserve banking system that was planned 
to control the currency issuance fully. However, the outbreak of the Second Sino-
Japanese War in 1937 delayed the ongoing central banking reform. Based on 
quantitative analysis and original synthesis of archives and previous research, this 
chapter studies China’s central banking institutions during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, 1937-1945.   
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To understand the wartime banking structure in China, it is crucial to review 
the relevant historical backgrounds. This is due to the complicity of the wartime China 
as the country was separated into Free China, Japanese-occupied China (along with 
Manchukuo) and Communist-occupied area. At the beginning of the analysis, this 
chapter provides the political and economic background during the Second Sino-
Japanese War, along with an analysis of the disappearing local, private, and 
spontaneously free banking systems. Secondly, this chapter deals with the background 
of the wartime banking policy. In the later sections, we discuss the process of the 
wartime expansionary monetary policy and price inflation and provide an in-depth 
discussion of the possible causes of the wartime price inflation, along with its 
consequences.  
In this chapter, combined with historical events and the statistics itself, we 
have made an original systematic quantitative analysis of the various causes of wartime 
price inflation (especially the second stage of price inflation). We point out that the 
most direct cause of price inflation during wartime was the issuance of Fabi. The cost of 
living and consumer goods price indexes were generally higher than other indexes 
during the war, especially from 1940 to 1943, both of which were higher than the wage 
indexes of the four major occupation categories (including the salary indices of college 
teachers, middle school teachers, primary school teachers, primary school teachers, and 
government officials) in the statistics. It can be seen that because of the rising cost of 
living and the increasing price of consumer goods, both the ordinary people and 
entrepreneurs’ production and living conditions were worsening due to wartime price 
inflation. Moreover, due to the wartime expansionary monetary policy and price 
inflation, people gradually lost their confidence in Fabi. We argue that the reduction of 
people’s psychological confidence in Fabi also caused an increase in prices. Besides, 
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through statistic results, we also conclude that the government’s taxation and fiscal 
policy, the expansion of private credits were also the triggers of wartime price inflation. 
While the policies of increasing interest rates, the rise of bank’s saving, the sales of gold 
and foreign reserves all together were not valid to suppress the wartime price inflation. 
Besides, the statistics result shows that the generally increasing agricultural production 
during wartime was not related to price inflation. 
Our analysis in this chapter not only discusses the impact of the National 
Government’s own policies on price inflation, but also discusses the effects of trade 
wars and currency wars between Free China, the Japanese-occupied areas (Occupied 
China and Manchukuo), and the Communist-occupied area on price inflation in these 
three regions. Although no specific statistics were available, evidence shows that to 
purchase export goods, the Chinese government relied on printing currency to make up 
for its fiscal deficit, which also partly caused the increase of price. During wartime, an 
insufficient supply of factory products also led to rising costs in Free China. These two 
were all related to the fact that most of the industries were in Occupied China and 
Manchuria. Besides, the reduction of the circulation area of Fabi caused by the Japanese 
occupation also partly caused Free China’s price inflation. At the same time, the 
Japanese-occupied areas (Occupied China and Manchukuo) and the Chinese 
Communist Party fought currency wars with Free China to destroy or distort the 
financial order of Free China in this way. 
Chapter 6 analyzes the conditions and the collapse of China’s first modern 
central banking institutions during the Chinese Civil War. Although China established 
its first modern central bank in 1928, along with its 1933 silver-standard reform and its 
1935 fiat currency reform, due to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the 
banking reform deployed. Because China passed its first democratically created 
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Constitution in 1946, becoming the world’s largest democratic country at the time, post-
WWII China was initially expected to establish a stable banking system. However, 
during the following Chinese Civil War period, not only the central banking experiment 
failed by massive price inflation and chaotic economic order, but the government of the 
Republic of China was also defeated militarily by the Chinese Communist Party.  
This chapter provides a quantitative, qualitative, and synthetic analysis of the 
collapse of China’s first modern central banking system and its price hyperinflation 
during the Chinese Civil War. Based on the above political background, this chapter 
provides a brief description of the Chinese economy during not only the Chinese Civil 
War, but also an in-depth analysis of the process and the reasons why two currency 
systems, the Fabi and the Gold Yuan Notes, collapsed successively during the Civil 
War. This chapter also synthesizes the economic, political, and social consequences of 
the wartime expansionary monetary policy and its price hyperinflation. The massive 
issuance of currency and its subsequent price hyperinflation in response to military 
expenditures later became the most prominent feature of China’s economy during the 
Civil War. We point out that President Chiang Kai-shek and the government of the 
Republic of China must bear the ultimate responsibility for the collapse of the monetary 
system and price hyperinflation as they ignored all the suggestions of the Chinese and 
foreign economists. They opposed the payment of military spending through excessive 
monetary expansion policy.  
An original evaluation of the economic and monetary policy debates during the 
Civil War is provided in this chapter. Among them, Soong Tse-ven and Arthur N. 
Young were the representatives of the economists who were in the level of 
policymaking that can directly influence the decision-making of President Chiang Kai-
shek; they were in favor of relatively free trade, and free exchange policy that they 
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believed was positive for the Chinese economy and they were firmly against the 
expansionary monetary policy along with its consequence of price (hyper)inflation. 
They suggested the postwar ROC government should adopt a more self-disciplined 
monetary policy, arguing that this policy would be good for economic rehabilitation and 
reconstruction. They strongly opposed uncontrolled military spending and advocated 
stabilizing the economic and financial order through fiscal austerity and other methods. 
From the previous chapters of the thesis, we have already known that Soong Tse-ven 
and Arthur N. Young had a consistent view of supporting fiscal and monetary 
tightening policies, even after the late 1920s. They did not contradict themselves. Apart 
from them, economist Yang Peixin was in favor of a more laissez-faire and a more 
profound perspective, who not only supported the above policy views that Soong Tse-
ven and Arthur N. Young held, but even proposed the complete abolition of state-owned 
enterprises and any other kind of government. He did this by demonstrating the danger 
of government economic intervention and regulation through his down-to-earth 
empirical observation of the real situation of the Chinese economy and the economic 
life of the Chinese people with sound and systematic argumentation. Besides, Yang 
Peixin also perceived that a sound economic policy alone was not enough for China’s 
post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. For him, constitutional democracy was also 
essential to establish a healthy and positive post-war economy. Therefore, his 
perspective was not just from the limited view of policymaking, but considers the more 
profound question of building a good institution in a macro and long-term perspective. 
It can be said that Yang Peixin’s point of view was the scholar who was the closest to 
the Austrian school’s free market and limited government stance during the period. 
In addition, we also point out that the Marshall Plan for China, which arrived 
lately in 1948, was useless to stabilize the Chinese economy and its monetary system. 
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The chapter concludes by pointing out that the Chinese Civil War and the collapse of 
China’s first central banking system have had a profound impact on the contemporary 
cross-strait relationship among the Communist Chinese Mainland and the Republic of 
China on Taiwan since 1949.  
The establishment of central banking institutions in the 20th century is an 
inevitable trend. Although the Austrian school’s support for free banks may not be 
realistic at the moment, their discussion of how government arbitrarily issues banknotes 
through the central bank, resulting in price inflation, distorting the spontaneous market 
order, and destroying entrepreneurship is still worth thinking about. In particular, the 
perspective of the Austrian school has a positive significance for analyzing the tragic 
failure of China’s first central bank in the 1920s and 1940s for later people to think 
more deeply about banking theories and banking systems. 
Finally, we propose some potential research aspects that are related to the 
discussion of this thesis. First, the research on the Chinese central bank systems given to 
the Austrian School’s currency theory needs to be further extended. As the Chinese 
Mainland ruled by the Chinese Communist Party and the Republic of China on Taiwan 
started to have two separate central banking institutions since the 1949 Communist 
Revolution, it is essential to systematically research the two central banking institutions 
and their impacts, especially their influence on entrepreneurship, based on the current 
research.  
Second, the Austrian school-based research on the effects of the banking 
theories influence the performance of the above two Chinese central banks. Although it 
is unrealistic to talk about the establishment of a free-banking system at present, an 
analysis from the perspective of the Austrian school can better help us study the 
different influences of the Chinese economists on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and 
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the Western economists’ theories on these two Chinese central banks, especially the 
understanding of price inflation and business cycles that were triggered.  
Third, a study of ancient Chinese (free) banking systems and the ancient 
Chinese (free) banking theory from the perspective of the Austrian school. Regarding 
the research content of this part, we have already covered in the relevant chapters of the 
thesis. Still, we have to emphasize that the research on this part is extremely scarce. We 
believe that in this field, scholars have a broader space to conduct a more systematic 
and extensive study of China’s (free) banking system over the past 2,000 years and 
ancient Chinese (free) banking theory. 
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Industrial Production, 1912-1937 
Year 
Gross value of output Net value added 
Millions of gross 








1912 119.7 11.9 58 15.7 
1917 268.6 26.7 118.3 32 
1927 670.1 66.6 245.1 66.3 
1928 725.6 72.1 260.8 70.5 
1929 773.8 76.9 278.2 75.2 
1930 821.1 81.6 296.4 80.1 
1931 886.9 88.1 320 86.5 
1932 921.5 91.6 334.1 90.3 
1933 1006.3 100 369.7 100 
1934 1042.6 103.6 395 106.8 
1935 1104.1 109.7 441.8 119.5 
1936 1227.4 122 499.1 135 
1937 965.8 96 415.2 112.3 
Appendix I Industrial production from 1912 to 1937.  
Sources: GVO and NVA along with their indices from 1927 to 1936 are from A. Young (1971, p. 311); GVO and 
NVA indices of 1912, 1917, and 1937 are from J. Zhu (2012, p. 335). 
Notes: Young’s statistical data is based on 1927 and J. Zhu's is based on 1933. We calculate the GVP and NVA data 
of 1912, 1917, and 1937 and their indices by unifying the statistical data base in 1933. Due to incomplete statistics at 




Agricultural Prices Index, 1931-1937 







Appendix II Agricultural prices index, 1931-1937.  
Source: A. Young (1971, p. 479).  






Monetary Supply and Price Indices, 1926-1945 
  Currency issues Currency deposits Total money supply Price index 
1926 228,962,163 657,646,855 886,609,018 100.0 
1927 262,164,410 700,172,666 962,337,076 104.4 
1928 308,818,375 808,337,121 1,117,155,496 101.7 
1929 350,236,497 957,374,032 1,307,610,529 104.5 
1930 412,968,538 1,389,109,572 1,802,078,110 114.8 
1931 393,367,870 1,213,334,120 1,606,701,990 126.6 
1932 451,590,418 1,255,014,045 1,706,604,463 112.5 
1933 535,190,933 1,579,824,899 2,115,015,832 103.9 
1934 622,522,374 1,820,621,425 2,443,143,648 97.2 
1935 867,984,374 2,324,341,889 3,192,326,263 96.4 
1936 1,633,106,095 2,708,005,032 4,816,000,000 108.6 
1937 1,640,000,000 2,019,000,000 3,659,000,000 189.5 
1938 2,310,000,000 2,506,000,000 4,816,000,000 247.6 
1939 4,290,000,000 3,214,000,000 7,504,000,000 415.9 
1940 7,870,000,000 4,315,000,000 12,185,000,000 969.6 
1941 15,100,000,000 7,746,000,000 22,846,000,000 2,449.4 
1942 34,400,000,000 16,391,000,000 50,791,000,000 7,371.0 
1943 75,400,000,000 24,796,000,000 100,196,000,000 23,702.5 
1944 189,500,000,000 85,587,000,000 275,087,000,000 81,642.3 
1945 1,031,900,000,000 474,690,000,000 1,506,590,000,000 308,372.4 
1946 3,726,100,000,000 5,455,494,000,000 9,181,594,000,000 76,001,058.0 
1947 33,188,500,000,000 27,777,060,000,000 60,965,560,000,000 681,743,336.0 
1948 196,520,300,000,000 202,571,339,000,000 399,091,639,000,000 28,070,706,707.8 
Appendix III Monetary supply and price indices: 1926-1945.  
Sources: Data on currency issues, currency deposits, and total money supply is from K. Chang (1958, p. 376); also 
see G. Wu (1958, pp. 92-96), P. Yang (1963, pp. 61-62), and Hong (2008, pp. 519-520). Data on price indices of 
1930 to July 1948 is from K. Chang (1958, pp. 371-373). Data on price indices in August 1948 is from G. Wu (1958, 
p. 162). Price indices from 1930 to 1936 is from the Shanghai price index. The price index from 1937 to July 1948 is 
from the whole Free China index. The price index of August 1948 is from the Shanghai price index.  
Notes: The price indices of 1946 to 1948 were obtained from the average of the monthly price indices for these years. 
In order to enable price indices from different sources to be displayed on the same statistical chart, we have processed 




Foreign Exchange Rates, 1927-1937 
Year High Low 
1927 47.33 42.35 
1928 50.09 45.02 
1929 45.43 36.83 
1930 36.92 24.54 
1931 26.3 19.88 
1932 25 19.09 
1933 34.31 19.47 
1934 37.88 31.19 
1935 42.13 29.5 
1936 30.25 29.44 
1937 30.25 29.44 
Appendix IV Foreign Exchange rate from the Chinese Dollar to the US Dollar. Unit: US Dollar (cents per C$).  




Expenditures, Revenues, and Deficits, 1929-1937 
Year Expenditures Revenues Deficits Deficit percentage of expenditure 
1929 434 334 100 23 
1930 585 484 101 17.3 
1931 775 558 217 28 
1932 749 619 130 17.4 
1933 699 614 86 12.3 
1934 836 689 147 17.6 
1935 941 745 196 20.8 
1936 1073 817 256 23.8 
1937 1177 870 297 25.4 
Appendix V Expenditures, revenues, and deficits, 1929-1937. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese dollars 
(C$). 




Foreign Trade, 1927-1937 
Year Imports Exports Total 
1927 1298 980 2278 
1928 1530 1047 2577 
1929 1620 1070 2690 
1930 1723 944 2667 
1931 2002 915 2917 
1932 1524 569 2093 
1933 1345 612 1957 
1934 1030 535 1565 
1935 919 576 1495 
1936 941 706 1647 
1937 953 838 1791 
Appendix VI Foreign trade, 1927-1937. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese dollars (C$).  
Source: A. Young (1971, pp. 494-494).  




Government, Commercial, and Provincial Bank Deposits, 1937-1945 
Year Current GBD Fixed GBD 
Savings 






1937 1318 685 188 2191 1115 3306 
1938 1808 928 251 2987 1166 4153 
1939 2408 1906 312 4626 1433 6059 
1940 3297 2172 533 6002 1884 7836 
1941 6446 3382 1104 10932 2833 13815 
1942 15039 1782 2976 19797 3164 22961 
1943 22811 891 7387 31089 4656 35745 
1944 78887 1213 15456 95556 9803 105359 
1945 466190 5289 55693 527172 10740 537912 
Appendix VII Government , commercial, and provincial bank deposits, 1937-1945. Figure’s currency unit is one 
million Chinese dollars (C$) 
Source: K. Chang (1958, p. 191). 
Notes: The data that we collect include the current government bank deposit (GBD), the fixed GBD, savings of the 
GBD, the total GBD, the commercial and provincial banks’ all deposits, and the total deposits of all banks. In our 
subsequent analysis, we will use the original data for analysis. Due to the lack of statistics at that time, there is no 




Foreign Credits, 1938-1945 






Appendix VII Foreign aids (credits and lend-lease) to China, 1937-1945. Unit of the currency in the figure is one 
million Chinese dollars (C$). 
Source: A. Young (1965, pp. 344-345). 
Notes: These aids included military, supplies, non-military purchases, currency stabilization, motor truck purchase, 




Factories in Free China, 1936-1944 
Year Number of plants established Capitalization of new plants 
1936 300 117950 
1937 63 22166 
1938 209 86583 
1939 419 120914 
1940 571 59031 
1941 866 45719 
1942 1138 9896 
1943 1049 14486 
1944 549 3419 
Appendix IX Factories in Free China, 1937-1944. Figure’s currency unit for new plants’ capitalization is one million 
Chinese dollars (C$). 




Agricultural Production Index, 1937-1945 
Year Rice Wheat Sweet potatoes Cotton Livestock 
1937 100 100 100 100 100 
1938 103 120 128 97 92 
1939 105 117 115 121 98 
1940 85 119 119 104 92 
1941 89 98 128 93 87 
1942 88 124 113 79 - 
1943 84 118 135 98 - 
1944 93 147 141 88 - 
1945 81 130 144 147 -  
Appendix X Agricultural production index, 1937-1945. Unit: 1937=100.  




Foreign Exchange Rates, 1937-1945 
Year Official exchange rates Market exchange rates 
1937 3.42 3.42 
1938 6.4 6.4 
1939 18.21 18.21 
1940 17.76 17.76 
1941 18.8 18.93 
1942 20 18.8 
1943 20 84 
1944 20 570 
1945 20 1705 
Appendix XI Foreign exchange rates (US dollars), 1937-1945. Unit: One Chinese dollar (C$) per US dollar (US$). 
Sources: Source: K. Chang (1958, p. 382).  
Notes: Data for all years are taken from December of that year. Since only official exchange rate data was available 
in 1937, in order to show statistical trends in the chart, we used the official exchange rate data of that year to place it 
in the statistical item of market exchange rate. Since the market exchange rate data was only available from 1938 to 
1940, in order to show the trend of the data, we used the market exchange rate data at this stage to place it in the 





Expenditures, Revenues, and Deficits, 1929-1945 
Year Expenditures Revenues Deficits Deficit percentage of expenditure 
1929 434 334 100 23 
1930 585 484 101 17.3 
1931 775 558 217 28 
1932 749 619 130 17.4 
1933 699 614 86 12.3 
1934 836 689 147 17.6 
1935 941 745 196 20.8 
1936 1073 817 256 23.8 
1937 1177 870 297 25.4 
1938 1169 297 872 74.59 
1939 2797 715 2082 74.55 
1940 5288 1317 3970 75.08 
1941 10003 914 9090 90.87 
1942 24511 4592 19919 81.26 
1943 58816 15882 42934 73 
1944 171690 35609 136081 79.26 
1945 1215089 159961 1065028 87.65 
Appendix XII Expenditures, revenues, and deficits, 1929-1945. Unit of the currency in the figure is one million 
Chinese dollars (C$). 
Sources: Data from 1929 to 1937, see A. Young (1971, p. 38). Data from 1938 to 1945, see A. Young (1965, p. 12). 




Wholesale Prices of Groups of Commodities in Chongqing, 1937-1945 







1937 1.15 1.04 1.22 1.66 1.18 1.49 0.84 
1938 1.6 0.95 1.92 5.34 1.94 2.96 1.09 
1939 3.16 1.83 3.87 13.6 3.73 5.7 2.19 
1940 11.3 9.48 12.5 22.4 11.9 22.6 5.23 
1941 27.6 25.5 28.3 66.9 28 43.3 9.72 
1942 80.1 48.3 131 263 99.7 188 26.6 
1943 228 187 324 526 228 432 64.5 
1944 648 477 903 1283 695 1669 212 
1945 2403 1604 2759 4994 2933 5157 942 
Appendix XIII Wholesale prices of groups of commodities in Chongqing, 1937-1945. 




Domestic, Import, and Export Wholesale Prices in Chengdu, 1937-1945 
Year Domestic goods Import goods Export goods General index 
1937 1.01 1.43 0.67 1 
1938 1.29 1.98 1.22 1.45 
1939 3.03 2.89 2.29 3.33 
1940 10.22 7.52 5.39 10.33 
1941 26.76 22.22 13.37 28.48 
1942 64.83 85.78 35.5 67.1 
1943 220 882 89 234 
1944 708 3078 355 791 
1945 2169 8372 1522 2523 
Appendix XIV Domestic, import, and export wholesale prices in Chengdu, 1937-1945.  
Source: A. Young (1965, p. 354).  
Notes: Due to the huge difference of data, we use logarithm to evaluate and express all the listed statistic items. All 



















































1937 79 95 100 85 88 110 100 100 100 131 130 146 122 
1938 88 108 103 85 96 142 124 111 93 186 181 306 115 
1939 110 141 118 85 120 282 95 122 64 243 231 404 159 
1940 224 202 204 169 213 1180 96 63 29 302 272 659 120 
1941 356 620 850 358 532 2930 78 82 21 376 316 1011 61 
1942 529 1131 1554 591 942 6290 75 75 10 352 325 920 26 
1943 17990 3536 5002 1769 3095 1830 69 58 57 344 245 849 13 
 
Wartime indices of salary and industrial production, 1937-1943. 
Sources: For college teachers’ salary index, middle school teachers’ salary index, primary school teachers’ salary 
index, government officials’ salary index, and the index of the all above four groups (1936-1937=100), see A. Young 
(1965, p. 321). Indices above are for December of each year. For Chongqing factory workers index (1937=100), see 
P. Yang (1963, p. 138). For Sichuan farmers index soldier salary index (1937=100), see D. Wu (1945, pp. 34-35). For 




Military Expenditure and Wartime Price Inflation, 1937-1945 
Year Fiscal expenditure 
Military 






for Free China 
1937 20.91 13.68 15.32 11.95 3,659,000,000 100 
1938 11.69 6.98 8.72 8.53 4,816,000,000 145 
1939 27.97 16.01 22.79 23.1 7,504,000,000 323 
1940 52.88 39.12 38.73 38.34 12,185,000,000 724 
1941 100.03 66.17 88.2 94.43 22,846,000,000 1,980 
1942 245.11 152.16 192.51 200.81 50,791,000,000 6,620 
1943 588.16 429.39 419.44 408.75 100,196,000,000 22,800 
1944 1716.8 1310.8 1387.26 1400.9 275,087,000,000 75,500 
1945 12150.89 10607.37 6853.67 10432.57 1,506,590,000,000 179,000 
Appendix XVI Military expenditure and wartime price inflation, 1937-1945. Figure’s currency unit is one million 
Chinese dollars (C$). 





The Expansion of Private Credit, 1938-1945 
Year 
Increase of 





private credit of 
government 
banks) of previous 
year 
Increase of private 
credit of commercial 















1938 225 392 102   32   27 
1939 882 25.3 163 160 47 147 68 
1940 223 131 88 54 97 206 133 
1941 294 1534 927 1,052 254 262 153 
1942 4,511 184 1083 117 220 87 201 
1943 8,344 184 2029 187 993 451 222 
1944 13,531 162 3087 152 1,037 103 244 
1945 121,661 899 7974 258 2,411 233 278 
 
Appendix XVII The expansion of private credit, 1938-1945.  




Market Interest Rate and Price Indices for Free China, 1937-1945 
Year Annual average of market interest percentage rate per month of wartime capital Chongqing Price indices for Free China 
1937 1 189.5 
1938 1.2 247.6 
1939 1.3 415.9 
1940 1.5 969.57 
1941 1.9 2449.44 
1942 2.8 7371 
1943 6 23702.5 
1944 9.3 81642.3 
1945 10.1 308372.4 
Appendix XVIII Market interest rate and price indices of Free China, 1937-1945.  





Government Banks’ Saving Policy, 1937-1945 
Year Government banks’ total savings 
Government banks’ 
percentage ratio of savings to 
total deposits 
Commercial and provincial banks’ 
ratio of total loans to total deposits 
1937 - - 67 
1938 - - 73 
1939 - - 71 
1940 533 8 60 
1941 1,104 10 70 
1942 2,976 15 98 
1943 7,387 14 110 
1944 15,456 16 84 
1945 55,693 11 151 
Appendix XIX Banks’ saving policy, 1937-1945. Figure’s currency unit is one million Chinese dollars (C$). 
Sources: For the data on government banks’ total savings, see K. Chang (1958, p. 256). For the data on government 




The Sales of US Dollar Certificates and Gold Savings Deposits, 1940-1945 







Appendix XX The sales of US dollar certificates and gold savings deposits, 1940-1945. Figure’s currency unit is one 
million Chinese dollars (C$). 




Wholesale Price Indices of Changchun, 1936-1944 
 
Year Currency issues of Manchukuo yuan (in millions) Wholesale price indices of Changchun (1936=100) 
1936 274,691 100 
1937 329,908 125.1 
1938 452,895 149.6 
1939 657,345 181.3 
1940 991,228 225.7 
1941 1,317,036 248.7 
1942 1,728,145 267.9 
1943 3,079,793 298.7 
1944 7,709,251 358.3 
Appendix XXI Currency conditions in Manchuria, 1936-1944. Figure’s currency unit is one million Manchukuo Yuan 
(MCB¥).  





Currency Issues of Federal Reserve Bank Dollars, 1937-1945 
Year Currency issues of Federal Reserve Bank Dollars (FRB$) 
Wholesale price index of north China 
(1939=100) 
1937 20,712,000 - 
1938 161,925,777 - 
1939 458,042,170 100.00 
1940 715,154,446 144.01 
1941 966,457,251 182.10 
1942 1,592,508,991 411.29 
1943 3,828,272,976 1,176.67 
1944 16,225,175,325 - 
1945 142,399,854,507.81 - 
Appendix XXII Currency issues of Federal Reserve Bank Dollars, 1938-1945. Unit of the currency in the figure is one 
Federal Reserve Bank dollar (FRB$).  
Sources: Data on currency issues of Federal Reserve Bank dollars and the wholesale price indices of north China 
from 1938 to 1945, see P. Yang (1963, p. 56) and G. Wu (1958, pp. 45-47).  
Notes: Data on 1933 is the monthly data on March 1933 when the issuance of Federal Reserve Bank Dollars was 
initiated. Data on 1944 is the monthly data on October 1944; data on 1945 is the monthly data on October 1945. Due 




Comparison of Price Indices Among Wartime Free China, Communist-
occupied Area, and Occupied China, 1937-1945 
Year Price index for Free China 
Price index for Communist-
occupied area 
Price index for Occupied China 
(Shanghai) 
1937 100 100 100 
1938 145 143 115 
1939 323 237 308 
1940 724 500 653 
1941 1,980 2,200 160 
1942 6,620 9,900 493 
1943 22,800 119,900 176 
1944 75,500 564,700 2,510 
1945 179,000 1,690,712 86,400 
Appendix XXIII  Comparison of price indices among Free China, Communist-occupied area, and Occupied China, 
1937-1945. 
Sources: For price index for Free China (1937=100), see A. Young (1965, p. 356). For price index for Communist-
occupied area from 1937 to 1944 (1937=100), see Schran (1976, p. 184). For price index for Communist-occupied 
area in 1945, see FEHCGSR (1981/2016, p. 135). For price index for Occupied China (1937=100), see A. Young 
(1965, p. 357). 
Notes: We choose the price indices of the capital of the COA Yan’an to demonstrate the COA’s price inflation 
condition. The price index for Communist-occupied area in 1945 was calculated based on the ratio of the 1944 to 
1945 data from FECCGSR and the 1944 data from Schran. The data of Occupied China is the wholesale prices in 





Monetary Supply and Price Indices, 1945-1948 
  Currency issues Currency deposits Total money supply Price index 
1926 228,962,163 657,646,855 886,609,018 100.0 
1927 262,164,410 700,172,666 962,337,076 104.4 
1928 308,818,375 808,337,121 1,117,155,496 101.7 
1929 350,236,497 957,374,032 1,307,610,529 104.5 
1930 412,968,538 1,389,109,572 1,802,078,110 114.8 
1931 393,367,870 1,213,334,120 1,606,701,990 126.6 
1932 451,590,418 1,255,014,045 1,706,604,463 112.5 
1933 535,190,933 1,579,824,899 2,115,015,832 103.9 
1934 622,522,374 1,820,621,425 2,443,143,648 97.2 
1935 867,984,374 2,324,341,889 3,192,326,263 96.4 
1936 1,633,106,095 2,708,005,032 4,816,000,000 108.6 
1937 1,640,000,000 2,019,000,000 3,659,000,000 189.5 
1938 2,310,000,000 2,506,000,000 4,816,000,000 247.6 
1939 4,290,000,000 3,214,000,000 7,504,000,000 415.9 
1940 7,870,000,000 4,315,000,000 12,185,000,000 969.6 
1941 15,100,000,000 7,746,000,000 22,846,000,000 2,449.4 
1942 34,400,000,000 16,391,000,000 50,791,000,000 7,371.0 
1943 75,400,000,000 24,796,000,000 100,196,000,000 23,702.5 
1944 189,500,000,000 85,587,000,000 275,087,000,000 81,642.3 
1945 1,031,900,000,000 474,690,000,000 1,506,590,000,000 308,372.4 
1946 3,726,100,000,000 5,455,494,000,000 9,181,594,000,000 76,001,058.0 
1947 33,188,500,000,000 27,777,060,000,000 60,965,560,000,000 681,743,336.0 
1948 196,520,300,000,000 202,571,339,000,000 399,091,639,000,000 28,070,706,707.8 
Appendix XXIV Monetary supply and price indices, 1926-1945.  
Sources: Data on currency issues, currency deposits, and total money supply is from K. Chang (1958, p. 376); also 
see G. Wu (1958, pp. 92-96), P. Yang (1963, pp. 61-62), and Hong (2008, pp. 519-520). Data on price indices of 
1930 to July 1948 is from K. Chang (1958, pp. 371-373). Data on price indices in August 1948 is from G. Wu (1958, 
p. 162). Price indices from 1930 to 1936 is from the Shanghai price index. The price index from 1937 to July 1948 is 
the whole Free China index. The price index of August 1948 is the Shanghai price index.  
Notes: The price indices of 1946 to 1948 were obtained from the average of the monthly price indices for these years. 
In order to enable price indices from different sources to be displayed on the same statistical chart, we have processed 






















1937 66 2,103 1,388 3,659 100 
1938 59.2 1,181 699 4,816 131 
1939 52.2 3,063 1,600 7,504 220 
1940 72.1 5,425 3,911 12,185 513 
1941 60.7 10,892 6,616 22,846 1,296 
1942 57.2 26,602 15,216 50,791 3,900 
1943 67.8 63,352 42,944 100,196 12,541 
1944 71.7 182,832 131,080 275,087 43,197 
1945 85 1,266,438 1,075,367 1,506,590 163,160 
1946 59.9 7,574,790 4,537,299 9,181,594 331,887 
1947 54.8 43,393,895 23,779,855 60,965,560 3,607,108 
1948 58.5 655,471,087 383,450,586 399,091,639 148,522,258 
Appendix XXV Military expenditure, 1937-1948. Unit of currency: one million Chinese dollar Fabi. 
Sources: Data on central government expenditure (1937-1945) is from A. Young (1965, p. 16). Data on central 
government expenditure (1945-1948) is from K. Chang (1958, p. 154). Data on military expenditure from 1946 to 
1948 (K. Chang, 1958, pp. 154-155) is based on the estimated defense expenditure composition and central 
government expenditure. Data on military expenditure (1937-1945) is from A. Young (1965 p. 16). Data on total 
money supply (1937-1948) is from K. Chang (1958, p. 376). The total money supply includes currency issues and 
currency deposits. Data on total money supply also see G. Wu (1958, pp. 92-96), P. Yang (1963, pp. 61-62) and 
Hong (2008, pp. 519-520). Data on price indices (1937-1948) is from Chang (1958, p. 371-373). The price index 
from 1937 to July 1948 is the index of Free China. Price index of January to August 1948 is the index of Shanghai. 






















1937 25.5 2,103 536 3,659 100 
1938 28.3 1,181 334 4,816 131 
1939 27 3,063 827 7,504 220 
1940 24.7 5,425 796 12,185 513 
1941 21.3 10,892 2,388 22,846 1,296 
1942 26.1 26,602 6,943 50,791 3,900 
1943 19.6 63,352 12,415 100,196 12,541 
1944 15.3 182,832 28,001 275,087 43,197 
1945 9.6 1,266,438 122,115 1,506,590,000,000 163,160 
1946 28.5 7,574,790 2,158,815 9,181,594,000,000 331,887 
1947 29.7 43,393,895 12,887,987 60,965,560,000,000 3,607,108 
1948 23.7 655,471,087 155,346,648 399,091,639,000,000 148,522,258 
Appendix XXVI Administration expenditure, 1937-1948. Unit of currency: one million Chinese dollar Fabi. 
Sources: Data on central government expenditure (1937-1945) is from A. Young (1965, p. 16). Data on central 
government expenditure (1945-1948) is from K. Chang (1958, p. 154). Data on administration expenditure from 1946 
to 1948 (K. Chang, 1958, pp. 154-155) is based on the estimated defense expenditure composition and central 
government expenditure. Data on administration expenditure (1937-1945) is from A. Young (1965 p. 16). Data on 
total money supply (1937-1948) is from K. Chang (1958, p. 376). The total money supply includes currency issues 
and currency deposits. For data on the total money supply, see also G. Wu (1958, pp. 92-96), P. Yang (1963, pp. 61-
62) and Hong (2008, pp. 519-520). Data on price indices (1937-1948) is from K. Chang (1958, p. 371-373). Price 
index from 1937 to July 1948 is the index of Free China. The price index of January to August 1948 is the index of 







Black Market Interest Rate and Production, 1946-1948 
























1946 3,726,100 2.57 1,627,281 10.7 15.08 331887 681563 1,073,483 
1947 33,188,500 5.27 23,434,073 15.14 18.25 3607108 10063000 16,119,751 
1948 374,762,200 10.82 201,245,341 23.17 26.55 148522258 558900000 156,496,326 
Appendix XXVII Black Market Interest rate and production, 1946-1948. Unit of currency: one million Chinese dollar 
Fabi. 
Sources: Data on note issues is from K. Chang (1958, p. 374); see also G. Wu (1958, pp. 92-96), P. Yang (1963, p. 
61-62) and Hong (2008, pp. 519-52). Data on the velocity of circulation of notes is from K. Chang (1958, p. 270). 
Since there is no annual data, we have selected the data for each December from 1946 to 1948 as the samples. Data 
on bank credit (in CNC$ millions) is from K. Chang (1958, p. 375). Bank credit data in 1946 is from June to July. 
Data on official market interest rate is from K. Chang (1958, p. 375). For data on the price index of 1945 (Free 
China), see K. Chang (1958, p. 371). For data on the price index of 1946 to 1948 of the whole China, see K. Chang 
(1958, pp. 372-373). Data on the price index of 1946 to 1948 is the annual data calculated from the monthly date of 
these years (K. Chang, 1958, pp. 372-373). Data on wholesale price index (Shanghai) is from K. Chang (1958, p. 79). 
The price indices of 1946 to 1948 were obtained from the average of the monthly price indices for these years. Since 
there is no complete monthly data, we have selected the wholesale price index of August 1948 as the sample. For data 
on price index, see also G. Wu (1958, pp. 154-163) and P. Yang (1963, pp. 61-62). For data on private loans, see K. 
Chang (1958, p. 77).  
Notes: Since there is no complete monthly data, we have selected the private loans data of June 1948 as the sample.
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Appendix XXVIII 
Currency Issues of Federal Reserve Bank Dollars in 1945 










Appendix XXVIII Currency issues of Federal Reserve Bank Dollars in 1945. 
Sources: For data on the currency issues of Federal Reserve Bank Dollars in 1945, see G. Wu (1958 p. 48) and P. 
Yang (1963, p. 56).
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Appendix XXIX 
Chinese Official Dollar Exchange Rate in 1947 
















Appendix XXIX Chinese official dollar exchange rate in 1947. Unit: One Chinese dollar Fabi.  
Sources: S. Zhu et al. (1947, p. 6) and K. Chang (1958, pp. 382-383).
590 
Appendix XXX 
The Government Deficit, 1946-1948 




revenue Government deficit 
1945 1031900 2348085 1241389 1106696 
1946 3726100 7574790 2876988 4697802 
1947 33188500 43393895 14064383 29329512 
1948 374762200 955471087 220905475 434565612 
Appendix XXX Government deficit, 1946-1948. Unit: One million Chinese Fabi dollars.  

















(the index of 
January to 
July 1937 is 
1) 
Black market 
price of US dollar 
in Shanghai (unit: 
1 Chinese dollar) 
Black market 
price of US dollar 
in Chongqing 
(unit: 1 Chinese 
dollar) 
Black market price 
of gold in Shanghai 
(Unit: 1 Chinese 
dollar value of 10 
tael) 
Black market price 
of gold in 
Chongqing (Unit: 1 
Chinese dollar value 
of 10 tael) 
Aug-45 557 - 120,800 1,754 - 111,424 
Sep-45 674 346 121,318 968 - 66,728 
Oct-45 806 379 932 1,334 574,700 83,751 
Nov-45 901 993 1,439 1,597 833,880 89,871 
Dec-45 1,032 885 1,213 1,354 731,374 84,721 
Jan-46 1,150 983 1,459 1,449 856,844 86,938 
Feb-46 1,261 1,860 2,072 1,804 1,413,729 124,487 
Mar-46 1,346 2,712 2,022 2,006 1,598,260 151,308 
Apr-46 1,528 2,735 2,098 2,074 1,555,380 152,436 
May-46 1,796 3,807 2,319 2,441 1,762,500 179,474 
Jun-46 2,113 3,724 2,578 2,625 1,899,792 197,648 
Jul-46 2,158 4,072 2,519 2,344 1,938,600 204,285 
Aug-46 2,376 4,286 2,909 2,781 2,030,768 205,658 
Sep-46 2,701 5,092 3,579 3,316 2,137,500 217,792 
Oct-46 2,984 5,363 4,223 4,068 2,231,923 225,542 
Nov-46 3,296 5,317 4,532 4,500 2,560,400 265,052 
Dec-46 3,726 5,713 5,910 5,787 3,167,600 332,272 
Jan-47 4,510 8,668 6,765 7,243 3,822,170 429,500 
Feb-47 4,838 10,665 12,657 11,161 61,110,000 564,478 
Mar-47 5,744 11,209 14,040 - 6,232,000 480,000 
Apr-47 6,901 14,253 16,250 - 7,488,000 707,270 
May-47 8,381 24,313 27,204 27,313 13,148,000 1,175,556 
Jun-47 9,935 29,931 32,826 35,900 19,182,550 1,795,625 
Jul-47 11,664 31,169 43,640 44,880 23,812,000 2,339,000 
Aug-47 13,697 32,980 42,680 39,900 24,644,000 2,359,400 
Sep-47 16,948 43,253 50,519 45,208 28,553,846 2,582,500 
Oct-47 20,791 59,879 81,058 79,981 44,500,000 4,092,309 
Nov-47 26,879 66,587 109,375 103,450 63,375,000 6,119,375 
Dec-47 33,189 83,796 149,615 154,500 85,000,000 9,258,077 
Jan-48 40,941 127,474 178,917 168,353 104,333,333 9,838,333 
Feb-48 53,929 182,554 213,250 191,929 141,250,000 13,705,536 
Mar-48 69,692 295,060 441,154 381,733 256,346,154 24,509,536 
Apr-48 97,799 342,042 661,154 696,923 368,038,462 35,930,772 
May-48 137,419 491,644 1,166,923 1,120,000 589,807,692 60,550,000 
Jun-48 196,520 884,800 2,252,917 1,453,333 1,119,600,000 112,832,000 
Jul-48 374,762 2,606,000 6,430,769 - 3,119,230,769 309,291,665 
Aug-48 663,694 4,927,000 11,088,000 - 5,396,000,000 437,695,652 
Appendix XXXI Currency issuance of Fabi, Prices of US dollar and gold in Fabi, 1945-1948, 1945-1948. 
Sources: G. Wu (1958, pp. 145-146, pp. 149-150), Hong (2008, p. 503), and P. Yang (1963, p. 75, p. 79, p. 83).
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Appendix XXXII 












Ratio of the price 
indices of semi-finished 
products to raw 
materials 
Ratio of price 
indices of finished 
products to raw 
materials 
Jun-37 1.05 0.99 1.02 0.94 0.97 
Dec-37 0.83 1.23 1.34 1.47 1.61 
Dec-38 1.09 1.81 3.34 1.66 3.06 
Dec-39 2 3.84 8.21 1.92 4.1 
Dec-40 8.77 10.37 17.61 1.18 2.02 
Dec-41 18.8 25.9 53.23 1.38 2.83 
Dec-42 52.62 92.07 226.26 1.75 4.3 
Dec-43 182.46 223.09 641.33 1.22 3.52 
Dec-44 554.1 771.55 2.199 1.39 3.97 
Jul-45 1639.5 2535 7810.7 1.55 4.76 
Dec-45 1221.34 2605.5 4773.67 2.13 3.91 
Dec-46 2829 4760.67 8845.8 1.68 3.13 
Dec-47 43832 83445 128228.5 1.9 2.93 
Dec-48 12.44 22.35 26.35 1.8 2.12 
Apr-49 22437.32 35578.46 63420 1.57 2.83 
 
Appendix XXXII Agricultural price indices, 1937-1949. 
Sources: P. Yang (1963, p. 141) and D. Wu (1945, pp. 34-35).  
Notes: The currency standard of 1948 was changed from Fabi to the New Gold Yuan Notes in the figure. 
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Appendix XXXIII 
Shanghai Price in 1947 
Year Price indices of Shanghai (1936=1) 
Wholesale price indices 
(Jan-Jun 1937=1) 
Price of living costs indices 
(1936=1) 
1947/8/1 48924 32980 31000 
1947/9/1 60519 43253 34400 
Rate of increase 23% 31% 11% 
 
Appendix XXXIII Shanghai price in 1947. 
Sources: P. Yang (1963, p.139) and Kuang (1948).
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Appendix XXXIV 
Kingming Price Indices, 1947-1948 (Jan-July 1937=1) 






of fuel  
 Price indices 
of metal 




Price index of 
others 
Feb-47 8558.9 8827.2 11008.5 6009.7 4167.8 7501.5 4371.8 
Mar-47 9232.5 9231.4 11966.7 6648 11217.1 9645.6 6300 
Apr-47 10017.3 9998.6 14349.7 6611.8 13826.5 10271.9 6229.7 
May-47 15021.4 15696.1 21385 6947.3 17809.6 13073.9 8451.6 
Jun-47 16963.2 17321.6 27123.1 8216.8 17963.8 15596.7 9289 
Jul-47 — — — — — — — 
Aug-47 — — — — — — — 
Sep-47 29847.1 28364 59820 19478.2 69186.7 35808.3 23102.1 
Oct-47 45542 42885 90706 34375.4 83126 55403 33846 
Nov-47 — — — — — — — 
Dec-47 7593.03 68773.3 132766.7 109097.4 110075 102493 57594 
Jan-48 113795 104467 189239 206519 195965 121422 70633 
Feb-48 160174 155318 219050 238028 239339 125877 83902 
Mar-48 246692 235267 374982 405573 356542 186900 164029 
Apr-48 272456 248594 454067 543150 547562 257200 224989 
May-48 476012 452250 763217 715350 674515 374809 322880 
Jun-48 879520 835180 1375320 1547040 797150 673034 685115 
Jul-48 2495000 2381000 3438000 4546000 2536000 2057000 1761000 
Aug-48 3465000 3174000 5643000 8139000 4764000 2997000 2826000 
Appendix XXXIV Kingming price indices, 1947-1948. 
Sources: G. Wu (1958, pp.186-188) and Central Bank Economic Research Division (1949). 
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